The most comprehensive and authoritative insight into official General Staff views on the war was provided by Major General N. Kutsenko, Deputy Chief of Staff for the Center of Operational-Strategic Research. On 27 February in Izvestiya, he outlined the allied ground campaign for Soviet readers.64 Kutsenko pointed out that three separate allied army corps --each consisting of 4-7 tank, mechanized, and marine divisions, and 3-5 brigades --had participated in the ground assault against Iraq. The main effort was launched in the center sector by American, British, and French forces. Moving along the Iraq-Kuwait border, allied forces were advancing toward Basra. A second attack, conducted by U.S. Marines and Egyptian troops in cooperation with airborne and naval landings, was launched along the coast. A third attack was launched in the West by an American army corps. Finally, an airborne landing was conducted in the vicinity of Kuwait city.
According to Rutsenko, the allied offensive was supported by more than 4000 artillery pieces and mortars, and 2000 aircraft and attack helicopters. Coalition electronic warfare assets were used on a large scale to disrupt Iraqi command and control systems. He highlighted the fact that Allied forces of battalion size and higher were utilizing space-based communication systems, as were allied staffs, which were making use of satellite reconnaissance to keep track of developments along the front.65
Kutsenko observed that while Iraqi forces were preparing to conduct an organized withdrawal from Kuwait, this would be difficult to accomplish. Allied forces enjoyed air superiority and would be able to completely destroy the withdrawing Iraqis. He argued that the United States sought not only the restoration of Kuwait, but complete control over a strategically important region of the world and its sources of oil. It was for this reason that attempts by the President of the Soviet Union to resolve the conflict through peaceful means were rejected.
Izvestiya commentator V. Litovkin, pointed out that the bulk of Iraqi military equipment was Soviet-produced, and that Iraqi Army officers had been trained in Soviet military academies. Thus, for many people the war in the Persian Gulf represented a clash between "U.S. and Soviet military science, between their weapons and ours.... It is obvious," he concluded, "which side has the advantage..." Kutsenko responded that Iraq had been armed by both East and West, not just the Soviet Union. In addition, Iraqi officers were trained "in the best military schools in the West; France, Britain, Italy..." He called the assertion that the Iraqi Army had copied Soviet tactics and operational art ridiculous. Kutsenko commented that the Iraqi Army had developed its own system of tactics and operational art during the Gulf War with Iran. It was there, he stressed, that the Iraqi Army had "perfected [their] own methods and means of waging armed combat," including the art of concealment, disinformation, and preparation of engineer positions for personnel and equipment. Kutsenko also indicated that the outcome of the conflict was not dependent on technology as much as on the professional preparation of the people operating and servicing it. "In the Iraqi Army, both [technology and preparation] left a great deal to be desired."66 Finally, he noted that most of Iraqi's military arsenal had been produced in the 1960s and 70s. In comparison, U.S.. British, and French weapons had been produced in the 1980s and 90s.
Kutsenko remarked that the leadership of NATO had exploited the war as an opportunity for testing the newest weapon systems and military technologies, many of which are already entering the arsenals of NATO armies.67 These included the F-117A Stealth fighter-bomber, the Patriot air defense missile complex with its "anti-missile missiles," the E-3A with its radar system for ground target reconnaissance and target designation, reconnaissance-strike complexes, air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, laser-guided bombs, and new armored equipment. The desert terrain and climate, however, revealed serious deficiencies in coalition equipment. Kutsenko noted, for example, that the gas-turbine engines of the Abrams tank were quite frequently disabled by sand. Additionally, the Apache, Puma, and other coalition helicopters proved unreliable in sandstorms. In comparison, Kutsenko pointed out that, according to the Syrian Minister of Defense, Corps General M. Tlass, Soviet T-62s and other tanks, Mi-8 helicopters and later models, and small arms proved "very reliable and effective in desert conditions."
Kutsenko concluded by drawing attention to the fact that the U.S. might exceed its authority and conduct military operations into Iraq. "Then," he warned, "the war would assume a completely different character. As to how everything does, however, only time will tell."
