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    State Armament Program 2018-2027

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    Vote (multiple choice allowed) for the type of material that in your opinion will remain in the Russian Armed Forces after the end of 2025, and leave without vote the material that will be totally out of the Russian Armed Forces, including of the reserve:

    [ 5 ]
    6% [6%] 
    [ 7 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 7 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 9 ]
    12% [12%] 
    [ 9 ]
    12% [12%] 
    [ 3 ]
    4% [4%] 
    [ 10 ]
    13% [13%] 
    [ 5 ]
    6% [6%] 
    [ 6 ]
    8% [8%] 
    [ 17 ]
    21% [21%] 

    Total Votes: 78
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Wed Nov 22, 2017 12:41 am

    Austin wrote:Bondarev: agreed amount of GPU for 2018-2025 is 19 trillion rubles

    Подробнее на ТАСС:
    http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4746605

    He clarified that in some areas of work in the new GPV prolonged until 2027.

    This is a clear sign of what is coming.

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Thu Nov 23, 2017 6:54 pm

    The Ministry of Defense called the new LGP a balanced

    https://rg.ru/2017/11/23/v-minoborony-nazvali-novuiu-gpv-sbalansirovannoj.html

    The new state program of armaments is balanced, Tatyana Shevtsova, deputy head of the Defense Ministry, told journalists: 19 trillion rubles - military equipment supplies, 1 trillion will be allocated to the synchronization system.

    "This is the main difference, because the previous LG was planned only for arms supplies, but did not include synchronization costs," Shevtsova said after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi.

    he Ministry of Defense needs a storage system, a system of basing and equipping the troops. "In the previous LG, this was not taken into account: this LG differs from the previous one in that, in addition to the weapons planned for national security, expenses for synchronization are also planned," the deputy minister explained.

    Shevtsova also said that a government decree will be prepared on the introduction of a system at the enterprises of the OPK, which will allow to correctly form the cost of production. "As a state customer, the price of the contract, the cost of the products is very important to us." We have a lot of disputes with the industrial enterprises, "she said.

    "We got approval of the president to prepare the necessary regulatory framework," Shevtsova said, "we commissioned a pilot project in June, involving enterprises of the Tula region, they worked out the methodology developed by the Defense Ministry on an initiative basis." According to her, the pilot project was successful.

    Austin

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Thu Nov 23, 2017 6:55 pm

    What does synchronization cost means ? They have allocated additional 1 trillion roubles for it ?
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    franco

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  franco on Thu Nov 23, 2017 10:00 pm

    Austin wrote:What does synchronization cost means ? They have allocated additional 1 trillion roubles for it ?

    Perhaps...

    The Ministry of Defense needs a storage system, a system of basing and equipping the troops. "In the previous LG, this was not taken into account: this LG differs from the previous one in that, in addition to the weapons planned for national security, expenses for synchronization are also planned," the deputy minister explained.
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Cyberspec on Thu Nov 23, 2017 10:04 pm

    I was about to say it means "the logistics",,,but maybe it's best if a native Russian speaker can confirm
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Fri Nov 24, 2017 4:10 am

    Austin wrote:What does synchronization cost means ? They have allocated additional 1 trillion roubles for it ?

    Is not an usual concept, but as I understand it must be related with the cost of getting the results in development of new material and in production at the right time.

    As example, it must be a right timing between the development and production of all the armata based warfare. All the different armata based material must come in the right amount in a synchronized maner in order to be a ble to do [Russia] a fast transition of a concrete unit, to armata based material.

    Habitually it should refer to overcosts related to accelerate some results to improve the timing, and also to overcosts related to some delay in other cases also to improve the timing. In the case were delays can be required, it would be a need of some, not big, storage. Surely the issue of the storage is not the most important. Surely the most important part of the costs of synchronization will be the cost of accelerating the projects that can cause overall delays in the procurement of weapons to the Russian Armed Forces.

    Following with the example, the T-14 or the T-15 can be more advanced today, as single projects, than some types of armata based artillery, mrls or air defense. The most delayed designs need additional money to be accelerated in order to cause not an overall delay in the formation of new armata units.

    In the refered to the amount, it seems that it is 1 trillion of the 19 trillions for this purpose.

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Fri Nov 24, 2017 6:37 am

    Russia’s Military Modernization Plans: 2018-2027

    http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russias-military-modernization-plans-2018-2027
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    Kimppis

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Kimppis on Tue Nov 28, 2017 6:47 pm

    Overall it seems to be a pretty good summary, but I have a few major issues:

    1. Why would it take that long to finish the development of "Product 30"? They just unveiled the first images...

    2. And then the "massive delay of S-500"

    Are those predictions based on anything? No...!?
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Cyberspec on Wed Nov 29, 2017 7:43 am

    By Dmitry Gorenburg....Kilo Golf's mentor no doubt Very Happy

    This guy was claiming that Russia was not capable of mounting an operation outside of it's borders (until 2015 Cool )...as far as I'm concerned, he's living in tra-la land and is basically Full of Sh*t
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    eehnie

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Thu Dec 07, 2017 10:56 am

    Despite the new timeline until 2027 for the State Armament Program 2018-2027, I expect the new timeline introduces not delays in the timeline to finish the equipment of the new generation of armament.

    The narrowest timeline would be for the Project 23000 aircraft carrier and for smoe projects of auxiliary aircrafts and helicopters. Here is likely where biggest effort must be done.


    Last edited by eehnie on Sat Feb 17, 2018 5:18 pm; edited 4 times in total

    Austin

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Thu Dec 07, 2017 1:43 pm

    On the planned costs for LGP 2018-2027. Is not that a little deal?

    https://topwar.ru/131038-o-planovyh-zatratah-na-gpv-2018-2027-ne-malovata-l-kolchuzhka.html
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 12:35 am

    RUSSIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015 AND STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    I.- CURRENT ARMAMENT AND PROJECTS AT LEAST IN PRODUCTION BY THE BEGIN OF 2018

    https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/russias-new-maritime-doctrine.391893/

    Shipbuilding strategy

    The 2015 doctrine adds a new section to the mix: shipbuilding. This, the doctrine states, is due to the re-emergence of the Russian shipbuilding sector over the past 10-15 years.

    Admiral Victor Chirkov, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy states that the navy's priority is to develop and deploy advanced equipment to enable Russia to make up for lost ground (against rivals) and to become superior to them in certain areas. In addition to refitting the fleets, the navy is looking to build up stocks of weaponry and materiel; improve naval command and control (C2); integrate joint force C2 into the various theatres; and improve the navy's basing and support systems.

