SAP 2018-2027 - Arms Procurement

Russia begins a new program, the State Armament Program 2018-2027, that will define the direction of the Russian Armed Forces toward this data. Surely this program is important enough to have its own place in the forum.

Until now, the news that try to offer a complete view of the program are so vague, not complete enough. There is better information about concrete news, but in this case allow not to have a complete view. Still is time for a preview and this would be mine, updated.

To see correctly where the Russian Armed Forces can go by 2027, before to talk about the changes, is necessary to give a reference about the current situation. To say it briefly, by the begin of 2018 or little after, the material listed in red in the following comments is likely to be totally out:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t6260p25-heavy-calibre-ammo-artillliery-ifv-tank-aa-naval-guns#183955
https://www.russiadefence.net/t6260p50-heavy-calibre-ammo-artillliery-ifv-tank-aa-naval-guns#184106
https://www.russiadefence.net/t7526-older-sea-warfare-performance-and-short-mid-term-decommissions#226862
https://www.russiadefence.net/t1321p125-russian-arms-supplies-to-syria#186218
https://www.russiadefence.net/t1321p125-russian-arms-supplies-to-syria#192471
https://www.russiadefence.net/t1321p125-russian-arms-supplies-to-syria#186235
https://www.russiadefence.net/t3416p150-auxilliary-vessels-special-purpose-and-minor-naval-ships#205606
https://www.russiadefence.net/t4971p75-the-russian-military-automotive-fleet#205602
https://www.russiadefence.net/t4312p300-russian-transport-aircraft-fleet-vta#250495
https://www.russiadefence.net/t4312p75-russian-transport-aircraft-fleet-vta#189143
https://www.russiadefence.net/t1321p125-russian-arms-supplies-to-syria#199589

To note that material initially more oriented toward Novorussia can go later to Syria if required.

From this basis, I would expect of the State Armament Program 2018-2027 (note that the most basic details, like spending on personnel, the spending on installations, and the maintenance and upgrading of current material, with new variants, ammunition/missiles, is not included, with very few exceptions in the points 7 and 10):

1.- To assure common standards in procurement and decommissions for land forces, common standards for aerospace forces, common standards for sea forces, common standards for land forces deployed by air means, and common standards for military intelligence:

Russian Army
Russian Strategic Missile Troops
Russian Troops of anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense
Russian Coastal Troops
Russian Military Police

Russian Aerospace Forces
Russian Naval Aviation

Russian Navy

Russian Airborne Troops

General Directorate of the General Staff
Russian Navy Special Forces

2.- To define more clearly the limits for the equipment exclusive of the Russian Armed Forces. I would expect the scrapping or militarization of some warfare that is now managed by non military security forces. It means the transference of low amounts of:

Project 1176 (1 unit from R Coast Guard to scrapping)

Project 1135 (2 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1265 (1 unit from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project 1330 (5 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)
Project T-4 (2 units from R Coast Guard to R Navy)

3.- To finish the process of replacement of foreign components, and a plan for the scrapping, sale or demilitarization of foreign material of the Russian Armed Forces. It would include foreign designs, but not Russian or Sovietic designs produced out of Russia. It means total decommission, including of the reserve, of some material, bolded in fuchsia.

Dry Cargo Ships for the operation in Syria
Type Dora
Type PPEK-30
Type Dubna
Type Paltus
Project REF-675
Project D-9030
Project D-9021
Project SK620
Project REF-100
Project N3291
Project R-5757
Project UK-3
Project V92/02670
Project D-9040
Project V820
Type IC16MII

L-39
An-140
An-148/158/178
L-410

Iveco LMV

4.- Total decommission, including of the reserve. In the following years, the total decommission, including of the reserve, of the relatively weakest, less standardized and/or less modern material, is likely to come by natural exhaustion after its use by the Russian armed forces, with decommission and scrapping, because of external demand or by transference to non-military Russian agencies of compatible material (also in the case of the point 3). With the likely appearance of Rocket Assisted Projectiles for 125mm (that should have longer range than the 120mm RAP) and longer range rockets of 220mm for the TOS-1, the (M)T-12 would be the alone remaining heavy equipment that must be always inside the range of portable/man-portable weapons of the adversary to do its work, and is likely to be used and totally disappear first. In overall terms, the following list of material bolded in fuchsia, includes the most likely total decommissions, including of the reserve, by 2025. To note that the reportes of large reserves of material like D-30 or BMP-1 do not agree with statistics of production. The large reserves exist but are of more modern material.

