US Naval Weapon Systems

By far the greatest challenge that the Russian navy will face is in the EW domain because the following US EW systems do NOT have any shortcomings that can be exploited .

AN/WLR-1H(V)
AN/SLQ-32
AN/SSX-1
AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System

Why are you so convinced they have zero shortcomings?


No system is perfect.
Russian ships have always traditionally been heavy on the EW as well.

Sujoy wrote:By far the greatest challenge that the Russian navy will face is in the EW domain because the following US EW systems do NOT have any shortcomings that can be exploited .

AN/WLR-1H(V)
AN/SLQ-32
AN/SSX-1
AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System

If any, EW department is by far the most strickened area of US Navy's surface ships defensive structure ; the strong point of this structure is absolutely not in the EW capabilities, neither in the quality of the interceptors, but almsot exclusively in the very high quality of the integrated fleet level detection and tracking architecture (AEGIS) allowing a very efficient threat's detection, discrimination and assignation to each defensive system present on the networked ships ,obtaining so an holistic increase of perfomances.


AN/WLR-1H(V) is ridiculously outdated ,AN/SSX-1 is a stand alone system of AN/SLQ-32 Block 1B's spiral enhancement program (SEWIP program) adding Specific Emitter Identification -SEI- to the system ; image that Soviet planners don't even wasted a minute trying to compute theirs impact on possibility to hit of theirs most advanced ASCM against CBG ,so crushing was the advantages enjoyed by the data-sharing, swarm attacking salvos of P-500, P-700 or P-1000 on this defensive layer, you can figure by yourself what is the situation with today domestic "Kalibr" or "Oniks".


AN-SLQ-49 has been almost completely replaced by Nulka and both of them are ,obviously, almost completely useless against any high supersonic ASCM with in-built processor target discrimination algorithms, for not say swarm-attacking missiles exchanging target's data resultant from radar irradiation from very different angle of incidence


Also US Navy is perfectly aware that cannot count on those weak EW defensive solutions against any except the less sophisticated enemies and instead invest enormous resources to mantain high the level of its ship based integrated survellaince and tracking systems and of the related interceptors elements.

Mindstorm wrote:
Also US Navy is perfectly aware that cannot count on those weak EW defensive solutions against any except the less sophisticated enemies and instead invest enormous resources to mantain high the level of its ship based integrated survellaince and tracking systems and of the related interceptors elements.

All valid points . However, fact remains that only a saturation strike by employing ‘swarm’ tactics will possibly be able to overwhelm these air-defences . For example the Soviet naval doctrine envisaged that at least 24 supersonic ASCMs need to be fired to overwhelm these US EW systems.

As on this date Russia can and to a lesser extent China can overwhelm these EW systems. That said, this is a very cost prohibitive tactic. A better approach is to find out the technical shortcomings of these systems and exploit them . As on this date NO such technical countermeasures to these EW systems exist .

Soviet naval doctrine envisaged that at least 24 supersonic ASCMs need to be fired to overwhelm these US EW systems.

I don't know where you get this information ,but it is totally false (i have even read comical figures of 100-120 missiles on some media ).

The entire salvo of a single Pr. 1144 (20 3M45, for three missiles groups) ,by end of '80 years, was computed capable to destoy all by itself an entire CBG with a probability superior to 85% ,with one probable surviving dameged ship among the escort piquet.

EW systems on those ships was ,at the times and are even more today, almost totally powerless against those kind of highly sophisticated menaces .
Already the previous infinetely less sophisticated P-120 Malakhit had a dual mode terminal seeker (active radar and passive IR) capable of crossing data reference , and P-500 ,P-700 and P-1000 all had not only a dual mode active/passive terminal guidance, heavily armoured components, inbuilt ECM systems, satellites -Legenda- target position reference but was also capable of "swarm" data sharing and correlation to obtain a multisensor and multi incidence picture of target position rendering so (in the same way of several of theris coeval elements of ground based IADS ) totally worthless any kind of decoys and deceptive jamming.

The last element of the high lethality and ECCM reliability of those missiles was represented by the sheer high supersonic speed ; in facts this factor don't only was capable to render, without taking into account the features previously mentioned, theirs intecepton several dozen of times more difficult in respect to a subsonic missile , but render also false ship's positions for the effect of terminal countermeasures employment incompatible with any target vector data previously collected.