For the second time since the beginning of the conflict, Major General Viktor Filatov, the editor of Military-Historical Journal, provided one of the most colorful and wrongheaded reports of the war. Filatov was covering the war as a special Soviet correspondent in Baghdad. Writing in Sovetskaya Rossiya, he reported that the Iraqi army had shown "its bravery and courage" in a series of counterattacks which "smashed" allied forces in the Persian Gulf.68 Filatov observed that the U.S. was bent on bombing Iraq "back into the stone age" as it had tried to do to Vietnam. He called American soldiers "the barbarians of the 20th century" and asserted that American forces had not actually entered Kuwait on February 24, as announced, but remained inside Saudi Arabia on the defensive. Filatov noted that those allied forces that did attack were halted by the Iraqi Army. "[A]fter resisting the initial power allied assault," he concluded, "the Iraqi 3d Army Corps launched its counteroffensive, which has been going on for eight hours."
Filatov's report accurately reflects the tone set by Sovetskaya Rossiya throughout the war, a bastion of Soviet conservatism, viewing the United States through Cold-War-colored glasses. It is interesting to note that Filatov's article in Sovetskaya Rossiya closely paralleled Iraqi dispatches of the fighting broadcast the same day.69 This suggests that Filatov-and perhaps the Soviet General Staff as well --was overly reliant on Iraq for information and thus misled on the progress of the war. The errors in Kutsenko's reports indicate that the Soviet General Staff encountered difficulties in effectively and accurately monitoring and analyzing developments during the Persian Gulf conflict, despite the formation of a special "operations group" early in the war and the commitment of additional Soviet space and communications intelligence assets to monitor the war's progress.70 The alternative explanation is that the Soviet General Staff knew the specifics of allied ground operations, but did not want to reveal the extent of the Iraqi defeat for fear of triggering an avalanche of criticism about the inadequacies of Soviet military thought and technology.
In stark contrast to Filatov's stridently anti-American tone, was a 27 February broadcast on Radio Moscow, which called the Gulf War "one of the most just wars ever fought."71
The war in the Gulf did not bury the hopes for a new world order, as some people had though it would. It only sharpened the outlines of a new worldwide political structure. The Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated common goals, even when quite natural subtle differences appeared in their approaches.
The broadcast went on to note that though the course of war proved "inevitable", its escalation was forestalled due to the efforts of Israel, Iran, and Turkey. "Today," it concluded, "we must congratulate all who took part in the anti-Iraqi coalition; from the men in uniform to the diplomats who battled as fiercely at the negotiation table. Humanity has survived another war, one of the most just wars ever fought."
Conclusion: "the Soviet Armed Forces will have to take a closer look at the quality of their weapons, their equipment. and their strategy."
Soviet officers are discussing the outcome of the Gulf War and attempting to derive relevant lessons. Opinions vary: some laud the efficiency of allied air and ground operations, while others refuse to accept Western reports at face value.
Colonel Aleksandr Tsalko, who headed a Soviet Air Force Training Center prior to assuming his duties as a Soviet People's Deputy, observed that the crushing defeat of the Iraqi Army made it clear the Soviet military doctrine and the entire model of military development were obsolete. On a 1 March Moscow Radio broadcast he stated:
Some military authorities in this country continue to believe that the outcome of a war is determined by a clash of huge masses of ground troops. It is sheer madness. The war in the Gulf clearly showed that the Iraqi Army was simply overwhelmed by air strikes and the troops had to keep their noses buried in the sand.72
Tsalko disagreed with those who claimed that the war demonstrated the inferiority of Soviet military equipment. "On many counts we are not so much behind." He stressed, however, that the main lesson of the war was that huge amounts of tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery pieces were "absolutely useless."
In the same broadcast, Colonel Nikolay Petrushenko, one of the leaders of the powerful, conservative, Soyuz [Union] organization, stated that he had no doubts that the reported successes of the multinational forces were exaggerated by the Western press. "Only a very naive person," he commented, "can believe that during the month and a half of preparations for the war, the U.S. lost 80 people, while more than a month of hostilities claimed a total of 70 men killed or wounded."73
In a separate 1 March broadcast on Radio Moscow, Major General Kutsenko remarked that operation Desert Storm "was not very novel in the operational-tactical sense."74 He pointed out that the large-scale use of air forces, cruise missiles and other precision-guided weapons, and prolonged electronic warfare operations to disable the enemy's command and control structure and undermine his military and economic potential had already been employed in other wars and conflicts. These had involved the air forces of the United States, Israel, and Great Britain. With regard to the Iraqi Army, however, Kutsenko stated that its imaginative use of operational camouflage was of some military interest.75 He concluded by announcing that the MoD would soon hold a workshop to analyze all aspects of the Gulf War.