An-2/4/6

2A18 D-30
2A19/29 (M)T-12
2B16 Nona-K

BMD-1
BMP-1
BRDM-2

Type Woljov
Project 73/433
Project 572 (modified to auxiliary ship)
Project 437N
Project 561
Project 572
Project 771
Project 522
Project 364
Project 527
Project 860
Project 596P
Project 6404
Project 577
Project 618
Project 733
Project 1541/1852
Project 1505
Project 876/605-PK
Type RBT/05T/378
Project 1731
Project 870
Project 773 (modified to auxiliary ship)
Project 1549
Project 861
Project 160
Project 550
Project 737
Project 871
Project 1236
Project 1893
Project 419
Project 368
Project 740
Project 1896
Project 1430
Project 1274
Project 1559V
Project 887
Project 1807
Project 852
Project 1791
Project 97
Project 1172
Project 1459
Project 714/563
Project 862/08622
Project 05360/05361
Project 872
Project 1993
Project 1823/1824
Project 712
Project 535
Project 1275
Project 1452
Project 1826
Project 1606/T63
Project 304
Project 864
Project 537
Project 1914/19411
Project 498
Project 14630
Project 320
Project 15201
Project 141
Project 14670
Project 192
Project 865
Project 719
Project 1496
Project 1439
Project 14611
Project 376
Project 1415
Project 1806/18061
Project 1799/17992/17994
Project 503
Project 1400

An-22
Mi-6/10/22

Project 613
Project 1204
Project 61/01090
Project 1134B
Project 641

5.- Retirement from active service of the last heavy towed weapons except the A-135:

2A36 Giatsint-B
2A65 Msta-B

6.- To exclude since the begin new orders for the procurement of the foreign and relatively weakest, less standard (including launched grenades) and less modern weapons (including the last variants) and auxiliary equipment in production:

2A65 Msta-B

SA-13
2S23
BTR-80
MT-LB
BPM-97

7.- Potential decision about the adoption of standard calibers for launched grenades (30mm, 45mm, 57mm, 76mm, 100mm). For it, the 40mm grenades can be moved to the standard 45mm caliber. It would be an improvement in standardization and also in the power of the projectiles. To note that the GP-25, GP-30 and GP-34 are not in the list of the point 6 because they are a component, but if this decission is made, their production would be stopped too as 40mm grenade launchers.

8.- Upgrade on self propelled Surface-Surface, Surface-Air and Artillery warfare, with the replacement of the tractor elements with unarmoured cabin by (more standardized) tractor elements with armoured cabin, according to the modern safety standards for the rest of the land warfare. Full armoured Typhoon-U 6x6 or Typhoon-K 6x6 can be used if required to replace some auxiliary vehicle of the systems. Habitually upgrades are not included in this scheme, but this exception comes because it would include a key change in the nature of the weapons, becoming armoured. The retired unarmoured tractor elements or entire vehicles can be used as military heavy auxiliary vehicles in non-contested areas (transport, engineering,...), in agreement with the status of use of every type of vehicle, and affecting to the procurement of land heavy auxiliary vehicles in the following years:

BM-21

SS-C-1
BM-27
SA-8
SS-21
SS-1
SS-C-3
SA-10/12/20/23
BM-30
A-222
SA-21
SS-25/27
SS-26
SS-C-5
SS-C-6
SS-29/32
SA-22

9.- Between the projects in production by the end of 2018 which introduction in the Russian Armed Forces has not been formally completed, I expect the formal delivery of the first unit (including prototypes) of the following key projects:

Su-SuperJet
Mi-38

Project 12300
Project 09851
Project 23560

Project 15310

10.- Finalisation of the development of the key projects of new armament and heavy auxiliary mobile equipment, and delivery of the first unit, to complete the new generation of equipment developed in the first quarter of the XXI century. Listed the key projects where the first unit for the Russian Armed Forces is not in production in 2018, plus some small but key detail on new ammunition. Bolded key projects where the timeline still assures not a first unit by 2025, and something else that I think would be interesting:

SS-30 RS-28

Project 23000 (multirole Aircraft Carrier)

