USSR Tank production during Cold War

Inadequacies in the GRU led to an unjustified increase in the release of weapons in the USSR in the 70- ies

Continued. Start at number number 19, 21, 27

The Soviet General Staff , based on the data of the Main Intelligence Directorate , traditionally inflated mobilization capacity and the degree of mobilization readiness of potential adversaries of the USSR and especially the United States of America . On January 1, 1973 military intelligence has determined their state for arms as follows : tanks - 70,000 ( 50,000 main battle , and 20,000 light ) units per year , combat aircraft - 23 thousand field guns (towed ) - 20000 , SAU - 30 000 . In the military and scientific work GRU military capability the United States " in 1975 under the editorship of the Chief of General Staff, Marshal Victor Kulikov claimed that the American tank industry manufacture armored vehicles for the mobilization plan should be carried out at nine assembly plants, three of which ( the total capacity of 27 thousand tanks per year) were active and six (total capacity of 29,000 tanks a year) are on standby . In this study authors concluded that all these enterprises are able to reach full capacity , not later than six months after the announcement of mobilization.

U.S. tank industry in decline

If such views are still somehow could be justified in the late 50's - early 60 's, when the leaders of the United States seriously considered the possibility of World War II with the Soviet non-nuclear means , by the mid 70- ies similar views of the Soviet General Staff had lost all touch with reality . By this time the Americans had in fact refused to maintain spare capacity in its military industry . This can be illustrated by the poor condition of armored U.S. industry , which became evident after the Yom Kippur War between Arabs and Israelis.

The fact is that 18 days in October 1973 during a fierce battle irrecoverable losses Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) have made more than 840 tanks, or 42 % of the entire tank fleet of 2,000 armored vehicles at the beginning of the war. However, the surviving tanks are in poor condition , because most of them were damaged , sometimes repeatedly , to the battlefield ( all tanks were damaged in 2500 - 125 % of the original number ) and returned to the system only through a beautiful tank repair service of the IDF . The huge losses suffered Israelis and armored personnel carriers ( APCs were destroyed in 1900 , or 43% of the prewar fleet of 4400 cars ) .

The Arab -Israeli war in 1973 forced the leadership of the armed forces of the United States to reconsider their need for tanks. But above all, Americans had to empty the tank park of its military group in Europe, through which Washington urgently to replace the loss of Israelis in armored vehicles. Naturally , the command of U.S. forces in the Old World has demanded the government an immediate recovery of these " losses " .

However, the main reason for the increased needs of the U.S. Army was not even in it. The high level of losses in the tanks during the October War in the Middle East led U.S. commanders to reconsider their views on the likely level of self- damage in the event of a possible large-scale armed conflict with the USSR. If the pre-1973 Americans felt that their tank losses would amount to 8,6 % per month ( for tanks M -60) from those in the armed forces at the beginning of the fighting vehicles, after the Arab- Israeli war, they came to the conclusion that this figure can reach at least 20.1 %.

I must say that the U.S. tank fleet by the beginning of 1974 numbered only 8,226 cars ( in 5-6 times less than that of the Soviet army ) , including a 5049 modern tanks, M - 60. The remaining vehicles (3177 units) were the tanks of the type M -48 built 1953-1959 years, some of which are equipped with flammable gasoline engines .

In short , the Ministry of Defense decided to rush job in order to acquire as many armored vehicles. Simulated scenarios of future hostilities with the experience of the Yom Kippur War , the Pentagon has concluded that it is necessary to increase the annual purchase of tanks from the American industry in the 5-12 times .

And here it became clear that U.S. industry not ready to meet the increasing appetite of the American army. Strictly speaking , nothing surprising in that was not . Over 20 years ( 1959-1979 ) release main battle tanks in the United States was engaged in a single assembly tank factory in Detroit . And in the years 1965-1971 the production of these armored vehicles here fell to the level of 200-300 units per year. In 1972 fiscal year, the Pentagon has purchased only 118 MBT . However , since 1965 , the company also supplied the armed forces of light reconnaissance tanks M- 551 " Sheridan " , but in 1971 stopped their production.

Naturally, such a low level of production of tanks , just to ensure continuity of the production cycle at the Detroit plant , has undermined the attractiveness of military business for many suppliers of tank parts and components and has led to a significant erosion of the subcontracting base tank industry . Thus, in 1959-1962 years in the U.S. had two plants - a supplier of tank shells and three - the casting of tank turrets , and in 1963-1971 , respectively , two of the company , by the 1974- th left only one firm Blau Knox in East Chicago (Indiana) , capable of producing little more than 500 sets of tank shells and towers in the year . Thus , even after the transition to three-shift working week without a weekend plant in East Chicago was able to release a total of 512 sets of buildings and towers.

The reader may ask: what 's the problem ? All that needs to be done in such a situation - is to donate the money to increase purchases of large armored casting , reactivated back foundries , finally build new businesses .

