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    State Armament Program 2018-2027

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    Vote (multiple choice allowed) for the type of material that in your opinion will remain in the Russian Armed Forces after the end of 2025, and leave without vote the material that will be totally out of the Russian Armed Forces, including of the reserve:

    [ 4 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 4 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 4 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 5 ]
    12% [12%] 
    [ 5 ]
    12% [12%] 
    [ 3 ]
    7% [7%] 
    [ 4 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 3 ]
    7% [7%] 
    [ 4 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 7 ]
    16% [16%] 

    Total Votes: 43
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Wed Nov 22, 2017 12:41 am

    Austin wrote:Bondarev: agreed amount of GPU for 2018-2025 is 19 trillion rubles

    Подробнее на ТАСС:
    http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4746605

    He clarified that in some areas of work in the new GPV prolonged until 2027.

    This is a clear sign of what is coming.

    Austin

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Thu Nov 23, 2017 6:54 pm

    The Ministry of Defense called the new LGP a balanced

    https://rg.ru/2017/11/23/v-minoborony-nazvali-novuiu-gpv-sbalansirovannoj.html

    The new state program of armaments is balanced, Tatyana Shevtsova, deputy head of the Defense Ministry, told journalists: 19 trillion rubles - military equipment supplies, 1 trillion will be allocated to the synchronization system.

    "This is the main difference, because the previous LG was planned only for arms supplies, but did not include synchronization costs," Shevtsova said after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi.

    he Ministry of Defense needs a storage system, a system of basing and equipping the troops. "In the previous LG, this was not taken into account: this LG differs from the previous one in that, in addition to the weapons planned for national security, expenses for synchronization are also planned," the deputy minister explained.

    Shevtsova also said that a government decree will be prepared on the introduction of a system at the enterprises of the OPK, which will allow to correctly form the cost of production. "As a state customer, the price of the contract, the cost of the products is very important to us." We have a lot of disputes with the industrial enterprises, "she said.

    "We got approval of the president to prepare the necessary regulatory framework," Shevtsova said, "we commissioned a pilot project in June, involving enterprises of the Tula region, they worked out the methodology developed by the Defense Ministry on an initiative basis." According to her, the pilot project was successful.

    Austin

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Thu Nov 23, 2017 6:55 pm

    What does synchronization cost means ? They have allocated additional 1 trillion roubles for it ?
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    franco

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  franco on Thu Nov 23, 2017 10:00 pm

    Austin wrote:What does synchronization cost means ? They have allocated additional 1 trillion roubles for it ?

    Perhaps...

    The Ministry of Defense needs a storage system, a system of basing and equipping the troops. "In the previous LG, this was not taken into account: this LG differs from the previous one in that, in addition to the weapons planned for national security, expenses for synchronization are also planned," the deputy minister explained.
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Cyberspec on Thu Nov 23, 2017 10:04 pm

    I was about to say it means "the logistics",,,but maybe it's best if a native Russian speaker can confirm
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Fri Nov 24, 2017 4:10 am

    Austin wrote:What does synchronization cost means ? They have allocated additional 1 trillion roubles for it ?

    Is not an usual concept, but as I understand it must be related with the cost of getting the results in development of new material and in production at the right time.

    As example, it must be a right timing between the development and production of all the armata based warfare. All the different armata based material must come in the right amount in a synchronized maner in order to be a ble to do [Russia] a fast transition of a concrete unit, to armata based material.

    Habitually it should refer to overcosts related to accelerate some results to improve the timing, and also to overcosts related to some delay in other cases also to improve the timing. In the case were delays can be required, it would be a need of some, not big, storage. Surely the issue of the storage is not the most important. Surely the most important part of the costs of synchronization will be the cost of accelerating the projects that can cause overall delays in the procurement of weapons to the Russian Armed Forces.

    Following with the example, the T-14 or the T-15 can be more advanced today, as single projects, than some types of armata based artillery, mrls or air defense. The most delayed designs need additional money to be accelerated in order to cause not an overall delay in the formation of new armata units.

