Continued. Start at number number 19, 21, 27
The Soviet General Staff , based on the data of the Main Intelligence Directorate , traditionally inflated mobilization capacity and the degree of mobilization readiness of potential adversaries of the USSR and especially the United States of America . On January 1, 1973 military intelligence has determined their state for arms as follows : tanks - 70,000 ( 50,000 main battle , and 20,000 light ) units per year , combat aircraft - 23 thousand field guns (towed ) - 20000 , SAU - 30 000 . In the military and scientific work GRU military capability the United States " in 1975 under the editorship of the Chief of General Staff, Marshal Victor Kulikov claimed that the American tank industry manufacture armored vehicles for the mobilization plan should be carried out at nine assembly plants, three of which ( the total capacity of 27 thousand tanks per year) were active and six (total capacity of 29,000 tanks a year) are on standby . In this study authors concluded that all these enterprises are able to reach full capacity , not later than six months after the announcement of mobilization.
U.S. tank industry in decline
If such views are still somehow could be justified in the late 50's - early 60 's, when the leaders of the United States seriously considered the possibility of World War II with the Soviet non-nuclear means , by the mid 70- ies similar views of the Soviet General Staff had lost all touch with reality . By this time the Americans had in fact refused to maintain spare capacity in its military industry . This can be illustrated by the poor condition of armored U.S. industry , which became evident after the Yom Kippur War between Arabs and Israelis.
The fact is that 18 days in October 1973 during a fierce battle irrecoverable losses Israel Defense Forces ( IDF ) have made more than 840 tanks, or 42 % of the entire tank fleet of 2,000 armored vehicles at the beginning of the war. However, the surviving tanks are in poor condition , because most of them were damaged , sometimes repeatedly , to the battlefield ( all tanks were damaged in 2500 - 125 % of the original number ) and returned to the system only through a beautiful tank repair service of the IDF . The huge losses suffered Israelis and armored personnel carriers ( APCs were destroyed in 1900 , or 43% of the prewar fleet of 4400 cars ) .
The Arab -Israeli war in 1973 forced the leadership of the armed forces of the United States to reconsider their need for tanks. But above all, Americans had to empty the tank park of its military group in Europe, through which Washington urgently to replace the loss of Israelis in armored vehicles. Naturally , the command of U.S. forces in the Old World has demanded the government an immediate recovery of these " losses " .
However, the main reason for the increased needs of the U.S. Army was not even in it. The high level of losses in the tanks during the October War in the Middle East led U.S. commanders to reconsider their views on the likely level of self- damage in the event of a possible large-scale armed conflict with the USSR. If the pre-1973 Americans felt that their tank losses would amount to 8,6 % per month ( for tanks M -60) from those in the armed forces at the beginning of the fighting vehicles, after the Arab- Israeli war, they came to the conclusion that this figure can reach at least 20.1 %.
I must say that the U.S. tank fleet by the beginning of 1974 numbered only 8,226 cars ( in 5-6 times less than that of the Soviet army ) , including a 5049 modern tanks, M - 60. The remaining vehicles (3177 units) were the tanks of the type M -48 built 1953-1959 years, some of which are equipped with flammable gasoline engines .
In short , the Ministry of Defense decided to rush job in order to acquire as many armored vehicles. Simulated scenarios of future hostilities with the experience of the Yom Kippur War , the Pentagon has concluded that it is necessary to increase the annual purchase of tanks from the American industry in the 5-12 times .
And here it became clear that U.S. industry not ready to meet the increasing appetite of the American army. Strictly speaking , nothing surprising in that was not . Over 20 years ( 1959-1979 ) release main battle tanks in the United States was engaged in a single assembly tank factory in Detroit . And in the years 1965-1971 the production of these armored vehicles here fell to the level of 200-300 units per year. In 1972 fiscal year, the Pentagon has purchased only 118 MBT . However , since 1965 , the company also supplied the armed forces of light reconnaissance tanks M- 551 " Sheridan " , but in 1971 stopped their production.