With the money really was no problem . Congress immediately appropriated virtually unlimited funds to expand production of armored casting . For example, 24 million went to increase the capacity of the plant in East Chicago, from 500 to 760 sets per year. Another large sums earmarked for reopening of a foundry in the town of Birdsboro ( Pennsylvania) . Nevertheless, the first additional armored vehicle , issued as a result of measures taken by firefighters to increase the capacity Tank U.S. industry , the Pentagon could get only after 28 months after the allocation of this money.

To better understand the difficulties encountered should first hear the views of overseas experts . Here, for instance , wrote in his report to the Pentagon R. Zilman , technical director of the American Association of cast steel , which the Ministry of Defence has commissioned a survey of the mobilization capacity of the foundry industry in the USA : "Due to the low level of production of tanks ( enough to sustain in the current state of only one foundry plant ) in recent years have been lost of skilled labor and professionals dramatically reduce the amount of production equipment and its technical level . After the Korean War, the government sought to maintain production capacity tank casting in a position to quickly boost production of tanks in the event of new emergencies. However, in the late 60 -ies of the government , seems to have abandoned its policy of maintaining a reserve base for the production of large armored casting . As a result, we now are left with no choice but to start all over again . "

The only possible way out of difficulties with the armored casting as soon as possible Zilman considered reactivation of the plant in Birdsboro ( it was built specifically for the manufacture of tank turrets corps at the end of the Korean War , but did not begin to produce them , he was sold to a private firm that it has mastered production of small castings for the civilian sector ) . However, in this optimal case , according Zilmana require at least 22 months that the company was able to produce 480 sets of buildings and towers in the year.

In turn, Jacques Gensler , a renowned expert in the field of military industry , appointed subsequently to the post of deputy secretary of defense for research and development and procurement in the administration of President Bill Clinton , was forced to conclude that the situation in the tank industry in the United States 1973-1978 , respectively, demonstrated complete lack of mobilization planning by the U.S. government , especially at the level of sub-contractors.

Thus , the GRU exaggerated the real possibility of staffing industry in the USA , barely capable at this time to issue five hundred tanks a year , about a hundred times , that is two orders of magnitude . Similarly, (dozens or more times ) overestimated the potential mobilization of the American military - industrial complex and the production of other types of weapons (aircraft , artillery , ammunition , etc.) . It is also proved to be exaggerated and the data, determines the power of MIC in Western Europe.

Bogus numbers on NATO

GRU and General Staff not only ignored the changes in the status of mobilization readiness of the industries of NATO in the 60- 70- ies , but also began to dramatically increase their estimates of the mobilization capacity of the unit.

For example , what happened to the figures for Germany . Indicators of mobilization capacity of tanks has increased from 4000 units per year in 1973-1983 period to 5100 in 1984 and 7100 units in 1985 . In the BMP and BTR - according to 3750 to 5800 and 8500 units for combat aircraft - from 800 units per year in 1985 to 1400 in 1987. Especially monstrous power grew by field guns - from 2800 units per year in 1983 to 16,500 ( of which 14 300 towed and 2200 self-propelled guns ) in 1987. To imagine the extent authorized overstatement enough to remember : in 1987 zapadnogermanskaya military industry produced only 65 tanks , 190 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers and a single field guns . As for field guns , then their production in Germany after World War II was carried out during the four years (1978-1981) , when it was made 216 field howitzers 155 mm .

Here is a quote from the certificate provided by the leaders of the GDR in the GRU intelligence, which , of course, were much better informed about the situation in the Federal Republic than their Soviet counterparts (incidentally, the GDR secret service in this help do not bother to even classify ): "In full loading of existing capacities of military industries of Germany while working in three shifts, arms production , compared with the period of peaceful time can be increased to a maximum of 50-60 %. The significant increase in the production of major weapons (tanks , artillery , combat aircraft ) can be achieved no earlier than the expiration of one year. " Production in peacetime and after mobilization (units per month) is shown in the table .

Thus, in comparison with those of East intelligence GRU overstated mobmoschnosti military industries in West Germany in tanks up to 6 times on APCs and armored personnel carriers - 12 times , on combat aircraft - in 5 times, field guns - 70 times .

Particularly rapid assessment of the General Staff of the mobilization capacity of NATO began to grow after 1986. Already in 1987 the corresponding figures for the tanks for the entire unit increased by 15 thousand units . As a result, the mobilization capacity of the alliance on which the General Staff held its teachings Center- 87 " , amounted to 80 thousand tanks ( 42 thousand for the U.S., 16,000 for Germany, 12,000 for the UK and 5000 for France and Italy). If we add the 10,000 Japanese armored vehicles ( this figure were identified possibilities of this island nation ) , tanks, China and Israel, as a result of such calculations of Staff implied that in case of war opponents of the Soviet Union would be able to produce more than 100,000 tanks per year.

