Africa General Military& Security News

In central and west Africa. France also has considerable presence. I had the impression also that Uganda has some close ties with Russia from the countries with red color

Why Another Country in North Africa Risks Being Embroiled in Civil War

Over the weekend, Moroccan King Mohammed VI announced Rabat's intention to return to the African Union after a 32 year absence. Meanwhile, the armed struggle over Western Sahara threatens to be reignited. Vzglyad news website contributor Said Gafurov discusses the danger of yet another country in North Africa becoming embroiled in war.

On Sunday, the Moroccan head of state indicated that his country would be returning to the African Union. Morocco left the organization in 1984 after it provided membership to Western Sahara, which Rabat considers to be Moroccan territory.

At the same time, in a detailed analysis on the situation in the region for the Russian news and analysis portal Vzglyad, Algiers-based journalist Said Gafurov warned that the partially-recognized Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic may soon resume its war of independence against Morocco.

Last week, representatives of the Polisario Front, a national liberation movement which aims to end the Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara, opened an extraordinary congress to choose a new leader at the Dakhla refugee camp in Tindouf province, southern Algeria. The estimated 2,000 delegates to the congress were charged with choosing a new leader following the death of long-time Polisario Front leader Mohamed Abdelaziz.

"The Polisario Front," Gafurov explained, "is recognized by the United Nations as the sole representative of the Western Saharan people, many of whom now live in exile as refugees, while the areas of the Rio de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra remain occupied by Morocco."

The conflict stretches back to 1975, and the UN presently considers Western Sahara to be the last colony in Africa. The Polisario Front stopped its armed struggle against Rabat in 1991 when, under the auspices of the UN, a cease-fire agreement was reached and a referendum process agreed to. However, twenty-five years later, negotiations on the referendum remain stalled over disagreements on voting rights.

At present, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) has been recognized by 84 UN member countries, mostly in Africa and Latin America, with 37 of them having since frozen or withdrawn recognition.

Mohamed Abdelaziz, who led the partially recognized state from 1976 until his death in May, was the leader of the 'political faction', according to Gafurov, "i.e. the representative of moderate forces – supporters of a political solution to the Saharan conflict."

"At the same time, he was considered the proponent of the pro-Algerian line in the SADR's leadership; Algiers has not yet recovered from a victorious but devastating war with the Islamists, and does not want another destabilizing conflict in the region (especially given that Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika is now seriously ill, and the new pluralist multiparty system in the country has not completely established itself)."

"To make matters worse," the journalist noted, "officials in France have threatened that Algeria may become the next country to face an 'Arab Spring'. In this situation, Algiers is opposed to a military option in the Sahara issue, but its influence, while significant, cannot be decisive, given that in Algeria itself there are different perspectives on how to view the problem of the SADR."

The partially recognized state has three main factions – the 'political faction', the 'youth faction', and the 'military faction'. The key issue separating them, according to Gafurov, is their position on the resumption of war. Moreover, "a 'peace faction' does not formally exist within the Polisario Front."

"Out of the hundreds of delegates to the previous congress speaking to Russian observers, only the head of the Saharawi Women's Federation opposed the resumption of war, and even then, with great reservations." Subsequently, Gafurov warned, "the question effectively boils down to the terms and conditions of the conflict's resumption."

"The 'youth faction' insists on the immediate resumption of war. Its more moderate part is in agreement to wait for the results of the negotiations with Morocco on the referendum, but for no more than one-and-a-half to two years, and with the unconditional beginning of combat operations in the event of the negotiations' failure."

"The 'political faction' is closely linked to the management of the refugee camps, and is engaged in the distribution of international aid, and its position is strongly influenced by the opinion of the international community. In principle, it is not opposed to the idea of a war of liberation in the event of the failure of talks, but the resumption of hostilities is considered the worst possible option. At the same time, the faction insists on the 'de-ideologization' of SADR; The Polisario Front, in its view, must stop being a left-oriented movement in order to facilitate the receipt of aid from the EU, and to receive political support from the United States," which it presently lacks.

