US Navy Aircraft Carriers

Dual Band Radar Swapped Out In New Carriers

WASHINGTON — In something of a surprise move, the US Navy revealed the long-touted dual band radar (DBR) being installed in new carriers of the Gerald R. Ford class will only be fitted on the first ship, and a new, yet-to-be-chosen radar will be installed on subsequent ships.

The revelation came Tuesday as Rear Adm. Thomas Moore, program executive officer for aircraft carriers, spoke at the McAleese Credit Suisse defense conference in Washington.

Moore indicated the move, decided upon last fall, was not due to particular problems with the DBR, now under development by Raytheon. Rather, he said, the decision was based on economics and need.

"It's a very capable radar," he said of the DBR, but analysis showed the carrier didn't need all the system's capabilities. The move to the EASR, he told reporters, could save up to $120 million on the second ship, the John F. Kennedy.

A specific EASR radar has not been chosen, Moore said, noting that "several candidates" were on the market.

Raytheon has been working on the EASR oncept under a $6 million study and demonstration contract awarded in June 2014 by the Office of Naval Research. The ONR study, according to a press release, is intended to "leverage proven Radar Modular Assembly (RMA) architecture matured on Air and Missile Defense Radar (AMDR)." The EASR, like the AMDR — also under development by Raytheon to replace SPY-1 radars in new Aegis combat systems — is intended to be a scalable family of radars tailored to suit different sizes of ships.

The complex DBR suite was once intended to be a cornerstone of a new combat system, fitted on DDG 1000 Zumwalt-class destroyers and CVN 78 Ford-class carriers. The system combines a SPY-3 X-band multifunction radar with a SPY-4 S-band volume search radar.

The Navy decided in 2010 to remove the SPY-4 radar from the Zumwalt destroyers as a cost-reduction move, although the carriers were to retain the original configuration.

With the decision to remove the DBR from subsequent ships of the class, the Ford now will be the only ship in the fleet to operate the full system.

A spokeswoman for the Naval Sea Systems Command said an EASR Request for Proposals "should be forthcoming."

The Ford, Kennedy and all other US aircraft carriers are built at the Huntington Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard in Newport News, Virginia.

Pentagon’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Already $370M Over Budget
23:57 21.05.2015(updated 00:47 22.05.2015)

The estimated cost to the US Navy's second Ford-class aircraft carrier is already $370 million above a Congressionally mandated cap set for its construction after the USS Ford ran $2 billion over budget.

The cost of the USS John F. Kennedy was capped at $11.498 billion, but a new estimate from the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office (CAPE) on Wednesday revised the numbers up to $11.868. That figure is a working estimate and the office is still waiting for more information from the Navy about particular costs to be confirmed.

The USS Kennedy — also known as CVN-79, using the Navy's designation for a nuclear powered aircraft carrier — is the second of three Ford-class carriers included in a program whose budget is supposed to be $42.8 billion.

Currently, Virginia-based Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. has been building the carriers in the Ford-class program, and the Kennedy is supposed to be completed by 2023.

Since the USS Ford — slated for delivery in March 2016 — ran $2 billion over budget to a final cost of $12.8 billion, current cost overruns are likely to encounter extra scrutiny.

Sen John McCain (R-Ariz.) — a longtime critic of wasteful, bloated military spending — responded that cost overruns on this project could put the entire Ford-class project at risk.

"Accountability must be restored to the Ford-class aircraft carrier program," McCain, who is the head of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement in response to the revised estimate. "Our nation simply cannot afford these kinds of cost overruns amid rising global threats and fiscal challenges."

McCain asserted that he expects the Pentagon to tell his committee "who is responsible for this cost overrun and what will be done to hold those individuals accountable."

The Pentagon has decided that no one is to blame, and no one will face consequences, for wasting a staggering $36 million building a shiny, new, sprawling military facility in Afghanistan that has never been used and will probably be demolished.

It does not bode well that just the day before, McCain was also issuing statements of condemnation over the Pentagon's inability to do exactly that — find someone accountable — for the waste of $36 million on a Marine facility in Afghanistan that military personnel never even used.

The Navy declined to respond to the latest estimates from CAPE.

"We do not discuss pending legislation, however controlling and improving CVN 79’s cost is of highest priority to the Navy. The Navy is committed to maintaining the cost of CVN 79 within the Congressional cost cap of $11.498 billion," Navy leaders said in a statement.

Broken Promises

The cost increases come after many Navy officials had asserted that lessons from the USS Ford were being applied to the Kennedy to reduce costs.

"I fully expect we will build Kennedy for a billion [dollars] less than we built Ford," Rear Adm. Tom Moore told Military.com in July 2013 as the first pieces of the Kennedy were being constructed, an expectation that is now almost certainly out of reach.


The USS Ford - seen here under construction in 2012 - ran $2 billion over budget but the Navy promised most of those costs were due to its being the first of its class and would not recur with the USS Kennedy.

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/military/20150521/1022434359.html#ixzz3aoVcTOuS

The possible cost overruns — estimated at 3.2% of the original budget — are being evaluated while the Defense Department's chief weapons buyer, Frank Kendall, considers the approval of a $4 billion construction contract for the Kennedy.