SA-?? A-235
SA-?? S-500
SA-?? S-350 Armata
SA-?? S-350 Kurganets
SA-?? S-350 Bumerang
SA-?? S-350 BMD-4(M)
SA-?? Pantsir Armata
SA-?? Pantsir Kurganets
SA-?? Pantsir Bumerang
SA-?? Pantsir BMD-4(M)
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm Terminator 3 (Armata platform)
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm Kurgantets
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm Bumerang
SA-?? BMPT 2S?? 57mm BMD-4(M)
SA-?? Sosna Armata
SA-?? Sosna Kurganets
SA-?? Sosna Bumerang
SA-?? Sosna BMD-4(M)
SS-33/C-9 Burevestnik
SS-34/C-7/8/14 Kalibr
SS-35/C-16 (Intermediate Range Ballistic)
TOS BM2 compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30. (Armata platform)
TOS Kurganets compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30.
TOS Bumerang compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30.
TOS BMD-4(M) compatible with the ammunition of the BM-21, BM-27 and BM-30.
2S?? 240mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S4 at production level. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm for long range direct fire. Successor of the 2S7 at production level. (Armata platform)
2S?? 203mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. New. (Armata platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S34 at production level. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New.(Kurganets platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. Successor of the BMP-3 100mm at production level. (Kurganets platform)
2S?? 152mm that combines direct and indirect (mortar) fire. Successor of the 2S23 at production level. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 152mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
2S?? 125mm for agile direct fire, antitank role, with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. New. (Bumerang platform)
T-14 152mm with some ammunition of range over 17.5 Km to be able to work also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons. (Armata platform)
BMO-2 (Armata platform APC)
Engineering Armata (T-16,...)
Engineering Kurganets
Engineering Bumerang
Engineering BMD-4(M)

MiG-41/PAK-DP
Tu-PAK-DA
Su-PAK-ShA evolution to FGA 5th Generation platform successor of the Su-34/32

Ka-60/62 (in the Che-22 10th size class with around 2.5 tons payload)
Tu-330 (in the Tu-204/214 5th size class with around 40 tons payload).
Mi-46/AHL (in the An-72/71/74 7th size class with around 15 tons payload).
Il-106/PTS Ermak 80 (in the An-22 3rd size class with around 80 tons payload).
Il-276 (in the An-10/12 6th size class with around 20 tons payload).
PTS Ermak 160 (in the An-124 2nd size class with around 160 tons payload).
Tu-304/Frigate Freejet (in the Il-62 4th size class for double configuration: 1 mid passenger capacity + long range, 2 high passenger capacity + mid range).
New Aircraft (in the Il-76/78 Be-A50 4th size class with around 60 tons payload).
CRAIC CR929 (in the Il-86/80/96 3rd size class for high passenger capacity + long range).
Ka-40 Minoga (in the Ka/27/28/29/31/32/35 9th size class with around 5 tons payload).
New Helicopter (in the Mi-26/27 6th size class with around 20 tons payload.
MS-21/Yak-242 (in the Tu-204/214 5th size class for mid passenger capacity + mid range).

Man-portable grenade launcher of 76mm
Man-portable grenade launcher of 45mm

New ammunition for the 125mm tanks of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.
New ammunition for the TOS-1 of range over 17.5 Km to allow them to fight also from outside of the range of man-portable weapons of the adversary.

Unitl now, in the current generation of new equipment that is being developed in the first quarter of the XXI century, between the projects that have been accepted and reached the Russian Armed Forces, only a few projects can be considered redundant out of the heavy sea auxiliary vehicles. Here would be the list:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p50-state-armament-program-2018-2027#212515

And is very likely that Russia avoids more redundant projects. There is enough work to finish the non-redundant projects in order to finish a complete new generation of equpment by 2025. In the previous list of key projects, there are not projects that create redundancies.