Finally, the journalist explained, "the 'military faction' is composed of military leaders who were demobilized after the ceasefire, who have effectively been denied access to political and administrative positions in the refugee camps, and who have been forced to engage in small-scale retail trade, which remains underdeveloped due to the lack of market relations in these camps."

"Gradually, elections have seen the military begin to push back the politicians, but this process is slow…The faction is aware of the unpredictability of the results of any possible war, but is looking for a change, which the political faction is advocating against."

Ultimately, on July 12, the Polisario Front's snap congress voted to elect 67-year-old Brahim Ghali, a long-time Sahrawi leader who has participated in the region's national liberation movement since the 1960s, and who served as Polisario's first leader between 1973-1975. He would go on to serve as Minister of Defense during the war with Morocco, and as the SADR's representative to Spain and Ambassador to Algeria.

"Thus, it can be said that the congress has issued a victory for the 'war faction'," Gafurov noted.

The keynote of the newly elected president's speech, the journalist summarized, "was that Sahrawis naturally seek a peaceful resolution to the problem [of their occupation by Morocco], but are also fully prepared for the resumption of war."

The UN Security Council has called for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to be permitted to carry out its mandate in full capacity.

"The refugees are simply tired of waiting for changes for the better," Gafurov explained. "A quarter-century has passed since the signing of the ceasefire in 1991, and the Sahrawi people have been living in appalling conditions in camps in the heart of the Sahara throughout this period. An entire generation has grown up, witnessing the rattling of sabers, the public rejection [by Rabat] of previously signed agreements, the expulsion of officials from the UN peacekeeping mission (MINURSO), and accusations against UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon" over comments on the occupation of Western Sahara.

"At the same time," the journalist warned, "the population of the areas under Morocco's occupation too has been expressing its discontent more and more loudly. If earlier this was manifested mainly in the form of civil disobedience, hunger strikes and protests, now, the documents of the Polisario Front congress speak of a full-fledged Intifada, while those living in the refugee camps are beginning to demand the resumption of the war and the liberation of their territory."

Effectively, Gafurov noted, the portion of the Sahrawi population living under Moroccan occupation believes that "they have little to lose, and much to gain" from ending Rabat's control over their territory. "Western Sahara has a relatively small population, and enormous natural resources. Earlier, it was believed that these consisted primarily of valuable phosphate deposits and reserves of iron ore; now, the region's coastal waters, which include a highly valuable fishing area, are considered even more important."

Ultimately, the journalist emphasized that the threat of a resumption of war between Rabat and the SADR also increases the risk of the region being overrun with Islamist terrorists. "And if the problem is being resolved today primarily by heavy-handed methods (Islamist preachers from abroad are simply not allowed into the region) in the case of resumption of hostilities, events may take an unexpected turn," given the inevitable reduction in Rabat's security capabilities.

"For this reason, the UN understands that a referendum in Western Sahara is long overdue. The Polisario Front proposes three options for the referendum: independence, autonomy within Morocco and full accession to Morocco. But what is of principle importance is that the people of Western Sahara are able to decide their fate for themselves. Any decision imposed from above threatens the outbreak of violence, an echo of the kind which also threatens the other side of the Mediterranean," Gafurov concluded.

http://sputniknews.com/africa/20160720/1043341842/morocco-resumption-hostilties-danger.html

The growth of Russian influence in the Mediterranean

According to French newsletter «TTU» in the article «Méditerranée: le« grand remplacement »», with the rapidity that distinguishes the Russian foreign policy, as well as using the Syrian model Moscow enjoys a strategic vacuum, which was formed in Libya because of the procrastination of European diplomacy as well as the uncertainty of foreign policy of US President Trump project administration. Russia also uses and the void created by Western diplomats in Egypt. Moscow systematically promotes its shape, strengthening cooperation in the field of security and defense with the countries of the region.

In Egypt, after the signing of major contracts for the purchase of arms in 2015 of 5 billion euros and the modernization of the local defense industry companies, Russia is negotiating on granting of Egyptian military bases, primarily naval and air base at Sidi Barrani. This convergence has continued in the diplomatic dimension: the common views of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on the Syrian issue (in countering Riyadh) and Libyan cases (in support of Marshal Khalifa Haftar).