Beci Brenton, a spokeswoman for Huntington Ingalls, told Bloomberg in an e-mail that the company expects a contract by June 30.

The Senate Armed Services Committee's version of the 2016 defense authorization bill, S. 1118, includes provisions to review costs for the Ford-class program and to limit some funds for the Kennedy and the third carrier in the program — the USS Enterprise.

New Class, New Costs, New Concerns

The Ford-class carriers feature larger deck space, with an electromagnetic catapult to launch jets into the air at sea, as well as more computer automation to reduce manpower needs compared to the Nimitz class.

The new carriers are also designed to generate three times the electrical energy of their predecessors, with four 26-megawatt generators supplying 104 megawatts to the ship.

One of the reasons the Navy said the Ford cost more, and the subsequent ships will not, is that it was the first of its class, and some of the engineering that had to be completed for it will not recur with the next two ships using the same model.

For example, there were problems with the Ford's new advanced arresting gear which catches the jets as they land on deck. That particular component underwent a two year delay due to redesign needs.


However, the Ford is not entirely complete, while work has already begun on the Kennedy, and it is still being equipped with some of the new advanced technology unique to the class.

McCain has pushed to have certain "shock tests" moved up to be performed on the Ford, which the Navy would prefer to have wait to test on the Kennedy. But McCain has had concerns about the stability of the new systems.

"These issues with CVN-78 raise questions about whether now is the time to award this contract for CVN-79, " McCain said. "This latest news report does not give me confidence that the Department of Defense understands the risk and cost of CVN-79, which they will be passing along to American taxpayers."



Read more: http://sputniknews.com/military/20150521/1022434359.html#ixzz3aoTArsY2

US Navy Plans to Equip Next-Generation Aircraft Carriers With Laser Weapons

This is America's new $13 billion warship



The US Navy is less than a year away from adding the most expensive warship in history to its fleet, the $13 billion USS Gerald Ford.

The USS Ford, the lead ship of the new Ford-class aircraft carrier series, is expected to join the US Navy by February 2016, according to CNN. Once deployed, the ship will be the largest carrier ever to ply the seas and will feature a number of changes and advancements over the US' current Nimitz-class aircraft carrier.

Here's a look at this multi billion-dollar beast:

The USS Gerald Ford is expected to cost upwards of $13 billion by the time it is deployed.

The Ford, and the accompanying Ford-class carrier fleet, are intended to relieve stress and over-deployment within the US Navy. Currently, the Navy operates 10 carriers but wants an additional vessel to take pressure off of the rest of the fleet.

The ship will feature a host of changes over the current Nimitz-class carrier. Ford-class carriers will be capable of generating three times more electrical power than the older carrier classes, for example.


This increased electrical power supply allows the Ford to use the newly designed Electro-Magnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), which will allow the vessel to launch 25% more aircraft a day than the previous steam-powered launch systems.


The amount of electricity onboard also makes the Ford-class carriers ideal candidates to field laser and directed-energy weapons in the future, like rail guns and missile interceptors.


Once launched, the Ford will be the largest warship in the world. It will be 1,092 feet long and displace upwards of 100,000 tons.




This size will allow the carrier to house about 4,400 staff and personnel while also carrying more than 75 aircraft.


The aircraft carrier Pre-Commissioning Unit (PCU) Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) gets underway beginning the ship's launch and transit to Newport News Shipyard pier 3 for the final stages of construction and testing.


But for all the advances within the Ford-class carrier group, some have questioned the wisdom of continuing an astronomically expensive carrier-heavy naval strategy in a time when inter-state warfare is rare and nations like China continue to develop potentially carrier-killing long-range anti-ship cruise missiles.

http://www.businessinsider.in/This-is-Americas-new-13-billion-warship/articleshow/47776394.cms

This is America's new $13 billion warship


$13 billion and still not wired for network centric warfare

CENTCOM, PACOM face flattop gaps this spring amid tensions

Crises in the world's most volatile regions could spell longer deployments and more uncertainty for fleet sailors.

The tense waters of Asia-Pacific or the Middle East could go for weeks or months without a U.S. aircraft carrier patrolling there this spring. But military planners are weighing whether this is the right moment to drop carrier presence, with strikes against Islamic State militants intensifying, rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and North Korea's hydrogen bomb test. The other options are to cut one carrier's needed maintenance short or extend a crew's deployment beyond the 7-month goal — both unsavory options for fleet bosses.

At issue is a weeks-long period between when the Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group heads home from the Gulf in May and when the Dwight D. Eisenhower CSG deploys later that summer. That leaves the John C. Stennis CSG, which deploys in a few weeks, as the only flattop in either 5th or 7th Fleet.

Another option is abruptly canceling the carrier Ronald Reagan's overhaul. The flattop recently arrived in Japan and needs maintenance before preparing for its patrol this summer.

The Navy declined to comment specifically on the looming carrier gap — precise deployment dates are not releasable to the public — but Navy spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Tim Hawkins said that leadership was constantly reviewing deployments.

"It's important to keep in mind that military leaders continually review force requirements and adjust global force management plans accordingly,” Hawkins said. “Naval forces are inherently flexible, agile and will continue to be where it matters, when it matters.”