    In the refered to the amount, it seems that it is 1 trillion of the 19 trillions for this purpose.

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Fri Nov 24, 2017 6:37 am

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    Kimppis

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Kimppis on Tue Nov 28, 2017 6:47 pm

    Overall it seems to be a pretty good summary, but I have a few major issues:

    1. Why would it take that long to finish the development of "Product 30"? They just unveiled the first images...

    2. And then the "massive delay of S-500"

    Are those predictions based on anything? No...!?
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Cyberspec on Wed Nov 29, 2017 7:43 am

    By Dmitry Gorenburg....Kilo Golf's mentor no doubt Very Happy

    This guy was claiming that Russia was not capable of mounting an operation outside of it's borders (until 2015 Cool )...as far as I'm concerned, he's living in tra-la land and is basically Full of Sh*t
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Thu Dec 07, 2017 10:56 am

    The final update/improvement of the comment opening the topic has been included at January 1, 2018.


    Last edited by eehnie on Mon Jan 01, 2018 9:16 pm; edited 3 times in total

    Austin

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Thu Dec 07, 2017 1:43 pm

    On the planned costs for LGP 2018-2027. Is not that a little deal?

    https://topwar.ru/131038-o-planovyh-zatratah-na-gpv-2018-2027-ne-malovata-l-kolchuzhka.html
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 12:35 am

    RUSSIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015 AND STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    I.- CURRENT ARMAMENT AND PROJECTS AT LEAST IN PRODUCTION BY THE BEGIN OF 2018

    https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/russias-new-maritime-doctrine.391893/

    Shipbuilding strategy

    The 2015 doctrine adds a new section to the mix: shipbuilding. This, the doctrine states, is due to the re-emergence of the Russian shipbuilding sector over the past 10-15 years.

    Admiral Victor Chirkov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy states that the navy's priority is to develop and deploy advanced equipment to enable Russia to make up for lost ground (against rivals) and to become superior to them in certain areas. In addition to refitting the fleets, the navy is looking to build up stocks of weaponry and materiel; improve naval command and control (C2); integrate joint force C2 into the various theatres; and improve the navy's basing and support systems.

    Among these, priority will be given to supporting Russia's ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) within the Northern and Pacific fleets.

    Additionally, the doctrine seeks to create a general-purpose marine force armed with long-range and high-precision strike systems capable of providing a non-nuclear deterrent.

    The navy's future surface fleet is to be divided between long-range multirole vessels and short-range vessels with modular capabilities. Looking ahead, the service intends to field a multi-service naval strike force capable of quick relocation to threatened areas.

    The doctrine also foresees the introduction of new and innovative technologies such as: artificial intelligence systems, unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles (UAVs, USVs, UUVs), non-lethal weapon systems, and new weapon types such as directed-energy weapons.

    Russia will now look to create a single, integrated, and jam-proof fleet-wide C2 system for use at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. This is intended to be adaptable and to form a single information control complex to enable network-centric command of diverse naval and joint-service assets in any theatre of operations.

    In connection with the maritime doctrine, and amendments in some aspects of force development, the Russian Navy is expected to gain some additional resources because the creation of a well-balanced and equipped naval force is a long-term effort of 30-40 years. Considering this and the duration of ship design/construction work, the conceptual approach to the development of the navy will be an ongoing issue for 45-50 years.

    To take account of the implementation time and existing/forecast resource and technology restrictions, the creation of the new-model navy has been divided into three phases: up to 2020; 2021-2030; and 2031-2050. The content of each phase was outlined by Adm Chirkov for the various elements of the navy.

    Strategic nuclear forces

    Up until 2020 the maritime strategic nuclear force will focus on completing the development and launching of its fourth-generation Borey-class (Project 955/955A) SSBNs, while maintaining its remaining Delta III/IV-class (Project 667BDR/667BDRM) SSBNs in operational service.

