Militarov wrote:We were successful? How comes none of my commanding officers felt that way i wonder, they just participated in that war. But i suppose you are right, what do they know.
We tied up shit, we were barely able to keep equipment going around to preserve it from destruction, all fixed sites we had were demolished. We shot 2 manned targets in 78 days. Ratio, right.
Those are the assertions that let me doubt that you have truly served in a Serbian AD unit (or serve in a role allowing you to really understand the AD dynamics of that air campaign).
Do you see Militarov the opinion of your commanding officiers
on theirs performance in that 1999 Air Campaign depend entirely on WHO was your AD commanding officiers
-admitting obviously your good faith -.
What a real Serbian AD operative should know perfectly ,in facts, is that those NATO manned aircraft loss
- an F-117 downed ,another F-117 heavily damaged beyond in theatre repair, an F-16CJ downed, another midly damaged by proximity detonation and one A-10 heavily damaged and not more employed for the entire campaign - was ALL the product of a SINGLE battery
(the 3th battery of 250 AD brigade), in spite that battery occupied a more difficult operative position
(more widely exposed to air attacks for landscape geomorphic reasons and relatively far from roads) in comparison to other Serbian AD brigades ,it was in a much less "target rich" sector in comparison to N-W axis
-the main one from Aviano AB -, that battery launched significantly less SAMs in comparison to the average counted in AWOS for its operative sector
,it was collocated just in the main transition route of SEAD/DEAD NATO aircraft
, it became quickly the FIRST target in the entire Serbian AD network
,for the combined efforts of the previously mentioned NATO's SEAD/DEAD fomations.
That battery in spite of those enormous circumstantial hindrances and the literally titanic NATO's SEAD/DEAD efforts directed specifically against it concluded the campaign without a single manning or equipment loss.
A Serbian AD operative know perfectly the absolutely DECISIVE role played by
,in first instance, NATO's aicraft Altitude
, in second, Flight's Pact Planning
- around the supposedly not mobile SA-3 batteries, the only having the kinematics capabilities to engage them at those altitude - and in third by susceptibility of those outdated SAM to ALE-50 decoy
- of which 1,479 was expended in the campaign - in maintaining whole those aircraft in the air, with good peace of the fancy stories garbage circulating in public media on it.A Serbian AD operative know perfectly the abysmal performance of AGM-88 in that campaign
and the fluctuating one of the NATO jamming platforms
-often incapable to achieve the required jamming signal's density at the radiating source even for those antediluvian SAM systems radars, to the point that it was risen a requirement for a sharp increase of the number of those platforms even to cope with those highly permissive environment.
A Serbian AD operative know perfectly as even a mere reduction of few seconds in the mean reaction time for the SA-3 batteries
- the unique with the kinematic performance for engaging NATO aircraft at theirs incoming altitude - would have produced a disproportionate effect both
in terms of number of engagement executed
than in the PK of those
enegagements and that for remain silent of the increase of the maximum number of target engaged for battery
that would have done wonders against the spaced four-ship F-16CJ SEAD formations and the FOV degree limit of theirs HTS.
Therefore Militarov all depend on WHO was your commanding officiers : very few
(those ones attempting ,with some personal initiatives and modifications to theirs equipment and operative employement, to partially emulate a fraction of the capabilities offered by beginning of '80 years AD products ) would spell of a score of several to zero in theirs favour
in spite of the absurd lopsided odds, the majority would simply point out the highly professionalism of theirs engineering and strategic command collagues allowing them to suffer very limited losses against the combined effeorts of more than a thousands of NATO aircraft and almost 20 Navy combat units.