None of the options facing the fleet and combatant commanders are good, according to officials familiar with the internal deliberations.

f the Navy pulls the carrier from U.S. Central Command in favor of dispatching Stennis to U.S. Pacific Command, it will be the second time within a year that the fight with ISIS will lack a flattop. The ultimate decision will rest with Gen. Joe Dunford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and Defense Secretary Ash Carter.

Fleet Forces Command was tasked in 2014 by the Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert to get deployments down to seven months from as long as 10 months, a goal the current CNO Adm. John Richardson has committed to. But in order to close the looming carrier gap, the Navy will either have to extend Truman’s seven-month deployment to eight months or more, or curtail Reagan’s maintenance period in Japan. Cutting carrier maintenance, especially after years of straining optempo, is a step fleet bosses have pushed to avoid.

All CSG and amphibious ready group deployments under the new deployment rotation plan are scheduled for seven months, according to Fleet Forces Command spokesman Cmdr. John Gay.

More challenges

All of this comes at a time when the fleet is attempting to reset after years of hard use, including a two-year period between 2011 and 2013 when the Navy was required to keep two CSGs in 5th Fleet. The Optimized Fleet Response Plan was designed to give the Navy the time and space to fix its ships and give sailors, who have borne the brunt of the deployment uncertainty, time to recover.

Work stoppages in the Navy-run public shipyards due to automatic spending cuts called sequestration also created maintenance delays, further reducing the readiness of the fleet.

Extending deployments and returning to uncertainty would take a toll on sailors and their families, said one former FFC leader.

“How much will the sailors and their families sustain in an all-volunteer force before you start harming retention,” said retired Adm. John Harvey, who commanded FFC until 2012. “You do a back-to back deployment like [carrier Eisenhower] did in 2012/2013, you pay for that.”

Harvey said the issues the Navy is facing are the result of the meeting combatant commander requirements beyond its capacity, including the stretch from 2011 to 2013 when the Navy was required to have two carriers in the gulf and one in the Pacific at all times.

“There is no easy way to take a 10-carrier force and operate it like you have 16,” Harvey said. “At some point the wheels will come off the cart.”

And the fleet will continue to be a 10-carrier force for most of the decade. The fleet has been at 10 carriers since the carrier Enterprise was decommissioned in 2013 and stayed at that figure because of delays in the deployment date of carrier Gerald R. Ford, said Bryan Clark, a retired submarine officer and analyst with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

“It was supposed to be a 14-month gap at 10 carriers and now the gap will be almost 8 years with shock testing being added to the Ford’s pre-deployment preparations,” Clark said. In August, the Pentagon ordered the Navy to run shock trials on Ford before she deploys, further delaying the Navy’s newest ship.


Still, Clark argues that the COCOMs should just make do with the reduced presence so as not to endanger the Navy's future ability to generate force.

“There will likely be more security challenges going forward, rather than less, as China continues to pursue its ambitions, North Korea strives to get attention, Russia looks to shift attention from its domestic problems, and ISIS tries to regain the initiative,” Clark said.

“The U.S. should take this time, although it may mean less carrier presence now, to get the fleet back in good shape to prepare for a decade in which the U.S. will need to reassert its role as an enforcer of global norms.”

For many observers, the carrier gaps are the result of delays created primarily by ill-considered cuts to the Navy’s budget and force structure.

“We are reaping the consequences of our actions,” said Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper and influential consultant with the FerryBridge Group. “We cut too deeply in the face of mounting requirements and we’re either going to have to figure this out on our own, or we are going to be forced into figuring it out by a calamity.”

Supercarrier Ford to join Navy fleet in September

The most expensive warship ever built, the $12.9 billion aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), is expected to join the U.S. Navy's fleet in September, a Navy official says.

Sean J. Stackley, the Navy's assistant secretary for acquisitions, gave the timetable for the 100,000-ton, 1,100-foot-long supercarrier in testimony prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee on wednesday.

As of March, the Ford, on which construction began in 2009, was 97% complete, Stackley said. He said the carrier is expected to begin sea trials in July and be delivered to the Navy by Newport News Shipbuilding two months later.

The ship is named after the 38th president, who died in 2006. He served aboard the USS Monterey during World War II and was discharged from the Navy as a lieutenant commander.

Stackley said the next carrier in the Ford class, the USS John F. Kennedy (CVN 79), is scheduled to be launched in 2020. That ship was 18% percent complete as of March, he said.

The third Ford-class carrier, the USS Enterprise (CVN 80), is set to begin construction in 2018, Stackley said.

The timetable for the Navy's biggest warships came as Stackley gave lawmakers the Navy's budget request for the next five years. The service wants to spend $81.3 billion over that period to build 38 warships, he said.

Included in that request are the first replacement for the aging Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, nine Virginia-class attack submarines, 10 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and smaller numbers of other surface ships.

The goal of the building plan is to have a Navy battle force of 308 ships by 2021, according to Stackley's testimony.


3 new Aircraft Carriers

The age of aircraft carriers could be coming to an end

Since World War II, flat-topped aircraft carriers have been the backbone of US power projection and military might at sea, but a new generation of long-range missiles being developed by the US's adversaries could push these mechanical marvels off the front lines.