In overall terms, it is necessary to analyze if the redundant projects in development, and the rest of the new projects cited not until now which first unit reached not the Russian Armed forces according to the public reports or have not been officially ordered, maybe only a distraction of efforts and funds.

https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p50-state-armament-program-2018-2027#213501

11.- Finally, intense procurement in relative terms, in order to raise the standards for the material in active service, on:

Infantry Combat Vehicles (to improve the fleet toward the modern standards)

For a more complete view about what can be expected on procurement see these comments, that include my Estimation of needs with different levels of priority and a preview for the procurement in the following years:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p25-state-armament-program-2018-2027#208063
https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p50-state-armament-program-2018-2027#216049
https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p75-state-armament-program-2018-2027#217034
https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p50-state-armament-program-2018-2027#216051
https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p125-state-armament-program-2018-2027#234248

12.- For longer timeline:Current innovative key projects that can be part of the next future equipment generation, and as consequence, where a timeline longer than 2025 for the delivery of the first unit would not be a problem from a military point:

Il-PAK-TA as Supersonic Transport Aircraft
Unmanned Long Range Shipborne Maritime Patrol-Early Warning VTOL aircraft/helicopter
Unmanned High Speed Combat Helicopter compatible with all the branches of the Russian Armed Forces

Unmanned technologies and robotization can require in overall terms longer timeline that the stablished in the State Armament Program 2018-2027:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t7032p125-state-armament-program-2018-2027#242816


-----


Taking into account that the system allows to include a related poll in the topic for the people can talk about it, we have one here. It is not possible to include all. One of the most interesting parts is the refered to the possible total decommissions (the points 3 and 4). There is a topic talking about the future of the foreign sea warfare including also a poll:

https://www.russiadefence.net/t6715-future-of-the-foreign-sea-material-in-the-russian-armed-forces

having 10 options, the poll of this topic can look at the land and air material cited in the points 3, 4 and 5. Total decommission includes:

- Scrapping.
- Sale.
- Help to allies.
- Demilitarization by transfer to other non military gouvernmental agencies (in the case of this poll would be more for the foreign material).

*Grabs Popcorn*

So, you from New Zealand pretend to be the land based opinion? Let me laugh please.

Your comments on calibers always have the same flaw. Your view on calibers only includes the Army. And the decissions on calibers must be made for the entire Russian Armed Forces. Only taking into account the entire Russian Armed Forces is possible to make decisions right and to give the right steps on normalization and standardization.

I commented in the point 1 how I expect (because is necessary) the adoption of common standards for the different branches of the Russian Armed Forces. This is one case of many where this can be applied. But even going further, because the caliber system is a question that affects to all the branches, not only to the most related between them. In many cases the common standards for all the branches will be close to the standards applied in the Russian Army, specially in the refered to the safety of the crews for new combat equipment, but in this case, the Russian Navy has a better situation and is the Russian Army who may have to give the biggest steps toward a normalization of the measures used by launched grenades toward the system of standard calibers.

Traditionally the surface-air, the surface-surface missiles and rockets and the launched grenades have been out the normalized system of calibers of the Russian Armed Forces (not of the Russian Army). In the case of the Surface-Air and Surface-Surface missiles and rockets the normalization is almost impossible, because of the high number of measures used, in many cases far bigger than the normalized calibers, but in the case of the launched grenades is easier, like it was explained in the paragraph you cited, despite to require also an important change, specially for the Russian Army.

The 3 standard calibers cited (30mm, 45mm and 73mm) are used today for launched grenades of the Russian Armed Forces, and are inside the normalized system of standard calibers of the Russian Armed Forces. Also the 57mm and 76mm calibers would be usable for this purpose (and in the future likely will be, but today not still), while the 73mm caliber is declining as standard caliber (only used by the BMD-1 and the BMP-1, since its use for some SA or SS rockets/missiles does not make the caliber standard).

A decision like this would affect only to the 40mm launched grenades, and it would have an effect today only at a production level and in the refered to the new projects. Also it would be possible to accelerate the transition to standard calibers with the sale of part of the current arsenals of these weapons, components and ammunition. Nothing out of touch or expensive.

In the case of the 40mm measure, despite to be of bigger use, today only is used in components attached to other weapons, until the point that I had to include the last paragraph you cited, to have new of it, because there is not a single weapon that uses this measure as primary armament. While there is some project (like you mentioned) to include them as independent weapon, if there is a reflection on the standardization of the launched grenade measures to the system of standard calibers in the State Armament Program 2018-2025, likely will not advance to the Russian Armed Forces.

