x_54_u43 wrote:Could you please tell us your thoughts on Carrier Aviation Wing being used in a anti-ship role?
It is obvious to anyone that LRASM is by no means even close to X-31 or Onyx and such.
But since LRASM will be entering service soon enough, and with LRASM range combined with combat radius of carrying aircraft, as well as possibility of in-flight refueling, such range would be far greater than any ship-borne anti-ship missile.
With such range advantage, as well as large numbers of carried munitions per aircraft and large numbers of aircraft carried per carrier, would you not be able to achieve an acceptable level of success? Being able to hit your opponent outside of the range where he can hit you is a very large advantage.
This concept, in facts, is at the basis of the US Navy doctrine since WWII and ,given the permanence of the carrier wing "variable" the overall balance in a conventional engagement between a formation including one or more US Navy CVBGs in a blue water environment
(more than 1400 km from enemy shore) and any surface ship group of any enemy Navy of this planet would be lopsided in US Navy favour
, in particular in relation to the capability of carrier air wing to progressively deplete the defensive capabilities of enemy formations in open sea capitalizing the chance to attack repeatedly from outside the engagement range of opponent's ships.
Obviously the Federation's Naval doctrine
since Soviet Union times have always taken into account this central "allowing" element of the US Navy; the constituting ideas
at its foundation was ,for conventional scenarios, in four main directions
1) Maintain a significative technological advantage in antiship missile and antiship missile defense technology in comparison to NATO nations
so to assure that, in the removing from the equation the carrier wing factor the entire composition of US surface Navy would suddenly collapse in the almost complete irrelevance for naval engagements.
In the event of the elimination of the air wing element, in facts, single Soviet Navy units would have been capable to engage and destroy a much higher number of enemy surface ships from almost complete stand-off safety
2) Create an highly resilient multispectral, multiplatform sensors network ,from strategic to in-theatre level
,encopassing the entire level's gamut of theirs basing (under surface, surface, air and space based
) capable to continously and reliably assure detection and tracking of the position of the big formations of surface and submerged US Navy units
that would have been forced to remain in limited area of sea to assure a defensive coverage for the essential aircraft carrier element and transfer the positional data to air, sea and submerged units.
3) Create highly specialized antiship weapons
based on platforms not allowing NATO CVBG to capitalize the range advantage offered by theirs aviation elements. The natural selection was for : supersonic bombers capable to takeoff from airbases at thousands of km of distances
protected by the titanic domestic IAD (the domestic constitutive "allowing" element) and capable to delivery at very high speed, theirs payload from well outside the effective engagement range of carrier DCA Group, submarines capable to employ those state of art antiship weapons from well outside the defensive submarine complement of CVBGs
4) Create limited safe-heaven areas
- the so called "santuaries" - near to Federation's shores
where was effectively impossible for NATO aircraft, ships and submarine to operate; so to assure a safe basin for the surface fleets to replenish offensive and defensive weapons or wait for the previously mentioned elements to enter into play allowing them to fully capitalize theirs superior weapon suit.
Today the basis of those relative naval doctrines remain more or less the same (with the obvious intercurring technological advancements on both sides).
The most equilibrated western article on that last subject -even if with some notable and gross mistakes coming out, mostly, from the employement of material of P. Bukowski - is this one :
You can easily infer the relevance of the adaption of a "navalized" AGM-158 for ship and aircraft launch in comparison with the impact on the realive balance equation of the plurality of those domestic programs.......
As already said , no much is destined to change, in the near/middle term, in the relative weapon balance and operational doctrine in both sides, in respect to Cold War situation.