April 18, 1991 newspaper "Red Star "held an editorial roundtable entitled "The armor and people " , dedicating his tanks and tank . The meeting was attended by Deputy Minister of Defence Industry Zakharov , head of armored control Defense Col. Gen. Alexander Galkin, his first deputy, Maj. Gen. N. Zhuravlev , Head of the Military Academy of Armoured Troops , Colonel-General Vladimir Gordienko , director of the Research Institute of Transmash " Professor E. Potemkin and Chief Military Institute Maj. Gen. V. spray . Considerable discussion took place and issues of mobilization training. Colonel-General Galkin , noting that the cost of tank in the Soviet Union fell by more than twice , and the release of infantry fighting vehicles - even more than five times , said that it eventually leads to loss of capacity for mobilization tank industry . But Colonel General Gordienko generally justify the numerical superiority of Soviet tanks in the NATO countries over the huge mobilization capacity of the West. " Americans so much technology (as in the Soviet Union's tanks. - V. Sh ) to anything - he said. - But this does not mean that if necessary they can not clean up its release in the right quantities . When mobilization deployment ( within six months ) U.S. industry is able to build on the 50,000 tanks a year. Power in Western Europe - 25 thousand. Agree , figures eloquent .

The figures were really eloquent . Such estimates gave GRU released in 1975, the military-scientific work " The military capability of the United States " edited by Chief of General Staff Marshal V. Kulikov.

I think that in the history of modern exploration of other failures of this magnitude is not easy to find . And this , moreover, that, as illustrated by the production of tanks in the U.S., there was quite enough information available to conclusively demonstrate that no large reserve capacities , or high alert for mobilization deployment of the military industries of the West was not. There was the GRU and quite authentic documents , obtained by our agents , supporting data open press.

Why is all this wealth of information ( by the way, often expensive and extracted difficult and sometimes dangerous by most intelligence) has been abandoned in favor of frank " lime "? The reasons are several .

First, the lack of skilled professionals needed to study such complex phenomena as the military-economic potential and mobilization training of the economy of modern Western states . In essence it and learn something in the early 70- ies there was no one . This may seem implausible , but in such a huge organization such as the GRU, in which some generals have not less than a hundred, this time recruited nearly a dozen employees, more or less continuously involved in research in the field of military economy .

Secondly , and perhaps most importantly , the White House came to President Ronald Reagan, who declared that the United States must be prepared to conduct long-term non-nuclear world war. The Soviet General Staff could not imagine the preparations for this war except through the tremendous increase not only the current release of equipment , but also the mobilization capacity of American industry for the production of conventional weapons ( tanks, planes , artillery , etc. ) as well as ammunition . Besides, was dismissed from his post as Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov , a supporter of the development of precision weapons , and was replaced by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev , people from more traditional views , for which the tank was something like " holy cow " .

Vitaly Shlykov

Chairman of the Commission on Security Policy and the examination of the military law of the Public Council under the Russian Defense Ministry

The US didn't need tanks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davy_Crockett_(nuclear_device)

3 men with that device could annihilate any tanks Russia sent at them. Hence tanks weren't needed anymore.

I always wonder if those devices still exist.

US built too many bombers in the 50's-60's?

The B-52 was the best investment ever made. Not all planes flew and many were just used as parts..to this day. No need to make B-52 parts for decades was a savings.

What other bombers were made...

B-45 was made in small numbers and was only used for Korean War.
B-47 was Nazi tech swept wing that never saw combat. Was only a nuclear deterrent that bothered Russian airspace.
B-57 wasn't liked because it was British, most were destroyed on the ground in Vietnam.

Making all the aluminum which was eventually used for beer cans meant US would have massive profits in exports later. Winning the export game which resulted in huge money in US to invest in other countries....creating massive empire.

Russia was just left with alot of tanks that couldn't be turned around for a profit.

Pervius wrote:The US didn't need tanks.



3 men with that device could annihilate any tanks Russia sent at them. Hence tanks weren't needed anymore.

I always wonder if those devices still exist.

By that definition, since the USSR had nuclear tipped SAMS, they did not need any bombers. One SAM would wipe out any fleet of bombers. US wasted its money on all those bombers and other aircraft that made up the gargantuan USAF.

Also there were nuclear torpedoes. Guess those expensive American carriers became useless long ago as well.

That is not the total number of course. Even today, most vehicles are stored.

But yes, the old Soviet armored fist of like 30 thousand tanks is history. And for the better.

In terms of one simultaneously operating group of 30,000, ofc that never was. But, I was speaking in generalities, if we look at soviet tank force in the 80s:

Согласно информации Министерства обороны СССР, на 1 января 1990 года в строю имелось 63 900 танков, 76 520 боевых машин пехоты и бронетранспортёров[20]

From information by the ministry of defense, USSR, on January 1, 1990, the armed forces had 63,900 tanks and 76,520 BMPs and BTRs.

Absurdly impressive? Indeed, of course this included T-55s, T-62s, probably stored T-10s and other older stuff. But given massive modern tank production, much of this first was contemporary and effective equipment. Those days are long gone though.

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-KXADEmADJxY/TxhE_3yaKyI/AAAAAAAACaM/hzdj1KorfYs/s1600/Relikt_Grigoryan-3.jpg
Random sexy photo of BMP-3 with finally a good measure of protection.

http://www.otvaga2004.narod.ru/publ_w8_2012/0003_wallpapers.htm

Gur Khan added a bunch of wallpapers, from Tagil show.