Naturally, such a low level of production of tanks , just to ensure continuity of the production cycle at the Detroit plant , has undermined the attractiveness of military business for many suppliers of tank parts and components and has led to a significant erosion of the subcontracting base tank industry . Thus, in 1959-1962 years in the U.S. had two plants - a supplier of tank shells and three - the casting of tank turrets , and in 1963-1971 , respectively , two of the company , by the 1974- th left only one firm Blau Knox in East Chicago (Indiana) , capable of producing little more than 500 sets of tank shells and towers in the year . Thus , even after the transition to three-shift working week without a weekend plant in East Chicago was able to release a total of 512 sets of buildings and towers.
The reader may ask: what 's the problem ? All that needs to be done in such a situation - is to donate the money to increase purchases of large armored casting , reactivated back foundries , finally build new businesses .
With the money really was no problem . Congress immediately appropriated virtually unlimited funds to expand production of armored casting . For example, 24 million went to increase the capacity of the plant in East Chicago, from 500 to 760 sets per year. Another large sums earmarked for reopening of a foundry in the town of Birdsboro ( Pennsylvania) . Nevertheless, the first additional armored vehicle , issued as a result of measures taken by firefighters to increase the capacity Tank U.S. industry , the Pentagon could get only after 28 months after the allocation of this money.
To better understand the difficulties encountered should first hear the views of overseas experts . Here, for instance , wrote in his report to the Pentagon R. Zilman , technical director of the American Association of cast steel , which the Ministry of Defence has commissioned a survey of the mobilization capacity of the foundry industry in the USA : "Due to the low level of production of tanks ( enough to sustain in the current state of only one foundry plant ) in recent years have been lost of skilled labor and professionals dramatically reduce the amount of production equipment and its technical level . After the Korean War, the government sought to maintain production capacity tank casting in a position to quickly boost production of tanks in the event of new emergencies. However, in the late 60 -ies of the government , seems to have abandoned its policy of maintaining a reserve base for the production of large armored casting . As a result, we now are left with no choice but to start all over again . "
The only possible way out of difficulties with the armored casting as soon as possible Zilman considered reactivation of the plant in Birdsboro ( it was built specifically for the manufacture of tank turrets corps at the end of the Korean War , but did not begin to produce them , he was sold to a private firm that it has mastered production of small castings for the civilian sector ) . However, in this optimal case , according Zilmana require at least 22 months that the company was able to produce 480 sets of buildings and towers in the year.
In turn, Jacques Gensler , a renowned expert in the field of military industry , appointed subsequently to the post of deputy secretary of defense for research and development and procurement in the administration of President Bill Clinton , was forced to conclude that the situation in the tank industry in the United States 1973-1978 , respectively, demonstrated complete lack of mobilization planning by the U.S. government , especially at the level of sub-contractors.
Thus , the GRU exaggerated the real possibility of staffing industry in the USA , barely capable at this time to issue five hundred tanks a year , about a hundred times , that is two orders of magnitude . Similarly, (dozens or more times ) overestimated the potential mobilization of the American military - industrial complex and the production of other types of weapons (aircraft , artillery , ammunition , etc.) . It is also proved to be exaggerated and the data, determines the power of MIC in Western Europe.
Bogus numbers on NATO
GRU and General Staff not only ignored the changes in the status of mobilization readiness of the industries of NATO in the 60- 70- ies , but also began to dramatically increase their estimates of the mobilization capacity of the unit.
For example , what happened to the figures for Germany . Indicators of mobilization capacity of tanks has increased from 4000 units per year in 1973-1983 period to 5100 in 1984 and 7100 units in 1985 . In the BMP and BTR - according to 3750 to 5800 and 8500 units for combat aircraft - from 800 units per year in 1985 to 1400 in 1987. Especially monstrous power grew by field guns - from 2800 units per year in 1983 to 16,500 ( of which 14 300 towed and 2200 self-propelled guns ) in 1987. To imagine the extent authorized overstatement enough to remember : in 1987 zapadnogermanskaya military industry produced only 65 tanks , 190 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers and a single field guns . As for field guns , then their production in Germany after World War II was carried out during the four years (1978-1981) , when it was made 216 field howitzers 155 mm .