The US's massive aircraft carriers have a problem. The F-18s aboard US aircraft carriers have a range of about 500 nautical miles, as Ben Ho Wan Beng notes at the US Naval Institute.

The incoming F-35Cs are expected to have a marginally better range of about 550 nautical miles.

Meanwhile, China's aptly named DF-21 "Carrier Killer" anti-ship ballistic missile is said to have a range of 810 nautical miles, and is capable of sinking an entire 1,100 foot carrier with 70 aircraft and 6,000 sailors on board.

Such long-range anti-ship missiles create anti-access/area denial areas (also established in the Baltics by Russia) wherein the US can't position it's most powerful assets, the aircraft carriers.

Thusly, aircraft carriers, which have been the star of the show since their emergence during World War II, may end up taking a back seat to smaller vessels.

The US Navy has long been working towards achieving "distributed lethality," or a strategy that entails arming even the smallest ship with long-range missiles capable of knocking out enemy defenses from far away. Engaging enemies with smaller ships also helps to keep extraordinarily valuable targets like carriers out of harm's way.

In fact, the Navy plans to have at least 40 Littoral Combat Ships with a "full suite of anti-ship and anti-submarine sensors and weapons ... Plus such improvements as a medium-range 'over the horizon' missile to sink enemy ships," as Breaking Defense notes.

So instead of putting a carrier in harm's way, the Navy would likely look to use longer ranged platforms, like cruiser-destroyers that carry the Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, which have a range of about 900 nautical miles.

In the end, a Carrier Strike Group would no longer lead with the carrier.

Instead, Destroyers firing Tomahawk missiles would initiate the attacks, softening up enemy anti-access/area-denial capabilities before the big carriers moved in closer to shore

The Real Problem with America’s Aircraft Carriers Is Easy to See (But Near Impossible to Fix)

Stretching back several decades, the concept of missile defense has been hotly debated. Some well reasoned scholars argue that the United States and other countries need such defenses incase deterrence breaks down or an irrational actor gets their finger on the nuclear trigger. Others argue that missile defenses are a waste of money given that they are easily defeated, and defensive technology will always stay behind the curve — never ready for primetime.

Both sides have logical arguments. For the record, I am an advocate of missile defense — under certain conditions. With various nations all over the planet purchasing or developing ballistic and cruise weapons, defenses against such weaponry are vital — especially for the American navy in the form of Aegis missile defenses. When it comes to missile defense in nuclear matters- I have some shall we say, complex views. For regimes such as Iran, North Korea and others when sometimes rationality is not their strongest suit — missile defense all the way. When it comes to nations with larger missile arsenals such as China or Russia, I am not sold — yet.

There is however one thing you can't argue against, simple math.

Case in point, take a look at a recent book chapter by Dr. Toshi Yoshihara in Chinese Aerospace Power (a really good book, China defense geeks I am talking to you — it's a classic — get your credit card out) from our friends over at the Chinese Maritime Studies Institute.

Dr. Yoshihara notes:

"ASBMs (anti-ship ballistic missiles) may not need to produce mission kills against the surface fleet to complicate U.S. plans. They only need to reach the fleet's defensive envelope for the Aegis to engage the incoming threats, thus forcing the defender to expend valuable ammunition that cannot be easily resupplied at sea under combat conditions. Even inaccurate ASBMs, then, could compel the Aegis to exhaust its weapons inventory, leaving it defenseless against further PLA actions. Used in conjunction with conventional ballistic missile strikes against U.S. bases and other land targets across Asia — strikes that would elicit more intercept attempts — ASBM raids could deprive the United States and its allies of their staying power in a sea fight."

Such a point raises a larger question. Will American commanders in the future face large missile forces aimed at their ships that can just simply overwhelm their defenses through sheer numbers?

Another example comes from a 2011 report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Analysis entitled Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats (A2/AD geeks, this is truly a must read). In sketching out a scenario for a possible Iranian A2/AD campaign between 2020-2025, the authors explain:

"Iran could deploy its land-based ASCMs (anti-ship cruise missiles) from camouflaged and hardened sites to firing positions along its coastline and on Iranian-occupied islands in the Strait of Hormuz while placing decoys at false firing positions to complicate U.S. counterstrikes. Hundreds of ASCMs may cover the Strait, awaiting target cueing data from coastal radars, UAVs, surface vessels, and submarines. Salvo and multiple axis attacks could enable these ASCMs to saturate U.S. defenses…salvos of less capable ASCMs might be used to exhaust U.S. defenses, paving the way for attacks by more advanced missiles."

Think about it — could we someday see a scenario where American forces at sea with a fixed amount of defensive countermeasures facing an enemy with large numbers of cruise and ballistic weapons that have the potential to simply overwhelm them? Could a potential adversary fire off older weapons that are not as accurate, causing a defensive response that exhausts all available missile interceptors so more advanced weapons with better accuracy can deliver the crushing blow?

Simply put: does math win?