Pervius wrote:The US didn't need tanks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Davy_Crockett_(nuclear_device)

3 men with that device could annihilate any tanks Russia sent at them. Hence tanks weren't needed anymore.

I always wonder if those devices still exist.

From your wiki link.

Both recoilless guns proved to have poor accuracy in testing, so the shell's greatest effect would have been its extreme radiation hazard. The M-388 would produce an almost instantly lethal radiation dosage (in excess of 10,000 rem) within 500 feet (150 m), and a probably fatal dose (around 600 rem) within a quarter mile (400 m).[3]

The 55th and 56th Infantry Platoons, attached to the Division Artillery of the U.S. 82nd Airborne Division, were the last units equipped with the M-29 Davy Crockett weapons system. These two units were parachute deployed and, with a 1/2 ton truck per section, (3 per platoon) were fully air droppable. The units were deactivated in mid-1968.

GarryB wrote:More importantly they were dangerous in the sense that they reduced the nuclear threshold, where previously a nuclear strike would generally be in retaliation for a WMD attack, but here it is used against an armoured attack where there are no western armoured units to counter it.

And the other problem is... how will your allies... whose ground you are supposed to be defending feel about you irradiating every square km of territory of theirs?

Most Soviet Armour had anti radiation liners so the effective lethal range of the radiation from the Davey Crockett would be less than expected, but how effective will Soviet units become if they know they are already going to die a slow painful death over the next few weeks from radiation? How will they treat the civilian locals, or any prisoners they might capture? What sort of decisions will they start making about the use of the fire power at their disposal?

And you can be sure if the US Army had introduced nuclear armed tactical rockets that all those tactical rockets the Soviets had in service would get their share of nuclear tips too.

Then there is the area of doctrine... the western doctrine seemed to be based around fighting a losing battle and eventually resorting to nukes to prevent a rout.
Ironically the Soviet doctrine seemed to be based on the premise that if the enemy has them they will use them so a full conflict with the west would involve the use of nuclear and chem and bio weapons from the outset, because keeping them in storage till they are needed might result in your enemy having the advantage of using them first, which might deal such a critical blow that it is decisive. They compare it with a gun fight in the wild west... in a gunfight they don't swear at each other and then trade punches and then throw chairs and bottles and then go for their guns... what happens if you are holding a chair to throw at the other guy and he goes for his gun... You go for your gun straight away and so does he...

I think a lot of Soviet doctrine is self-serving revisionism... I saw a documentary with an ex-KGB officer who said, "In the 1970s and 1980s the leaders remembered the horrible losses of the Great Patriotic War, we were all either veterans or the children of veterans and we had all lost a family member... We would never have used our weapons in a first strike."

Of course they wouldn't have, because there would have been massive retaliation!

In 1972 the Soviets wanted to obliterate China, and they approached the USA and said, "we are done with China, we cannot deal with them, we are going to destroy them, their arsenal is limited, it may cost us some cities in Siberia and perhaps Vladivostok, but we want you to know what we plan to do so you are not alarmed when you detect our launches..." and the USA said, "if you launch on China we will do a full launch on you, we will not let you erase China from the map."

The Soviets were not afraid of a minor nuclear arsenal such as that possessed by China.

Yes the USA is the only nation ever to have used nuclear weapons on another nation, but we had a nuclear monopoly over the USSR for a few years in the late 1940s and we did not use it. If Stalin had been the only guy with a nuclear arsenal in 1948 you can be certain there would have been nuclear devastation in Europe and Asia.


Soviet doctrine was against a first strike because a first strike would not have been able to neutralize all possible avenues of retaliation (land based ICBMs, submarine based, aerial based, etc). They couldn't pull it off so they wouldn't attempt it, that's why they didn't try.

If the Soviet leadership had determined a first strike were feasible and could reasonably be expected to destroy most American/NATO nuclear assets, they would have done it.

Hell the US Joint Chiefs of Staff told Kennedy in 1961-1962 that they could have US Marines killed by Special Forces dressed as Cuban/Soviet commandos, at Guantanamo Bay, and then detonate a small nuclear device in Miami and use it as an excuse for a full nuclear strike on the USSR which would kill 95% of the Soviet population, with the USA losing "only 30%" of its population in the Soviet retaliation. Of course Kennedy was outraged that they even came up with such a proposal and he chewed them out over it... Of course the military-industrial-financial complex eventually killed Kennedy.

I think that some Soviet leaders were genuine patriots who wanted peace with other nations and good things for their people, others need to be looked at as interlopers who couldn't have cared less if Russia was ravaged by nuclear fire or if Russians suffered, just as long as their regime remained in power and their immediate family/clique was secure in a bunker.

If it is possible to have "favorite" Soviet leaders, I would pick Kruschev and Gorbachev. Kruschev was a consummate politician who knew how to stay alive in the Stalinist terror but he was smart enough, or caring enough, to know that nuclear war would not benefit anybody.

GarryB wrote:

And the other problem is... how will your allies... whose ground you are supposed to be defending feel about you irradiating every square km of territory of theirs?

