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    Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

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    Vladimir79

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    Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Vladimir79 on Thu Jul 16, 2009 2:17 am

    Key challenges to create a new image of the Russian Armed Forces should be completed by December 1 - Medvedev
    16.07.2009

    NOVOROSSIYSK, July 15. (ITAR-TASS). Key challenges to create a new image of the Armed Forces should be completed by December 1, demanded Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

    July 14, Speaking at a meeting on the basis of operational-strategic exercises Kavkaz-2009 ", the President recalled that one of the priorities adopted in May, the National Security Strategy of Russia until 2020, is to create a new image of the army and navy.

    "Our task - to create a mobile equipped with latest technology, efficient, adequate modern threats to the Armed Forces and that is what we will do in the coming years. I would like to emphasize that as early as December 1 this year, the major work on the formation of a new image of the Armed Forces should be completed "- said Medvedev.

    "In the future, to be another big part of this work - doosnaschenie our Armed Forces with modern weapons and technology" - the president added, recalling that their share in 2020 to have 80 percent.

    Medvedev also said that it should be, despite the crisis, to comply with the stated plans for the construction of this year 45 thousand apartments for military men. "The new face of the armed forces - is, of course, the new technique, but not only. This is another component of our combat readiness - social sphere - social issues, solving the problems of increasing the allowance. We are engaged in quite successfully. We need this program to deploy and bring to a final decision, "- said Medvedev.
    15.07.2009

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    Russian Patriot

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    Russian Military Reforms [Command-Structure-Personnel]

    Post  Russian Patriot on Tue Aug 11, 2009 1:04 am

    Medvedev proposes bill on troop deployment outside Russia
    RIA Novosti

    10/08/200916:10

    SOCHI, August 10 (RIA Novosti) - Russia's president said on Monday he had submitted a bill to parliament on the procedure for sending troops to fight outside the country's borders.

    "This is linked to the events that took place a year ago," Dmitry Medvedev said at a meeting with the leaders of Russia's largest political parties.

    August 7 was the first anniversary of a five-day war between Russia and Georgia over breakaway South Ossetia.

    "Such issues must be clearly regulated," Medvedev said speaking in the Black Sea resort city of Sochi, which borders on Abkhazia, another former Georgian republic.

    Russia's current 2006 legislation only allows the president to send troops to fight terrorism on foreign soil. Experts say the law lacks clearly defined terms of "wartime" and a "combat situation," which complicates the deployment of army units outside the country.

    Russia sent in troops last summer to repel Georgia's offensive on South Ossetia, where Moscow had maintained peacekeepers since a bloody post-Soviet conflict in the early 1990s. Russia was condemned internationally over its "excessive" use of force and subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

    Georgia severed diplomatic ties with Russia after the war and declared the regions occupied territories. Russian officials said some 162 civilians and 67 Russian service personnel were killed in the conflict.

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2009/russia-090810-rianovosti01.htm
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    bhramos

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  bhramos on Thu Sep 24, 2009 4:58 am

    where does exactly foreign means?
    where could possibly the Russian soldiers be deployed?
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    Vladimir79

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Vladimir79 on Thu Sep 24, 2009 5:21 am

    bhramos wrote:where does exactly foreign means?
    where could possibly the Russian soldiers be deployed?

    Georgia is the most obvious. It also includes any CIS state to help solidify the quick reaction brigades of CTSO. This also can give an opening to operate in areas of the Arctic we wish to claim. A possible invasion of Crimea might be in the near future as well.
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    Russian Ground Forces: News #1

    Post  Vladimir79 on Fri Nov 06, 2009 6:45 am

    Results of "Ladoga-2009"

    14.10.2009 17:58 The armed forces, Russia, ucheniyaversiya Print

    Completed exercises "Ladoga-2009" became perhaps the biggest exercises in recent years. Died away shots of tank guns, silenced steel trills and automatic machine-gun bursts. The troops in winter quarters lead to the proper type of equipment and weapons. But work on the analysis of the results of exercise continues at the headquarters. What are they? Preliminary results are encouraging.


    These exercises were difficult and were largely experimental. Suffice it to say that within the operational and strategic exercises in-Ground Forces and other security agencies "Ladoga-2009" held at the same time, two operational and strategic doctrine. Actually "Ladoga-2009" in the north-west Russia. And "West-2009, which covered the central part of Russia, the territory of Moscow and part of the Volga-Ural military districts, as well as Belarus. Regional scale was unprecedented.