This is a video ,with english subtitles, with some informations on those missiles, give to it a look (for you could be interesting the notion that two-three BrahMos are sufficient to sink a modern aircraft carrier ,practically would be sufficient the BrahMos payload of a single Super Su-30MKI penetrating CBG's defence to add ,two-three hours after, a new coral barrier the size of a Nimitz class to the bottom of sea )



https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-cm-f2JpiI

Mindstorm wrote:

Soviet naval doctrine envisaged that at least 24 supersonic ASCMs need to be fired to overwhelm these US EW systems.

I don't know where you get this information ,but it is totally false (i have even read comical figures of 100-120 missiles on some media ).

I am referring to a US fleet not a single destroyer or frigate .

Your remaining points are valid , but then as I said this a cost prohibitive exercise . Why ? Because apart part from the EW systems the destroyers , frigates , aircraft carriers will also use their anti cruise missile systems like Sea Sparrow, Phalanx and Sea Ram. Therefore , it makes far more sense to take out the EW systems technically . But then as I have already said "technical countermeasures" against these EW systems do NOT exist.

One possible way could be to use something like "Suter" which uses a data stream filled with algorithms to invade an EW system through its antennas.

Thanks for the video.

TR1 wrote:Why are you so convinced they have zero shortcomings?

I am not convinced and am always delighted to Learn. I do not say there are no shortcomings . There are NO technical shortcomings . You see the difference ? Now if you point out to docile problems of EMI shielding , elimination of dissimilar metals , communication bandwith etc that's a different thing . But overall NO technical shortcomings that can be taken advantage of .

TR1 wrote:No system is perfect.

As I said these systems can be overwhelmed by a barrage of missiles , which is a costly affair.

TR1 wrote:Russian ships have always traditionally been heavy on the EW as well.

But do NOT have TECHNICAL countermeasures against the EW systems I have listed . And the converse is also true that the US does NOT have TECHNICAL countermeasures against the EW systems on board Russian ships.

Sujoy wrote:By far the greatest challenge that the Russian navy will face is in the EW domain because the following US EW systems do NOT have any shortcomings that can be exploited .

AN/WLR-1H(V)
AN/SLQ-32
AN/SSX-1
AN/SLQ-49 Chaff Buoy Decoy System

Yes, these EW systems do NOT have any technology related shortcomings. Only way to destroy them is to overwhelm the system by dozens of stand off missiles.

Mindstorm wrote:
Also US Navy is perfectly aware that cannot count on those weak EW defensive solutions against any except the less sophisticated enemies and instead invest enormous resources to mantain high the level of its ship based integrated survellaince and tracking systems and of the related interceptors elements.

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile . The EW systems that are on board US ships are more than capable of taking out hostile missiles. The only option is a saturation strike , but that can be said about any aspect of warfare. Even a saturation strikes with ICBMS can make ABMs look obsolete.

I am referring to a US fleet not a single destroyer or frigate .

Single destroyer or frigate ?

I talk of an entire Carrier Battle Group -CVBG - not of a single ship .
Something say to me that you lack a clear picture of what chances have CVBG's defenses against advanced anti ship supersonic missiles.

Maybe some words from the someone of the US Navy's insiders involved will disperse a bit of mist:


http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5LkaU0wj714

But then as I have already said "technical countermeasures" against these EW systems do NOT exist.

Sorry Sujoy, but i are uncapable to understand what you mean here.

None of the EW systems you mentioned employ any revolutionary measure or solution, rather some are even badly outdated
Those systems are in no way different or better than those mounted on surface ships of the most advanced nations worldwide; literally even the most conventional of ASCM at world (leaving out high supersonic monsters capable of "swarm cooperative attacks" such as P-500,P-700 and p-1000) is designed to resist to similar "classic" kind of countermeasures : decoys, jamming and chaff/flares.

I truly don't understand, Sujoy.

Someone could rightly ask what are the measures implemented in an attacking system to overcome defensive systems employing new solutions: at example someone could question what measures should be involved in next generations torpedos - in the past designed only to resist to "soft-kill" defensive systems - to avoid interception by part of an innovative Paket-E/NK hard-kill anti-torpedo systems because it introduce a completely new level of defensive solutions to overcome in order to achieve its intended goal; AN/SLQ-32 or AN/SLQ-49 to the contrary don't represent anything worth of special attention.

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile .

