Russia - India Strategic Relationship: News

GarryB wrote:

As I've repeated before, Russia's foreign policy toward ungrateful, sell-out countries (especially including ex-Soviet and Eastern European states) should be strictly transactional and commercial. Give up privately on hopes for any of them cherishing fraternity, brotherhood, shared history, culture, language etc., but in public carry on trumpeting such fanciful, rhetorical "values". Sell that bullshit, make money and secure your strategic interests. The US has already provided the blueprints to this facetious playbook, selling their "values" too.

Russia would not benefit from manipulating trade partners the way the US does today, in fact the US would benefit because then they could truly say the Russians and the Chinese are no better than us so better the devil you know.

Russia and China are not trying to get into the position the US is in now, they want a unipolar world where they can make their own choices and decisions and don't have to bow down to any other country.

Russia would be a pole of power, but so would China and even the US, and the EU and other countries... Brazil, India, South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, etc etc a situation where groups of countries don't gang up to bully other countries or regions... that is how WWI started and was what created the necessary conditions for WWII to happen... and almost started WWIII several times.

GarryB wrote:But once you get signed agreements and alliances then you create two or more power blocks and while the theory that is supposed to create deterrence to prevent conflict, as we saw it dragged countries that had no reason to fight each other except for a piece of paper they signed to help out another country in need.



A proper multipolar world does not involve ganging up or military agreements or organisations like HATO.

Hahaha... just saw this and thought it was relevant with power blocks... WWII... Britain and India etc etc..

BTW this is eddie izzard... ignore the makeup and he is funny... he was transgender back before it was popular.... if they were all like he was then I would have less problems with them....

The Russian President Vladimir Putin’s short visit to New Delhi and the inaugural 2+2 meeting between India and Russia — which is India’s fourth such engagement with another country — will help improve Moscow-New Delhi ties, currently fraying under the pressure of larger global power shifts. Of all the diplomatic balancing acts India has to play in this milieu of geopolitical uncertainty, the one with Russia is the most significant. And yet, let the ongoing flurry of activity between Moscow and New Delhi not blind us to the global forces that will pose formidable challenges for the partnership.
There are constraints

Russia, no doubt, is a friend in need to India; but Moscow’s friendship comes with limitations. Not only would the realities of the global balance of power shrink the robustness of the relationship over time, but, more crucially perhaps, a legacy relationship based on limited interaction might eventually lose the warmth given that there is little organic, people-to-people content to the relationship.

To put it bluntly, unless the bilateral ties can move beyond arms sale/purchase, the phase of stasis will kick in sooner rather than later in India-Russia relations. Consider for instance, the India-Russia bilateral trade is around U.S.$10 billion, far lower than India’s trade with China and the United States, China’s trade with the U.S. and Russia, and even the U.S.’s trade with Russia. The Soviet-era cultural and people-to-people contacts have almost entirely evaporated. Arms sales alone won’t a relationship make.

Today, the India-Russia relationship stands deeply strained by the larger geopolitical realities which neither of them is completely in control of. The quadrilateral dynamics among India, China, the U.S. and Russia have different implications of varying degrees for all four states in this relationship, in particular for India.
The dynamics

Let us use the concept of primary and secondary antagonisms to understand the dynamics of this quad better. To a great extent, if not entirely, the dynamics of this six-way relationship, at the apex, is a function of the U.S.-China rivalry. In this six-way matrix, China-U.S. antagonism is the first order relationship and the U.S.-Russia, China-Russia and Russia-India are the second order relationships. While the second order relationships in this quad are, to a great extent, a product of the primary antagonism, the second tier relationships also have their own unique dynamics and implications.

For instance, India-China, a second order relationship in this quad, is both a product of the primary antagonism between the U.S. and China as well as a result of the regional geopolitical rivalry between India and China.

Even though China remains its primary antagonism, Washington has not yet succeeded in divorcing its less challenging second order antagonism (rivalry with Moscow) from it. Washington’s parallel rivalries with China and Russia (albeit to a lesser extent) have complicated matters for New Delhi.

What appears to be a near certainty in the medium to longer term is that the dynamics of the quadrilateral relationship, in particular India’s tense relations with China, will go on to complicate India’s time-tested partnership with Russia, a process that has already started.

Even though Beijing has not aggressively attempted to damage India-Russia relations, there is little doubt that China will attempt to drive a wedge between New Delhi and Moscow since isolating India in the larger Asian region suits Beijing’s larger game plan.
A few scenarios

It gets more complicated if we were to examine the various potential scenarios in this quadrilateral relationship. For instance, the extent of Chinese aggression towards India will play a role in determining India’s relationship with Russia. Consider this. An aggressive China will push India towards the U.S., and even though Russia would be understanding towards India’s rationale behind such a pro-U.S. tilt in the medium term, India’s relationship with the U.S. will invariably create hurdles in India-Russia relations in the longer term. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s warning to India should be read in that context: “We expressed our serious concern to our Indian friends over the U.S. activity there (Asia-Pacific region) under the slogan of so-called Indo-Pacific strategies and the creation of closed bloc-type structures”.

Put differently, the more aggressive Beijing gets towards New Delhi, the more India would grow closer to Washington and Moscow. However, while Moscow would appreciate a close partnership with New Delhi, it may not be when it comes to a growing India-U.S. partnership. More so, if Moscow has to choose between Beijing and New Delhi, it would choose Beijing just as New Delhi would choose Washington over Moscow if it comes to that.