    As part of the exercises "Ladoga-2009" personal decision-Chief of Ground Forces, Army General Vladimir Boldyrev was suddenly raised the alarm, refer to the highest degree of alert and sent to the area of maneuvers in the North-West Russia 28 th Separate Motorized Infantry Brigade of the Volga-Urals Military District. The brigade arrived in the area of maneuvers and was preparing to conduct tactical exercises with live firing in the daytime. This has nothing to diminish the complexity of its tasks, the more so for in the next day as they had to act at night.


    But that's not all. The troops were fighting on the territory of nine (!) Polygons, including two marine. As the Chief of General Staff of the Army, Deputy Chief of maneuvers, Lieutenant General Sergei Skokov, unit performs combat training missions with live firing in the teams, including at night. A shelf Airborne implemented dropping personnel and equipment from aircraft, military transport aircraft Il-76. On the coast a landing was.


    An interesting and such a moment. In part raznovidovoy and raznorodovoy of troops on the teachings of the various operating aircraft (airplanes and helicopters), have been firing rockets and artillery detachment Northern Fleet warships. 326-I missile brigade of the Leningrad military district complied with the group launch tactical missiles "Point-To-Do" at a distance of 52 km on the conditional enemy command post. The aim was struck by the first hit. That is, by the saturation of artillery and bombardment of the enemy's teachings were simply unique. A decision on missile launching was made commander of Combined Forces in the strategic direction.


    Recall that a tactical missile system "Tochka-U" does launch missiles at a distance of 120 km. Crew launcher - 3 persons. Time of deployment of the complex - 10 minutes. In place of this menacing missile is already a new operational-tactical missile system - the notorious "Iskander".


    Along with the rocket troops army paratroopers 76-second landing-assault division at the district site "Struga Reds worked the scene to complete the tactical destruction of the command and control of conditional enemy. To draw the fighting, some thousands of troops landing assault regiment parachuted with standard weapons and equipment (about 30 units) at the landing site, and made the 90-kilometre march to the area of teaching.


    Important place - the interaction of the army and navy with other forces. Within maneuvers "Ladoga-2009" at the firing range RF MVD Internal Troops near Peterhof, for example, have passed special tactical exercises 33rd separate special purpose brigade of the North-West Regional Command of Internal Troops MVD RF. In the course of it worked out the practical actions of the troops on search and destroy sabotage and reconnaissance groups, blocking populated GOVERNMENTAL items seized by terrorists and free the hostages. As well as arrangements for the protection and defense of state and military facilities (nuclear power plants, ports, federal transportation links). To action were involved in more than one and a half thousand troops Interior Ministry troops, army aviation and armour.


    However, special attention was paid to study the most severe trial, existing in the armed forces - a clear and uninterrupted operation of control system of the General Staff to the platoon inclusive. The statement was made commander of Ground Forces, Army General Vladimir Boldyrev. He noted that one of the main objectives of the exercises "Ladoga-2009" was to "investigate the management of the Armed Forces of the General Staff to a platoon inclusive. This is the most difficult issue in our army, on the solution of which we are working on our teachings, "- said Army General Vladimir Boldyrev.


    Peculiarity of the exercises "Ladoga-2009" is also in the fact that they were part of the strategic maneuvers "Autumn 2009", covering all three strategic directions for the western theater of military operations: South-Western, Western and North-Western. Commander of Ground Forces recalled in this connection that in June this year as part of maneuvers "Autumn-2009" in the North Caucasus region were operational-strategic exercises Kavkaz-2009 ". Naturally, all this is the result and consequence of the transfer of the Armed Forces of the country to a new brigade structure. It was important to see how it behaves in an environment as close to combat.


    Today in the Ground Forces Russia has in fact formed 85 brigades of constant combat readiness, including combined arms, rocket, landing-ground attack, electronic warfare and other compounds that can operate in any directions. This was confirmed by Chief of Ground Forces, Army General Vladimir Boldyrev, the end of special tactical exercises 33rd Separate Brigade for operational use of the North-West Regional Command of the Interior Troops of the Interior Ministry, which took place within the operational and strategic maneuvers Army and other security agencies in the North-West Russia . Battle of the organizational and staff structure of the Army will now be presented units and formations only constant alert, able to perform tasks in the shortest possible time, said Commander. He explained that it is highly maneuverable forces capable of acting without action on mobilization and additional slazhivaniyu in all directions. But first and foremost on those where there is most probable threats to national and military security of Russia.