Truth be told, this is a very simplistic way of looking at the classic missile vs. missile-interceptor game. Many complex scenarios could be easily envisioned. Sea-based forces on the defensive would likely employ multiple methods to secure themselves. Jamming of missile and land-based guidance systems, counterstrikes on enemy missile launchers and attacks on enemy command and control would all likely be employed on some level once offensive missiles are launched. Preemptive strikes could also be employed if a credible threat of a launch was presumed. Not to mention possible available land-based interceptors could be in the mix depending on the area of hostilities as well as cyber and UAV strikes. And this says nothing about nuclear weapons…

Yet, you have to wonder, math does have a powerful say in such a scenario. And considering the cost of missile defenses vs. offensive missiles, "math" seems to have some valid arguments.

Ford carrier delayed until November, at least a year late

• The navy now estimates Gerald R Ford may be delivered in November 2016, more than a year late
  

• Some key subsystems will still be unproven when the carrier is delivered

The US Navy's (USN's) next class of nuclear-power carriers, USS Gerald R Ford (CVN 78), is to be delayed another two months and now delivered more than a year later than the original contracted delivery date.

"The current estimated delivery date is in November 2016," USN spokesperson Captain Thurraya S Kent said on 12 July. Shipbuilder Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) signed a detailed design contract with the navy that stated a delivery date of 30 September 2015.

As of June, Gerald R Ford was 98% complete and HII has turned over 97% of compartments, Capt Kent said.

So far 89% of the overall shipboard testing has been completed, but the November delivery date may need to be revised "if additional issues arise during the remaining shipboard testing", Capt Kent noted.

The revelation drew reproach from John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a long-term critic of the programme.

"Even if everything goes according to the navy's plan, CVN 78 will be delivered with multiple systems unproven," he said. "The advanced arresting gear [AAG] cannot recover airplanes. Advanced weapons elevators cannot lift munitions. The dual-band radar cannot integrate two radar bands," the senator said.

Indeed, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) published the redacted report on 11 July stating the navy had not proven the capability or safety of the AAG system. AAG's developmental testing, originally scheduled to end in 2009, will continue through 2018.

The DoD IG recommended the navy "perform cost-benefit analyses to determine whether the AAG is an affordable solution for navy aircraft carriers before deciding to go forward with the system on future aircraft carriers".

Navy’s $12.9 Billion Carrier Isn’t Ready for Warfare, Memo Says


The U.S. Navy’s newest aircraft carrier isn’t ready for warfare. The $12.9 billion USS Gerald R. Ford -- the most expensive warship ever built -- may struggle to launch and recover aircraft, mount a defense and move munitions, according to the Pentagon’s top weapons tester. On-board systems for those tasks have poor or unknown reliability issues, according to a June 28 memo obtained by Bloomberg News.

“These four systems affect major areas of flight operations,” Michael Gilmore, the Defense Department’s director of operational test and evaluation, wrote Pentagon and Navy weapons buyers Frank Kendall and Sean Stackley. “Unless these issues are resolved, which would likely require redesigning” of the aircraft launch and recovery systems “they will significantly limit the CVN-78’s ability to conduct combat operations,” Gilmore wrote, using a technical name for the carrier.
More Delays

The reliability woes mean that delivery of the Ford -- the first of three carriers ordered up in a $42 billion program -- will probably slip further behind schedule. The Navy announced last week that the ship, originally due by September 2014, wouldn’t be delivered before November this year because of continuing unspecified testing issues.

The service has operated 10 carriers since the retirement of the USS Enterprise in 2012. Extended deployments of the remaining ships have placed stress on crews and meant added strain meeting global commitments from the battle against Islamic State to ensuring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, home to $5 trillion in annual trade.

A prolonged delay could also hamper the military if a new conflict arises.

“Based on current reliability estimates, the CVN-78 is unlikely to conduct high-intensity flight operations” such as a requirement for four days of 24-hour surge operations “at the outset of a war,” Gilmore wrote.

As delivery of the Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc. vessel approaches, “my concerns about the reliability of these systems remain and the risk to the ship’s ability to succeed in combat grows as these reliability issues remain unresolved,” Gilmore said.
‘Unacceptable’ Delays

Republican Senator John McCain, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, called the Navy’s announcement of additional delays last week “unacceptable,” adding that it was a “case study in why our acquisition system must be reformed.”

A Navy spokeswoman, Lieutenant Kara Yingling, said the Navy was aware of the report but referred additional comment to Kendall’s office. Kendall spokesman Mark Wright said in an e-mail "we don’t feel it is appropriate to release our response to this internal memo.”

Top US Navy Admiral Says Russia, China Defenseless Against US Aircraft Carriers

Recent naval advances by China and Russia have been heralded by defense experts who contest that America’s reign of dominance over the high seas may be coming to an end, but America’s Chief of Naval Operations thinks the US Navy remains unstoppable.

In an interview with National Interest, Admiral John Richardson claimed that US aircraft carriers could operate unscathed within China and Russia’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) zones boasting about the long standing naval superiority of America’s Pacific Fleet.

"This A2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some of our competitor, but achieving that goal is much different and much more complicated," said Admiral Richardson. "I think there is this long-range precision-strike capability, but A2/AD is sort of an aspiration. In actual execution it’s much more difficult."

http://sputniknews.com/military/20160906/1045001218/russia-china-pacific-fleet-navy.html

This guy is suppose to be there top admiral, his words not only put his competence into question, but also his sanity.
The Russian and Chinese navies have nothing to worry about with U.S officers of such "incredible" caliber.

