Levchenko: soon again
The penultimate issue of the SF newspaper “On guard of the Arctic” (dated November 29, 2019) in passing reports on the technical condition of the Admiral Levchenko BPC, which “is currently not part of the Northern Fleet’s constant readiness forces ... As it became known, it is planned to soon placing the ship in a factory to replace the main engine "(ref. 1, p. 4). Everything would be fine, but something similar was already said more than a year and a half ago, and then it was a question of imminent “global repair” with the replacement of a gas turbine engine in the plural (ref. 2, p. 3).
As is known, on October 30, 2018, as a result of a technical accident, the floating dock PD-50 of the 82nd shipyard sank, as a result of which the reconstruction of the dock complex of the 35th shipyard was launched in order to provide secondary repairs with the modernization of the Admiral Kuznetsov priority for the Navy. A dry dock for an aircraft carrier at best will be ready by mid-2020, and TAVKR itself, under the terms of the state contract, should be transferred to the fleet by the end of 2021. This means that before 2022 the plant will not be able to accept BOD for repair. Earlier in the blog, a proposal was made to repair Levchenko on Zvyozdochka, however, due to the distorted priorities of the central control center (and USC?), There is little hope for this (link 3). Against such a background, the optimistic "soon" from the message of the naval circulations sounds unconvincing.
A misunderstanding with Admiral Levchenko, who faces a total of 10 years of being out of work, is just a special case of a general dysfunctional state of the BOD SF group. "Admiral Chabanenko" has been behind for more than 6 years, 3-4 more he will have to be repaired. "Admiral Kharlamov", who is not even thirty, spent more than half of his service life (over 18 years) in reserve, standing at the pier. Thus, 3 out of 5 North Sea BODs (60%) will be ready for a long time, while at the Pacific Fleet the number of 1155 ready-made units is only 25% of the payroll, which is clearly seen from the tables published on the blog (link 4).
It is difficult to name the reason for this trouble. I would not want to think that this is somehow connected with the fact that, starting in 2007 (after Vysotsky), only submariners (Maximov, Korolev, Evmenov, Moiseev) were appointed to the post of commander of the Northern Fleet, often later becoming commanders-in-chief of the Navy ( in contrast to the Avakyants submarine, who has been commanding the Pacific Fleet since 2012). However, with the submelt in the North the same problems. According to available data (ref. 5), 11 out of 20 (55%) general purpose combat submarines (nuclear and diesel) are most likely not able to fulfill their intended purpose. Be that as it may, admirals should command the fleets and the fleet as a whole, ready, like Kuznetsov and Gorshkov, to fight for their ships in all instances to the last star on uniform.