    Among these, priority will be given to supporting Russia's ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) within the Northern and Pacific fleets.

    Additionally, the doctrine seeks to create a general-purpose marine force armed with long-range and high-precision strike systems capable of providing a non-nuclear deterrent.

    The navy's future surface fleet is to be divided between long-range multirole vessels and short-range vessels with modular capabilities. Looking ahead, the service intends to field a multi-service naval strike force capable of quick relocation to threatened areas.

    The doctrine also foresees the introduction of new and innovative technologies such as: artificial intelligence systems, unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles (UAVs, USVs, UUVs), non-lethal weapon systems, and new weapon types such as directed-energy weapons.

    Russia will now look to create a single, integrated, and jam-proof fleet-wide C2 system for use at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. This is intended to be adaptable and to form a single information control complex to enable network-centric command of diverse naval and joint-service assets in any theatre of operations.

    In connection with the maritime doctrine, and amendments in some aspects of force development, the Russian Navy is expected to gain some additional resources because the creation of a well-balanced and equipped naval force is a long-term effort of 30-40 years. Considering this and the duration of ship design/construction work, the conceptual approach to the development of the navy will be an ongoing issue for 45-50 years.

    To take account of the implementation time and existing/forecast resource and technology restrictions, the creation of the new-model navy has been divided into three phases: up to 2020; 2021-2030; and 2031-2050. The content of each phase was outlined by Adm Chirkov for the various elements of the navy.

    Strategic nuclear forces

    Up until 2020 the maritime strategic nuclear force will focus on completing the development and launching of its fourth-generation Borey-class (Project 955/955A) SSBNs, while maintaining its remaining Delta III/IV-class (Project 667BDR/667BDRM) SSBNs in operational service.

    During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs. Within this second phase Russia will also work on developing a new ship-based (in fact submarine-based) strategic missile system and a fifth-generation SSBN class. The doctrine sets out that series production of the fifth-generation SSBN will then commence in the final 2031-2050 phase.

    General-purpose force

    The general-purpose marine force inventory will include in its first phase the creation of a strategic non-nuclear deterrent force, enhancements to its SSN and diesel-electric submarines (SSKs), the build-up of the inventory and capability of its surface forces, and the creation of the new marine rapid-response force. In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by Yasen-class (Project 885M) SSNs and Oscar-class (Project 885M) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs). Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by upgrading its third-generation SSNs and building a new generation of SSKs.

    During the 2021-2030 phase Russia's existing SSN/SSK fleet is planned to be improved by adding unmanned technologies, while construction of a new-generation SSN class is also planned.

    Surface fleet

    In the first phase Russia's Admiral Gorshkov-class (Project 22350) frigates and Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    In the mid term a new-generation destroyer featuring advanced strike, air defence and missile defence capabilities will become the navy's main oceangoing ship. Between 2021 and 2030 a new class of modular multirole surface combat ship will be designed and enter series production as the successor to the Project 22350/20380 classes. It is envisaged that these will be armed with novel weapon systems and will carry unmanned vehicles of various sorts.

    The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, new aircraft carriers will be the core of its capability, along with multirole landing ships. Work to design a new class of Russian aircraft carrier is to be completed before 2020, with construction and entry into service planned for the second phase of the doctrine (2021-2030).

    Unlike the heavy aircraft cruisers of the previous generation of Russian aircraft carriers, the new carrier design will be multirole. It is envisaged to be equipped with manned and unmanned combat systems operating in the air, at sea, underwater and possibly in space. The carrier's air groups will include radar surveillance and C2 aircraft, alongside reconnaissance and strike UAVs.

    Naval Aviation

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be the development and serial production of an advanced maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) by 2020.

    Additionally, Russia will look to develop and produce a new shore/ship-based multirole helicopter (to replace the Ka-27) and acquire a ship-based combat helicopter (the Ka-52K). Russia will also seek to develop advanced airborne strike systems.

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new Russian ship-based radar surveillance aircraft, ship-based UAVs, and ship-based strike aircraft. The 2021-2030 period will see the Russian Naval Aviation transition to optionally piloted aircraft, including those derived from existing manned aircraft. Obsolete aircraft are to be replaced by modern, multirole manned and unmanned aircraft. During the 2031-2050 phase naval aviation focus will switch to a new generation of multirole aircraft and UAVs and field a new generation of airborne precision weapon systems.

    Coastal forces

    The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: the completion of development of advance coastal-defence missiles and the issuing of them; and the enhancement of the marine brigade's ability to operate in different climates, including extreme Arctic conditions.

    Between 2021 and 2030 the doctrine plans the introduction of a highly mobile amphibious combat vehicle for the coastal troops so that they can support the marines' operations. The marines are also earmarked to begin receiving unmanned platforms during this period, possibly armed with directed-energy weapons or powered by alternative energy sources.

    Long term

    The direction of the final 2031-2050 phase is currently being analysed, according to Adm Chirkov. However, it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines; ongoing series production of the new aircraft carrier class; the start of series production of the new multirole ship class; the creation of a new generation of multirole unmanned systems; and the arming of coastal defence troops with new-generation unmanned missile systems capable of striking air, surface, sub-surface and space targets.

    Long-term plans (by 2050) also call for a transition to modular combat platforms for both surface ships and submarines.

    Nikolai Novichkov is a JDW Correspondent, reporting from Moscow

    REFERENCES PROJECT BY PROJECT:


    1.- Project 667 BDR / 09786

    Up until 2020..., while maintaining its remaining Delta III-class (Project 667BDR ... ) SSBNs in operational service.

    During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs.

    2.- Project 667 BDRM / 09787

    Up until 2020..., while maintaining its remaining Delta IV-class (Project ... 667BDRM) SSBNs in operational service.

    During the 2021-2030 phase work will proceed on replacing the Delta class with fourth-generation SSBNs.

    3.- Project 949

    In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by ... Oscar-class (Project 885M 949) nuclear-powered guided missile submarines (SSGNs).

    4.- Ka 50 / 52

    Additionally, Russia will ... acquire a ship-based combat helicopter (the Ka-52K).

    5.- Project 20380 / 20385

    In the first phase Russia's ... Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    6.- Project 955

    Up until 2020 the maritime strategic nuclear force will focus on completing the development and launching of its fourth-generation Borey-class (Project 955/955A) SSBNs.

    7.- Project 885

    In the mid term the non-nuclear deterrent will be provided by Yasen-class (Project 885M) SSNs.