The point in the standardization of the launched grenades of 40mm to 45mm, would be more in to unify the different types of grenades to a single type of external format, of cover, to have the chance of firing all them with every grenade launcher of 45mm. Like is done in many other calibers, every type of launcher of 45mm should be able to fire all the types of grenades of this caliber, like a tank of 125mm is able of firing projectiles for different purposes and with different ranges.

And in the refered to the launchers, today there are 3 main types that can be used with 45mm projectiles:

- DP-64 (45mm) like

- AGS-17 (30mm) like

- GP-25 (40mm) like


Today there are not launchers of 45mm of the last 2 types, but the effort of developing them compatible with an entire range of 45mm grenades for different purposes for the 3 types of launchers would be fairly low.

This is what I would expect. Clean and easy.

eehnie wrote:So, you from New Zealand pretend to be the land based opinion? Let me laugh please.

Thats the lamest thing I've read on your posts so far. Maybe you are wiser than all of us, but that should make you more gentle.

T-47 wrote:

eehnie wrote:So, you from New Zealand pretend to be the land based opinion? Let me laugh please.

Thats the lamest thing I've read on your posts so far. Maybe you are wiser than all of us, but that should make you more gentle.

At this point there is people with no credit to say things like this:

GarryB wrote:you just see the numbers and ignore the reality... with a list of grenade launchers you are lumping all sorts of unrelated things together and coming to all sorts of conclusions.

being false like it is.

eehnie wrote:

T-47 wrote:

eehnie wrote:So, you from New Zealand pretend to be the land based opinion? Let me laugh please.

Thats the lamest thing I've read on your posts so far. Maybe you are wiser than all of us, but that should make you more gentle.

At this point there is people with no credit to say things like this:

GarryB wrote:you just see the numbers and ignore the reality... with a list of grenade launchers you are lumping all sorts of unrelated things together and coming to all sorts of conclusions.

being false like it is.

That doesn't make your comment justified. You are claiming you know better than him, so you should apply logic and facts. But here you are proposing upgrades of Scud, P-15 and concluding someone lives in New Zealand so so he must be a noob about ground forces.

T-47 wrote:

eehnie wrote:

T-47 wrote:

eehnie wrote:So, you from New Zealand pretend to be the land based opinion? Let me laugh please.

Thats the lamest thing I've read on your posts so far. Maybe you are wiser than all of us, but that should make you more gentle.

At this point there is people with no credit to say things like this:

GarryB wrote:you just see the numbers and ignore the reality... with a list of grenade launchers you are lumping all sorts of unrelated things together and coming to all sorts of conclusions.

being false like it is.

That doesn't make your comment justified. You are claiming you know better than him, so you should apply logic and facts. But here you are proposing upgrades of Scud, P-15 and concluding someone lives in New Zealand so so he must be a noob about ground forces.

This is not right. I answered. My comment opening the topic has nothing of this what you say. He is who tried to discredit my opinion trying to appear like the realistic opinion based on knowledge from the ground, not from the numbers. Something false.

Your credit is being rapidly wasted.

Typical comment of a person with 0 technical skills...

Which are the technical limitations that make not possible a range of projectiles of 45mm with different ranges for different purposes that can be compatible with the 3 types of launchers? Obviously GarryB knows not the answer to this question. If he would know it, would not be saying stupid things.

A senior shoe-shiner knows not what he knows not, but still thinks he knows enough to fail to the respect to other people.

A senior shoe-shiner uses lack of respect to make other better technically skilled people to avoid discussions with him (and in this forum there is a good number of them).

A senior shoe-shiner only is able to accept what he saw before. As consequence:

- A senior shoe-shiner see a 45mm launcher of long barrel but of very low pressure, and thinks there is not other way for the use of 45mm launched grenades.
- A senior shoe-shiner see 45mm grenades of very low pressure, and thinks it is not possible to increase the pressure respecting the external configuration of the grenade in the measures that affect to the compatibility with the launcher.
- A senior shoe-shiner see only 40mm underbarrel grenade launchers and thinks only this measure is possible. Because you know, a barrel with 5mm or 7mm bigger diameter is killer for the use, of course not doable.
- A senior shoe-shiner see not recoil-less technics applied to 45mm grenade launchers, and thinks it is not possible to apply them to this caliber. Like if far bigger weapons like the 73mm SPG-9 designed in the early 1960s would have still problems with the recoil.
- A senior shoe-shiner thinks in a 45mm grenade of 1.5/1.8 Km of range available in the mix for an underbarrel launcher and thinks the soldier can not continue firing grenades of 500m of range.