Oh yes ,SPS-171/L005S/Sorbtsiya-S in suffiecient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile. Radar based AAM are doomed


Chances to jam sea skimming missiles (enjoying therefore a very low sidelobe's susceptibility), capable to create a swarm-like integrated picture of the targets composed by the multi-incidence active/passive radar data coming from each missile of the salvo (a capability unique still today among missiles in any category and in any nation worldwide) and with high supersonic speed[/b], therefore offering [b]enormously reduced times not only to overcome ECCM screening of the active half part of the seeker but also to eventually put a similar missile in a vector (compatible with the atacking missile's inertial guidance data) outside ship's projection ....all of that starting from AN SLQ 32's line of sight horizont !!) are ,for those reasons, technically very, very slim.


We are attempting to conduct a serious ,informed debate on the subject and you are more than agreeably invited to expose your position on the subject, it can be a resource for all of us.

Naturally this statement :

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile.

or this one

SPS-171/L005S/Sorbtsiya-S in suffiecient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile.

would never represent serious assertions on the related subjects

Is that video actually accurate?

For example, the fake signal creation by the Granit? How does it even detected an incoming missile? Is the false signal accurate?

Maybe I have been a slacker on my reading, but I have never even hear of this before.

AN SLQ 32 in sufficient numbers ( which we have ) can jam any incoming hostile missile .

Funny you say that because of the large Kh-22M missiles to be carried by the Tu-22M3 in naval combat they pretty much had three main types... active radar homing, passive radar homing, and tactical nuclear with inertial guidance to a coordinate.

The thing is that after any initial attack a carrier group will be using radar to detect threats at max range so it can deal with them so the standard strategy was to launch active radar homing missiles to find the elusive carrier group... of course these missiles also have a home on jam capability so using the SLQ 32 would allow the active radar homing missiles to switch from active radar to passive HOJ guidance. Of course active jammers emit a lot of noise so most Soviet platforms nearby will now know exactly where the emitter or emitters are so an enormous range of weapons will start closing in on the emitter/s.

Unless that vessel or group of vessels want to be totally blind however they will need to turn on a radar or two, to get information to plan their defence... plenty of older Russian antiship missiles were fitted with backup IR guidance systems.

The point is that after the first wave of missiles have hit there is no advantage to emcon and the second wave will likely include ARM equipped missiles too.

For example, the fake signal creation by the Granit? How does it even detected an incoming missile? Is the false signal accurate?

Maybe I have been a slacker on my reading, but I have never even hear of this before.

Granit is three times the weight of Onyx, and was a very capable missile. Think how far computer technology has moved on... today a palm top computer can perform better than a 1970s mainframe.

An incoming missile with active radar homing can be detected from the radar signal coming from its nose. A SARH missile can be "detected" by the change from "scanning" to target marking mode.

The ancient Styx in Soviet service had a back up IR guidance system and it would not be impossible for Granit to have something similar to detect the IR plume of an incoming missile.

Mindstorm wrote:
Single destroyer or frigate ?

I talk of an entire Carrier Battle Group -CVBG - not of a single ship .

That's what I am talking about as well . Let's be more precise and say the 7th Fleet ( which was sent against India during the 1971 conflict) . Understood

Mindstorm wrote:Maybe some words from the someone of the US Navy's insiders involved will disperse a bit of mist:

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5LkaU0wj714

Mindstorm , please note that we need to take those observations with more than just a pinch of salt. Most of the time they may these assertions to get bigger defense grants from the Govt. Lobbying groups are working with them . This is not Russia where if you make un warranted comments you loose your job.

Mindstorm wrote:Sorry Sujoy, but i are uncapable to understand what you mean here.

I begin with the premise that swarming a fleet of sea vessels with super sonic cruise missiles is an option which on today's date Russia has and to a lesser degree China has . Now let's take a adversary who is weaker like say Iran , North Korea , Venezuela or even India . Can these countries overpower the EW systems of US fleet ??? Certainly NOT . As they simply do NOT have as many super sonic cruise missiles . I am assuming they will need at least 3 cruise missiles to take out one ship in the fleet . Now there are 50 - 60 ships in the US 7th Fleet . So at least 180 - 200 cruise missiles will be required . In the recently concluded Zuhai Air Show in China Chinese simulations showed a swarm of WZ-600 'Blue Shark' UCAVs armed with stand off missiles attacking en masse the INS Groshkov (Vikramaditya) . You get the picture ? Swarm of UCAVs for just 1 air craft carrier.