Russian support of Marshal Haftar, which was discussed during the "meeting of the sea", against the government of national unity, expressed in the ongoing negotiations for the purchase of arms worth about 1.5 billion euros (combat aircraft, tanks, air defense systems), as well as proposals for reform of the Libyan army. As a reciprocal gesture Moscow is in talks to obtain naval bases, which will give Russian Fleet parking lot, bred west than its Syrian and Egyptian bases.

"Pearl Necklace", which will allow the Russian fleet to ensure a permanent presence in the Mediterranean, while the US Navy also did not leave the water. In political terms, Moscow is pushing marshal Khalifa Haftar for a meeting with Libyan Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarrayem in Cairo.

With Algeria, which is an important customer of the Russian defense industry, and the time has come to strengthen the security arrangements. In Morocco, with which Moscow has signed several agreements in the field of security in the past year, particularly with regard to the fight against terrorism, are showing interest in Russian bombers and submarines. Upon its return to the Middle East, Russia is prepared to stay a long time in the Mediterranean region.

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2421361.html

T-90S tanks of the armed forces of Uganda

On the page on twitter.com of Uganda's President Yoweri Kagut Museveni, a photo was posted of the president's visit to the Uganda ground and air defense joint exercises at the Kalama Armoured Warfare Training School (KAWATS) of the Uganda People's Defense Force in Kabamba near Mubene on July 23, 2017. The photo shows the T-90S tanks of the Uganda People's Defense Force. This is the first known published photo of T-90S tanks in Uganda.

Also in the picture are T-72B tanks and Chinese tanks of type 85-IIM. The receipt of Uganda-type tanks 85-IIM had not previously been reported.



Recall that in 2011 Uganda received 44 T-90S tanks produced by NPK Uralvagonzavod under the contract with an estimated cost of 119 million dollars, concluded with Rosoboronexport JSC in the total package for the acquisition of Uganda by Russian armament in the amount of 740 million dollars in Beginning of 2010. 44 T-90S tanks delivered in 2011 entered service with the tank battalion of the brigade of the Ugandan presidential guard (since 2013 - the Command of Special Operations Forces), while the supply of T-90S tanks to Uganda itself was hiding by both sides, and the images of these tanks in Uganda has not yet appeared in public access.

In 2016, Uganda also received from Russia an unknown quantity (up to 60 units) of T-72B tanks from the availability of contracts for the purchase of Russian weapons, concluded in 2015, under the latest package.

http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2752053.html

Parade of the Polisario Front in honor of the 45th anniversary of the beginning of the armed struggle for independence



https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3209514.html

ISS: Is another Boko Haram or al-Shabaab erupting in Mozambique?

A Mozambican soldier.A sudden upsurge in brutal violence in northern Mozambique, including the beheadings of women and children, has sounded alarms that a violent jihadist movement like Boko Haram or al-Shabaab could be evolving. Since October last year, over 50 people have been killed in about 20 attacks in Cabo Delgado province on the Tanzania border.

Gruesome footage of headless and mutilated bodies has been circulating on social media, accelerating an exodus of citizens from the region. Multinational energy companies poised to exploit Cabo Delgado’s huge liquefied natural gas reserves have paused. Fears are growing that the violence could sabotage the exploitation of this valuable resource which remains Mozambique’s one great hope for defeating poverty.

Those allegedly responsible for the attacks apparently call themselves Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ (often abbreviated to al-Sunnah). Locals dub them al-Shabaab, even though the group doesn’t seem to be formally affiliated to its more famous Somali namesake.

Has full-blown violent Islamist extremism arrived in Mozambique, and indeed in southern Africa? Or are these just poor, marginalised locals presenting ordinary crimes as something else? Or are they perhaps the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) in disguise? Or, even more cynically, are mercenaries deliberately stoking violence to win a lucrative contract to protect the natural gas industry?