Here is a quote from the certificate provided by the leaders of the GDR in the GRU intelligence, which , of course, were much better informed about the situation in the Federal Republic than their Soviet counterparts (incidentally, the GDR secret service in this help do not bother to even classify ): "In full loading of existing capacities of military industries of Germany while working in three shifts, arms production , compared with the period of peaceful time can be increased to a maximum of 50-60 %. The significant increase in the production of major weapons (tanks , artillery , combat aircraft ) can be achieved no earlier than the expiration of one year. " Production in peacetime and after mobilization (units per month) is shown in the table .
Thus, in comparison with those of East intelligence GRU overstated mobmoschnosti military industries in West Germany in tanks up to 6 times on APCs and armored personnel carriers - 12 times , on combat aircraft - in 5 times, field guns - 70 times .
Particularly rapid assessment of the General Staff of the mobilization capacity of NATO began to grow after 1986. Already in 1987 the corresponding figures for the tanks for the entire unit increased by 15 thousand units . As a result, the mobilization capacity of the alliance on which the General Staff held its teachings Center- 87 " , amounted to 80 thousand tanks ( 42 thousand for the U.S., 16,000 for Germany, 12,000 for the UK and 5000 for France and Italy). If we add the 10,000 Japanese armored vehicles ( this figure were identified possibilities of this island nation ) , tanks, China and Israel, as a result of such calculations of Staff implied that in case of war opponents of the Soviet Union would be able to produce more than 100,000 tanks per year.
April 18, 1991 newspaper "Red Star "held an editorial roundtable entitled "The armor and people " , dedicating his tanks and tank . The meeting was attended by Deputy Minister of Defence Industry Zakharov , head of armored control Defense Col. Gen. Alexander Galkin, his first deputy, Maj. Gen. N. Zhuravlev , Head of the Military Academy of Armoured Troops , Colonel-General Vladimir Gordienko , director of the Research Institute of Transmash " Professor E. Potemkin and Chief Military Institute Maj. Gen. V. spray . Considerable discussion took place and issues of mobilization training. Colonel-General Galkin , noting that the cost of tank in the Soviet Union fell by more than twice , and the release of infantry fighting vehicles - even more than five times , said that it eventually leads to loss of capacity for mobilization tank industry . But Colonel General Gordienko generally justify the numerical superiority of Soviet tanks in the NATO countries over the huge mobilization capacity of the West. " Americans so much technology (as in the Soviet Union's tanks. - V. Sh ) to anything - he said. - But this does not mean that if necessary they can not clean up its release in the right quantities . When mobilization deployment ( within six months ) U.S. industry is able to build on the 50,000 tanks a year. Power in Western Europe - 25 thousand. Agree , figures eloquent .
The figures were really eloquent . Such estimates gave GRU released in 1975, the military-scientific work " The military capability of the United States " edited by Chief of General Staff Marshal V. Kulikov.
I think that in the history of modern exploration of other failures of this magnitude is not easy to find . And this , moreover, that, as illustrated by the production of tanks in the U.S., there was quite enough information available to conclusively demonstrate that no large reserve capacities , or high alert for mobilization deployment of the military industries of the West was not. There was the GRU and quite authentic documents , obtained by our agents , supporting data open press.
Why is all this wealth of information ( by the way, often expensive and extracted difficult and sometimes dangerous by most intelligence) has been abandoned in favor of frank " lime "? The reasons are several .
First, the lack of skilled professionals needed to study such complex phenomena as the military-economic potential and mobilization training of the economy of modern Western states . In essence it and learn something in the early 70- ies there was no one . This may seem implausible , but in such a huge organization such as the GRU, in which some generals have not less than a hundred, this time recruited nearly a dozen employees, more or less continuously involved in research in the field of military economy .
Secondly , and perhaps most importantly , the White House came to President Ronald Reagan, who declared that the United States must be prepared to conduct long-term non-nuclear world war. The Soviet General Staff could not imagine the preparations for this war except through the tremendous increase not only the current release of equipment , but also the mobilization capacity of American industry for the production of conventional weapons ( tanks, planes , artillery , etc. ) as well as ammunition . Besides, was dismissed from his post as Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov , a supporter of the development of precision weapons , and was replaced by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev , people from more traditional views , for which the tank was something like " holy cow " .
Chairman of the Commission on Security Policy and the examination of the military law of the Public Council under the Russian Defense Ministry