Mindstorm wrote:None of the EW systems you mentioned employ any revolutionary measure or solution, rather some are even badly outdated

Would appreciate if you can explain this . My point is , if we take quantity out of the equation ( in this case a swarm of cruise missiles ) then how do you de grade the adversary's E system ?? I could't find any except for a few inconsequential ones like improved EMI shielding , elimination of dissimilar metals and improving communication bandwith . The US Navy's new program called Integrated Topside is designed to drastically improve the AN/SLQ-32 but will remain ineffective against a swarm of cruise missiles.

So how does countries like the ones I have mentioned above who do NOT have a whole lot of cruise missiles in their arsenal deal with such EW threats .

Remember MAKS 1997 ? Remember Moscow-based AviaKonversia Co? Remember their exhibition of a GPS jammer that cause GPS receivers to malfunction and to display the last coordinates calculated prior to jamming. This Russian invention caused quite a stir all over the world and terrified military users . OK so this is the type of technology I am talking about . Makes sense ?

I am talking about these type of technologies to deal with EW systems like AN/SLQ 32 . Unfortunately , I do NOT think such systems exist . One plausibility as I had stated earlier is to use a program like "SUTER" to disturb the AN/SLQ-32

Mindstorm , please note that we need to take those observations with more than just a pinch of salt. Most of the time they may these assertions to get bigger defense grants from the Govt. Lobbying groups are working with them . This is not Russia where if you make un warranted comments you loose your job.

If possibel this is the exact opposite of what happen in reality.

American military Psy Warfare's principles have, historically, always stressed on self-boosting and over-selling of its military capabilities while ,contextually, "bashing" at maximum and tarnish while possible anything related to any not allied advanced nation (also with the aid of Us funded NGO and media operating in the nation ).


Those so called "support/counter-will" operations have a duplice function :


1) Spread an -enormously inflated- image of strenght among internal and allied public opinion basis so to mantain high support ,cohesion and confidence in the ultimate success of any military operation and in the decisions taken at the higher echelon levels.
Naturally in order to be credible this type of operation must be continous in the time , coordinated and ,above all, must have empirical elements on which stand ; from that come from the habit to engage in war only immensely inferior nations uncapable to inflict any serious material or human loss (and even then ,very often ,only after having insulated them ,attacked in big Coalition with allied nations and after long periods of embargo !! ) employ tactics and means operatively and economically inefficients but capable to reduce at minimum material adn live losses (at example using for months exclusively Air Forces against those inferior enemies,naturally at stellar costs ,when a joint ground operation would have resulted in the victory in few days and at a very little fraction o the costs) and "sell" those easy victories as great military achievements, where US military machine has demonstrated its great strenght

2) Persuade "enemies" people that it live in a crumbling nation/system ,that is military structure is failed and uncapable to achieve victory and that attempt to beat the "american" structure are doomed to fail (in that this process reproduce perfectly the comical representation of facts and reality present in theirs media and movies.)

Those principles of Psy/Info War are very simple and could appear even childish to an attentive analysis ,but theris secret ingredient is that them operate on very elementary psycological levels which slip under the most complex adn evolute process of critical thinking .


Returning to the subject in question is important to highlight that technical shortcoming are at the basis of those enormous difficulties by part of US Navy to design efficient defnses against complex high supersonic ASCM , them lack even only the theoretical and engineering basis to design infinitely less performant and complex target drones .
this document can provide to you a picture of the situation:

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA441466.pdf

Zuhai Air Show in China Chinese simulations showed a swarm of WZ-600 'Blue Shark' UCAVs armed with stand off missiles attacking en masse the INS Groshkov (Vikramaditya) . You get the picture ? Swarm of UCAVs for just 1 air craft carrier

If you employ stand-off ammunitions (capable to be delivered outside the effective range of interception of carriers' aicraft screening group) you don't need UCAV -the unique advantage of which is to avoid to put pilot's lives in danger) you need ,instead, the faster delivering platform you have at disposition, capable not only to reduce the useful interception range of the defending screening air squadrons but ,synergically, increase also drammatically the enagement range of the ASCMs delivered.

Sujoy have you a link for this video ?
I am very curious to observe what is the strange CONOPS at the basis of a similar odd system's selection for that task.