    During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs. Within this second phase Russia will also work on developing a new ship-based (in fact submarine-based) strategic missile system and a fifth-generation SSBN class. The doctrine sets out that series production of the fifth-generation SSBN will then commence in the final 2031-2050 phase.

    General-purpose force

    The general-purpose marine force inventory will include in its first phase the creation of a strategic non-nuclear deterrent force, enhancements to its SSN and diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), the build-up of the inventory and capability of its surface forces, and the creation of the new marine rapid-response force. In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by Yasen-class (Project 885M) SSNs and Oscar-class (Project 885M) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs). Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by upgrading its third-generation SSNs and building a new generation of SSKs.

    During the 2021-2030 phase Russia's existing SSN/SSK fleet is planned to be improved by adding unmanned technologies, while construction of a new-generation SSN class is also planned.

    Surface fleet

    In the first phase Russia's Admiral Gorshkov-class (Project 22350) frigates and Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    In the mid term a new-generation destroyer featuring advanced strike, air defence and missile defence capabilities will become the navy's main oceangoing ship. Between 2021 and 2030 a new class of modular multirole surface combat ship will be designed and enter series production as the successor to the Project 22350/20380 classes. It is envisaged that these will be armed with novel weapon systems and will carry unmanned vehicles of various sorts.

    The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, new aircraft carriers will be the core of its capability, along with multirole landing ships. Work to design a new class of Russian aircraft carrier is to be completed before 2020, with construction and entry into service planned for the second phase of the doctrine (2021-2030).

    Unlike the heavy aircraft cruisers of the previous generation of Russian aircraft carriers, the new carrier design will be multirole. It is envisaged to be equipped with manned and unmanned combat systems operating in the air, at sea, underwater and possibly in space. The carrier's air groups will include radar surveillance and C2 aircraft, alongside reconnaissance and strike UAVs.

    Naval Aviation

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be the development and serial production of an advanced maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) by 2020.

    Additionally, Russia will look to develop and produce a new shore/ship-based multirole helicopter (to replace the Ka-27) and acquire a ship-based combat helicopter (the Ka-52K). Russia will also seek to develop advanced airborne strike systems.

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new Russian ship-based radar surveillance aircraft, ship-based UAVs, and ship-based strike aircraft. The 2021-2030 period will see the Russian Naval Aviation transition to optionally piloted aircraft, including those derived from existing manned aircraft. Obsolete aircraft are to be replaced by modern, multirole manned and unmanned aircraft. During the 2031-2050 phase naval aviation focus will switch to a new generation of multirole aircraft and UAVs and field a new generation of airborne precision weapon systems.

    Coastal forces

    The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: the completion of development of advance coastal-defence missiles and the issuing of them; and the enhancement of the marine brigade's ability to operate in different climates, including extreme Arctic conditions.

    Between 2021 and 2030 the doctrine plans the introduction of a highly mobile amphibious combat vehicle for the coastal troops so that they can support the marines' operations. The marines are also earmarked to begin receiving unmanned platforms during this period, possibly armed with directed-energy weapons or powered by alternative energy sources.

    Long term

    The direction of the final 2031-2050 phase is currently being analysed, according to Adm Chirkov. However, it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines; ongoing series production of the new aircraft carrier class; the start of series production of the new multirole ship class; the creation of a new generation of multirole unmanned systems; and the arming of coastal defence troops with new-generation unmanned missile systems capable of striking air, surface, sub-surface and space targets.

    Long-term plans (by 2050) also call for a transition to modular combat platforms for both surface ships and submarines.

    Nikolai Novichkov is a JDW Correspondent, reporting from Moscow

    REFERENCES PROJECT BY PROJECT:


    1.- Project 667 BDR / 09786

    Up until 2020..., while maintaining its remaining Delta III-class (Project 667BDR ... ) SSBNs in operational service.

    During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs.

    2.- Project 667 BDRM / 09787

    Up until 2020..., while maintaining its remaining Delta IV-class (Project ... 667BDRM) SSBNs in operational service.