P.S: I wasn't able to find the original NI article, mostly because there website is completely disorganized.

AlfaT8 wrote:

Top US Navy Admiral Says Russia, China Defenseless Against US Aircraft Carriers

Recent naval advances by China and Russia have been heralded by defense experts who contest that America’s reign of dominance over the high seas may be coming to an end, but America’s Chief of Naval Operations thinks the US Navy remains unstoppable.

In an interview with National Interest, Admiral John Richardson claimed that US aircraft carriers could operate unscathed within China and Russia’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) zones boasting about the long standing naval superiority of America’s Pacific Fleet.

"This A2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some of our competitor, but achieving that goal is much different and much more complicated," said Admiral Richardson. "I think there is this long-range precision-strike capability, but A2/AD is sort of an aspiration. In actual execution it’s much more difficult."

http://sputniknews.com/military/20160906/1045001218/russia-china-pacific-fleet-navy.html

This guy is suppose to be there top admiral, his words not only put his competence into question, but also his sanity.
The Russian and Chinese navies have nothing to worry about with U.S officers of such "incredible" caliber.

P.S: I wasn't able to find the original NI article, mostly because there website is completely disorganized.

But the U.S. officers have to worry about the "incredible" Kalibr.

AlfaT8 wrote:

Top US Navy Admiral Says Russia, China Defenseless Against US Aircraft Carriers

Recent naval advances by China and Russia have been heralded by defense experts who contest that America’s reign of dominance over the high seas may be coming to an end, but America’s Chief of Naval Operations thinks the US Navy remains unstoppable.

In an interview with National Interest, Admiral John Richardson claimed that US aircraft carriers could operate unscathed within China and Russia’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) zones boasting about the long standing naval superiority of America’s Pacific Fleet.

"This A2/AD, well, it’s certainly a goal for some of our competitor, but achieving that goal is much different and much more complicated," said Admiral Richardson. "I think there is this long-range precision-strike capability, but A2/AD is sort of an aspiration. In actual execution it’s much more difficult."

http://sputniknews.com/military/20160906/1045001218/russia-china-pacific-fleet-navy.html

This guy is suppose to be there top admiral, his words not only put his competence into question, but also his sanity.
The Russian and Chinese navies have nothing to worry about with U.S officers of such "incredible" caliber.

You are right, this is yet another hubris filled windbag propaganda koolaid drinker. Note the "long-range precision strike capability"
drivel. Sure thing there, sunshine, Russia is too primitive to have such "high tech" capability. When you read wiki-crappia and its
claims about Russian ICBM CEP numbers remember this clown and his drivel. NATO idiots really believe that Russian laser gyroscopes
are less accurate than NATO laser gyroscopes. These NATO idiots never took a physics course in their lives; they are a bunch of
high school dropouts who worked their way up as interns for various politicians. Their uneducated gut feelings tell them that all Russian
missiles miss their targets by miles.

The Shocking Secret Why America's Aircraft Carriers Dominate the World's Oceans

Dave Majumdar
December 8, 2016



Naval aviation is an inherently dangerous business, but over the course of more than 75 years, through robust procedures, rigorous training and continuous practice, the U.S. Navy has honed its carrier flight deck operations into a well-oiled machine. Accidents do happen, but the Navy is continually working on improving flight deck safety. Every time there is a mishap, the accident is investigated so that procedures can be refined to prevent a recurrence.

But those lessons have often come at price in lives lost, injuries and monetary costs. Hundreds of men have been killed or injured during accidents at sea onboard a carrier. As one now-retired naval aviator told me—with only slight hyperbole: “Every line in the NATOPS manual is written in blood.”

Indeed, the Navy learned many painful lessons during the Vietnam War in the 1960s during a series of fires onboard three aircraft carriers. On Oct. 26, 1966, a magnesium flare that had inadvertently gone off started a major fire onboard USS Oriskany (CVA-34) that resulted in the deaths of 44 sailors and caused 156 others to be injured. Three aircraft were destroyed and three more were damaged in the incident.

During a second incident, on July 29, 1967, a massive fire devastated USS Forrestal (CV-59) during combat launch and recovery operations in the Gulf of Tonkin killing 134 sailors and injuring 161 others. Additionally, 21 aircraft were lost in the blaze—which was traced back to a Zuni unguided rocket was accidentally fired and set off a chain reaction. The fire crippled the carrier, which spent months being repaired.

During the third incident on Jan.14, 1969 —which was also setoff by a Zuni rocket—USS Enterprise (CVN-65) was ravaged by a fire that claimed the lives of 28 sailors, injured 314 others and destroyed 15 aircraft. During the chain reaction that followed, Enterprise suffered from 18 munition explosions and eight holes were blown through the flight deck and deep into the ship. It took more than three hours to extinguish the blaze.

In the aftermath of the fires, the Navy instituted major changes to its damage control and weapons handling procedures. The Navy also modified its carriers with a so-called “wash down” system to help prevent such incidents from happening again. While the Navy took corrective action—the lessons learned came at a price—hundred of death and injures, the loss of dozens of aircraft and severe damage to three carriers.