A conference of the Moscow City Council on 3 March discussed the lessons of the Gulf War. According to speakers, the war showed that Soviet military doctrine and principles of military development had "considerable drawbacks" and that prevailing Soviet views on modern war had become "outdated."76 The war also showed the advantages of a highly-professional army over a mass army based on universal military service. Participants in the conference included Soviet and Russian People's Deputies, members of the Democratic Russia Movement, and military servicemen. They pointed out that the previously announced military reforms were actually not taking place for lack of relevant legislation.
In an interview with INTERFAX, Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, former Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, said that the "human factor" was largely responsible for the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf War.77 Kulikov, who is now responsible for veterans' affairs at the MoD, noted that the Soviet equipment sold to Iraq was not technologically inferior to Western equipment. He claimed that the "human element" was always the derisive element in the success or failure of any weapon system. He observed that while the Iraqis had been trained by Soviet military advisors, "one does not always succeed in injecting one's knowledge into someone else's head." However, like Soviet Defense Minister Yazov, Kulikov acknowledged that the Iraqi air defense system, composed essentially of Soviet equipment, had not functioned. He concluded:
The military operations between the coalition forces and Iraq have modified the idea which we had about the nature of modern military operations. A deeper analysis is necessary, but one point is already clear; the Soviet Armed Forces will have to take a closer look at the quality of their weapons, their equipment, and their strategy.
by Colonel David M. Glantz
The Gulf War has fueled Soviet concerns regarding the nature and consequences of future war. Soviet observers commented extensively on the diplomatic and military deployment phases (August 1990-January 1991) and on the air war (January-February 1991), and have begun critiquing the short but violent ground phase. Although their judgments have often reflected a wide diversity of political views, arid some have been polemical in tone and unrealistic in content, these observers have begun identifying several important trends or tendencies which are worth, of deeper analysis.
Certainly the question of coalition-building and power projection heads the list of important Soviet concerns. Although they themselves contributed to the process, they were impressed by the ability of the U.S., within the context of the United Nations, to form a coalition from such diverse and often mutually hostile states. Observers have also noted U.S. ability to move a sizeable force to and, even more important, conduct an impressive logistical build-up in a distant region which lacked a well-developed communications infrastructure. Despite the fact that this process of "preparing a remote theater of military operations " took up to six months, the military results and political consequences of that feat will likely prompt increased concern on the part of those who, since Marshal Ogarkov's time, have warned of U.S. power projection capabilities.
To Soviet planners the most troubling trend was the seeming dominance of the battlefield, if not the theater as a whole, by modern technology in the form of hi8h-precision weapons Despite the predictable achievement by the Allies of total air superiority, the crushing weight of technology seemed to confirm the Soviet's worst fears -- that new high-precision weapons and weapons whose effect could not be readily predicted did, in fact, dominate and even alter the course and outcome of the subsequent ground war. These new weapons and, even more important, the systems employed to integrate them and older weapons in combat may, they fear, negate many more traditional measures of military power and have a revolutionary impact on future combined-arms concepts. The role of the Allied naval forces during active operations and as a means of deception will reinforce Soviet anxiety regarding the issue of naval power in warfare and insure that the U.S. Navy is a subject of future arms control negotiations.