Interpretations have differed widely. But the latest attacks seem to be forging a growing consensus that this is indeed an incipient local variant of the sort of violent Islamist extremism seen elsewhere in Africa. Both Mozambique and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) should be paying more attention.

The birth of al-Sunnah in Cabo Delgado dates back to 2013 or early 2014, according to independent security analyst Johann Smith. But on 5 October last year it caught wider attention. Thirty to 40 gunmen launched well-coordinated simultaneous attacks on three police or military posts in the coastal town of Moćimboa da Praia, 70 km south of the Tanzania border. Two police officers and 14 assailants were killed, Smith said.

The attacks in Cabo Delgado continued at a lower level. But they took a sinister turn on 27 May 2018 when attackers killed 10 unarmed civilians, several of whom were beheaded; and burnt many houses in Monjane village in the district of Macomia.

Police spokesman Inacio Dina told reporters in Maputo that the killers were common bandits, not terrorists. But analysts believe these gruesome attacks on civilians demonstrate that al-Sunnah has raised its terror campaign to a new level.

The upsurge in violence is also threatening Mozambique’s $30 billion gas bonanza, Bloomberg reported last week. It said London-listed explorer Wentworth Resources hadn’t been able to gain access to its onshore licences near Moćimboa da Praia due to safety concerns since the attacks. This week Reuters reported that US-based Anadarko Petroleum declined to comment on reports that it had suspended work on its massive natural gas project in Mozambique.

Some observers are suspicious about the coincidence of the upsurge in attacks and the awarding of a $750 million contract for protecting gas fields to a private security consortium. The consortium involves Erik Prince – founder of the famous US private security/military company – and a Mozambique company linked to government intelligence. Others have implicated ISIS and al-Shabaab, and some dismiss all this as alarmist sensationalism.

However the most comprehensive known investigation of al-Sunnah so far suggests this is a genuine violent extremist Islamist phenomenon, with some links to foreign jihadists, though not necessarily directed by them.

Islamic cleric Sheikh Saide Habibo and academics Salvador Forquilha, director of the Institute of Economic and Social Studies and João Pereira, assistant professor at Eduardo Mondlane University, conducted three field trips to Cabo Delgado and Nampula provinces in November, December and February. They interviewed a wide cross-section of society.

In their report presented late last month, they concluded that Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jamâ (which translates roughly as ‘adherents of the prophetic tradition’) first appeared in the north of Cabo Delgado as a religious group. In 2015 military cells were formed.

The province has a Muslim population of about 58%, compared to 18% for Mozambique as a whole. Most al-Sunnah adherents are youths who feel local communities are not practising correct Islam, the researchers found. They don’t send their children to state schools.

The group’s leaders have links with ‘religious circles, commercial and military activities of radical Islamist groups in Tanzania, Somalia, Kenya and the Great Lakes Region’ – mostly through training there, the report said.

Adherents have a uniform and distinctive appearance, wearing white turbans, robes and long black shorts; shaving their hair and sporting large beards. They are ‘armed with white weapons to symbolise jihad’. The picture of al-Sunnah painted by the three researchers resembles the beginnings of violent Islamist extremist groups elsewhere, like Boko Haram, some analysts warn.

Most members are ‘socially marginalised youth: without formal employment; without schooling’. They’re largely from the Mwani ethnic group, though they include young immigrants from other countries such as Tanzania, Somalia and the Great Lakes Region. These people have been radicalised by ‘degrading social conditions’ in the country’s poorest province, as well as a sense of ‘political exclusion’.

The members are trained both locally – sometimes by disaffected police officers and security guards – and externally in Tanzania and the Great Lakes Region by militia chiefs hired by al-Shabaab in Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia. They preach the usual doctrines, including sharia law. They finance themselves from illicit activities such as wood, charcoal, ivory and ruby smuggling and outside donations.

The report concludes with several pertinent questions, including how this Islamic radicalisation might affect current efforts to stabilise Mozambique economically and politically and what government should do about it. Some reports say the government has already responded harshly by clamping down indiscriminately with many arrests and the closure of mosques and madrassas.