It may sound crass and ugly but the USA doesn't really care about the long-term consequences to the land of its supposed allies.

Most Americans wouldn't have cared too much if there had been a hot war with NATO and Warsaw Pact taking place in FRG/DDR (West/East) Germany even if it lasted from the 1970s into the 1980s, as long as it didn't result in a nuclear exchange between the USA and the Soviet Union and it didn't see any damage resulting in the USA.



American society and national culture is incredibly selfish and overwhelmingly materialistic. For 80-90% of Americans as long as their daily life is not interrupted and their quality of life does not decrease, they don't care if some random nation (say Poland, or Turkey, or Argentina, or Serbia, or Kazakhstan) is wiped off the map tomorrow.

Most Americans now have such a blood lust that they cheer when their government brutalizes a small nation incapable of effectively defending itself, let alone ever posing a threat against America... Americans were thrilled when NATO bombed Serbia because the Serbs dared to defend THEIR province of Kosovo against Albanian terrorists. I was very young at the time and even found myself caught up in the media hysteria that the Serbs were evil. Only later did I learn that the media lied, we bombed the wrong side, NATO was absolutely wrong, there was no genocide against Albanians, and even if Albanians were being shoved around, Albanians were operating as insurgents and gangsters and had to be crushed.

America's mass media whips people into a frenzy and they end up cheering like the audience of the ancient colosseum, demanding blood, the blood of whichever nation America happens to be bombing during some particular month.

GarryB wrote:

In 1972 the Soviets wanted to obliterate China, and they approached the USA and said, "we are done with China, we cannot deal with them, we are going to destroy them, their arsenal is limited, it may cost us some cities in Siberia and perhaps Vladivostok, but we want you to know what we plan to do so you are not alarmed when you detect our launches..." and the USA said, "if you launch on China we will do a full launch on you, we will not let you erase China from the map."

Sorry, but what is your source for this... I have serious doubts the Soviets would confide such a thing to the US. Second of all I rather doubt the US would have gotten involved and would have been overjoyed at the thought of the Soviets and Chinese fighting each other.

The Soviets were not afraid of a minor nuclear arsenal such as that possessed by China.

And yet the US was afraid of the Chinese in the early 1950s when Chinese forces directly intervened in Korea... and they didn't even have the bomb then...

Yes the USA is the only nation ever to have used nuclear weapons on another nation, but we had a nuclear monopoly over the USSR for a few years in the late 1940s and we did not use it.

Well actually you only had a couple and your only delivery options were slow B-29s which would have been in serious trouble over the Soviet Union... especially compared with over Germany or Japan. The Mig-3 was average at medium and low altitudes but at high altitudes it was an excellent interceptor and Germany lost a lot of spy aircraft to them.

Equally the US had just fought a world war on two fronts and the US population was sick of war. The Soviets had lost a lot, but their position at the end of the war was vastly different from their position at the start... and most of their cities had already been trashed several times.

Soviet forces at the end of WWII would have not been that easy to deal with for any force let alone the western allies... most of which were actually grateful to the Soviets for their part in defeating the German army.

Just a bit of a response for now, then I sleep for a while...


First, my source on the China thing was an article a few years ago citing remarks from Kissinger and some statements made by Kissinger discussing how the USA "went to bat" to save China. I'll try to dig up the article.



As for Soviets at the end of WW2, they had received 600,000 trucks from the USA along with 15-16 million pairs of boots, not to mention a HUGE amount of refined petroleum products. Sure they had a lot of crude, but they had very minimal refinery capabilities. The Soviets had no war economy, they had nothing. The USA could have stopped shipping them stuff in 1945, attacked them in 1946, and their army would have collapsed after running out of fuel and food. Hell, the USA had to ship the Soviets several hundred thousand tons of supplies so they could carry out the attack into Manchuria. They needed fuel, food, munitions, etc.

Without the USA the Red Army would walked into battle, barefoot, carrying what few supplies they had on their backs.

America provided the Soviet Union with approximately 600,000 trucks, enough to enable them to motorize just about their entire army and all of the major units/Fronts that took part in Operation Bagration in August 1944.


15+ million pairs of boots
600,000 trucks
23,000 tanks and other armored fighting vehicles
2.6 MILLION TONS of aviation fuel (approx 60% of the aviation fuel used by the Soviets in the war)
2,000 railway locomotives (approx 82% of locomotives the Soviets used in the war)
11,100 railway cars (approx 81% of railway cars the Soviets used in the war)
591,000 tons of aluminum (approx 56% of the aluminum the Soviets used in the war)
390,000 tons of copper (approx 45% of the copper the Soviets used in the war)
300,000 tons of explosives (approx 35% of the explosives the Soviets used in the war)



The Bolsheviks had so thoroughly wrecked Russia that it basically no economy, no industrial base, no agricultural base, they ruined the nation to the point that without the massive injection of aid from the Western Allies, especially the USA, the entire Soviet logistics system would have collapsed no later than mid 1942.