Deception and surprise, in the Soviet view, played critical roles in both the air and ground phases of the war. This judgement reinforced the existing Soviet belief that recent technological developments have placed an even greater premium on the conduct of deception and the achievement of surprise. Both are absolute necessities if a state is to achieve success in future warfare. Early Soviet concerns that the Allies had not exploited the effects of the air campaign soon enough probably evaporated when the Allies ultimately did so quickly, effectively, and with practically no ground casualties. Soviet anxiety over the poor performance of specific Soviet weapons and integrating systems will probably pale beside their realization that modern high-precision weaponry, artfully and extensively applied, produced paralysis and utter defeat. Subsequent large- scale Allied conduct of successful operational maneuver sustained to great depths by an unprecedented logistical effort, combined with limited loss of materiel and weapons on the part of the attacker, will likely become major subjects of future Soviet study. While Soviets analyze these important issues, it is likely they will be plagued by the nagging questions, "Did not the air phase of the operation render all subsequent ground actions anti- climatic," and if so, "Why?."
Soviet planners certainly recognize the unique circumstances existing in the theater and asymmetries in forces, levels of modernization, and military competence between coalition and Iraqi military establishments. Nevertheless, in all probability the Allies ability to forge an effective combined effort and apply force efficiently in both the air and ground phases of the campaign has prompted concern in Soviet military and political circles. The unprecedented disruption of Iraq's military infrastructure, combined with extensive operational maneuver conducted within the context of the Airland Battle concept against Iraq's military center of gravity, seems to have confirmed Marshal Ogarkov's oft-expressed concern about a potential Soviet enemy's so-called war-winning potential in an initial period of any future war. Depending on one's political point of view, this will give cause for concern on the part of both those who have supported the concept of defensive sufficiency and those who have argued strenuously against it. The events of the Gulf War will likely, reinforce the arguments of reformers who have underscored the destructiveness and, hence, folly of future war. Conversely, it will serve as fodder for those who have argued against defensiveness or for greater defensive strength in light of what they perceive as a growing threat to the Soviet Union.
For the U.S., it would be a mistake to generalize from the experiences of the Gulf War and assume that the performance of the Iraqi Army with its predominantly Soviet equipment replicates how Soviet forces would operate in future war. The Iraqis did possess Soviet equipment, but did not employ it in a "Soviet manner." An over-arching system similar to that of the Soviets to integrate weaponry was noticeably absent. The result was the almost immediate loss of the air war and subsequent disaster.
Most Iraqi senior commanders, as Soviet critiques point out, were educated in Western or Indian staff colleges, while lower level commanders were Soviet educated. Much of the Soviet equipment performed well technically, and the Soviet military will not scrap the T-72 tank because its Iraqi crews chose to abandon them rather than fight.
Soviet military theorists are carefully studying the lessons of Operation Desert Storm and will continue to study them. While that study will be intense and the lessons learned will likely be extensive, the Soviets do not view the results of the war as an indictment of their weaponry or military methodologies. Rather, they will likely view the lessons of the war as an indictment of an inflexible Iraqi war leadership which failed to support its army adequately and gave short shrift to the vital issue of armed forces morale.
1. See, for example, Suzanne Crow, "The Gulf Conflict and Debate Over Soviet 'National' Interests," Report on the USSR, 3, no. 6 (February 8, 1991), pp. 15-17.BACK
2. G. Zhivits, "How Professionals Wage War: Soviet Military Expert Analyzes the Course of Hostilities in the Persian Gulf Region," Izvestiya, 19 January 1991, p. 4.BACK
