I have just read some posts of the last days and have realized how this debate has completely lost the most feeble connection with reality.
Let me search to point out some "fixed points" about the CONPS and the defensive/offensive weapon suit available to Arley Burke class :
1) Arleigh Burke
is a very highly specialized anti-air defense destroyer mostly conceived to defend aircraft carriers and ballistic/cruise submarine
in theirs operation's air space and to provide a secondary long range ground attack
capability to those main elements.
2) Arleigh Burke therefore has been equipped ,initially, only with truly "symbolic" antiship and CIWS weapon suit (Flight I)
that completely disappeared
-only to point out how specialized is the CONPOS of this class of ship - in Flight II and Flight III representing the very bulk of the class
3) The Arley Burke with "96 VLS"
- Flight II and Flight III - lack today not only any kind of antiship capability
(how i have pointed previopusly out the entire US Navy doctrine depend entirely on carrieir's Air Wing for similar missions) and at-sea capability to resupply but also any type of specialized CIWS
and here we do not talk of something so advanced as a combined missile-artillery system such as "Каштан-М" or "Палаш", but as simple like a "Phalanx" CIWS.....
At today even a sub-1000 tons dispalcement «Буян-М» has incomparably higher antiship capabilities than AB destroyers. I know this can appear odd but , as explained before, that is the direct effect of the strict AD commitments formulated in the initial design layout of that class of ships.
4) Talking of future -post 2020 - has been pointed out as US Navy analysts have realized that carrier's survivability was not more in stake only against nuclear power enemies
(against which anyhow aircraft carrier's military relevance was practically not-existent since at least '60 years) but also against emerging powers
, that could effectively prevent ,in a totally conventional way, the employment of the pressure element represented by CVBG presence in theirs theatre ,central for the US foreign policy's vision and influence around the globe, through a progressively faster proliferation of advanced anti-ship missiles
surpassing ,even in theirs export versions, of several times the parameters of domestic US Navy ones ; this situation generated the urgency of a plan to quickly provide some kind of long range anti-surface ship capabilities to theirs surface combatants.
Lacking the very complex technical knowledge pool necessary to create a true anti-ship missile at the level of those available today to competitors, the stop-gap solution came in the form of two possible adaptation of existing missiles
designed and optimized for totally different CONOPS : AGM-158
Someone here has come to the point to make a comparison of 96 (from the total 96 tubes avilables
) of those adapted AGM-158 or BGM-109 in the post 2020 available to AB destroyers with the antiship complement of a пр. 22350.Leaving even a part the enormous difference in mere technical parameters ,range included, between domestic П-800 or 3M-54 and the up-mentioned adapted missiles
- for the less "aware" here i recall that from an analysis of the metrics of foreign and domestic samples by part of a leading domestic Institute was comupted that closing speed and terminal G-pull limitis of a sea skimming missile accounted for the variation of probability of interception by part of various classes of ship-borne AD systems from six to eight times of the aggregate of all other features present on those AShM combined - i want to remember that none in its sane mind would ever mount in the future 96 LRASM on AB destroyers for the simple reason that in this way a simple Проект 636 or even a pair of the up mentioned «Буян-М» could single-handedly eliminate with a probability next to 100% an entire naval group composed by those destroyers with minimal to absent risk exposure for themselves. Those 96 VL tubes represent the entire offensive/defensive potential available to today Arleigh Burke destroyers
,including medium and close range anti-air self-defence
taking into account that AB lack
,as explained, CIWS even at level of smallest frigates
; therefore the VLS missile composition will forcibly be in the traditional 1/3 -2/3 between anti-ship or land attack missiles and air defense ones of various kind.