EMI shielding , elimination of dissimilar metals and improving communication bandwith

What about multi-composite target picture resulting from cooperative exchange of target's poositional and data validation coming from both active (with two different different bands of emissions), inertial (with authomatic exclusion of "incoherent" target positions in respect to : missile's position/speed ,target maximum speed and target maximum degree of bank) space based (Legenda constellation at the time) and passive sensors present on each missile of the "salvo-swarm", shifting from one to the other in a totally random way and illuminating (when active elements operate) any target and decoy from very different angles of incidence....all of that while the in-built 3Б47 "Кварц" create false missile radar returns for enemy's interceptors and radar sensors ?


I repeat the design of P-700 was ,under a strict technical point of view, a true alien for the time; was IT at represent the technological novelty that need to be countered (and you have seen now what was the situation in reproducing much simpler ASCM menaces in USA at....end of 2005 !!), to the contrary AN/SLQ 32 represent the most typical ship-based EW defensive system not offering any type of particular solution.

Mindstorm wrote:
Sujoy have you a link for this video ?
I am very curious to observe what is the strange CONOPS at the basis of a similar odd system's selection for that task.

Right now only a link ( not a video link ) . If I get the video link I will post it here.

http://www.defensenews.com/article/20121119/DEFREG03/311190001/China-Challenges-West-Arms-Trade

a video was shown of the futuristic Blue Shark UCAV diving for an attack on the Indian Navy aircraft carrier Vikramaditya.

Mindstorm wrote:What about multi-composite target picture resulting from cooperative exchange of target's poositional and data validation coming from both active (with two different different bands of emissions), inertial (with authomatic exclusion of "incoherent" target positions in respect to : missile's position/speed ,target maximum speed and target maximum degree of bank) space based (Legenda constellation at the time) and passive sensors present on each missile of the "salvo-swarm", shifting from one to the other in a totally random way and illuminating (when active elements operate) any target and decoy from very different angles of incidence....all of that while the in-built 3Б47 "Кварц" create false missile radar returns for enemy's interceptors and radar sensors ?

The AN/SLQ-32 ( V5) now uses a jammer called "Sidekick" . The Sidekick system achieves EW objectives by providing full threat band frequency coverage, instant azimuth coverage, high probability of intercept and simultaneous response to multiple threats. Therefore,it can detect aircraft search and target radars well before they detect the ship. Unfocused noise from output traveling wave tubes is coupled into the AN/SLQ-32A(V) receivers affecting both Electronic Attack and Electronic Support functions.When the AN/SLQ-32(V) is performing electronic attack (EA), some of the radiated energy is reflected from the superstructure and detected by the Electronic Support (ES) receivers. The AN/SLQ-32(V) employs a process called Dynamic Threshold Leveling that prevents radiated energy from being perceived as a new emitter.

R17 software changes AN/SLQ-32A(V) operation in the system operation, and threat engagement areas. Among these changes are Deceptive EA and Decoy Integration algorithms that allow for system control of decoy launches and coordinated engagements.

Therefore, Mindstorm as I have said the problem will not be for Russia as it has a huge arsenal of sea skimming cruise missiles but other "weaker" nations . The chances of US/NATO going to war against Russia in the near future is Very slim . However, there is a genuine possibility that Iran , Venezuela and maybe even India can be attacked by NATO/US or China .

The AN/SLQ-32 ( V5) now uses a jammer called "Sidekick" . The Sidekick system achieves EW objectives by providing full threat band frequency coverage, instant azimuth coverage, high probability of intercept and simultaneous response to multiple threats.

Sujoy AN(SLQ-32(V5) is NOT the most advanced EW system mounted on US Navy's ships , it was simply a rushed improvement on the AN(SLQ-32(V2) intended for medium class surface combatants the jammer of which (Sidekick) has an average jamming energy output and frequecy agility equal to almost HALF of that present on AN(SLQ-32(V3)
Is AN-SLQ(V3) -after failure in 2002 of the AIEWS "Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System" program- at represent the benchmark for EW systems in US Navy's blue water surface ships.

Among these changes are Deceptive EA and Decoy Integration algorithms that allow for system control of decoy launches and coordinated engagements.