Well, this is what we have to deal with here...

Poor eehnie

Unable to keep himself on topic

This is a grenade of the new 40mm Balkan launcher.

http://weaponland.ru/load/granatomet_6g27_balkan/61-1-0-232



Is this like a small mortar projectile?
Is this like a RPG-7 rocket?
Do you pretend to look serious comparing a launched grenade with artillery systems (small mortar) or surface-surface rockets (RPG-7)?

No-one said that a mortar of 40mm or a RPG-7 of 40mm must be mounted underbarrel. Only a grenade launcher compatible with all the types of grenades launched by similar weapons, in order to advance in standardization and in order to provide aditional advantages to the soldiers (better range, more powerful grenades to launch, better compatibility of weapons and ammunition,...).

Try to answer in technical terms, like an engineer. The question is clear.

Which are the technical limitations that make not possible a range of projectiles of 45mm with different ranges for different purposes that can be compatible with the 3 types of launchers?

PS: And yes, recoil-less design technics can be applied to potential grenade launchers of 45mm, very likely in the needed measure.

In this topic there is a good number of off topic comments by T-47 and some pretend to be offensive. It would be positive to move them out.

eehnie wrote:In this topic there is a good number of off topic comments by T-47 and some pretend to be offensive. It would be positive to move them out.

I agree

Without joining the current calibre debate. I personally believe that all types of equipment you mention in the poll will still be in service and/or in reserve for one I can't see Russia getting rid of the huge number of MT-12 anytime soon without having to totally scrap them even though their pretty obsolete in future plans. But Russia harbours a lot of equipment and I am a firm believer of selling the stuff or donating/deal sweetners etc. But the longer they keep it the older/outdated it gets and the more it's less likely to sell or donate. And it's not just Russia but Ukraine and Belarus also harbour vast amounts

GarryB wrote:You said the 45mm calibre would replace the 40mm under barrel calibre and the 30mm grenade calibre across the services.

I said the 40mm grenade you posted above might replace the 30mm grenade but it is too powerful to replace the 40mm under barrel launched grenade which is designed for much shorter ranges from a much smaller lighter weapon.

GarryB wrote:The 30mm grenade you want to replace with the above rounds looks like this:

This is false GarryB. What I said is in my comments, not in your comments.

I never said something about the replacement of 30mm launched grenades by 45mm launched grenades. I said explicitly the contrary, I said that in a process of standardization of the launched grenades to the current caliber system of the Russian Armed Forces, the 30mm, 45mm and 73mm grenade launched meassures would be to remain thanks to be coincident with the current standard calibers, taking also into account that the 73mm caliber is disappearing as caliber and it would affect to the launched grenades of 73mm (only the SPG-9, that is also fairly obsolete compared to the MANPATs and rocket granade RPGs).

I have been talking about the standardization of the measures for launched grenades around 45mm to this standard caliber of the Russian Armed Forces, and I said explicitly that it would affect to the launched grenades of 40mm and its launchers present in the Russian Armed Forces at the production and procurement stages:

- 40mm GP-25 (underbarrel component)
- 40mm GP-30 (underbarrel component)
- 40mm GP-34 (underbarrel component)

I mentioned not the new Balkan launcher of 40mm in the first comment because is not present still, but obviously would be affected. The introduction of the launched grenades to the system of standard calibers of the Russian Armed Forces would mean a redesign of the Balkan to 45mm instead of 40mm. Nothing out of touch.

d_taddei2 wrote:Without joining the current calibre debate. I personally believe that all types of equipment you mention in the poll will still be in service and/or in reserve for one I can't see Russia getting rid of the huge number of MT-12 anytime soon without having to totally scrap them even though their pretty obsolete in future plans. But Russia harbours a lot of equipment and I am a firm believer of selling the stuff or donating/deal sweetners etc. But the longer they keep it the older/outdated it gets and the more it's less likely to sell or donate. And it's not just Russia but Ukraine and Belarus also harbour vast amounts

The time of the (M)T-12 in the Russian Armed Forces depends mostly of the needs of the Syrian gouvernment.