3. See "Iraqi Aims Analyzed," FBIS-SOV-91-014, 22 January 1991, pp. 23-24.BACK
4. V. Gorbachev, "...Tanks Will Not Save the Day. Soviet Military Expert Analyzes the Progress of Combat Operations in the Persian Gulf Region," Izvestiya, 21 January 1991, p. 6.BACK
5. Reports that the MoD had provided the United States with information about Soviet-built Iraqi systems would continue to haunt it. Chief of the Soviet General Staff, General of the Army Mikhail Moiseyev's rebuttal was aired on Moscow TASS International Service, 1110 GMT, 30 January 1991. See "General Denies Revealing Secrets," FBIS-SOV-91-021, 31 January 1991, p. 5.BACK
6. "General Says 90 Percent Off," FBIS-SOV-91-015, 23 January 1991, p. 12.BACK
7. "Evacuee Says Extremely Accurate," FBIS-Sov-91-015, 23 January 1991, p. 12.BACK
8. "USSR Marshal Akhromeyev: Conflict Not of Short Duration," Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, Neues Deutschland, 22 January 1991, p. 4.BACK
9. Captain S. Sidorov, "In the Skies Over Iraq," KZ, 25 January 1991, p. 3.BACK
10. For insights into Iraqi use of Italian produced military decoys, see N. Miroshnik, "Persian Gulf: Business Is Business," Pravda, 25 January 1991, p. 4.BACK
11. Alekeandr Colts, "Shadow of Chemical Weapons Over the Persian Gulf," KZ, 31 January 1991, p. 3. Yestaf'yev is described as "a U.N. expert on the use of chemical weapons." However, an article in KZ, 11 September 1990, p. 3. describes him a Chief of a Directorate of Chemical Troops on the Soviet General Staff. BACK
12. A. Rhokhlov, "The War in the Gulf Has Not Yet Begun," Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 1 February 1991, p. 3.BACK
13. "Lobov Foresees Settlement," in Moscow World Service in English, 1210 GMT, 1 February 1991, FBIS-SOV-91-023, 4 February 1991, p. 15.BACK
14. V. Pereverzev, "Military Observer's Notes," Izvestiya, 4 February 1991, p. 4.BACK
15. Ye. Shchekatikhin, "Protracted Downpour," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 2 February 1991, p. 5.BACK
17. V. Nikanorov, "The General Staff is Closely Monitoring the Developing Situation," KZ, 31 January 1991, p. 3.BACK
18. "War Gives Soviets Unprecedented Chance to Evaluate U.S. Performance," Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 18, 1991, p. 46.BACK
19. One example of this is the recent visit to Baghdad by the Major General V. Filatov, editor of Military-Historical Journal. According to unofficial reports, he recently spent five days in the Iraqi capital during the height of the allied bombing campaign. This would have made Filatov, who has provided Soviet coverage of the Vietnam War, the War in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq War, the ranking Soviet officer in Baghdad.BACK
20. See Scott Shane, "U.S. Had Underestimated Iraq's Military Capabilities, Soviets Say," Baltimore Sun, reprinted in Kansas City Star, February 10, 1991.BACK
21. See, for example, S. Zavorotnyy and I. Chernyak, "Baghdad Blazing Like a Christmas Tree," Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 18 January 1991. The two analysts observed: "The Iraqis' helplessness is striking: There is no sound of their aircraft taking off, they have only been able to launch a few missiles. We note that Soviet military equipment, of which Iraq has an abundance, has not shown itself at its best. Will anyone dare to buy it after such an obvious failure?"BACK
22. While Iraq possessed some French ADA systems and aircraft, the majority were of Soviet origin. At the beginning of the war, the Iraqi Army had Soviet SA-2,3,6,7,8,9,13,14 and 16s, in addition to French Roland Is, IIs and captured American Hawks. Additionally, nearly two-thirds of Iraq anti-air artillery was Soviet, while the remainder was Chinese. See National Training Center Handbook 100-91, The Iraqi Army - Organization and Tactics (Ft. Irwin, California, 3 January 1991), pp. 132-133. The Iraqi Air Force possessed Soviet Su-17/20/22s and MiG 21s, 23s, and 29s, in addition to French F-1 Mirages.BACK
23. Soviet Military Power 1990, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 5.BACK
24. This is a repetition of the same debate that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. After the war, Arab clients demanded, and were provided with increasingly sophisticated Soviet weaponry. In light of the need for hard currency, the postwar period may thus find the Soviet Union providing its clients with its most sophisticated systems.BACK
