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    Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

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    ZoA

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  ZoA on Sun Oct 15, 2017 11:05 pm

    I meant no slight on Franco. Seemed to me his interest is more in links in footnotes then in nonsense author was writing. And indeed there are few interesting footnotes.
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    Cyberspec

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  Cyberspec on Sun Oct 15, 2017 11:29 pm

    ZoA wrote:Carnegi sure employs some high grade imbeciles.....

    like your assesment.. Very Happy
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    franco

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  franco on Sun Oct 15, 2017 11:42 pm

    Obviously no readers of Sun Tzu No



    Smile
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    miketheterrible

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  miketheterrible on Mon Oct 16, 2017 1:18 am

    franco wrote:Obviously no readers of Sun Tzu  No



    Smile

    nah nah, no attack on you. Most don't know the wisdom of Franco. You are like one of those old Chinese monks. You don't say something unless you have to, everything you post is for a reason. Took me a while to figure you out Wink
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    kvs

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  kvs on Mon Oct 16, 2017 1:56 am

    GarryB wrote:Well from a less reliable source... the western media... these exercises were supposed to involve over 100,000 Russians coming from Russian into Belarus and potentially not leaving.... Hahahahahaha.

    Now that would justify all those NATO forces moving to Russian borders... except that the NATO forces moved first so who is provoking whom?

    Especially when NATO armoured units moving to the Russian border are real and the Russian response is not.

    NATO tards only wish Russia would waste money deploying 100,000 troops to Belorus. NATO tards think that they will
    only be fighting a conventional war against Russia. NATO tards will get glassed with tactical nukes inside Poland and
    the Baltics.
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    George1

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  George1 on Mon Oct 16, 2017 12:51 pm

    Indian ships to arrive in Russia for Indra-2017 exercises on October 19

    The opening ceremony of the Indra-2017 exercises will take place on October 20

    VLADIVOSTOK, October 16. /TASS/. A detachment of Indian Navy warships will arrive in Vladivostok, the home port of the Russian Pacific Fleet, for the Indra-2017 Russian-Indian drills, Pacific Fleet Spokesman Nikolay Voskresensky told reporters on Monday.

    "The solemn ceremony of meeting a detachment of Indian Navy ships will take place at the 33rd berth of Vladivostok’s Korabelnaya Embankment. Taking part in it will be representatives of the Russian Navy command, the crews of the vessels taking part in the exercises, an honor guard company and the orchestra of the Pacific Fleet Staff," he said.

    According to Voskresensky, the solemn opening ceremony of the Indra-2017 exercises will take place on October 20.

    Earlier reports said that the Satpura frigate and the Cadmatt corvette would be dispatched to take part in the exercises. A total of 900 Indian military servicemen will take part in them.

    This year, instead of the Indra Navy-2016, the Avia Indra-2016 and the Indra-2016 exercises held last year, the two countries will hold maneuvers that will involve three armed forces branches - the Pacific Fleet, aviation units and the ground forces of the Eastern Military District.


    More:
    http://tass.com/defense/970837


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    Cyberspec

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  Cyberspec on Tue Oct 17, 2017 9:30 am

    franco wrote:Obviously no readers of Sun Tzu  No



    Smile

    I only said I like your assesment of the writer (imbecile) Very Happy ...not having a go at you
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    franco

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  franco on Tue Oct 17, 2017 10:14 pm

    Didn't take it offensive from either of you.
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    franco

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  franco on Sat Nov 04, 2017 4:00 pm

    Very interesting look at the American military strength verses Russia and others;

    http://thesaker.is/do-you-think-his-assessment-is-accurate/
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    George1

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  George1 on Sun Nov 12, 2017 12:38 am

    The land phase of the Russian-Indian exercise "Indra-2017"

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/2944224.html


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    George1

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    Re: Russian National Defense Strategy: Issues

    Post  George1 on Fri Dec 29, 2017 2:20 pm

    Moscow Defense Brief and Mikhail Barabanov present: "Zapad-2017 Strategic Drills"

    In the recent issue of Moscow Defense Brief magazine the article by Mikhail Barabanov "Zapad-2017 Strategic Drills" was published. Bmpd presents its contents.

    The Zapad 2017 strategic military drills have been one of the most important events of the year for the Russian Armed Forces, along with the ongoing campaign in Syria. As such, they came under close international scrutiny.

    Russia holds the Zapad drills along its western borders once every four years; the previous such event took place in 2013. This year, however, the reaction from some of Russia’s neighbors to the west has been nothing short of hysterical. The obvious explanation is the general deterioration in Russian-Western relations since 2014.