    8.- Kurganets platform

    The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: ... the enhancement of the marine brigade's ability to operate in different climates, including extreme Arctic conditions.

    My impression is that the Kurganets platform can be the new platform designed to be the best addapted to Arctic conditions.

    9.- Bumerang platform

    Between 2021 and 2030 the doctrine plans the introduction of a highly mobile amphibious combat vehicle for the coastal troops so that they can support the marines' operations.

    10.- Su-57

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based strike aircraft.

    11.- Project 22350

    In the first phase Russia's Admiral Gorshkov-class (Project 22350) frigates ... and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    12.- Project 20386

    In the first phase Russia's ... Steregushchy-class (Project 20380) corvettes and their variants will become the core of the surface force for long- and short-range operations.

    13.- Project 23560 Lider http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_23560.htm

    In the mid term a new-generation destroyer featuring advanced strike, air defence and missile defence capabilities will become the navy's main oceangoing ship. Between 2021 and 2030 a new class of modular multirole surface combat ship will be designed and enter series production as the successor to the Project 22350/20380 classes. It is envisaged that these will be armed with novel weapon systems and will carry unmanned vehicles of various sorts.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... the start of series production of the new multirole ship class

    14.- Be-200 / Be A-40/A-42

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be the development and serial production of an advanced maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) by 2020.

    15.- More Generic

    Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by upgrading its third-generation SSNs

    The first phase of the doctrine concerning Russia's coastal troops and marine force aims to achieve: the completion of development of advance coastal-defence missiles and the issuing of them;

    During the 2021-2030 phase Russia's existing SSN/SSK fleet is planned to be improved by adding unmanned technologies,

    The 2021-2030 period will see the Russian Naval Aviation transition to optionally piloted aircraft, including those derived from existing manned aircraft. Obsolete aircraft are to be replaced by modern, multirole manned and unmanned aircraft.

    In overall terms, the direct references to the current material mean not explicitly new orders, except in the case of the Ka-52K, a navalized variant of the Ka-50/52. It is possible to see new orders, but is not something explicitly exposed, and the queue of ships ordered of projects in production is long and open. Even the cancellation of the contract of the Be-200 would not break the text.


    Last edited by eehnie on Fri Mar 02, 2018 12:00 am; edited 4 times in total
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    franco

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  franco on Mon Dec 18, 2017 12:41 am

    Apparently will be hearing more news on the 2018-2027 Armaments Procurement plans on December 22nd along with all the other Annual figures. Preliminary reports suggest an fairly equal division of funds for the various services;

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3007032.html
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Cyberspec on Mon Dec 18, 2017 4:53 am

    eehnie wrote:9.- Su-57

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based strike aircraft.

    Naval Su-57 Question
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 9:51 am

    RUSSIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015 AND STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    II.- FUTURE ARMAMENT AND PROJECTS THAT ARE VERY LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN THE STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    In this second part of the analysis it would be included the earliest references in the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 to new projects. It would include the references to potential new projects mentioned for the first phase (2015-2020) of the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015, and also the references to potential new projects mentioned for the second phase (2021-2030) that would need to reach a phase of construction by the end of 2025, in order to meet the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 (this would not mean to have mandatorily the first unit finished by the end of 2025, despite to be good).

    REFERENCES BY POTENTIAL PROJECTS:

    1.- Project 23000 Shtorm http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Project-23000E_a003273001.aspx

    The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, new aircraft carriers will be the core of its capability, ... Work to design a new class of Russian aircraft carrier is to be completed before 2020, with construction and entry into service planned for the second phase of the doctrine (2021-2030).

    Unlike the heavy aircraft cruisers of the previous generation of Russian aircraft carriers, the new carrier design will be multirole. It is envisaged to be equipped with manned and unmanned combat systems operating in the air, at sea, underwater and possibly in space. The carrier's air groups will include radar surveillance and C2 aircraft, alongside reconnaissance and strike UAVs.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... ongoing series production of the new aircraft carrier class

    2.- Ka-40 Minoga https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=es&sl=auto&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fruslet.webnode.cz%2Ftechnika%2Fruska-technika%2Fletecka-technika%2Fn-i-kamov%2Fminoga%2F

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be ... Additionally, Russia will look to develop and produce a new shore/ship-based multirole helicopter (to replace the Ka-27).

    3.- Project ??? Kalina http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Kalina_a002962001.aspx

    The general-purpose marine force inventory will include in its first phase ... Meanwhile, the capability of Russia's non-strategic submarines will be ensured by ... building a new generation of SSKs.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines;

    4.- More Generic

    For the Russian Naval Aviation the focus in the first phase will be ... Russia will also seek to develop advanced airborne strike systems.


    In this case the references would lead to procurement of the new projects.

    Also while the references to the options 1 and 2 would lead to production of some project that would be successor of equipment designed and produced by the Soviet Union, and as consequence would be more urgent from a strategic point, the references to the option 3 can lead to some potential redundance with some other modern project of the current generation in production (Project 677).

    And the generic reference to advanced airborne strike systems leads me to think about unmanned strike systems.


    Last edited by eehnie on Thu Mar 01, 2018 11:54 pm; edited 8 times in total
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 10:44 am

    RUSSIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE 2015 AND STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025

    III.- FUTURE ARMAMENT AND PROJECTS THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN THE STATE ARMAMENT PROGRAM 2018-2025 ONLY IN A LEVEL OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

    In the third part of the analysis would be included the references for longer timeline that likely will not reach a first unit completed by 2025, and as consequence the presence of the projects in the State Armament Program 2018-2025 would be likely only in a phase of research and development.

    REFERENCES BY POTENTIAL PROJECTS:

    1.- Project ??? Husky http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Husky_a003316001.aspx

    Within this second phase Russia will also work on developing a new ship-based (in fact submarine-based) strategic missile system and a fifth-generation SSBN class. The doctrine sets out that series production of the fifth-generation SSBN will then commence in the final 2031-2050 phase.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines

    2.- Project ??? Underwater Interceptor http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Underwater-Interceptor_a003212001.aspx

    During the 2021-2030 phase ..., while construction of a new-generation SSN class is also planned.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: series production of new-generation submarines;

    3.- Project ????? Priboi http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Priboi_a003199001.aspx
    Project ????? Lavina http://www.deagel.com/Fighting-Ships/Lavina_a003202001.aspx
    Project ????? Kashalot https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/bdk-newcon-kashalot.htm

    The marine rapid-response force is intended to be capable of conducting missions in the maritime, aerial and land domains in any part of the world. For this, ... will be the core of its capability, along with multirole landing ships.