BTRfan wrote:

especially the USA, the entire Soviet logistics system would have collapsed no later than mid 1942.

Given that the majority of Allied aid did not arrive after mid 1942, that is a very hard thesis to put any legitimacy in.

SOviet Union would have lived, US aid or not.

Soviets had no war economy? Nothing?

Nonsense to put lightly. The number of armored vehicles, guns, shells, and supplies to support the troops (yes, the MAJORITY of the supplies were Soviet in creation, not lend lease) goes against such nonsense.
Given how much of the nation was under German occupation/relocating, the war economy that the USSR achieved is nothing short of amazing.

I don't know what Western revisionism you have been reading, but I suggest you review your readings. The USSR would most certainly not have gone into battle bootless if it was not for the USA.

GarryB wrote:
Just the same as I doubt the Russians would launch a nuclear strike on the US if the US decided to attack Iran.

Actually my appraisal of the situation is that Russia will probably say, "enough is enough, we cannot permit this to continue" and will do something major if the USA blasts their way into Iran, especially if the USA uses nuclear weapons against Iran...


I see a possible scenario along these lines...


Israel launches air raids into Iran.

Iran retaliates with massive conventional ballistic missiles, rockets, etc.

Hezbollah joins in and launches massive rocket/artillery attacks from Lebanon.

Israel launches nuclear attacks against select targets in Iran after suffering tens of thousands of civilian casualties from the rocket/missile attacks.

Iran responds with massive chemical and biological weapons attacks against Israeli cities. If Iran has any nuclear weapons they use what few they might have at this time.

Israel responds with massive nuclear attacks against Iranian population centers.

Pakistan launches major nuclear attacks against Israeli population centers. It is also possible the Pakistani government will refuse to help Iran or go after Israel, in which case it will be toppled by radicals who will then launch the attacks.

India may cease the opportunity to attack Pakistan or pre-emptively attack Pakistan, possibly using their nuclear weapons.

China might be drawn into this escalating conflict.

America will probably add its weight to the conflict and launch nuclear strikes on Iran at this point, possibly adding Syria to the hit-list.

If things get to this point, there's little reason to believe that Russia won't intervene in a nuclear war going on just south of its borders.



Basically Israel has the potential to start the next world war. There is absolutely no reason to believe that Iran's leaders want to develop a handful of nuclear weapons so they can immediately use them against the West.

I don't believe the media that a nuclear armed Iran will be an existential threat to any nation, let alone the USA (or even Israel for that matter, a nation I regard as a "bandit state" and a truly "rogue state" but one which is kept afloat and in power by the king of rogue states, the USA). A nuclear armed Iran will be a positive force for peace in a region rife with conflict and strife.

Iran probably does want nuclear weapons as they realize that genuine nuclear powers do not get attacked by the USA/NATO. The USA will falsely claim a nation is trying to get nuclear weapons, to justify an attack and sell the idea of an attack to the American masses, as was the case with Iraq, but real nuclear powers (such as DPRK/North Korea) do not get attacked/invaded.

A nuclear armed Iran will up the ante, raise the stakes, and make conventional military action too risky and too dangerous, opening the way for an increase in diplomatic and economic activity. Instead of rattling the saber against Iran we should be trading with them, investing in their development, and working with them to help combat piracy (on the high seas), stop piracy (of merchandise/intellectual property), curtail the opium/heroin trade, etc. However, America's government is not so much an American government as it the American branch of the Israeli government. You might call the House of Representatives and the Senate "The American branch of the Israeli Knesset." American politicians answer to Israel and Israel's insane paranoid regime.

Most nations are ruled by rational leaders who want to perpetuate their rule and keep their nation intact. There is no reason to believe Iran's leaders are itching to develop a handful of nuclear weapons so they can plunge bring about a global nuclear conflagration.


At some point Russia is going to have to "get tough" and "draw a line in the sand" with NATO, and let them know, "your nonsense has gone on for too long... First it was bombing Republika Srbska, then it was bombing Serbian forces in the Serbian province of Kosovo, the expansion of NATO into the former Warsaw Pact, the expansion of NATO right up to our very borders, the invasion of Afghanistan, then Iraq, then Libya, the coups and power changes in Tunisia, Egypt, all over North Africa and the Middle East... We're not going to let you walk all over another half-dozen nations and bring the world to the brink of chaos or nuclear war."

Russia is one of the few powers that can draw a line and enforce it. I think Russia and China should communicate to America, in very simple terms, "if you invade or otherwise attack Iran it will require a nuclear response against the continental United States."

America has gotten to the point where it cannot be dealt with in a reasonable and laid back diplomatic fashion. It needs a brutal hard-hitting ultimatum to shake it awake. A nation that tells a leader, "you and your sons have 48 hours to leave Iraq or there will be shock and awe" is not a nation you can hold a rational discussion with.

There is no real possibility of dialogue with American officials, be they politicians or State Department bureaucrats. Russia and China need to simply say, "If you want a nuclear war then attack Iran, if you don't want a nuclear war then refrain from attacking Iran, that's how it can play out... The ball's in your court, do what you think is best."