    Long before the drills kicked off, the West launched an aggressive propaganda campaign about the alleged “Russian threat”. That campaign must have affected the Russian leadership, who changed their usual tack and tried to play down the scale and the military-political significance of the event. There was much less of an emphasis in the pro-government Russian media on the anti-NATO nature of the Zapad exercise in 2017 than in 2013.

    The greatest controversy in 2017 was probably about the numbers of the Russian forces and hardware involved. In their effort to demonize Zapad 2017, Western observers began to insist long before the event that up to 100,000 simultaneously deployed Russian troops would take part.

    Official Russian sources, meanwhile, tried to play down the scale of the drills, and to portray them as little more than joint Russian-Belarusian maneuvers in Belarusian territory. According to official reports, the main phase of the exercise involved 12,700 servicemen, of which 10,200 were deployed in Belarus (including 7,200 Belarusian troops and 3,000 Russian servicemen brought in from Russia specially for the drills). The amount of hardware involved was stated as 690 armored vehicles and artillery systems, plus 70 planes and helicopters.

    The scenario of the main phase was based on a conflict between the North (Russia and Belarus) and the West (the fictional states of Veyshnoria, Lubenia, and Vesbaria). The main goal under that scenario was to defend the sovereignty of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

    The objectives of the exercise were:

    • To improve operational compatibility between the various tiers of command,

    • To improve the cohesiveness of the future command and control systems, and

    • To field-test new rules and regulations (some of which were based on the lessons learnt in Syria)


    Under the Zapad 2017 scenario, “The West” fomented an armed separatist movement in Veyshnoria (a fictional state in the western part of Belarus) and encouraged it to secede from the Union State of Russia and Belarus. During the first stage of the main phase, held in Belarusian territory, allied troops contained Veyshnorian rebels, put an end to their subversive activities, and then destroyed them. They also reinforced the border of the Union State using troops of the Special Operations Forces and other branches of the Armed Forces.

    As part of the second stage of the drills, the armed forces of neighboring Lubenia and Vesbaria invaded Veyshnoria to provide armed support to the separatists. In response, the Russian and Belarusian forces mounted a joint defensive maneuver and then launched an offensive, crushing the enemy on land, in the air, and at sea.

    The drills placed special emphasis on the following elements:

    • Compatibility and interoperability of the Union State’s reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and air defense assets,

    • The use of high-precision weapons, including real launches of SAM, theater defense, and coastal defense missiles,

    • Real use of reconnaissance and strike systems, including comprehensive detection of targets by military reconnaissance assets; automated real-time target designation for aircraft, missile units, and artillery provided by the main command and control center of the joint Russian-Belarusian force, and

    • Territorial defense and transition of local companies and organizations to a war footing


    There was also a focus on the use of modern command and control systems. The communications units involved in the drills rapidly deployed new communication lines and nodes, and equipped field command and control stations. The drills also tested the effectiveness of the Russian Armed Forces’ high-speed, multi-mode data network.

    Russia’s 2nd Guard Taman Motor Rifle Division, 4th Guard Kantemirov Tank Division, and 6th Independent Tank Brigade (all three units are part of the 1st Guard Tank Army) each contributed a battalion tactical group. Additionally, the 76th Guard Airborne Assault Division (Pskov), the 98th Guard Airborne Assault Division (Ivanovo), and the 106th Guard Airborne Assault Division (Tula) of the Airborne Assault Troops (the VDV service) also contributed a battalion tactical group apiece. Furthermore, the drills involved several missile brigades and units of the Aerospace Forces and Air Defense Troops assigned to the Western Military District (including two combat plane squadrons), as well as several engineers, transport, and psy-ops support units. The Baltic Fleet’s contribution included land units of its 11th Army Corps stationed in Kaliningrad Region. Finally, troops and hardware were contributed by the Russian Guard, the Interior Ministry, and the Emergencies Ministry.

    The Belarusian parts of the Zapad 2017 were hosted at six firing ranges: Lepelsky, Borisovsky, Losvido, Osipovichsky, the Ruzhansky Air Force and Air Defense range, and the Domanovksy range, plus an isolated area near the town of Dretun. The Russian part was hosted by the Luzhsky range (Leningrad Region), Strugi Krasnye (Pskov Region), and Pravdinsky (Kaliningrad Region).

    For all the Western concerns, the scenario of the main phase of the drills was purely defensive, and focused on defending an allied state (Belarus) from hostile actions and then a direct invasion by the West. In that sense, the scenario was fully in line with the Putin administration’s perception of the domestic and external threats facing Russia. The exercise was a fairly typical reflection of how Russia believes it should act in the former Soviet republics to protect its “sphere of interests” from any encroachment by foreigners. It did not imply any major military operations beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union. As with the famous “Gerasimov Doctrine” (which reflects Russian views of how the West operates, but which Western commentators choose to interpret as Russia’s own preferred course of action), the West 2017 drills were not a simulation of a Russian act of aggression. Rather, they reflected the growing concern in the Russian military-political leadership about increasingly blatant Western meddling in former Soviet republics.