    During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs.

    3.- Project 949

    In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by ... Oscar-class (Project 885M 949) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs).

    4.- Ka 50 / 52

    Additionally, Russia will ... acquire a ship-based combat helicopter (the Ka-52K).

    5.- Project 20380 / 20385

    In the first phase Russia's ... Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    6.- Project 955

    Up until 2020 the maritime strategic nuclear force will focus on completing the development and launching of its fourth-generation Borey-class (Project 955/955A) SSBNs.

    7.- Project 885

    In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by Yasen-class (Project 885M) SSNs.

    8.- Bumerang platform

    Between 2021 and 2030 the doctrine plans the introduction of a highly mobile amphibious combat vehicle for the coastal troops so that they can support the marines' operations.

    9.- Su-57

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based strike aircraft.

    10.- Project 22350

    In the first phase Russia's Admiral Gorshkov-class (Project 22350) frigates ... and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    11.- Project 20386

    In the first phase Russia's ... Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    12.- Project 23560 Lider http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_23560.htm

    In the mid term a new-generation destroyer featuring advanced strike, air defence and missile defence capabilities will become the navy's main oceangoing ship. Between 2021 and 2030 a new class of modular multirole surface combat ship will be designed and enter series production as the successor to the Project 22350/20380 classes. It is envisaged that these will be armed with novel weapon systems and will carry unmanned vehicles of various sorts.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... the start of series production of the new multirole ship class

    13.- Be-200 / Be A-40/A-42

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be the development and serial production of an advanced maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) by 2020.

    14.- More Generic

    Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by upgrading its third-generation SSNs

    The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: the completion of development of advance coastal-defence missiles and the issuing of them;

    During the 2021-2030 phase Russia's existing SSN/SSK fleet is planned to be improved by adding unmanned technologies,

    The 2021-2030 period will see the Russian Naval Aviation transition to optionally piloted aircraft, including those derived from existing manned aircraft. Obsolete aircraft are to be replaced by modern, multirole manned and unmanned aircraft.

    In overall terms, the direct references to the current material mean not explicitly new orders, except in the case of the Ka-52K, a navalized variant of the Ka-50/52. It is possible to see new orders, but is not something explicitly exposed, and the queue of ships ordered of projects in production is long and open. Even the cancellation of the contract of the Be-200 would not break the text.


    Last edited by eehnie on Mon Jan 01, 2018 9:25 pm; edited 3 times in total
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    franco

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  franco on Mon Dec 18, 2017 12:41 am

    Apparently will be hearing more news on the 2018-2027 Armaments Procurement plans on December 22nd along with all the other Annual figures. Preliminary reports suggest an fairly equal division of funds for the various services;

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3007032.html
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Cyberspec on Mon Dec 18, 2017 4:53 am

    eehnie wrote:9.- Su-57

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based strike aircraft.

    Naval Su-57 Question
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 9:51 am

    RUSSIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015 AND STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    II.- FUTURE ARMAMENT AND PROJECTS THAT ARE VERY LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN THE STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    In this second part of the analysis it would be included the earliest references in the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 to new projects. It would include the references to potential new projects mentioned for the first phase (2015-2020) of the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015, and also the references to potential new projects mentioned for the second phase (2021-2030) that would need to reach a phase of construction by the end of 2025, in order to meet the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 (this would not mean to have mandatorily the first unit finished by the end of 2025, despite to be good).

    REFERENCES BY POTENTIAL PROJECTS:

    1.- Project ??? Kalina http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Kalina_a002962001.aspx

    The general-purpose marine force inventory will include in its first phase ... Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by ... building a new generation of SSKs.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines;

    2.- Ka-40 Minoga https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=es&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fruslet.webnode.cz%2Ftechnika%2Fruska-technika%2Fletecka-technika%2Fn-i-kamov%2Fminoga%2F

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be ... Additionally, Russia will look to develop and produce a new shore/ship-based multirole helicopter (to replace the Ka-27).