If it comes to a nuclear war, so be it, as horrible as it will be, this present situation of a unipolar world with an American/NATO/Zionist bully roaming around the world beating up on nations that cannot effectively defend themselves, has to end, it has to be stopped.

America has become the evil empire and it needs to be stopped. America is every bit as rotten as the Soviet Union was in 1940, the Soviet Union that invaded the Baltic States and Finland. America is every bit as rotten as the British Empire was, the Empire that forcibly subjugated 25-30% of the land surface of the world and caused tens of millions, maybe hundreds of millions, of deaths.

Israel is the greatest threat to world peace. An America dominated by Israeli interest groups, "Israel firsters," globalists, internationalists, Council on Foreign Relations, Bilderbergs, Free-Masons, etc, is the second greatest threat to world peace. In a sense, America is the muscle and Israel is the nerve center, the command center. Israel shouts orders and America enforces the orders, and the great mass of humanity suffers miserably as a result.

This international bully regime has to end.



Anyway, if I were Iran, assuming that Iran may have 2-3 small nuclear devices, along with their SRBMs and IRBMs... There is no way Iran can pose a nuclear threat to the USA or even retaliate effectively in nuclear terms... However, if Iran is attacked in an act of naked/unprovoked aggression by the USA/NATO (this seems to be an increasingly common occurrence, NATO/USA attack nations that do not want war), Iran would best be served by using one of their small nuclear devices detonated about 100-200 miles up over the center of the USA to destroy all non-shielded/non-hardened electronics and plunge the USA into total chaos. In the event of an invasion of Iran along the lines of what was done to Iraq, Iran would be morally justified in doing whatever it could do wreck America's ability to wage war against it.


That said, America is missing a huge opportunity with Iran. Iran has a GDP that puts it on par with highly developed Western European nations, it has an increasingly young and educated population, but it has a shortage of management talent, engineers, etc. If it were not for the media rhetoric and the boycotts, it would be very plausible for several hundred thousand Americans to move to Iran for a few years and help them with management, administration, engineering, etc... It would alleviate some of the unemployment problems in the USA, help further Iran's develop, and it would foster cooperation and friendship between the nations. It would also give a large number of Americans a chance to gain firsthand insight into Iran... However, the USA/Israeli bully team does not want that because most Iranians are not marching in the streets calling for the death of all Americans, they just want to be left alone even though they are opposed to the nasty American government... Even if they call for the death of the US government or burn the American flag, think of it this way, the USA government has stated that it has not removed the option of a NUCLEAR STRIKE against Iran from the "table of options." If somebody has stated they are not averse to the idea of hitting your country with nuclear weapons, why wouldn't you hate their government?


Anyway, I didn't mean to rant. I just hope Russia, China, and other nations assert themselves and stand up to the USA before the USA destroys the world.

Question - wht didn't the USSR opt for a new tank design in late 1970s and 1980s as they did previously i.e. a new tank design every 8-12 years?

We have:
T-54 - 1949
T-62 - 1961
T-64 - 1964
T-72 - 1973

Then nothing until T-14. I don't count T-55 and T-80, both are just modified variants of previous designs.

Was it for financial reasons or for practical ones i.e the Soviet army considered the existing models to be good enough and with enough potential for modernization that a new tank was not needed?

Allo Zaloga! Where are U?
West is barely admitting that soviet tanks were not so ineffective, and they could match with the most sophisticated western hardware. Very strange, they admitted that Iraqi -soviet origin- tanks wiped out of the map nearly '100' Iranian -western origin- tanks, meanwhile the westerners are continuing to claim that F-14 tomcat destroyed nearly "160 Iraqi" -soviet origin- aircraft. In fact, the Mollahs in Iran have been lying since 1979, but not when they claimed Iranian F-14 destroyed 160 Iraqi fighter bombers. Of course, the F-14 so effective, that Iranian ground forces did not need its precious coverture. Iranian high commands preferred to sacrifice its Tankists in order to preserve the Iranian F-14 'reputation'. During June 1982 in Lebanon, at the Sultan Yakoub's battle, even the T-62 burnt the Israeli state of the art tank dubbed 'Merkava' -facts ignored in this article-, but the Israelis false claims continue to prevail until these days pretending that the Israeli air force destroyed 100 Migs, meanwhile none Israeli aircraft were lost. Again the Israelis preferred to lose their Tankists and their soldiers instead of risking to degrade the famous reputation of their F-15 and F-16.
This article demonstrates to you those soviet technologies whatever the battlefield, and the time, were at least equal to the Western state of the art's technologies.