In Syria at this point Russia is thinking very likely not only in the frontline needs, but also in the overall military capabilities of the country. Syria can not afford to have available only the material in the frontline, it is necessary for Syria an important stock of material in their own territory that can be feared by outside enemies and that can be enough to keep them outside of the war. Approximately Syria needs to keep the prewar military level and it means many Russian old material stored at this point in territory of Syria. It means the entire available stocks in Russia of the oldest Russian weapons (there is some reference in the first links of the message opening the topic).

Approximately by the begin of 2018, the T-64, the (M)T-12 and the SPG-9 can be first in line for assistance of combat material to Syria, and depending of the intensity of the post-ISIS Syrian war, the needs can be big.

eehnie wrote:

d_taddei2 wrote:Without joining the current calibre debate. I personally believe that all types of equipment you mention in the poll will still be in service and/or in reserve for one I can't see Russia getting rid of the huge number of MT-12 anytime soon without having to totally scrap them even though their pretty obsolete in future plans. But Russia harbours a lot of equipment and I am a firm believer of selling the stuff or donating/deal sweetners etc. But the longer they keep it the older/outdated it gets and the more it's less likely to sell or donate. And it's not just Russia but Ukraine and Belarus also harbour vast amounts

The time of the (M)T-12 in the Russian Armed Forces depends mostly of the needs of the Syrian gouvernment.

In Syria at this point Russia is thinking very likely not only in the frontline needs, but also in the overall military capabilities of the country. Syria can not afford to have available only the material in the frontline, it is necessary for Syria an important stock of material in their own territory that can be feared by outside enemies and that can be enough to keep them outside of the war. Approximately Syria needs to keep the prewar military level and it means many Russian old material stored at this point in territory of Syria. It means the entire available stocks in Russia of the oldest Russian weapons (there is some reference in the first links of the message opening the topic).

Approximately by the begin of 2018, the T-64, the (M)T-12 and the SPG-9 can be first in line for assistance of combat material to Syria, and depending of the intensity of the post-ISIS Syrian war, the needs can be big.

I did read that but I can't see Syria needing 2,000+ T-12 nor any other force so hence the reason why I think they will still be in service and/or in reserve in 2025

The 45mm caliber has been, is part and will continue beign part of the standard systems of calibers of the Russian Armed Forces in at least a decent number of decades. If you are not able to see it is because you have not a global vision about the calibers of the Russian Armed Forces.

Examples of the presence of the 45mm caliber in the Russian Armed Forces:

http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_20380.htm (in production)
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_11540.htm (in production)
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_11435.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_956.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1124.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1155.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1144.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_775.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1164.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1135.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1171.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_1134b.htm
http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_61.htm

Without include auxiliary ships and without include the 45mm launched grenades.

Maybe you expect all them retired or "upgraded", to see the 45mm standard caliber totally retired. You will have to wait several decades. You are not offering a realistic view of the caliber, not about its present, not about its future.

The 45mm caliber is the alone standard caliber present between the 30mm and the 57mm calibers, it makes very unlikely to see this caliber retired of the Russian Armed Forces, because it is just in the right place to cover the needs of armament of the Russian Armed Forces between the 30mm and the 57mm calibers (this is likely the main reason for its survival). The 45mm is a winner in the system of standard calibers of the Russian Armed Forces, and in the future you will see weapons of 45mm of the same type and role of the current weapons of 30mm, specially fast firing weapons.

It is possible to include the launched grenades in the system of standard caliber and to advance in the standardization of calibers. The 30mm and the 45mm would be the current standard calibers for it. The 40mm launched grenades would be of redundant measure.

Note: I updated my comment about the 73mm SPG-9 and the 43mm GM-93/94 (LPO-97) grenade launchers in the post opening the topic. Analyzing with more detail the situation of these weapon, in the case of the SPG-9 we see how the competence of this weapon with the man-portable launchers of rockets and missiles leaves this weapon in a very weak position that makes unlikely that can survive in the Russian Armed Forces to the campaign in Syria. In the case of the GM-93/94 (LPO-97) its low presence also makes unlikely this weapon can survive in the Russian Armed Forces to the campaign in Syria. It is to be expected that the SPG-9 and the GM-93/94 (LPO-97) be totally moved to Syria by the begin of 2018, as part of the military help to this country, disappearing totally from Russia, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Novorussia, like explained at the begin of the first comment of this topic.