Russian Naval Construction Plans and Numbers

eehnie wrote:http://russianships.info/eng/warships/project_23560.htm

This database includes not projects of ships that reached not the construction phase. As example you will not find still in the database the Project 23000, the Project Priboi, the Project Lavina, the Project Kalina, the project Husky, the Project 22500,...

After looking about every project, I found no-one case in the database where they say a project reached the prodction phase, but is not right. My experience is that their work is right in overall terms and I found not a mistake of the importance of whicht you are accusing them of. For me the source is reliable in overall terms, unlike your word. And is one of the bests, if not the best.

If you want to dispute the source, you can try to find in the database one case more where the database says that a project reached the production phase but is not true.

Tsavo Lion wrote:Rebuttal: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2018-.02-22/1_985_west.html?print=Y

JohninMK wrote:Lights blue touch paper.

In early 2010s the successes in Russian military buildup triggered an euphoria. It was characterized by calls to resume the production of missile-carrying trains, sea skimmers, air-cushioned ships and total upgrade of the fleet inherited from the USSR. However, it should be admitted now that the program had failed, expert Alexander Shishkin writes in the Vzglyad business newspaper.

http://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focus-analysis/naval-technology/6006-russia-s-modernization-of-soviet-era-vessels-facing-problems-part-1.html

As Ivan Safronov writes in the article "Cephalopod" surfaced in Bocharov Creek , published in the newspaper Kommersant , on Wednesday, in the presence of President Vladimir Putin, military and industry representatives discussed the problems of cooperation of the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), because of which the deadlines execution of the state defense order. The military repeatedly raised this issue at internal meetings, but the situation remained almost unchanged. The president's intervention is designed to prevent similar problems in the implementation of the new state armament program until 2027, in which trillions of rubles are allocated for the development of the Navy.

Opening the meeting, Vladimir Putin recalled that the Navy is "the most important factor in the country's military, economic security, maintaining strategic parity" and "in general, a significant tool for ensuring our national interests." The latter included, in particular, the actions of ships and submarines that struck during the military operation in Syria strikes on positions of the militants with cruise missiles of the "Caliber" type from the waters of the Mediterranean and Caspian seas. "We will continue to equip the Navy with the latest systems of weapons, communications, reconnaissance and target designation." As before, the quality requirements, the deadlines for fulfilling the tasks of the state defense order should remain the most stringent, "the president said, recognizing" problematic issues "with both the creation of new equipment and the repair of the already delivered equipment. Then the meeting continued in a closed mode for the press:

The main topic of the meeting was the execution of the state defense order by enterprises that are part of the USC cooperation, two sources of Kommersant in the shipbuilding industry and an official close to the leadership of the Defense Ministry say. The military is concerned about the negative statistics of the failure of the terms of contracts for the supply of ships and submarines, provided timely advance and payment, one of the interlocutors of Kommersant admits.

For this reason, not only high-ranking military officers (acting Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Deputy Minister for Armaments Yuri Borisov, Navy Commander Vladimir Korolyov, etc.) were summoned to Sochi and the industry leadership (OSK President Alexei Rakhmanov and acting Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov), but the managers of the enterprises of the shipbuilding industry - Sevmash, Severnaya Verf, Zvezda and TsKB of marine engineering Rubin.

Re-equipment of the Navy was one of the priorities of the previous state program of armaments: in 2011-2020, the fleet planned to allocate about 4.7 trillion rubles, of which almost half were to go for serial purchases of new weapons and equipment. However, by early 2018, only three of the eight strategic nuclear submarines of Project 955 Borei (the standard carrier of the Bulava ICBM) and one of the seven multi-purpose submarines of Project 885 Yasen (carrier of cruise missiles) were introduced into the Navy. The situation was no better with combat surface ships: according to the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, the Navy received only four frigates and eleven corvettes (of 15 and 35 ordered accordingly) during this time. According to the interlocutor of "Kommersant" in the industry, in part the problems are objective:

In February, March and May, during the conference calls, Sergei Shoigu criticized USC enterprises, accusing them of disrupting the terms of their obligations under contracts, but, according to the Kommersant source, the situation did not improve, so the discussion reached the presidential level. Meanwhile, in the new state armament program until 2027 (about 4 trillion rubles in the part of the Navy) there are extremely important projects that can not be "shifted to the right" under any circumstances, the source of Kommersant in the department continues, - the construction of strategic nuclear submarines " Borey B, multi-purpose submarines of the fifth generation of the Husky type (carrier of hypersonic missiles Zirkon), non-nuclear submarines Kalina. Under special control, according to "Kommersant", there are projects of underwater drones such as "Cephalopod" and "Status-6"

According to the expert of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Konstantin Makienko, USC has a number of old problems, which it is unlikely to solve in the existing model of the industry management. But you can try to focus on projects that are key to the country's defense capability (strategic and multi-purpose nuclear submarines) or are already launched into the series, the expert believes.

Hole wrote:A lot has to do with politics and the Navy not knowing what it wants.

You start building a ship and than someone comes and tells you: "Stop using this or that component, because it´s foreign" or part of your suppliers stops delivering items because you are in Russia... Well, that´s not good for productivity.

Then look at the Steregutschij. Series production in the first yard was accelerating, then comes the Navy and wants the ships with cruise missiles. The yard stops production, the ship is redesingned and the production starts over again. But years are lost. Same with the Gren. First the Navy wants six vessels, mostly for coastal and littoral areas. But it should be well armed. Than they change their mind, reduce the weapon load, just to save a few bucks. Then Medveded/Serdukhov come along and decide, that the Mistral will be bought. The production is stopped for years.

LMFS wrote:
Sure

Lack of money + unclear priorities + change of components + inefficient production--> delays --> need for redesign --> start the cycle again

Definitely not looking good. Let's see if they manage to correct this trend

Singular_Transform wrote:

LMFS wrote:
Sure

Lack of money + unclear priorities + change of components + inefficient production--> delays --> need for redesign --> start the cycle again

Definitely not looking good. Let's see if they manage to correct this trend

They call it as "learning curve".
Again, see ford carrier.

Singular_Transform wrote:

LMFS wrote:
Sure

Lack of money + unclear priorities + change of components + inefficient production--> delays --> need for redesign --> start the cycle again

Definitely not looking good. Let's see if they manage to correct this trend

They call it as "learning curve".
Again, see ford carrier.

LMFS wrote:

Singular_Transform wrote:

LMFS wrote:
Sure

Lack of money + unclear priorities + change of components + inefficient production--> delays --> need for redesign --> start the cycle again

Definitely not looking good. Let's see if they manage to correct this trend

They call it as "learning curve".
Again, see ford carrier.

The Ford case looks rather like a fiscal cliff, is not the best example of how things should work IMO.
Of course I assume they will eventually get over it but the issue is when you are so ineffective you spend and spend and go nowhere. This non acceptable for the government since you lose money and get nothing in return. I am crossing my fingers to start seeing faster deliveries to the navy in coming years.