    4.- Yak-44 evolution (likely unmanned and VTOL)

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new Russian ship-based radar surveillance aircraft,

    5.- More Generic

    Russia will now look to create a single, integrated, and jam-proof fleet-wide C2 system for use at all levels from the strategic to the tactical. This is intended to be adaptable and to form a single information control complex to enable network-centric command of diverse naval and joint-service assets in any theatre of operations.

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based UAVs.

    Between 2021 and 2030 ... The marines are also earmarked to begin receiving unmanned platforms during this period, possibly armed with directed-energy weapons or powered by alternative energy sources.

    During the 2031-2050 phase naval aviation focus will switch to a new generation of multirole aircraft and UAVs and field a new generation of airborne precision weapon systems.

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... the creation of a new generation of multirole unmanned systems

    it is envisaged that during this final phase the following will be undertaken: ... and the arming of coastal defence troops with new-generation unmanned missile systems capable of striking air, surface, sub-surface and space targets.

    The doctrine also foresees the introduction of new and innovative technologies such as: artificial intelligence systems, unmanned aerial, surface and underwater vehicles (UAVs, USVs, UUVs), non-lethal weapon systems, and new weapon types such as directed-energy weapons.

    Long-term plans (by 2050) also call for a transition to modular combat platforms for both surface ships and submarines.


    In this case also the references lead to new procurement, but in a timeline that can be longer than the timeline of the State Armament Program 2018-2025.

    Finally, in the case of the manned material, the references of this part lead to new projects that would have some redundance with other new projects of the new generation of armament that is being developed in the first quarter of this century (Project 955, Project 885 / 08851 and Project 11711), and as consequence would be a little less urgent.

    The references to more generic material are in this case almost totally refered to unmanned material.
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Dec 18, 2017 11:26 am

    Cyberspec wrote:
    eehnie wrote:9.- Su-57

    The second phase will see the deployment of the new ... ship-based strike aircraft.

    Naval Su-57 Question

    Yes
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Wed Dec 27, 2017 1:48 am

    GENERATION OF ARMAMENT AND MATERIAL OF THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE XXI CENTURY: REDUNDANT PROJECTS COMPLETED UNTIL NOW

    One of the main success of the very few countries that are able to develop an entire generation of armament and material is to reach a modern solution for every type of need. The timeline of a generation of armament is habitually long enough to allow some redundancies. This is not a problem unless the effort in the development of redundant material makes to reach not a solution for some type of armament, leaving some area uncovered.

    Also in this generation of new armament and material there are projects which first unit is completed, that have some degree of redundance despite to have logically some difference:

    1.- Heavy Armament:

    Project 11660/11661 (redundant with the Project 20380/20385)
    Project 11356 (=)

    Project 21630 (redundant with the Project 21631)

    SS-C-6 (redundant with the SS-C-7)
    SS-C-5 (=)

    Typhoon-U (redundant with the BTR K-16 Bumerang)
    Typhoon-K (=)

    2.- Heavy Auxiliary Mobile Equipment:

    Project 04690 (redundant with the Project 23120)
    Project 16609 (=)
    Project 90600 (=)
    Project 705B (=)
    Project 02790 (=)
    Project 14970 (=)

    Project 20360 (redundant with the Project 20180)

    Project 23370 (redundant with the Project 22870)
    Project 23040 (=)
    Project 21300 (=)

    Project 22030 (redundant with the Project 02980)

    Project 14157 (redundant with the Project 11980)

    Project 19910 (redundant with the Project 19920)

    Project 02510 (redundant with the Project 02800)
    Project 03160 (=)
    Type IC16MII (=)

    Kamaz 6520 (redundant with the TMM 4902)
    Kamaz 6560 (=)
    Kamaz 5350 (=)

    UAZ 3163 Patriot (redundant with the GAZ-3344)
    GAZ 2330 Tigr (=)
    Kamaz 4350 (=)
    Iveco LMV (=)

    3.- Man-Portable Armament:

    RPG-30 (redundant with the RPG-28)

    The sea and land auxiliary fleets offer until now the biggest number of redundant projects accepted.

    As commented, this is not a problem while the no-redundant projects can advance until to have the first unit ready. Every project can be improved, even in the short-term, but the problem with redundant projects begin, when the work on improvements over recent material distracts resources and time from the non-redundant projects, damaging the finalisation of the new generation of armament.

    All the most likely non-redundant projects and potential new options which development is not finished have been detailed in the fist box of the point 10 of the first comment of this topic. The State Armament Program 2018-2025 is the key tool to assure the finalisation of the development of all the no-redundant armament and material.

    Foreign material in pink color. To note that all the foreign material which production begins this century, adopted until now, would be redundant or would be in cathegories not succesful today (An-148/158/178). The foreign material adopted this century really does not make a difference in the defense of Russia. It tend to be small auxiliary vehicles. In overall terms are of very low interest.


    Last edited by eehnie on Sat Jun 09, 2018 7:06 pm; edited 15 times in total
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Fri Jan 05, 2018 5:10 am

    Aircraft Carriers and Fighters: The real costs in the case of the US


    https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02298.pdf

    $21.0 Billion = Development costs F-22


    http://www.jsf.mil/news/docs/20160324_Fact-Sheet.pdf

    $55.1 Billion = Development costs F-35 (only Research, Development, Test and Evaluation costs, nothing of procurement, nothing of military construction)


    https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS20643.pdf

    $04.7 Billion = Development cost G Ford Aircraft Carriers
    $12.9 Billion = Cost per unit (CV-78 G Ford Aircraft Carrier)
    $11.4 Billion = Cost per unit (CV-79 JF Kennedy Aircraft Carrier)
    $13.0 Billion = Cost per unit (CV-80 Enterprise Aircraft Carrier)
    $13.0 Billion = My estimation of the Cost per unit (CV-81 ????? Aircraft Carrier)
    $55.0 Billion = Total cost of development of the G Ford Aircraft Carriers plus construction of the 4 aircraft carriers


    In the case of the US originally, it seems that the development of the F-22 over the F-23 was decided because of the option in the F-22 of a naval variant, that finally was not developed in the initial stage. Now there is a new effort on development of modernization of the aircraft, and there are bids of landing on aircraft carriers like this one:



    How many money would have avoided to waste the US if the main variant of the F-22 would have been able to operate in aircraft carriers since the begin.