    Another important event timed to coincide with Zapad 2017 was a series of separate drills, exercises, and combat readiness inspections of several Russian military units and formations stationed in the European part of the country. It is these separate drills and exercises that provided the grounds for speculations in the West about the scale of the Zapad 2017 event, with some sources putting the number of troops involved at up to 100,000. As a matter of fact, Russia always holds drills and inspections at its military units every September to conclude the summer training period. That is why only those separate events that were part of the Zapad 2017 strategic drill plan can be legitimately regarded as part of Zapad – and those were few in number. In any event, even if those separate events are taken into account, they do not change the fact that the general thrust of Zapad 2017 was not about invading other countries, but rather about preventing such an invasion of Russia and its allies.

    On the whole, Zapad 2017 was a significant event because it offered a great opportunity to test the combat readiness of the Russian troops and command staff in the western theater, which is the most important theater of operations for Russia because that is where the NATO forces are deployed. NATO has a 15-fold superiority over Russia in terms of its combined military spending, and a five-fold superiority in troop numbers. The deployment of additional NATO forces in Poland and the Baltic states increases the level of threat facing Russia, because these forces are of course merely the forward component that could be bolstered by much larger reinforcements. Russia clearly needs to develop a set of measures to respond to that threat. Another Russian objective is to improve military coordination with Belarus, its ally in the Union State of Russia and Belarus.

    Zapad 2017 has demonstrated the growing differences between Russia and the West on European security issues. Those differences have already transcended the professional and political level, to become part of the social, cultural, and psychological plane. The rhetoric of official Western representatives and media outlets on the Zapad 2017 drills was based on deliberately ignoring inconvenient facts. It blatantly peddled prejudices, cultural, psychological and nationalistic stereotypes, and primitive propaganda tricks.

    The alarmist rhetoric was further fueled by several Eastern European nations and the Baltic states. It was quite clear that the eastern NATO allies were not genuinely concerned by the Zapad 2017 drills; rather, they merely used those drills as a pretext for scaremongering about the alleged Russian threat. These foreign and defense policy of these countries centers on their self-identification as a Western “cordon sanitaire” against Russia. They believe that by positioning themselves in such a way, they greatly increase their own value as allies of the West. That is why cultivating the idea of a Russian threat is an important element of the Eastern European nations’ foreign policy – an element that does not really require any provocation by Russia. In that sense, the Zapad 2017 drills have been a veritable boon for the Eastern European narrative. To secure greater Western assistance and cooperation, these countries are eager to provoke a deterioration in their relations with Russia, and then to incorporate that deterioration into the overall climate between Russia and the West. Their rhetoric on Zapad 2017 was a blatant attempt at such provocation.

    To conclude, Russia’s Zapad 2017 strategic military drills were not a contributing factor but rather a victim of the growing tensions between Russia and the West. Moscow’s attempts to reduce those tensions by limiting the scale of the drills, and by emphasizing their purely defensive scenario, proved fruitless. They found no appreciation in the West, where the drills were used as a propaganda instrument to peddle the idea of the “Russian threat”. This kind of situation can further erode mutual levels of restraint when it comes to holding large military drills on the European continent.

    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3026859.html


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    Oleg.Klubkov

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    "Transparent War": Journalists are impressed with the new doctrine of the Russian Defense Ministry in cooperation with the media

    Post  Oleg.Klubkov on Thu Apr 05, 2018 5:41 pm



    Despite the completely groundless accusations of the West that Russia is preparing to launch a "hybrid war" in the world, Russia demonstrates the desire for partnership and cooperation. In this connection, the Ministry of Defense of Russia radically changed its attitude to the “fourth estate". A new doctrine in the field of public information disclosure increases the authority of Russia on a worldwide scale.

    Information arms race

    By the time of Vladimir Putin's presidential career, the Russian army really was a "giant with feet of clay", as the Soviet army called after a dubious attack against Finland in the 1930s. "Hazing" and other criminal offenses in the ranks of the army, sinking submarines and falling fighters ... All this had to be justified, and  the generals rarely looked convincing on camera. It was a time of rumors and classified information, and very few people could predict the rapid and effective offensive of the Russia in Georgia in 2008. Perhaps, if there were more faith in the possibilities of Russians in the West, the eccentric Mikhail Saakashvili would not advised to resolve the issue with the satellites of Russia so radically?

    Today's Russia seems to have taken into account the past mistakes and Russian military and the press service of the Ministry of Defense have taken the first place in citing and popularity among journalists recently. And such a policy pursues not one, but several goals at once.