And...?
Any relatively modern EW system of any advanced nation worldwide has integrated decoy laucher control , it is a standard amaong any system in the category


http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Radar-and-Electronic-Warfare-Systems/MP-407-naval-Electronic-CounterMeasures-ECM-system-Russian-Federation.html


Do you know American PR has been successful in all those years in inject in public imaginary this strange ,subliminal message, leaving the feel that USA enjoy some sort of "magic" lead in anything even by far linked to the "not-kinetic" warfare

Them have literally sold ,in particular through controled media, the lead them enjoy in a particular ,limited, sector of data processing microcircuits and in production of some type of RF transistors ,as a sort all-encopassing lead in anything related to all not-kinetic systems

Reality is not only very far from that ,but often the exact opposite .
The greater difference are in the historical principles of "information warfare" of its main opposing Nations, stressing on the exact opposite : downplay itself when possible leaving under total silence any critical military.related technological lead enjoyed on the enemy.

Some of the institutions operating perfectly within US Psy-warfare principles(such as Jamestown Foundation ,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and dozen of NED funded organization), for Russian standards in Information Warfare, wouldn't appear simply comical ,but would be considered ,for theirs "self boosting" aptitude and the usual habit to highlight and "oversell" any domestic military-related achievement or advantage enjoyed over competitors, even a true menace to National Security !!

Mindstorm wrote:Sujoy AN(SLQ-32(V5) is NOT the most advanced EW system mounted on US Navy's ships , it was simply a rushed improvement on the AN(SLQ-32(V2) intended for medium class surface combatants the jammer of which (Sidekick) has an average jamming energy output and frequecy agility equal to almost HALF of that present on AN(SLQ-32(V3)
Is AN-SLQ(V3) -after failure in 2002 of the AIEWS "Advanced Integrated Electronic Warfare System" program- at represent the benchmark for EW systems in US Navy's blue water surface ships.

Mindstorm , I am under no illusion that the AN/SLQ 32(V5) is a perfect system . There are several shortcomings :

(1) limited number of threats that can be engaged with onboard active EA.
(2) limited elevation coverage
(3) limited polarization diversity
(4) high sidelobe levels
(5) high RCS
(6) transmitter-to-receiver isolation issues

Now for a moment just for the sake of this argument imagine that you are not Russian but a Serbian or Iranian or North Korean or Indian or Vietnamese , in short the so called "third world" countries that NATO / China loves to bully . What do you do then to take out an EW system like the AN/SLQ 32(V5) without resorting to overwhelming the EW system with cruise missiles(since you can't afford it) ? For every 6 or 7 cruise missiles that you fire at a NATO/China Warship at least 2 or 3 will be intercepted and the remaining 3 or 4 will hit the warship . You will have to ensure your own protection as well because the enemy will also fire a volley of cruise missiles at you .

So you realize now how difficult the situation might be for a Iran , India , Vietnam etc . Right ?

As I said earlier that it is a far better option to exploit the 6 shortcomings that I have listed above. Question is how ?

One possible solution that I can think of is that Modern air defense at sea doctrines need to consider the emerging technology of software-defined radar. In this manner the surveillance and tracking abilities of imaging radar are implemented in software. Concurrently there exists the need to forge the other side of the same coin. The Software-defined Radar Countermeasure System can prove to be a solution for confusing adversary radar operators .The simulator approach for imaging radar countermeasures is preferred because it provides a bespoke generation of the required signals valid for a diverse set of adversary observers, which are considered to be Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar systems

I would say that as a defensive measure against hostile cruise missiles there is a need for a more rigorous integration of optical technologies with microwave technologies that enables the deployment of off board microwave decoy systems . For offensive measures the only possible weapon against EW systems like the AN/SLQ 32(V5)is the use of cyber weapons .

Mindstorm wrote:Do you know American PR has been successful in all those years in inject in public imaginary this strange ,subliminal message, leaving the feel that USA enjoy some sort of "magic" lead in anything even by far linked to the "not-kinetic" warfare

I am happy to announce that for tragic stories with comic ending we Indians do NOT rely on American PR . Our preferred choice is Bollywood and we have had great success in exporting it as well

Old News

US Navy Tests Missile Interceptors in Pacific: Defense Contractor


Two US missile interceptors were tested against cruise missile targets during the US Navy's Combat Ship Qualification Trials in the Pacific, interceptor designer Raytheon Company announced on Friday.

Two US missile interceptors were tested against cruise missile targets during the US Navy's Combat Ship Qualification Trials in the Pacific, interceptor designer Raytheon Company announced on Friday.

"Advanced warning and cueing from another sensor or ship allows the US Navy to take full advantage of SM-6's over-the-horizon capability. The warfighter does not have to wait until the threat is knocking at the door to take it out," Standard Missile-6 senior program director Mike Campisi said in a written statement.