    To note that the Su-57 has a reported need of lenght of runway of 330m on land, while the Project 23000 aircraft carrier has a reported lenght of 330m. Surely neither of both data is totally accurate still. I can not assure the Project 23000 will allow a comfortable use of the main variant of the Su-57. If possible, to integrate the full capabilities of the Su-57 on the aircraft carriers and to avoid an specific fleet for aircraft carriers would be major achievements with major advantages for Russia. If finally a naval variant of the Su-57 is needed, for sure it will not require major adaptations and will be fairly cheap compared to other alternatives.

    To go to full size aircraft carriers makes full sense for Russia. Major achievements can be made, and it fits perfectly with the main mission of the future Russian aircraft carriers: Non nuclear deterrence (Russian Maritime Doctrine 2015). The case of the US proves how is far cheaper the development and construction of full size aircraft carriers than the development of new aircrafts, specially if the aircraft carrier allows the use of the main variant of the main fighter. In other words, Russia will save lots of money if the Project 23000 aircraft carrier allows a comfortable use of the main land variant of the Su-57.
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Sun Jan 07, 2018 5:43 pm

    REDUNDANT PROJECTS NOT COMPLETED UNTIL NOW, NOT ACCEPTED, AND PROJECTS UNDER A CONCEPT OUTDATED, UNSUCCESSFUL TODAY, OR REACHING NOT THE STANDARDS

    In this comment will be listed the weakest projects looking at the State Armament Program 2018-2025. To note that components (like weapons,...) and ammunition (like missiles,...) are not included. There are two main reasons to make weaker a project at this point:



    1.- The first is to cause redundancy. Even despite to be an improvement over the current available options, this is a weakness for a project at this point, because the improvement over as recent predecessors tend to be less important, tend to be minor improvements. We can see it with an example. The potential of improvement of the T-14 over the T-90 of the previous generation is far bigger than the potential of improvement of a new corvette over the Project 21631 of the current generation.

    These projects are the most likely to suffer cuts if necessary, but are not to be ruled out, except in case of multiple redundancy or in case of being not an improvement over the adopted material.

    In the case of the projects that offer improvements over current valid solutions, the future of these projects is likely a delay until the next armament generation, to enter after 2025 surely accumulating more improvements still. Even in the case of the projects which first unit can be under construction at this point.

    In the case of the projects that would not be to be adopted by the Russian Armed Forces in the future, the development is unlikely to be completed with Russian military funds, but in case of being completed, there are alternatives like to export and/or civil use.

    List of redundant heavy armament:

    Project ??? Kalina (SSK)
    Project ??? Husky (SSBN)
    Project ??? Underwater Interceptor (SSN)
    Project ????? Priboi (multirole Amphibious Ship)
    Project ????? Lavina (multirole Amphibious Ship)
    Project ????? Kashalot (multirole Amphibious Ship)
    Project 23550 (5000-10000 tons Warship)
    Project 22160 (1500-5000 tons Warship)
    Project 20386 (1500-5000 tons Warship)
    Project ????? Briz (1500-5000 tons Warship)
    Project 23800 (1500-5000 tons Warship)
    Project 22800 (500-1500 tons Warship)
    Project 22500 (500-1500 tons Warship)
    SS-31 (ICBM)
    Atom (IFV Amphibious Wheeled platform)
    Typhoon-K 8x8 (APC Amphibous Wheeled platform)
    BMD-5 (IFV Airborne Tracked platform)

    List of redundant heavy auxiliary mobile equipment:

    Project 03182 (logistic ship tanker)
    Project 23131 (logistic ship tanker)
    Project 23470 (logistic ship tug)
    Project 16450 (hydrographic ship oceanographic)
    Not completed sea and land heavy auxiliary mobile equipment
    Tu-334 (airliner aircraft in the Su-SJ-100 size class)
    Ka-92 (helicopter in the Ka-27/28/29/31/32/35 size class
    Mi-X1 (helicopter in the Ka-27/28/29/31/32/35 size class)
    Mi-54 (helicopter in the Mi-Ansat size class)
    Ka-118 (helicopter in the Ka-226 size class)

    List of redundant man-portable armament:

    Not completed



    2.- The second is to be a project under a concept outdated, unsuccessful today, or reaching not the current standars of the Russian Armed Forces. These projects very likely will not be accepted for the Russian Armed Forces, and as consequence, its development would not be to be completed with Russian military funds. These would be very likely projects to export (except the 2S37 that produced not a result).

    List of projects of heavy armament under a concept outdated, unsuccessful today, or reaching not the current standars of the Russian Armed Forces:

    Derivatsiya-PVO 57mm BMPT BMP-3 platform
    Gibka-S Under MANPAD range Air Defense Tigr platform
    MD-PS Under MANPAD range Air Defense Vodnik platform
    2S12A 120mm Tigr platform
    2S35-1 152mm Truck platform
    2S36 120mm Tigr platform
    2S37 152mm BMD-4M platform
    2S38 057mm BMP-3 platform
    2S39 120mm DT-30 platform (designation and more details to be confirmed)
    2S40 120mm Truck platform
    2S41 082mm Typhoon-VDV 4x4 platform
    2S?? 120mm Bumerang platform
    MiG-LMFS (Fighter)
    Yak-VTOL fighter (Fighter)

    List of projects of heavy auxiliary mobile equipment under a concept outdated, unsuccessful today, or reaching not the current standars of the Russian Armed Forces:

    Su-KR-860 (airliner aircraft in the An-225 size class)
    PTS 240 (transport aircraft in the An-225 size class)
    Mi-32 (helicopter in the Il-76/78 Be-A50 size class)
    Be-A-40/42 (transport aircraft in the Tu-204/214 size class)
    Yak-44 (transport aircraft in the An-72/71/74 size class)
    Tu-324/414 (airliner aircraft in the An-72/71/74 size class)
    Il-112 (transport aircraft in the An-24/26/30/32 size class)
    Tu-130/136 (transport aircraft in the An-24/26/30/32 size class)
    MiG-110 (transport aircraft in the An-24/26/30/32 size class)
    Yak-48 (airliner aircraft in the Yak-130 size class)
    Il-108 (airliner aircraft in the Yak-130 size class)
    Be-112 (transport aircraft in the Che-22 size class)
    MiG-AT (trainer aircraft in the Che-22 size class)
    M-302 (airliner in the Che-22 size class)
    M-202 (airliner in the Che-22 size class)
    Che-22 Korvet (transport aircraft in the Che-22 size class)
    T-208 Eagle (transport aircraft in the Che-22 size class)
    T-101/130/210 (transport aircraft in the An-2 size class)
    T-207 (transport aircraft in the An-2 size class)
    M-102 (airliner in the An-2 size class)
    Rysachok (airliner in the An-2 size class)
    T-115 Niva (transport aircraft in the An-2 size class)
    T-440 (airliner in the An-2 size class)
    T-517 Fermer (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    GM-17 Viper (airliner aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    SR-10 (trainer aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    M-500 (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    T-507 (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    T-511 Aist-M (transport aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    SA-20P (airliner aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    Accord-201 (airliner aircraft in the Ka-226 size class)
    Not completed smallest air heavy auxiliary mobile equipment