    3.- Project 23000 Shtorm http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Project-23000E_a003273001.aspx

    The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, new aircraft carriers will be the core of its capability, ... Work to design a new class of Russian aircraft carrier is to be completed before 2020, with construction and entry into service planned for the second phase of the doctrine (2021-2030).

    Unlike the heavy aircraft cruisers of the previous generation of Russian aircraft carriers, the new carrier design will be multirole. It is envisaged to be equipped with manned and unmanned combat systems operating in the air, at sea, underwater and possibly in space. The carrier's air groups will include radar surveillance and C2 aircraft, alongside reconnaissance and strike UAVs.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... ongoing series production of the new aircraft carrier class

    4.- More Generic

    The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: ... the enhancement of the marine brigade's ability to operate in different climates, including extreme Arctic conditions.

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be ... Russia will also seek to develop advanced airborne strike systems.


    In this case the references would lead to procurement of the new projects.

    Also while the references to the 1 and 2 options can lead to some potential redundance with some other modern project of the current generation in production (Project 677 and Mi-38 respectively), the references to the option 3 would lead to production of some project that would be successor armament designed and produced by the Soviet Union, and as consequence would be more urgent from a strategic point.

    The generic reference in the coastal troops to achieve ability to operate in Arctic conditions can lead to the adoption and procurement of some specific equipment by the end of 2020.

    And the generic reference to advanced airborne strike systems leads me to think about unmanned strike systems.


    Last edited by eehnie on Mon Jan 01, 2018 9:19 pm; edited 5 times in total
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 10:44 am

    RUSSIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015 AND STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    III.- FUTURE ARMAMENT AND PROJECTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN THE STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025 ONLY IN A LEVEL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

    In the third part of the analysis would be included the references for longer timeline that likely will not reach a first unit completed by 2025, and as consequence the presence of the projects in the State Armament Program 2018-2025 would be likely only in a phase of research and development.

    REFERENCES BY POTENTIAL PROJECTS:

    1.- Project ??? Husky http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Husky_a003316001.aspx

    Within this second phase Russia will also work on developing a new ship-based (in fact submarine-based) strategic missile system and a fifth-generation SSBN class. The doctrine sets out that series production of the fifth-generation SSBN will then commence in the final 2031-2050 phase.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines

    2.- Project ??? Underwater Interceptor http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Underwater-Interceptor_a003212001.aspx

    During the 2021-2030 phase ..., while construction of a new-generation SSN class is also planned.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines;

    3.- Project ????? Priboi http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Priboi_a003199001.aspx
    Project ????? Lavina http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Lavina_a003202001.aspx
    Project ????? Kashalot https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/bdk-newcon-kashalot.htm

    The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, ... will be the core of its capability, along with multirole landing ships.

    4.- Yak-44 evolution (likely unmanned and VTOL)

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new Russian ship-based radar surveillance aircraft,

    5.- More Generic

    Russia will now look to create a single, integrated, and jam-proof fleet-wide C2 system for use at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. This is intended to be adaptable and to form a single information control complex to enable network-centric command of diverse naval and joint-service assets in any theatre of operations.

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based UAVs.

    Between 2021 and 2030 ... The marines are also earmarked to begin receiving unmanned platforms during this period, possibly armed with directed-energy weapons or powered by alternative energy sources.

    During the 2031-2050 phase naval aviation focus will switch to a new generation of multirole aircraft and UAVs and field a new generation of airborne precision weapon systems.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... the creation of a new generation of multirole unmanned systems

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... and the arming of coastal defence troops with new-generation unmanned missile systems capable of striking air, surface, sub-surface and space targets.

    The doctrine also foresees the introduction of new and innovative technologies such as: artificial intelligence systems, unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles (UAVs, USVs, UUVs), non-lethal weapon systems, and new weapon types such as directed-energy weapons.

    Long-term plans (by 2050) also call for a transition to modular combat platforms for both surface ships and submarines.