But while the three Vietnam-era fires were some of the worst post-WWII disasters onboard a carrier that resulted in massive changes in procedures, practices and hardware, there have been more subtle changes too. The Navy is continually working on improving safety on the flight deck. Indeed some of those practices involve things as simple as avoiding the area around the air intake of an operating jet engine. Indeed, during my very first days of ground school many years ago I was shown whar was a Navy safety video of a crewman who was sucked into the jet intake of a Grumman A-6 Intruder on a carrier flightdeck. While the crewman miraculously survived, the video highlights hazards of working on the ramp (or flight deck in this case).

But nonetheless, despite the best efforts of the crew, accidents–even if they are preventable—inevitably happen in any complex environment. Recently, I spoke to an old friend who is a veteran naval aviator who describes one such accident. “We lost a [Grumman F-14] Tomcat in 2002 after the first OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] cruise when the tail-hook snapped off during recovery,” he told me.

Another senior naval aviator mentioned that the Navy has learnt to have an “abundance of caution” over the service’s more than 75 years of carrier aviation experience as he explained why service rarely sees the type of problems that the Russians have been recently experiencing onboard Kuznetsov. “We have 75 plus years of experience with carrier aviation. There are a multitude of safeguards and interlocks to minimize error and ensure a successful arrested landing,” the naval aviator said. “Definitely an abundance of caution.”

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-shocking-secret-why-americas-aircraft-carriers-dominate-18678

KiloGolf wrote:

The Shocking Secret Why America's Aircraft Carriers Dominate the World's Oceans

Dave Majumdar
December 8, 2016



Naval aviation is an inherently dangerous business, but over the course of more than 75 years, through robust procedures, rigorous training and continuous practice, the U.S. Navy has honed its carrier flight deck operations into a well-oiled machine. Accidents do happen, but the Navy is continually working on improving flight deck safety. Every time there is a mishap, the accident is investigated so that procedures can be refined to prevent a recurrence.

But those lessons have often come at price in lives lost, injuries and monetary costs. Hundreds of men have been killed or injured during accidents at sea onboard a carrier. As one now-retired naval aviator told me—with only slight hyperbole: “Every line in the NATOPS manual is written in blood.”

Indeed, the Navy learned many painful lessons during the Vietnam War in the 1960s during a series of fires onboard three aircraft carriers. On Oct. 26, 1966, a magnesium flare that had inadvertently gone off started a major fire onboard USS Oriskany (CVA-34) that resulted in the deaths of 44 sailors and caused 156 others to be injured. Three aircraft were destroyed and three more were damaged in the incident.

During a second incident, on July 29, 1967, a massive fire devastated USS Forrestal (CV-59) during combat launch and recovery operations in the Gulf of Tonkin killing 134 sailors and injuring 161 others. Additionally, 21 aircraft were lost in the blaze—which was traced back to a Zuni unguided rocket was accidentally fired and set off a chain reaction. The fire crippled the carrier, which spent months being repaired.

During the third incident on Jan.14, 1969 —which was also setoff by a Zuni rocket—USS Enterprise (CVN-65) was ravaged by a fire that claimed the lives of 28 sailors, injured 314 others and destroyed 15 aircraft. During the chain reaction that followed, Enterprise suffered from 18 munition explosions and eight holes were blown through the flight deck and deep into the ship. It took more than three hours to extinguish the blaze.

In the aftermath of the fires, the Navy instituted major changes to its damage control and weapons handling procedures. The Navy also modified its carriers with a so-called “wash down” system to help prevent such incidents from happening again. While the Navy took corrective action—the lessons learned came at a price—hundred of death and injures, the loss of dozens of aircraft and severe damage to three carriers.

But while the three Vietnam-era fires were some of the worst post-WWII disasters onboard a carrier that resulted in massive changes in procedures, practices and hardware, there have been more subtle changes too. The Navy is continually working on improving safety on the flight deck. Indeed some of those practices involve things as simple as avoiding the area around the air intake of an operating jet engine. Indeed, during my very first days of ground school many years ago I was shown whar was a Navy safety video of a crewman who was sucked into the jet intake of a Grumman A-6 Intruder on a carrier flightdeck. While the crewman miraculously survived, the video highlights hazards of working on the ramp (or flight deck in this case).

But nonetheless, despite the best efforts of the crew, accidents–even if they are preventable—inevitably happen in any complex environment. Recently, I spoke to an old friend who is a veteran naval aviator who describes one such accident. “We lost a [Grumman F-14] Tomcat in 2002 after the first OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] cruise when the tail-hook snapped off during recovery,” he told me.

Another senior naval aviator mentioned that the Navy has learnt to have an “abundance of caution” over the service’s more than 75 years of carrier aviation experience as he explained why service rarely sees the type of problems that the Russians have been recently experiencing onboard Kuznetsov. “We have 75 plus years of experience with carrier aviation. There are a multitude of safeguards and interlocks to minimize error and ensure a successful arrested landing,” the naval aviator said. “Definitely an abundance of caution.”

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-shocking-secret-why-americas-aircraft-carriers-dominate-18678

Veteran friend my ass that video of hook snapping was on Youtube for years . After that incident they did inspections on all F-14s tail hooks, and some were reinforced. Due to extensive use though years tiny cracks appeared which could on long run lead to hook being torn out.