    List of projects of man-portable armament under a concept outdated, unsuccessful today, or reaching not the current standars of the Russian Armed Forces:

    Not completed


    Last edited by eehnie on Wed Jun 06, 2018 8:01 pm; edited 19 times in total
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  franco on Tue Jan 09, 2018 9:46 pm

    Equipment to be received in 2018;

    http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4851793
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  George1 on Sun Jan 14, 2018 12:23 pm

    The State Arms Program for 2018-2027 is approved

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3048979.html


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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  Austin on Wed Jan 24, 2018 5:21 pm

    Putin: the new state program of armaments will ensure stable volumes until 2027

    Подробнее на ТАСС:
    http://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4899582
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Feb 12, 2018 3:16 pm

    In the following comment there is a preview about the production of combat ships until 2025, covering almost totally the timeline of the new State Armament Program 2018-2027.

    http://www.russiadefence.net/t5541p175-russian-naval-construction-plans-and-update#213723

    PREVIEW OF CHANGES IN THE COMBAT FLEET OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY 2018-2025

    As explained before, Russia has been doing a process of reduction of the fleet since the end of the Soviet Union. Russia has been selecting the best mix of ships to keep from the fleet of the Soviet Union while decommissioning the less modern and less useful ships. For it, Russia decommissioned a good amount of young ships, something that only makes sense in a process of reduction of the fleet (otherwise is a strong source of money loses).

    Taking into account the data of the last years, the process of reduction of the combat fleet is about to be finished. Still there is some early decommission, but very few. In overall terms it seems that Russia is begining the next stage for its fleet, advancing not more in the reduction of the fleet.

    2016 Decommissions: Total = 6

    1 Project 667BDR Nuclear Submarine (commissioned 1979)
    1 Project 641B Conventional Submarine (commissioned 1982)
    1 Project 877 Conventional Submarine (commissioned 1984)
    1 Project 956 Destroyer (commissioned 1990)
    1 Project 12421 Missile Boat (commissioned 2000, sale to Egypt)
    1 Project 1332 Minesweeper (commissioned 1973) ??

    2016 Commissions: Total = 5

    2 Project 06363 Conventional Submarines
    2 Project 11356 Frigates
    1 Project 12700 Minesweeper

    2017 Decommisssions: Total = 3

    1 Project 667BDR Nuclear Submarine (commissioned 1980)
    1 Project 11351 Frigate (commissioned 1991, Russian Coast Guard)
    1 Project 12411 Missile Boat (commissioned 1987)

    2017 Commissions: Total = 2

    1 Project 11356 Frigate
    1 Project 20380/20385 Frigate/Corvette

    2018 Decommisssions: Total = 0


    2018 Commissions: Total = 1

    1 Project 21631 Corvette

    The next stage for the Combat Fleet of the Russian Navy is a phase of stability. After a phase of reduction of the fleet the alone logical step is a phase of stability. A country does not decommission young ships to build inmediately big amounts of new ships. This is a bad business. In the following years, Russia will likely do a number of commissions very close to the number of decommissions. And this number will be low because Russia has a this point very low number of old ships.

    For the period between 2018-2025, these are the ships that I expect to go to decommission and/or scrapping:

    1 - Project 641B Conventional Submarine (captured to Ukraine)
    4 - Project 1204 15 to 500 tons Missile Boats
    4 - Project 1171 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ships
    1 - Project 1134B 5000 to 10000 tons Warship
    1 - Project 61/01090 1500 to 5000 tons Warship
    6 - Project 266 Minesweeper (1 captured to Ukraine)
    2 - Project 1176 15 to 1500 tons Amphibious ships (planned early decommission in the Coast Guard, ships ruined)

    It means 19 total ships that would be to be replaced in the period 2018-2025. More decomissions and/or scrapping would be negative.

    This is what can be expected for the period 2018-2025. It is logical then, a reduction of the budget for the Russian Navy in the new program.

    This is a link to a previously posted list of Russian Combat Ships under construction:

    http://www.russiadefence.net/t5541p150-russian-naval-construction-plans-and-update#212605

    The list is far longer than the needs in the short and mid term, but also this long list of ships under construction is part of the strategy of Russia, that only would need to increase the rythm of production in case of problems. The slow rythm of production and commission of new ships is part of the military strategy of Russia, this is not a consequence of bad management or lack of efficiency like some people want to say.

    This was the complete list, some of the ships can be to export:

    By generic role:

    48 - Warships:
    1 - Project 11540 Frigate (2 more not-completed)
    3 - Project 11356 Frigate
    1 - Project 11660/11661 Frigate (1 more not-completed)
    9 - Project 20380/20385 Frigate/Corvette
    6 - Project 21631 Corvette (1 more not completed)
    6 - Project 22350 Destroyer/Frigate
    11 - Project 22800 Corvette
    6 - Project 22160 Frigate
    2 - Project 20386 Frigate/Corvette
    2 - Project 23550 Destroyer/Frigate
    1 - Project 23560 Cruiser/Destroyer
    0 - Project 23000 Aircraft Carrier

    21 - Submarines:
    1 - Project 949/09852 Nuclear Submarine (5 more not-completed)
    6 - Project 636/06363/877/08773 Conventional Submarine (2 more not-completed)
    2 - Project 677 Conventional Submarine
    5 - Project 955 Nuclear Submarine
    6 - Project 885/08851 Nuclear Submarine
    1 - Project 09851 Nuclear Submarine

    9 - Amphibious:
    1 - Project 11770/11771 (Azov shipyard, Mariupol)
    6 - Project 21820
    2 - Project 11711

    17 - Minesweepers:
    3 - Project 1265 (1 more not-completed)
    6 - Project 10750
    1 - Project 12255 (1 more not-completed)
    7 - Project 12700

    7 - Missile Boats:
    6 - Project 12411/12417/12418/1241RE Missile Boat
    1 - Project 12300 Missile Boat

    102 - Ships under construction (13 more not-completed) Some maybe to export.