    In this case also the references lead to new procurement, but in a timeline that can be longer than the timeline of the State Armament Program 2018-2025.

    Finally, in the case of the manned material, the references of this part lead to new projects that would have some redundance with other new projects of the new generation of armament that is being developed in the first quarter of this century (Project 955, Project 885 / 08851 and Project 11711), and as consequence would be a little less urgent.

    The references to more generic material are in this case almost totally refered to unmanned material.
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 11:26 am

    Cyberspec wrote:
    eehnie wrote:9.- Su-57

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based strike aircraft.

    Naval Su-57 Question

    Yes
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Wed Dec 27, 2017 1:48 am

    GENERATION OF ARMAMENT AND MATERIAL OF THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE XXI CENTURY: REDUNDANT PROJECTS ACCEPTED UNTIL NOW

    One of the main success of the very few countries that are able to develop an entire generation of armament and material is to reach a modern solution for every type of need. The timeline of a generation of armament is habitually long enough to allow some redundancies. This is not a problem unless the effort in the development of redundant material makes to reach not a solution for some type of armament, leaving some area uncovered.

    Also in this generation of new armament and material there are projects adopted or which first unit is formally ordered and in construction, that have some degree of redundance despite to have logically some difference:

    1.- Heavy Armament:

    Project 20386 (redundant with the Project 20380/20385)
    Project 22160 (=)
    Project 11660/11661 (=)
    Project 11356 (=)

    Project 21631 (redundant with the Project 22800)
    Project 21630 (=)

    Project 02510 (redundant with the Project 22820)

    SS-29 (redundant with the SS-31)

    SS-C-6 (redundant with the SS-C-7)
    SS-C-5 (=)

    Typhoon-U (redundant with the BTR K-16 Bumerang)
    Typhoon-K (=)
    BTR-90 (=)

    2.- Auxiliary Vehicles

    Project 03182 (redundant with the Project 23131)
    Project 03180 (=)

    Project 23470 (redundant with the Project 23120)
    Project 04690 (=)
    Project 16609 (=)
    Project 90600 (=)
    Project 705B (=)
    Project 02790 (=)
    Project 14970 (=)

    Project 20360 (redundant with the Project 20180)

    Project 23370 (redundant with the Project 22870)
    Project 23040 (=)
    Project 21300 (=)

    Project 22030 (redundant with the Project 02980)

    Project 14157 (redundant with the Project 11980)

    Project 22010 (redundant with the Project 16450)

    Project 19910 (redundant with the Project 19920)

    Project 12150 (redundant with the Project 23550)

    Project 03160 (redundant with the Project 02800)
    Type IC16MII (=)

    Kamaz 6560 (redundant with the Kamaz 6520)
    Kamaz 5350 (=)

    UAZ 3163 Patriot (redundant with the GAZ-3344)
    GAZ 2330 Tigr (=)
    Kamaz 4350 (=)
    Iveco LMV (=)

    3.- Man-Portable Armament:

    RPG-30 (redundant with the RPG-28)

    The sea and land auxiliary fleets offer until now the biggest number of redundant projects accepted.

    As commented, this is not a problem while the no-redundant projects can advance until to have the first unit ready. Every project can be improved, even in the short-term, but the problem with redundant projects begin, when the work on improvements over recent material distracts resources and time from the non-redundant projects, damaging the finalisation of the new generation of armament.

    All the most likely non-redundant projects and potential new options which development is not finished have been detailed in the fist box of the point 9 of the first comment of this topic. The State Armament Program 2018-2025 is the key tool to assure the finalisation of the development of all the no-redundant armament and material.

    Foreign material in pink color. To note that all the foreign material which production begins this century, adopted until now, would be redundant or would be in cathegories not succesful today (An-148/158/178). The foreign material adopted this century really does not make a difference in the defense of Russia. It tend to be small auxiliary vehicles. In overall terms are of very low interest.