    Firstly, it is logical to assume that the power preparing for an offensive war will hide its military potential, rather than show it off. Secondly, it should be noted that Russian commanders rely not on copying of sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system, but on creating fundamentally new effective models. At the same time, the demonstration of new weapons to the whole world allows unassumingly emphasize both the inability to defeat Moscow in the arms race and the meaninglessness of spending on global military projects, such as missile defense in Eastern Europe, which could be easily overcome by new Russian weapons.

    And the Kremlin has perfectly mastered the public relations in recent years. The head of the Russian military's press service, Brigadier General Igor Konashenkov, actually announced the concept of a "transparent war", posting on the Internet and providing the media with clips of Russian air attacks on the bases of militants in Syria, publishing interactive maps of military operations, and emphasizing in every way the openness of Russia's actions in the Middle East. The true power of the Russian army appears in front of the Western astonished audience.

    Ultimately, such an information company puts the US, the NATO countries and their allies in a disadvantaged position, forcing them to catch up with Russia, rather than the reverse as it was during the Cold War with the USSR. Instead of an outdate BMD system, it is necessary to develop a fundamentally new system of protection against Russian supersonic missiles, to change the protection system of carrier forces from a new type of torpedoes. At the same time, many eastern European politicians are scared by the growth of Russia's military potential and require Washington and Brussels to protect their eastern borders, taking into account the latest innovations of the Russian military-industrial complex. And Europeans have to spend money, including in the budget insurance from" the Russian bear".

    "Transparent war" and its consequences

    The department of Sergei Shoigu managed to change the attitude to the army in Russian society in the space of a few years. Tank biathlon videos - a kind of sport invented in Russia – generates millions of hit. Russian Special Forces units called as “little green men” had quickly occupied vital ground in the Crimea in February 2014 and became a symbol of the Russian bloodless military success for a long time. It runs to the absurd: there are not enough places in the armed forces for conscripts in some Russian regions. At the same time, "a small victorious online war" has turned into a kind of show, very popular across Russians.

    Vladimir Putin's famous Message to the Federal Assembly was conceived as a challenge or even a threat in the West, but in Russia was compared with his election program of recent elections. Russia was not afraid to start wars and get involved in global conflicts during Putin’s presidency, so he has no competitors in his country. To the contrary, candidates who have taken anti-war positions are conceived by the majority of electorate as traitors. And military successes are capitalized for Putin in real support of voters who will come to vote, even knowing who will win. It seems that elections in 2018 have turned for the Russians into an act of national unity against foreign enemy.

    It must be confessed, that serious failures in military trials, failures in the introduction of new technology and problems during the military training exercise are not publicly available. But the press service of the Ministry of Defense accepts military defeats, such as the recent defeat of the column of Syrian troops and Russian private security companies by Kurds and American soldiers. After that publishes a video of effective retaliation actions or places falsehoods in the network explaining the reason of the defeat by factors that do not discredit the Russian military. It has not succeeded to catch the press service of the Russian defense establishment in a lie yet.

    Moreover, the Russian side is scrupulous about various military demonstrations. The recent case of a US submarine frozen in the ice of the Beaufort Sea is hardly possible in Russia. But the Kremlin will with pleasure display effective demonstration launch of new missiles with the participation of media representatives. However, it seems that the ultimate goal of the new information policy is not to intimidate the West. First, the efforts of military PR specialists, especially on the eve of the recent elections, were aimed at own population. Secondly, Brigadier General Igor Konashenkov and his team are trying to accomplish an almost impossible task of demonstrating the power and peacefulness of Russia at the same time.  

    Play on the Russian field

    The best way to prevent an arms race and avoid any war is negotiation and cooperation. The recent presidential elections in Russia undoubtedly demonstrated the high cohesion of Russians around Putin regardless of the numerous violations. And the speeches of the Russian leader conceived as too aggressive can also be considered as a signal that Russia is calm for its defensive capability and readiness to talk on equal terms. And, paradoxically, the openness of the Russian Ministry of Defense for contacts with the media, foreign observers and experts that can become a way for understanding Russia's new foreign policy. If the Kremlin is ready for dialogue and answers to questions about the aspirations of the military, maybe it is through them that we should begin? Should we begin a constructive dialogue with Kremlin because of readiness of its military department for dialogue and answers to questions about Russian motivation in the Middle East and North Africa?

    In the end, Russia did not turn the Middle East into an arena of endless competition of different kinds armed Islamists. Russia did not sponsor neo nazis in Ukraine, which hurl their country into chaos. Russia still looks more like a peacekeeper than an arsonist, although established an ambitious level of geostrategic interests. At least, the Russian bear engages in rattling not far from its den. Perhaps we can reach an agreement with him?

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