    Taking into account the role of the ships to be decommissioned, the ships with most advanced status of production, and the most likely models for a well balanced distribution of the Russian fleet, my estimation (finding a minimum) for the construction of new combat ships would be of 15 new combat ships until the end of 2025, 1.875 per year on average. The question is which of these 102 ships can be part of the around 15 combat ships that Russia can finish and commission until the end of 2025.

    To finish the construction of the first unit of a new project is very important in order to assure the capability/hability in the production of the following ships of the project. To do it for projects avoiding redundances is even more important still, becomes key. It means, that between the ships under construction is sure to see the commission before the end of 2025 of the fist unit of the following projects:

    1 - Project 23560 Over 10000 tons Warship
    1 - Project 22350 5000 to 10000 tons Warship
    1 - Project 09851 Nuclear Special Submarine
    1 - Project 11711 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    1 - Project 12300 15 to 500 tons Missile Boat

    Also it is important for Russia to assure that the country is able to build modern combat ships of every cathegory. The alone cathegory out until now would be Aircraft Carriers. Russia is developing a project under the State Armament Program 2011-2020, that must be finished by 2020, Russia expects to finish the upgrading of its shipyards by 2020, and the order and begin of construction of the first unit of the Project 23000 (the alone known until now) is likely to be done under the State Armament Program 2018-2027:

    1 - Project 23000 Aircraf Carrier Warship

    Between all the list, these 6 combat ships are those which construction is the most important for Russia in the period 2018-2025, because its production, in adition to the military capabilities of the ships, will provide to Russia the hability to build new more modern projects of ships and even new types of ships that Russia produced not until now.

    Taking into account the 6 previous and the likely decommissions, the rest until 15 likely would be (unless some of these go to export):

    1 - Project 11711 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    2 - Project 21820 15 to 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    1 - Project 1265 Minesweeper
    1 - Project 10750 Minesweeper
    1 - Project 12255 Minesweeper
    3 - Project 12700 Minesweeper

    Then, unles some of the new minesweepers go to export, the most likely scheme of replacement for the period 2018-2025 would be:

    1 - Project 1134B 5000 to 10000 tons Warship <-------------------------> 1 - Project 22350 5000 to 10000 tons Warship
    1 - Project 61/01090 1500 to 5000 tons Warship <----------------------> 1 - Project 23560 Over 10000 tons Warship
    1 - Project 1171 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship <--------------------> 1 - Project 23000 Aircraf Carrier Warship
    1 - Project 1171 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship <-------------------->
    2 - Project 1171 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship <--------------------> 2 - Project 11711 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    2 - Project 1176 15 to 500 tons Amphibious Ship <--------------------> 2 - Project 21820 15 5o 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    1 - Project 641B SSK Conventional Submarine  <-----------------------> 1 - Project 09851 Special Nuclear Submarine
    1 - Project 266 Minesweeper <----------------------------------------------> 1 - Project 10750 Minesweeper
    1 - Project 266 Minesweeper <-----------------------------------------------> 1 - Project 1265 Minesweeper
    1 - Project 266 Minesweeper <-----------------------------------------------> 1 - Project 12255 Minesweeper
    3 - Project 266 Minesweeper <-----------------------------------------------> 3 - Project 12700 Minesweeper
    1 - Project 1204 15 to 500 tons Missile Boat <----------------------------> 1 - Project 12300 15 to 500 tons Missile Boat
    3 - Project 1204 15 to 500 tons Missile Boat <---------------------------->

    That would:
    - Keep stable the combat ship fleet of Russia (in 300 ships).
    - Keep stable the balance between the sips of different roles.
    - Cover the replacement of the oldest ships (with 50 years old by 2025).
    - Reinforce the overall strenght of the fleet.
    - Assure that Russia is able of producing by 2025 modern ships of every type of combat ship. http://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p25-state-armament-program-2018-2025#208063
    - Avoid the early retirement of more young ships.
    - To keep stable the human force of the Russian Navy, that would continue in the same level, with the reduction of its fleet of auxiliary ships that is not finished still.

    Is this over optimistic? No, the alone ship that can have a narrow timeline would be the Aircraft Carrier, but the low need on other types of ships in this period helps to do a bigger effort on this project. It is about to attend priorities.

    For the period between 2026-2027, these are the ships that I expect to go to decommission and/or scrapping:

    2 - Project 775 Over 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    1 - Project 1176 Under 500 tons Amphibious Ship
    1 - Project 697 Minesweeper
    1 - Project 266 Minesweeper (captured to Ukraine)

    New orders of ships under the State Armament Program 2018-2027? Taking into account the previous analysis, including the ships that would be to decommission in 2026-2027, is likely to see new orders of:
    Aircraft Carrier (Project 23000, as commented)
    Amphibious ships over 500 tons (Project 11711 and/or one of the new Amphibious Helicopter Carriers)
    And maybe more

    Modernization of current ships? Yes. Upgrade to the new types of missiles and to make them multirole if possible.

    It is possible that Russia can afford to finish the construction of more ships in 2018-2025? Maybe, specially between the ships currently launched. Less important than the modernization of current ships.

    Design and development of new types of ships? Those most directly inspired by the Russian Maritime Doctrine of 2015 would be the main options, avoiding redundant projects:
    http://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p50-state-armament-program-2018-2025#211922
    http://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p50-state-armament-program-2018-2025#211924
    Project ??? Kalina (SSK)
    Project ??? Husky (SSBN)
    Project ??? Underwater Interceptor (SSN)
    Project ????? Priboi or Project ????? Lavina or Project ????? Kashalot

    --------------------------------

    To note that this production would cover the most urgent needs of combat ships identified in the comment of the page 2 of this topic (following link). This rythm of production would be still under the rythm for a stable production in the long term. A rythm of production of 6 CombatSips&Submarines/Year sustained 50 years would be enough to assure a total renovation of the current fleet of combat ships and submarines every 50 years. Taking into account the age of the current fleet, Russia would reach this rythm of production around 2030.

    http://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p25-state-armament-program-2018-2027#208063


    Last edited by eehnie on Sat Jun 09, 2018 8:21 pm; edited 12 times in total
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    Re: State Armament Program 2018-2027

    Post  eehnie on Mon Feb 12, 2018 4:17 pm

    PREVIEW ABOUT PROCUREMENT OF COMBAT AIRCRAFTS

    In this link from wikipedia edited by a member of this forum, we can see the procurement data in the recent years. From the table we can see the total numbers for every type of combat aircrafts:

    Fighters (FAS and FMR) (total per year)
    2010: 00
    2011: 14
    2012: 10
    2013: 30
    2014: 40
    2015: 52
    2016: 39
    2017: 27
    Average 2010-2017: 26.5
    2018: 24 (planned)


    It has been reported that Russia plans to have around 700 Fighters, including FAS, FMR and Fighter Interceptors. Taking into account that a new Fighter Interceptor is being developed, and taking into account that today would be 140 MiG-25/31 in active service, the figure of 700 means around 550 Fighters (FAS and FMR).