    Last edited by eehnie on Sat Jan 06, 2018 2:03 pm; edited 4 times in total
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Fri Jan 05, 2018 5:10 am

    Aircraft Carriers and Fighters: The real costs in the case of the US


    https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02298.pdf

    $21.0 Billion = Development costs F-22


    http://www.jsf.mil/news/docs/20160324_Fact-Sheet.pdf

    $55.1 Billion = Development costs F-35 (only Research, Development, Test and Evaluation costs, nothing of procurement, nothing of military construction)


    https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf

    $04.7 Billion = Development cost G Ford Aircraft Carriers
    $12.9 Billion = Cost per unit (CV-78 G Ford Aircraft Carrier)
    $11.4 Billion = Cost per unit (CV-79 JF Kennedy Aircraft Carrier)
    $13.0 Billion = Cost per unit (CV-80 Enterprise Aircraft Carrier)
    $13.0 Billion = My estimation of the Cost per unit (CV-81 ????? Aircraft Carrier)
    $55.0 Billion = Total cost of development of the G Ford Aircraft Carriers plus construction of the 4 aircraft carriers


    In the case of the US originally, it seems that the development of the F-22 over the F-23 was decided because of the option in the F-22 of a naval variant, that finally was not developed in the initial stage. Now there is a new effort on development of modernization of the aircraft, and there are bids of landing on aircraft carriers like this one:



    How many money would have avoided to waste the US if the main variant of the F-22 would have been able to operate in aircraft carriers since the begin.

    To note that the Su-57 has a reported need of lenght of runway of 330m on land, while the Project 23000 aircraft carrier has a reported lenght of 330m. Surely neither of both data is totally accurate still. I can not assure the Project 23000 will allow a comfortable use of the main variant of the Su-57. If possible, to integrate the full capabilities of the Su-57 on the aircraft carriers and to avoid an specific fleet for aircraft carriers would be major achievements with major advantages for Russia. If finally a naval variant of the Su-57 is needed, for sure it will not require major adaptations and will be fairly cheap compared to other alternatives.

    To go to full size aircraft carriers makes full sense for Russia. Major achievements can be made, and it fits perfectly with the main mission of the future Russian aircraft carriers: Non nuclear deterrence (Russian Maritime Doctrine 2015). The case of the US proves how is far cheaper the development and construction of full size aircraft carriers than the development of new aircrafts, specially if the aircraft carrier allows the use of the main variant of the main fighter. In other words, Russia will save lots of money if the Project 23000 aircraft carrier allows a comfortable use of the main land variant of the Su-57.
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:43 pm

    REDUNDANT PROJECTS NOT ACCEPTED UNTIL NOW, AND PROJECTS UNDER A CONCEPT OUTDATED, UNSUCCESSFUL TODAY, OR REACHING NOT THE STANDARDS

    In this comment will be listed the weakest projects looking at the State Armament Program 2018-2025. There are two main reasons to make weaker a project at this point:



    1.- The first is to cause redundance. Even despite to be an improvement over the current available options, this is a weakness for a project at this point, because the improvement over as recent predecessors tend to be less important, tend to be minor improvements. We can see it with an example. The potential of improvement of the T-14 over the T-90 of the previous generation is far bigger than the potential of improvement of a new corvette over the Project 22800 of the current generation.

    These projects are the most likely to suffer cuts if necessary, but are not to be ruled out, except in case of multiple redundance or in case of being not an improvement over the adopted material.

    In the case of the projects that offer improvements over current valid solutions, the future of these projects is likely a delay until the next armament generation, to enter after 2025 surely accumulating more improvements still.

    In the case of the projects that would not be to be adopted by the Russian Armed Forces in the future, the development is unlikely to be completed with Russian military funds, but in case of being completed, there are alternatives like to export and/or civil use.