25. V. Demidenko, "Special Comments on Komsomol'skaya Pravda Correspondents 'Tunnel' Vision of the Quality of Soviet Military Equipment," KZ, 6 February 1991.BACK
26. According to one Soviet analyst, the bunker system which so effectively sheltered the Iraqi Air Force was built by the West. In "Shelters for Iraqi Air Force According to NATO Standards," Izvestiya, 2 February 1991, B. Moskvichev writes that from 1984 to 1985 a series of underground air bases, including some 300 underground aircraft shelter, were built in Iraq to the same standards that are stipulated for NATO bases. Various French, Italian, German, and British firms took part in the construction of Iraqi underground air bases."Take-offs can be executed right from the hangers, which transforms the concrete underground structure into a real fortress."BACK
27. N. Burbyga, "Ground War Inevitable," KZ, 8 February 1991, p. 6.BACK
28. "Soviet Review," USA Today, March 1, 1991, p. 3A.BACK
29. I. Yevataf'yev, "Chemical Attacks and Nuclear Retaliation," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 8 February 1991, p. 5.BACK
30. Moscow Radio Rossiya Network (in Russian), 1900 GMT, 9 February 1991. See "Krasnaya Zvezda's Pro-Iraqi Bias Deplored," FBIS-SOV-91-030, 13 February 1991, p. 17.BACK
31. Lieutenant-General I. Skuratov, "D-Day, February '91? What Will the Amphibious Landing in the Persian Gulf Be Like," KZ, 12 February 1991,p. 3.BACK
32. In "The General Staff is Closely Monitoring the Developing Situation," KZ, 31 January 1991, p. 3., Major General Bogdanov observed: "Certain Western specialists have no doubt that the American command has plans for low-yield nuclear strikes against Iraq if the latter resorts to chemical weapons."BACK
33. "Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons in Gulf View," Moscow World Service, 2300 GMT, 13 February 1991, FBIS-SOV-91-031, 14 February 1991, p. 15.BACK
34. See, for example, "Soviets: Stopping START," Newsweek, February 25, 1991, p. 3., and "Arms Pact Sleight of Hand," Time, March 4, 1991, p. 57.BACK
35."Bessmertnykh Speaks to Supreme Soviet on Gulf War," Moscow TASS International Service, 1620 GMT, 19 February 1991, FBIS-SOV-91-034, 20 February 1991, pp. 24-27.BACK
36. I. Vladimirov, "NATO and the Crisis in the Persian Gulf," KZ, 19 February 1991, p. 3.BACK
37. According to Izvestiya, 12 December 1990, p. 6, Soviet Space Units are commanded by Colonel General V. L. Ivanov.BACK
38. V. Litovkin, "Patriot for Space: United States Tests New Antimissile Unit," Izvestiya, 11 February 1991, p. 4.BACK
39. Only a few years ago, such an admission of Soviet technological inferiority would have been unthinkable.BACK
40. See Scott Shane, "Soviet Muslims Support Saddam Hussein," The Baltimore Sun, January 20, 1991 and George Stein, "Soviet Muslims Divided on Gulf War," Report on the USSR (Radio Free Europe), Vol. 3, No. 8 (February 22, 1991), pp. 13-15.BACK
41. Some 63% of 2000 Soviet citizens interviewed during the first week of the war supported the allied coalition. See "Soviet General Fears War Could Reach USSR Territory," Reuters, January 31, 1991. Cited in Stein.BACK
42. Oleg Shchedrov, "Islamic Factor in Policy on Iraq," Radio Moscow (in English), November 8, 1990. Cited in Stein.BACK
43. "10,000 Soviet Citizens Want to Serve in the Army of Saddam Hussein," Novosti, February 5, 1991. Cited in Stein. The same day the Soviet Ministry of Defense announced that it could not concern itself with sending volunteers to assist either Iraq or the allies in the war. See "We Do Not Enlist Volunteers," KZ, 5 February 1991, p. 3.BACK
44. See Population of the USSR. A Statistical Yearbook (Moscow: Finances and Statistics, 1989), p. 8.BACK
45. Ibid., p. 3. Population growth was 17 percent in Azerbaijan, 13 percent in Kazakhstan, 4 percent in Latvia, 6 percent in the Ukraine, and 7 percent in Russia, Byelorussia, and Estonia.BACK
46. Inter-ethnic violence in the Soviet Union has already led to the appearance of hundreds of thousands of refugees. See Ann Sheehy, "The State of the Multinational Union," Report on the USSR (RFE/RL Research Institute), Vol. 3, No. 1, (January 4, 1991), p. 18. See also Charles Carlson, "Kazakhstan. Inter- ethnic Tensions, Unsolved Economic Problems," Bess Brown, "Tadzhikistan. Ten Months after the Dushanbe Riots," and James Critchlow, "Uzbekistan. The Crisis Deepens," in the same issue, pp. 29-30, 32-34 and 36-40 respectively.BACK