    Russia is finding a long-term stable production that leads to this figure of 550 Fighters. And this is what we begin to see. A production of 22 Fighters/Year,
    sustained 25 year means just 550 new Fighters, for a renovation of the entire Fighter fleet every 25 years. Under this rythm of production the aircrafts wold have a life of 25 years in active service plus 25 years in the reserve. And just it allows to the development of a new generation of Fighter every 25 years.

    All this means that unless war or very high tension with adversaries, this stable rythm of production of around 22 Fighters/Year on average will not be modified in years.

    And a consequence of it is that the current level of procurement of the Su-30 and Su-35 will be modified, will be reduced in the refered to the procurement of the Russian Armed Forces, to attend external demand and for for the introduction of the Su-57. Taking into account that the Su-57 will be very likely the alone fighter design of this armament generation, it is likely that the production line of the Su-57 be designed for a stable production of around 22 Su-57/year, affording first production for the Russian Armed Forces, and later production to export.

    The alone thing that would make change that is if Russia goes forward with some weaker project of fighter like the MiG LMFS and/or a Yak VTOL. In this case the figure of 22 Fighters/Year would be the sum of the production of the 3 (or 2).

    Fighters Ground Attack: (total per year)
    2010: 04
    2011: 06
    2012: 10
    2013: 12
    2014: 18
    2015: 18
    2016: 16
    2017: 16
    Average 2010-2017: 12.5
    2018: 18 (planned)


    In this case public reports talk about an active fleet of 465 Fighter Ground Attack aircrafts. Again Russia is finding a sustained and stable production for peace time. And a production of 18 FGA/Year, sustained 25 years means just 450 FGA, for a complete rotation of the fleet in 25 years. Again the life of the aircrafts would be of 25 years in active service plus 25 years in the reserve. And just it allows to the development of a new generation of FGA every 25 years.

    As consequence, the production of Su-34 will remain stable around this numbers, until a new FGA appears. The first prototype of a new FGA aircraft based on the 5th Generation platform of the Su-57 is likely to be by 2025. Likely after 2030, while the production of Su-34 for the Russian Armed Forces declines, it will be replaced by production to export and by the production of the new aircraft for the Russian Armed Forces.

    With the expected decission of replacing the Su-25 with a variant reinforced of the Su-34, it is obvious that Russia only will have one FGA model per armament generation.[/quote]

    Fighter Interceptors: (total per year)
    2018: 00 (planned)

    The decission to go forward with the MiG-41 fighter interceptor seems solid. Technologically there is an important difference with Fighters (FAS and FMR) and only when the technologies for Interception get underdevelopped both types of aircrafts become closer.

    The current fleet of active MiG-25/31 would be of 140 aircrafts. It should be big amounts of spare parts. The projection of the fleet of Fighter Interceptors seems to be of around 150 aircrafts.

    With the scheme of renovation obtained for both Fighters and Fighter Ground Attack, of a total renovation of the active fleet every 25 years, we would reach to a stable production of 6 FighterInterceptors/Year.

    Strategic Bombers: (total per year)
    2018: 00 (planned)

    The decission to go forward with the return to production of the Tu-160 is only a sign of that this type of aircrafts have a future. Taking into account that all the Maritime Patrol role is being solved by Strategic Bombers (as military concept) except the Be-12 that has not the range, the fleet of active Strategic Bombers would be of around 179 aircrafts (Tu-160, Tu-22, Tu-95/142 and Il-38). From the public news about future productions we can see how the projection for the future fleet of strategic bombers seems to be of around 175 aircrafts.

    Taking this reference of 175, and with the scheme of renovation obtained for both Fighters and Fighter Ground Attack, of a total renovation of the active fleet every 25 years, we would reach to a stable production of 7 StrategicBombers/Year. A production of 7 StrategicBombers/Year sustained 25 years would means 175 Strategic Bombers.

    Recent news say that the new production line for the Tu-160 is planned for a rythm of 3 StrategicBombers/Year. It seems that at same time there is a planned production Tu-PAK-DA. My impression is that a total production of 7 StrategicBombers/Year can be likely.

    And again I expect only one design of Strategic Bomber per armament generation, taking into account that the Tu-160 is a design of the previous generation, and that an advanced Tu-PAK-DA with main features surpasing the Tu-160 (otherwise the Tu-160 will win the orders) would be the design of the current generation.

    Combat Helicopters (total per year)
    2010: 29
    2011: 40
    2012: 61
    2013: 95
    2014: 70
    2015: 55
    2016: 60
    2017: 59
    Average 2010-2017: 58.625
    2018: ?? (planned)


    This data would include the Ka-50/52, the Mi-28 and the entire family of Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177. In the last case some helicopters with auxiliary roles are included, but it is very difficult to separate the production of combat and auxiliary variants, then better to include all.

    Again in this case Russia seems to find a stabilization of the production. According with the data I have been collecting now Russia would have 1442 helicopters of the three models in active service. Taking the average production of recent years, and sustaining it during 25 years, it would mean 1466 new helicopters. Still is not known the plan of production for 2018 for these three models, but is likely to be again around 58 CombatHelicopters/Year.

    Technologically the trend of for the Combat Helicopters as warfare type is to decline. The risks for them are high, and the pressure in relation with human loses increases. In the future this group very likely will become unmanned. Likely the next generation of combat helicopters will be unmanned, being able to assume higher risks that manned helicopters can not assume. The transition is unclear still. In the following years the production of this type of helicopters is likely to decline in order to focus on umanned solutions.

    -----------------------------------------------

    To note that this production would cover the most urgent needs of combat aircrafts identified in the comment of the page 2 of this topic. The rythm of production can reach the stable long term level for a total renovation of the fleet for all types of combat aircrafts, except for Fighter Interceptors (MiG-41) and Strategic Bombers (Tu-PAK-DA).

    http://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p25-state-armament-program-2018-2027#208063


    Last edited by eehnie on Thu Mar 01, 2018 8:52 pm; edited 5 times in total

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