If Pereira et al. are correct, the Mozambican authorities should start by acknowledging the real nature of the problem. They should then take care to target their counter-extremism measures more selectively while tackling the socio-economic root causes of extremism that are so evident in Cabo Delgado.

Maputo should take note in particular of the recent United Nations Development Programme report Journey to Extremism in Africa. Researchers interviewed 718 people, 495 of whom had been directly involved in extremist groups. For 71% of the respondents, the tipping point that prompted them to join extremist groups was violent or repressive government actions against them or others close to them.

Smith fears that without proper intervention, al-Sunnah could go the way of Boko Haram. He is concerned that neither Mozambique nor SADC are taking the threat seriously enough.

http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=52051:iss-is-another-boko-haram-or-al-shabaab-erupting-in-mozambique&catid=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113

Good article . Points to what I think is basic problem of identifying the true class and social content of movements . As opposed to superficial ideological baggage for many of these movements . More often as a convenient cover story or selling point . To gather mass and popular support . If it is not Islam . It will be socialism . Or liberalism . All are fashion victims .

Deep down ethnic or tribal or economic or class struggles are dressed up ideological . We should not be a victim of this . Or allow others to fish out of muddy waters .

Mali Air Force received four Super Tucano combat trainers

According to the Malian media, the Mali Air Force received four turbo-propeller combat training aircraft (light attack aircraft) Embraer EMB-314 (A-29) Super Tucano of Brazilian production. The ceremony of transferring the Super Tucano airplanes to the Mali Air Force was held on July 11, 2018 at the 101st aviation base in the capital airport of Bamako with the participation of the President of Mali, Ibrahim Bubakar Keith.



Four Super Tucano aircraft built by Embraer, which had a temporary Brazilian registration of PT-ZTN, PT-ZTI, PT-ZTJ and PT-ZTF, departed July 7 from Recife (Brazil) and reached Bamako (Mali) on July 10th. In the Mali Air Force, the aircraft received registration numbers from TZ-01C to TZ-04C.

The government of Mali signed a contract with the Brazilian company Embraer for the purchase of six Super Tucano aircraft on June 15, 2015, but then the number of acquired aircraft was reduced to four. Apparently, the contract is fully or partially funded by Western military assistance to Mali. In addition to the supply of aircraft, the contract includes the training of Embraer ten pilots and 17 ground technical experts of the Mali Air Force, as well as the provision of technical support.

Mali became the 16th country - the operator of the Super Tucano.





https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3272954.html

Yes here the video also

Cayman appeared at 1:01:10-1:01:20





https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3297083.html

Minigun behind a metal shield... sounds like they were expecting a full on riot...

Or perhaps it was just intimidation to prevent a problem rather than for dealing with anything that might occur.

I would think a flame thrower would have the same effect while limiting the kill zone to 20-30m.

Unmanned systems at the AAD-2018 in South Africa

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3360760.html

Repair and modernization of Su-25 DRK attack aircraft in Baranovichi

According to the photograph and information published in the Belarusian military newspaper “For the Glory of the Motherland”, in Belarus at the 558th Aviation Repair Plant OJSC in Baranavichy are repairing and upgrading the Su-25 ground attack aircraft of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In the course of the modernization, the Congolese Su-25 aircraft are equipped, in particular, with the equipment of individual radio engineering protection (SATZ) “Satellite” of its own design and production “558 ARZ”. Repair and modernization of Su-25 DRK attack aircraft in Baranovichi

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3432647.html

Military parades are either for commemoration, intimidation, or just plain showing off...

Some can be all three, like the Russian military parade in May.

This one is clearly focusing on showing off.

It looks like they put armour and extra wheels on a school bus, but in terms of low intensity conflicts it actually looks rather more comfortable than most APCs I have seen.

I suspect Trumps military parade will be all about showing off too... could be interesting to compare...  

(Of course the American parade would probably pay the entire Ghana GDP for 10 years...)

Ghana military industry innovations!

https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3487638.html

Ugandan tank crews

April 4, 2019 in the capital of the Republic of Senegal, the city of Dakar was held a military parade in honor of the 59th anniversary of the country's independence from France.



https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3598522.html