47. Moscow World Service, 1210 GMT, 21 February 1991. See "Chemical Troops Commander Speaks," FBIS-SOV-91-036, 22 February 1991, pp. 29-30.BACK
48. M. Zheylov, "The Warsaw Pact and European Security," KZ, 22 February 1991, p. 3.BACK
49. See "Army-Navy Game," U.S. News and World Report, March 18, 1991, p. 28. The Soviets are reported to be transferring large amounts of military equipment to naval outposts in order to circumvent arms-reduction accords. They are also reported to be building four new ballistic missile submarines, despite assurances to the U.S. to the contrary. Jane's Defense Weekly reports that the Soviets have shifted some 10,000 tanks, 4,000 other armored vehicles, and 20,000 artillery pieces to storage depots located east of the Ural Mountains to escape destruction under a conventional arms treaty. See "Soviets Are Moving Military Equipment," cited in The Kansas City Star, March 14, 1991, p. A7.BACK
50. Korzelov, "Half an Hour with Wang Xio," Moscow International Service, 1300 GMT, 22 February 1991. Cited in "Commentary Views Possible MiG-29 Sale to PRC," FBIS-SOV-91-037, 25 February 1991, p. 6.BACK
51. With a maximum take-off weight of 39,000 lbs, the MiG-29 Fulcrum is reported to have an engine thrust of 18,300 lbs, a maximum speed of Mach 2.3, and a service ceiling of 56,000. Soviet and East German aircraft are equipped with an extremely powerful pulse-doppler look-down/shoot down radar. In comparison, the 68,000 lb. F-15 has an engine thrust of 23,830, a maximum speed of Mach 2.5, and a service ceiling of 60,000 ft. With a wingspan of 42 ft. 9.75 inches, a length of 63 ft. 9 in. and a height of 18 ft. 5.5 in. the F-15 has a large radar cross section. In comparison, the MiG-29 has a wingspan of 37 ft. 8.75 in., a length of 56 ft. 8 in., and a height of 14 ft. 5.25 in. In Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in June 1982, Israeli F-15s engaged the best Soviet build fighters in the Syrian Air Force --which included MiG-29s --and destroyed 58 in air combat without suffering any losses. See Walter J. Boyne, Weapons of Desert Storm (Lincolnwood, Illinois: Publications International, Ltd., 1991), pp. 9, 16.BACK
52. The U.S. has also expressed interest in purchasing or leasing the MiG-29. See Charles Bickers, "U.S. Plans to Lease Soviet Aircraft," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 March 1991, p. 325. According to the author, coalition pilots practiced against former East German MiG-29s in the buildup to Operation Desert Storm.BACK
53. In the case of China, the MiG-29s are part of a barter deal in which the Soviets provide arms for food.BACK
54. See, for example, "Israelis Fear Syria is Buying Sophisticated Weapons," Knight-Rider Newspapers, cited in The Kansas City Star, March 16, 1991, p. A13. The Syrians and Soviets are involved in a "very huge" arms deal as Syria is attempting to upgrade its arsenal as a result of the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War. "The arms race...," remarked one Israeli military official, "is going to increase in the coming months."BACK
55. Moscow TASS International Service, 1515 GMT, 22 February, cited in "Defense Ministry Denies Military Delegation in Iraq," FBIS-SOV-91-037, 25 February 1991, p. 17.BACK
56. "Is Moscow Helping Baghdad," New Times, No. 7 (19-25 February 1991), p. 1.BACK
57. Moscow International Service, 0100 GMT, 27 February 1991, cited in "Yazov Interviewed on Gulf, Pact, China Ties," FBIS-SOV91-041, 1 March 1991, pp. 51-52.BACK
58. "USSR Defense Minister's Order of the Day No. 8," KZ, 22 February 1991, p. 1. The order was dated February 1991.BACK
59. A. Gorokhov and V. Izgarshev, "Today is Soviet Army and Navy Day," KZ, 23 February 1991, pp. 1-2.BACK
60. Yazov reiterates the point made by Corps General M. Tlass, Syrian Minister of Defense, on Moscow Radio during a recent visit to Moscow.BACK