This also implies that an aggressive China may also help increase India-Russia relations in the short to medium term, something we may already be witnessing. Recall Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow in June 2020 soon after the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops on the Line of Actual Control to procure more weapons systems, among other things.

In the meantime, the seemingly unresolvable first order antagonism (the U.S. versus China) also provides space for geopolitical hedges in the second order partnerships/antagonisms, i.e., India-Russia and even Russia-U.S. For instance, Russia’s dormant concerns about China’s rising influence in its traditional periphery, and Moscow’s relations with India in the broader context of Central and West Asia and the western Indian Ocean could prompt Moscow to maintain a certain degree of, albeit limited, geopolitical hedge vis-à-vis Beijing. India’s desire for a robust relationship with Russia will be more appreciated by the U.S. due to the Chinese aggression against India and the U.S.’s systemic and first order rivalry with Beijing. More so, once the reality of the rise of China becomes a concern for Moscow, it could potentially open conversations with Washington to create a balance vis-à-vis Beijing which suits Indian interests.

At the same time, however, if there is a rapprochement between the U.S. and Russia or a reduction in the war of words between the U.S. and China, this may or may not have a direct and substantive impact on Sino-Indian relations since the strains in Sino-Indian relations are not just a product of global balance of power but, more fundamentally, a result of India-China dynamics in the Southern Asian region. Put differently, no matter what the state of global geopolitics is, the essential (adversarial) nature of India-China relations is unlikely to undergo a fundamental transformation. For New Delhi, the principal antagonism is China. Therefore, New Delhi must exploit strategies and partnerships that can help address the China challenge more effectively. This means that India has to carefully balance its growing partnership with the U.S. with its somewhat delicate relationship with Russia.
Potential for cooperation

Let us return to the India-Russia ties and examine the potential for cooperation between the two sides. In a sense, the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul and India’s relationship with Moscow have helped New Delhi to adopt more flexible strategies vis-à-vis Afghanistan as well as the broader region. Given the close relationship that New Delhi enjoyed with Washington, American presence in Kabul had, in a way, limited India’s options as New Delhi was broadly encouraged to follow U.S. policy in the region. With the Americans gone, India can openly cooperate with Moscow and even Tehran, especially if the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) renegotiations succeed, and engage Afghanistan and the Central Asian region with their help.

If New Delhi plays its cards well, it can use Moscow to gain more geopolitical heft in the region — while the U.S. provided New Delhi status quo in the region, Moscow could provide India with more direct opportunities. Of course, New Delhi would need to be prepared for adverse reactions from Beijing and Islamabad.

Yet another area of cooperation between Moscow and New Delhi is the Indian Ocean Region, especially the western Indian Ocean where Russia has been expanding its influence and India has significant interests.

For New Delhi, located in an unstable and virtually friendless neighbourhood, friendship with Russia is important notwithstanding the structural limits to such a friendship. It will, therefore, take a great deal of diplomatic agility from New Delhi to stay the course and improve the relationship with Moscow amidst high-stakes geopolitical contestations.

Sujoy wrote:
Happymon Jacob teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defense Research

flamming_python wrote: In a multi-polar world, why should either Moscow or New Delhi have to 'choose' when it comes down to it?
They are both major powers in their own right and can decide on their own positions, or to not take a position at all.

flamming_python wrote:And if Russia and India desire to hedge bets against China, then they can just co-operate with each other to the extent they wish, without needing to involve America in this bilateral relationship.

Sujoy wrote:

flamming_python wrote: In a multi-polar world, why should either Moscow or New Delhi have to 'choose' when it comes down to it?
They are both major powers in their own right and can decide on their own positions, or to not take a position at all.

Because they are not great, they are too small to hold their own against the U.S and China. India's economy should roughly have been the size of that of China but India refuses to develop.

Russia by now should have had an economy that's roughly $7-$8 trillion but for reasons unknown to me, it's not.

So until such time that Russia & India drastically increases the size of their economy they will have to play second fiddle to U.S and China.

flamming_python wrote: Dmitri Trenin from Carnegie Moscow recently analyzed the current state of Russia-India relations. He too suggests that Russian politicians remains Euro centric and people to people relation between Russia & India is missing.

https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85903

flamming_python wrote: Well that's a bit of a lack of self-confidence there Sujoy

flamming_python wrote: Russia is certainly not about to let China say who it can and can't be friends with

flamming_python wrote: Going forward, Russia needs a strong India as it wants a counter-balance to China as well

flamming_python wrote: India unfortunately, is reading Russia entirely wrong, either by articles like that, or by news reports like this

flamming_python wrote: Building ties with India serves the same goal. The strategically timed visit to India was not about the negotiations with Biden

GarryB wrote: Because the west has closed shop and the old boys club won’t let Russia in because it didn't go to the correct school and does not wear a school tie they recognise.

miketheterrible wrote:I talked with a few professors while I was in Delhi. One thing I noticed from them is they both felt that India may cease to exist in its current form in a decade or two.  Simply because the division is way too big, and people are too worried about things that don't matter- their religious views and foreign prospects.  

miketheterrible wrote:Every third sign in India everywhere is "apply here to get jobs in Canada, US, Australia and UK".  It's rather evident that most don't want to stay in India so they seek outside the country to thrive

GarryB wrote:Much like nurses and doctors and other professionals from Europe come here to New Zealand