Targets are destroyed sooner and one ship can defend a larger area, Campisi said.

During the test, the first interceptor took out a short-range supersonic rocket while the other halted smaller low-altitude, medium range target drone. Interceptors were fired by Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville.

Raytheon called the missile tests a success.

SM-6 provides protection against fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles. According to Raytheon, the interceptors are equipped with their own individualized radar system aimed to detect the movement of its target.

Raytheon has delivered more than 130 Standard Missile-6 interceptors to the US Navy.

The interceptors final assembly takes place at Redstone Arsenal Army post in Huntsville, Alabama.

1)Can US ships EW system and Nulka decoys or of various hardkill systems  damage russian ashm moskit , yakhont , klub  missile guidance ?



2)We've seen in anti-ship missile defense(ASMD) trials that ESSM RIM-116 , ASTER were succesful in destroying incoming supersonic ashm's . So how exactly russian supersonic ashm will go past american anti-ship defenses ? DuTCH HAD GOALKEEPER in 90's o intercept supersonic ashm .


3) Any idea on it : GQM-163 SSST: A Tricky Coyote to Match Wits With Defenses

The rocket-boosted, ramjet-powered GQM-163A was developed to simulate supersonic cruise missiles like the SS-N-22 external link Sunburn, Kh-31 external link (aka. AS-17 Krypton, which may have an anti-air AWACS-killer version external link), the Indo-Russian PJ-10 external link Brahmos, etc., which are proliferating throughout the world. Their speed and evasive maneuvers compress the amount of time a defense system has to deal with them to under a minute. A training target that can simulate their performance is critical to both proper preparedness and pursuant performance.

Despite this growing need, the Supersonic Sea Skimming Target (SSST) program moved very slowly in the 1990s, with false starts that included a Boeing-Strela Kh-31 Krypton variant before the decision was made to develop a new SSST. Orbital Sciences won the contract in June 2000, but the BQM-163 suffered a number of program delays before its final developmental test flight eventually took place in in April 2005. The program is now moving forward, slowly, and picking up international customers .


The Coyote target missile design integrates a 4-inlet, solid-fuel ducted-rocket ramjet propulsion system into a compact missile airframe 18 feet long and 14 inches in diameter. Rail-launched from Navy test and training ranges, the highly maneuverable Coyote achieves cruise speeds of over Mach 2.5, with a range of approximately 60 nautical miles at altitudes of less than 20 feet above the sea surface



http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/gqm163-ssst-a-tricky-coyote-to-match-wits-with-defenses-03155/

2)We've seen in anti-ship missile defense(ASMD) trials that ESSM RIM-116 , ASTER were succesful in destroying incoming supersonic ashm's . So how exactly russian supersonic ashm will go past american anti-ship defenses ? DuTCH HAD GOALKEEPER in 90's o intercept supersonic ashm .

Hahaha... yeah, and in the early 1980s the British fleet sailed to the south atlantic safe and secure in the knowledge that the Seawolf missile could shoot down any threat to British shipping including 114mm artillery shells.

Didn't really work that way though in practise....

The Coyote target missile design integrates a 4-inlet, solid-fuel ducted-rocket ramjet propulsion system into a compact missile airframe 18 feet long and 14 inches in diameter. Rail-launched from Navy test and training ranges, the highly maneuverable Coyote achieves cruise speeds of over Mach 2.5, with a range of approximately 60 nautical miles at altitudes of less than 20 feet above the sea surface

So what they are saying is that after almost 20 years of development they have a missile that almost exactly replicates an early Kh-31 and perhaps with a bit more work they might get it to achieve the performance of the later Kh-31s in terms of range... how freakin amazing... they should pat themselves on the back... in 40 or 50 years they might be able to replicate the SS-N-22 which entered service in about 1984...  SS-N-22 is a 4 ton mach 2.5 anti ship missile with a range of about 120km, and packing one hell of a punch.

In a few years the Zircon will enter service flying at mach 7-8...

note that the picture shown is of a Kh-31 with a huge solid rocket booster behind it.... I would suggest they don't show off too much regarding this breakthrough.

GarryB wrote:

2)We've seen in anti-ship missile defense(ASMD) trials that ESSM RIM-116 , ASTER were succesful in destroying incoming supersonic ashm's . So how exactly russian supersonic ashm will go past american anti-ship defenses ? DuTCH HAD GOALKEEPER in 90's o intercept supersonic ashm .