61. Report on the USSR (RFE/RL Research Institute), Vol. 3, No. 10 (March 8, 1991), pp. 19-20. See also "Soviets Analyze Air Defence," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 March 1991, p. 328. Articles in the recently declassified journal of the Soviet General Staff, Voyennaya MYS1' [Military thought], suggest that a debate over the sufficiency of Soviet air defenses has been on-going for a number of years. See, for example, Colonel A. P. Vasil'yev and Colonel V. K. Rudyuk, "Is [Soviet] Air Defense Sufficient?" Voyennaya MYS1', No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 59-68. The authors argue that in light of recent American developments in stealth, cruise missile, and electronic warfare technology, the Soviet air defense system is inadequate.BACK
62. "But the Chemical War Has Already Begun..," KZ, 23 February 1991, p. 3.BACK
63. Petrov is the second senior Soviet officer to express the opinion the allied air strikes failed to completely destroy Iraqi chemical weapons production and storage sites. Reports that Saddam Hussein recently approved the use of chemical weapons against anti-government rebel forces in the South of Iraq give some validity to this argument.BACK
64. N. Kutsenko, "The Lessons of Combat," Izvestiya, 27 February 1991, p. 4.BACK
65. Kutsenko was drawing attention to the fact that the Gulf War was the first conflict in which wide-scale use was made of space assets, a lesson stressed by Western experts as well. See, for example, Barbara Starr, "Satellites Paved the Way to Victory," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 March 1991, p. 330.BACK
66. In comparison, a British general called the Iraqi Army "well equipped but badly trained, with no night fighting capability or experience of the operational level of war....It was totally out of its depth in the context of modern land-air battle." See Ian Kemp, "100-Hour War to Free Kuwait," Jane's Defense Weekly, 9 March 1991, p. 327.BACK
67. This has been a common theme throughout the Soviet military press. In an earlier interview, Army General M.A. Moiseyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff remarked: "The Persian Gulf has, to all intents and purposes, become a kind of testing ground for state-of-the-art technology and weapons which are or will become standard equipment for NATO's combined-arms forces in the near future. We must keep this in mind." See Yu. Rubtsov, "Unified Armed Forces for a Unified State," KZ, 23 February 1991, p. 2.BACK
68. Viktor Filatov, "Those Who Shed Blood," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 27 February 1991.BACK
69. See, for example, "Iraq Orders Troops to Halt Hostilities," United Press International, 1010 GMT February 28, 1991. "Despite the interference of large numbers of enemy helicopters and jet fighters," announced an Iraqi commentator on Baghdad Radio, "our troops managed to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy troops, which retreated in defeat."BACK
70. According to Moiseyev, an operations groups was formed at the beginning of the conflict. Its task was to "gather, generalize, and assess the information received." See Rubtsov, "Unified Armed Forces for a Unified State."BACK
71. Mikhail Mayorov, Moscow World Service, 1210 GMT 28 February 1991, cited in FBIS-SOV-91-040, 28 February 1991, p. 14.BACK
72. Moscow TASS, 1711 GMT, 1 March 1991, cited in "Officers Discuss War Lessons," FBIS-SOV-91-042, p. 40.BACK
73. Ibid., p. 41.BACK
74. Moscow TASS, 1936 GMT, 1 March lg91, cited in "Useful Lessons to be Drawn," FBIS-SOV-91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 42.BACK
75. This probably refers to mobile missile launchers, a matter of great interest to the Soviets. Despite all its space-based and aerial intelligence-gathering assets, the U.S. was unable to determine until late in the war just how many launchers were available to Iraq (initial estimates stated approximately 30, while final reports stated 200) and where they were located. Thus, the Persian Gulf War appears to vindicate Soviet emphasis on tactical, operational, and strategic mobile missiles. Conversely, it castigates the Soviet concept of the air campaign (at least against an opponent which possesses mobile missiles) which has as one of its main goals the swift destruction of the enemy's nuclear and chemical delivery capability.BACK
76. Moscow TASS, 1502 GMT, 3 March 1991, cited in "Military Reform Prospects Discussed," FBIS-SOV-91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 41.BACK
77. "Kulikov Defends Soviet Weaponry," FBIS-SOV-91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 43.BACK