Militarov wrote:

KiloGolf wrote:

The Shocking Secret Why America's Aircraft Carriers Dominate the World's Oceans

Dave Majumdar
December 8, 2016



Naval aviation is an inherently dangerous business, but over the course of more than 75 years, through robust procedures, rigorous training and continuous practice, the U.S. Navy has honed its carrier flight deck operations into a well-oiled machine. Accidents do happen, but the Navy is continually working on improving flight deck safety. Every time there is a mishap, the accident is investigated so that procedures can be refined to prevent a recurrence.

But those lessons have often come at price in lives lost, injuries and monetary costs. Hundreds of men have been killed or injured during accidents at sea onboard a carrier. As one now-retired naval aviator told me—with only slight hyperbole: “Every line in the NATOPS manual is written in blood.”

Indeed, the Navy learned many painful lessons during the Vietnam War in the 1960s during a series of fires onboard three aircraft carriers. On Oct. 26, 1966, a magnesium flare that had inadvertently gone off started a major fire onboard USS Oriskany (CVA-34) that resulted in the deaths of 44 sailors and caused 156 others to be injured. Three aircraft were destroyed and three more were damaged in the incident.

During a second incident, on July 29, 1967, a massive fire devastated USS Forrestal (CV-59) during combat launch and recovery operations in the Gulf of Tonkin killing 134 sailors and injuring 161 others. Additionally, 21 aircraft were lost in the blaze—which was traced back to a Zuni unguided rocket was accidentally fired and set off a chain reaction. The fire crippled the carrier, which spent months being repaired.

During the third incident on Jan.14, 1969 —which was also setoff by a Zuni rocket—USS Enterprise (CVN-65) was ravaged by a fire that claimed the lives of 28 sailors, injured 314 others and destroyed 15 aircraft. During the chain reaction that followed, Enterprise suffered from 18 munition explosions and eight holes were blown through the flight deck and deep into the ship. It took more than three hours to extinguish the blaze.

In the aftermath of the fires, the Navy instituted major changes to its damage control and weapons handling procedures. The Navy also modified its carriers with a so-called “wash down” system to help prevent such incidents from happening again. While the Navy took corrective action—the lessons learned came at a price—hundred of death and injures, the loss of dozens of aircraft and severe damage to three carriers.

But while the three Vietnam-era fires were some of the worst post-WWII disasters onboard a carrier that resulted in massive changes in procedures, practices and hardware, there have been more subtle changes too. The Navy is continually working on improving safety on the flight deck. Indeed some of those practices involve things as simple as avoiding the area around the air intake of an operating jet engine. Indeed, during my very first days of ground school many years ago I was shown whar was a Navy safety video of a crewman who was sucked into the jet intake of a Grumman A-6 Intruder on a carrier flightdeck. While the crewman miraculously survived, the video highlights hazards of working on the ramp (or flight deck in this case).

But nonetheless, despite the best efforts of the crew, accidents–even if they are preventable—inevitably happen in any complex environment. Recently, I spoke to an old friend who is a veteran naval aviator who describes one such accident. “We lost a [Grumman F-14] Tomcat in 2002 after the first OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] cruise when the tail-hook snapped off during recovery,” he told me.

Another senior naval aviator mentioned that the Navy has learnt to have an “abundance of caution” over the service’s more than 75 years of carrier aviation experience as he explained why service rarely sees the type of problems that the Russians have been recently experiencing onboard Kuznetsov. “We have 75 plus years of experience with carrier aviation. There are a multitude of safeguards and interlocks to minimize error and ensure a successful arrested landing,” the naval aviator said. “Definitely an abundance of caution.”

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-shocking-secret-why-americas-aircraft-carriers-dominate-18678

Veteran friend my ass that video of hook snapping was on Youtube for years . After that incident they did inspections on all F-14s tail hooks, and some were reinforced. Due to extensive use though years tiny cracks appeared which could on long run lead to hook being torn out.

Sort of the reason I take issue with the re-posting of these articles. "Good points?" Or lying, it's hard to tell, better just to avoid. Op-eds on mil equipment are generally just trash, (calm down Kilo, I meant that across the board).

OminousSpudd wrote:Sort of the reason I take issue with the re-posting of these articles. "Good points?" Or lying, it's hard to tell, better just to avoid. Op-eds on mil equipment are generally just trash, (calm down Kilo, I  meant that across the board).

We have a discussion which is the whole point. We are no authors and all sources suffer as such.

PS. you should address the ''calm down'' to those that react negatively to this information

KiloGolf wrote:

OminousSpudd wrote:Sort of the reason I take issue with the re-posting of these articles. "Good points?" Or lying, it's hard to tell, better just to avoid. Op-eds on mil equipment are generally just trash, (calm down Kilo, I  meant that across the board).

We have a discussion which is the whole point. We are no authors and all sources suffer as such.

PS. you should address the ''calm down'' to those that react negatively to this information

A discussion on bad journalism? Factual inaccuracy? Is it really constructive?

OminousSpudd wrote:A discussion on bad journalism? Factual inaccuracy? Is it really constructive?

On the topic. The whole article wasn't just that one bit. They are good points there.
If you don't want to read it, then it's your problem.