    List of redundant heavy armament:

    Project ??? Kalina (SSK)
    Project ??? Husky (SSBN)
    Project ??? Underwater Interceptor (SSN)
    Project ????? Priboi (multirole Amphibious Ship)
    Project ????? Lavina (multirole Amphibious Ship)
    Project ????? Kashalot (multirole Amphibious Ship)
    Project ????? Briz (1500-5000 tons Warship)
    Project 22500 (500-1500 tons Warship)
    SA-?? AD system successor S-350 and SA-11/17BuK (50 to 200 Km AD)
    SA-?? AD system successor ZSU-23-4 Shilka (MANPAD to 50 Km AD)
    MiG-LMFS (Fighter)
    Yak-VTOL fighter (Fighter)

    List of redundant heavy auxiliary mobile equipment:

    Tu-334 (airliner aircraft in the Su-SJ-100 size class)
    Ka-92 (helicopter in the Mi-38 size class)
    Ka-40 Minoga (helicopter in the Mi-38 size class)
    Ka-90 (helicopter in the Mi-38 size class)
    Mi-X1 (helicopter in the Mi-38 size class)
    Mi-54 (helicopter in the Mi-Ansat size class)
    Ka-118 (helicopter in the Ka-226 size class)

    List of redundant man-portable armament:



    2.- The second is to be a project under a concept outdated, unsuccessful today, or reaching not the current standars of the Russian Armed Forces. These projects very likely will not be accepted for the Russian Armed Forces, and as consequence, its development would not be to be completed with Russian military funds. These would be very likely projects to export (except the 2S37 that produced not a result).

    List of redundant heavy armament:

    2S12A 120mm Tigr platform
    2S35-1 152mm Truck platform
    2S36 120mm Tigr platform
    2S37 152mm BMD-4M platform
    2S38 057mm BMP-3 platform
    2S39 120mm DT-30 platform (designation and more details to be confirmed)
    2S40 120mm Truck platform
    2S41 082mm Typhoon-VDV 4x4 platform

    List of redundant heavy auxiliary mobile equipment:

    Su-KR-860 (airliner aircraft in the An-225 size class)
    PTS 240 (transport aircraft in the An-225 size class)
    Mi-32 (helicopter in the Il-76/78 Be-A50 size class)
    Yak-44 (transport aircraft in the An-72/71/74 size class)
    Tu-324/414 (airliner aircraft in the An-72/71/74 size class)
    Il-112 (transport aircraft in the An-24/26/30/32 size class)
    Tu-130/136 (transport aircraft in the An-24/26/30/32 size class)
    MiG-110 (transport aircraft in the An-24/26/30/32 size class)
    Yak-48 (airliner aircraft in the Yak-130 size class)
    Il-108 (airliner aircraft in the Yak-130 size class)
    Be-112 (transport aircraft in the L-410 size class)
    MiG-AT (trainer aircraft in the L-410 size class)
    M-302 (airliner in the L-410 size class)
    M-202 (airliner in the L-410 size class)
    Che-22 Korvet (transport aircraft in the L-410 size class)
    T-208 Eagle (transport aircraft in the L-410 size class)
    T-101/130/210 (transport aircraft in the An-2 size class)
    T-207 (transport aircraft in the An-2 size class)
    M-102 (airliner in the An-2 size class)
    Rysachok (airliner in the An-2 size class)
    T-115 Niva (transport aircraft in the An-2 size class)
    T-440 (airliner in the An-2 size class)
    T-517 Fermer (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    GM-17 Viper (airliner aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    SR-10 (trainer aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    M-500 (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    T-507 (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    T-511 Aist-M (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    SA-20P (airliner aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    Accord-201 (airliner aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)

    List of redundant man-portable armament:

    PS: To be completed. If you know some new project included not, you can ask about.


    Last edited by eehnie on Tue Jan 16, 2018 7:16 am; edited 5 times in total
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    franco

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  franco on Tue Jan 09, 2018 9:46 pm

    Equipment to be received in 2018;

    http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4851793
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    George1

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  George1 on Sun Jan 14, 2018 12:23 pm

    The State Arms Program for 2018-2027 is approved

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3048979.html


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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

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