During the Cold War the lack of a large scale open conflict between the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, despite high tensions and an intense arms race between the lasting over 40 years, meant that most comparisons of Soviet and Western hardware were made on paper rather than on the battlefield. Although conflict saw both sides claim to field the more capable battle tanks, actual engagements between tanks of the same generation were relatively few and far between - with the major wars in Korea and Vietnam seeing few major tank battles and neither of the Soviet defence clients equipped with modern armour. It was primarily in the Middle East, where terrain favoured armoured engagements, that major engagements between equivalent Soviet and Western tank designs took place. The first major example instance of this was the Yom Kippur War of 1973 - Israel’s first major war where it could boast modern American-supplied armour - which saw Israeli M60 tanks go head to head with Egyptian and Syrian Soviet-supplied T-55 and T-62s. Overall although Arab armoured units took heavy losses to Israeli air strikes due to insufficient provision of air cover, and eventually lost the war, the performance of the T-62 was considered superior to that of the M60 leading Israel to begin that same year with the development of an indigenous battle tank to avoid a further reliance on U.S. armour. While the M60 was the leading American tank at the time, the T-62 was considered the third best Soviet tank meaning the need for Israel to develop more competitive armour on its own was urgent.

While the Yom Kippur War lasted only 19 days, a far longer and more protracted war in the Middle East saw Western and Soviet tank designs engage one another in much larger battles which demonstrated more clearly the performance advantages of the latter over the former. The Iran-Iraq War saw both sides deploy the most capable export available tanks of their time, with the Iranian Army deploying 460 M60 tanks from the U.S. alongside an elite of 870 British Chieftain tanks. The Chieftain was the only Western tank thought to rival the M60 at the time, and Iran notably fielded hundreds more of these than the British Army itself. Iraq at the start of the war fielded approximately 1000 T-62 tanks alongside an elite of around 50 T-72s, with the T-72 design having entered service in the Soviet military from 1973 and the Middle East having been its first export destination. The new Soviet tank was considered the third most capable in the country’s inventory, and was developed as a lighter and cheaper derivative of the T-64 design, the country's number two tank, with the elite of Soviet armoured units now formed by T-80 tanks which were considered the most capable.

The performance of the third and fourth rate Soviet tank designs, the T-72 and T-64, against the most capable Western armour of its time, highlighted the extent to which the USSR had achieved a major advantage in armoured warfare technologies. Both Iraqi and Iranian forces highlighted that the T-72 was undoubtedly the most capable tank of the war, and despite participating in many major battles it suffered few losses and was almost totally invulnerable in combat against the Chieftain and M60, while inflicting very heavy losses on Iranian armour. As one Iranian officers observed in June 1981, the British Chieftain "do not go to any comparison with it [T-72]. Iran has no effective means of dealing with the T-72. " Following ground battles at Basra in July 1982, Iranian officers highlighted that not only was the T-72 superior, but those captured from Iraq had also proven much more reliable and easier to maintain than their own American and British supplied armour.

Iranian tank company commander Adar Forouzan recalled during the war Iranian tank crews had little good to say about the Chieftain, writing: "The more I learned about the tank ‘Chieftain,’ the more I agree with them." He further referred to the T-72 as the most dangerous weapon in the Iraqi inventory, stating: "the Iraqis were partially equipped with the new T-72 tanks. They had good speed and firepower, and their armour protects against RPGs of our infantry. T-72 was a very dangerous threat to us." Regarding one of Iran’s first clashes T-72s in the spring of 1982 in the region near the Dasht Abbas Dizful, the commander highlighted that following the appearance of T-72s Iranian Chieftains immediately started taking losses with his own tank being hit, stating: "In my tank hit the MTO exploded fuel vapours, the shock wave blew off the headset. We all jumped out of the tank and fled on foot." In the opening stages of the war an Iraqi tank battalions equipped with T-72s neutralised Iranian armour in multiple engagements reportedly suffered no losses at all, with even M68 anti tank guns and TOW anti tank missiles proving wholly ineffective. At least one engagement pitting T-62 and T-72 units against Iranian armour saw the Iranians lose over 100 tanks with Iraqi losses limited to around a dozen - most of them T-62s.

Both Iran and Iraq would place orders for further armour during the war, with Iraq receiving approximately 1000 T-72 tanks. Iran would purchase Type 59 and Type 69 tanks from China, derivatives of the older Soviet T-55, which were similarly overwhelmingly outmatched but was at least easier to maintain and more reliable than the complex Chieftain design. Iran’s most capable tank of the war was the Chonma Ho, a derivative of the T-62 produced in North Korea of which the country acquired around 200 along with Korean ballistic missiles, submarines, artillery and other assets. The war ultimately highlighted that had a major ground war occurred between Soviet and Western forces, Soviet armoured units would have had a significant advantage deploying the T-72 alongside the heavier and more capable T-64 and T-80 - with even the T-62 proving a match for the Chieftain and M60 despite being a fourth rate design. Iran would secure a contract shortly after the war’s end to produce the T-72 under license, which remains its most capable tank to this day with several hundred in service. Iraq meanwhile, although encouraged to purchase American M1 Abrams tanks following the overthrow of its Ba’athist government, would retire these from its elite units in favour of purchases of Russian T-90 tanks - a design derived closely from the T-72 which had entered service from the 1990s. Western interest in the T-72 and T-80 in particular was high, and multiple example of both tanks were acquired for study in the aftermath of the Cold War.

https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/soviet-vs-nato-tanks-how-russian-armour-proved-its-superiority-on-middle-eastern-battlefields