Hahaha... yeah, and in the early 1980s the British fleet sailed to the south atlantic safe and secure in the knowledge that the Seawolf missile could shoot down any threat to British shipping including 114mm artillery shells.

Didn't really work that way though in practise....

The Coyote target missile design integrates a 4-inlet, solid-fuel ducted-rocket ramjet propulsion system into a compact missile airframe 18 feet long and 14 inches in diameter. Rail-launched from Navy test and training ranges, the highly maneuverable Coyote achieves cruise speeds of over Mach 2.5, with a range of approximately 60 nautical miles at altitudes of less than 20 feet above the sea surface

So what they are saying is that after almost 20 years of development they have a missile that almost exactly replicates an early Kh-31 and perhaps with a bit more work they might get it to achieve the performance of the later Kh-31s in terms of range... how freakin amazing... they should pat themselves on the back... in 40 or 50 years they might be able to replicate the SS-N-22 which entered service in about 1984...  SS-N-22 is a 4 ton mach 2.5 anti ship missile with a range of about 120km, and packing one hell of a punch.

In a few years the Zircon will enter service flying at mach 7-8...

note that the picture shown is of a Kh-31 with a huge solid rocket booster behind it.... I would suggest they don't show off too much regarding this breakthrough.

Thanks Garry . but you haven't answered  my first question ?

Can US ships EW system and Nulka decoys or of various hardkill systems  damage russian ashm moskit , yakhont , klub  missile guidance ?

Thanks Garry . but you haven't answered my first question ?

Can US ships EW system and Nulka decoys or of various hardkill systems  damage russian ashm moskit , yakhont , klub  missile guidance ?

It is a fight between measure and countermeasure... both sides have an idea of what the other has and how it works and based on that can work out what might stop it from working properly. Of course the other side might anticipate some counter measures and implement some counter counter measures of their own....

For instance it is know that some high speed Russian missiles have angled titanium plates in their nose to deflect cannon shells and protect the warhead from HE rounds that are intended to set off the warhead. Jammers are effective against active radar guided weapons, but passive homing or missiles using IR guidance are immune to radar jammers... the missiles might even have a home on jam capability... especially those fitted with nuclear warheads that just need to get in the vicinity of the target to be effective.

Beneath the skin: US Navy DDG 51 Flight III guided missile destroyer

The US Navy's DDG 51 Flight III guided missile destroyer has now entered the detailed design stage. Richard Scott examines how this new variant, designed to take the new AN/SPY-6(V) Air and Missile Defense Radar to sea, will differ from the current Flight IIA design Beginning procurement in fiscal year (FY) 2016, the US Navy's (USN's) next-generation DDG 51 Flight III guided missile destroyer will, from the outside, resemble its antecedent. Under the skin, however, there will be some significant changes in order that the hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) systems, and the
Aegis combat system, can support a new Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR) intended to confer the Flight III ships with an unmatched integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) capability.

http://www.janes360.com/images/assets/731/51731/US_Navy_DDG_51_Flight_III_guided_missile_destroyer.pdf

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New RAM Block 2 achieves initial operational capability

RAM Block 2 was subject to DT/OT at the Pacific Missile Range between May 2013 and March 2015 .The RIM-116C Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) Block 2 ship self-defence missile has achieved initial operational capability (IOC) on board the LPD 17 San Antonio-class assault ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), the US Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has confirmed.

An evolutionary development of the RIM-116B RAM Block 1 missile, the new RIM-116C embodies kinematic and sensor upgrades to expand the missile's engagement envelope so as to defeat more manoeuvrable and higher speed anti-ship cruise missiles. RAM Block 2 is a far more advanced system, boasting three times the manoeuvrability of the original Rolling Airframe Missile .


Be scared russian ashms and ascms , New SEA-RAM RIM-116C is here .


http://www.janes.com/article/51938/new-ram-achieves-ioc

Don't worry... 

These are baseless claims and nothing more. The Navy seems to think that just because their missile can intercept a non-maneuverable, subsonic AShM it will be able to intercept every Russian one. 

The RAM's use a very small fragmentation warhead that would require a direct hit on the AShM to take it down...against a missile that is *faster* and also maneuvering (especially in groups), that is unlikely. 

Besides we use so few RAM systems it barely makes a difference.