    And what lies ahead? In 2010, in the eastern region of Russia have already been scheduled and will be operational-strategic exercises "Vostok-2010". They will be part of troops of the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts, and will involve economic complex, which is located on the east. And the results of "Ladoga-2009" will certainly be taken into account.

    Vladimir Semenchenko, MIC

    ??????-????? «??????-2009»
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    Vladimir79

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    : Russian Military: Strategic issues, Doctrines and Threats

    Post  Vladimir79 on Sun Dec 06, 2009 2:01 pm

    Commanders are relying on the quality

    2009-12-04 / Viktor Litovkin

    In 2009, exercises of the armed forces of Russia were almost continuously.

    December 1, 2009 was for our Armed Forces a remarkable day. First, the Minister of Defense sent a report to the Supreme Commander in Chief, which is officially reported on the implementation of the plans of the first phase of military reform and give the Army and Navy of the new long-term appearance. Secondly, from this day on the tradition in the Army begins new school year, and it also will extend all the changes that have occurred in BC in recent years. And, third, and at the same time - in the fourth and fifth - the first day of winter should finally begin to learn of future professionals, sergeants and operators of UAVs in the rifle brigade - come platoons of snipers, and in garrisons - military police. .. But first things first.

    On the eve of the alleged events with journalists met Head of training and service troops of the Armed Forces of Russia Lieutenant-General Valery Yevnevich. He summarized inversely studies in the outgoing year, and also spoke about the operational and strategic, tactical, special and exemplary exercises, which are scheduled for 2010.

    And although the traditional final test in 2009 will not, nor will be held and the meeting of senior officers with the President (which, according to the "NWO", scheduled for March next year), the quality and results of combat training was the general as saying.

    RANGE PEACE NOT EVEN DREAMING

    Above all, said Valery Yevnevich, the fact that in the course of giving a new image of the armed forces, when the re-formation took place in the new structure of one half of the combat troops, and then the second, reappointed officials, was diversion of equipment from one region of the country to another, address other organizational tasks, glow of combat training and training is not reduced. He was, perhaps, as high as ever. In summer and autumn, there were several successive complex operational and strategic doctrines that are comparable in size and number of participating troops and military equipment with only those maneuvers that took place during the Soviet era. Among them, the general highlighted the first large-scale operational-strategic exercises "Autumn 2009", conducted in several stages almost throughout the country. They were attended by all kinds and all kinds of troops of the Armed Forces.

    The maneuvers began in the North Caucasus Military District (the "Kavkaz-2009"), then continued in the territory of the Leningrad Military District ( "Ladoga-2009" involving special forces of the Kaliningrad region, where for the first time in post-Soviet period was carried out an amphibious operation involving ships and Marines of the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern Fleet). Then went smoothly on the Belarusian land (West 2009). The participants were united, Russian-Belarusian group of troops, backed by bomber aircraft long-range aircraft, as well as parts of the Collective Security Treaty. And ended up in Kazakhstan, on the range "Matybulak" with the participation of Russian, Kazakh troops and the individual units and operational teams from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. And, moreover, had long hikes domestic seafarers in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, our missile flights to Venezuela, combat firing of air defense systems in Ashuluk and Transbaikalia, on the range "Telemba. Such mass movements of troops and military equipment at such great distances, the general said, over the past twenty years, none of the generals can not remember.

    Past teachings, said Valery Yevnevich, showed that the leadership of the Army and Navy have learned from last year's August events in the Caucasus, and today, our troops are able to perform a variety of combat missions in any theater of operations without additional rearrangements, resupply and other types of training. They can act autonomously staffing immediately after receiving a combat mission. Results for the last year there were 15 brigade tactical exercises, 161 Battalion, 736 of company and battery, 8 thousand live firings. Plus, it has 600 special credits and 280 tactical command and staff training. Paratroopers carried out 188 thousand parachute jumps, which is 35 thousand more than in 2008. From military transport planes had dropped 93 units of military equipment. This scale amphibious operations, said Evnevich, not a single army in the world. Duration young pilots managed to bring up an extra 55 hours per person.
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    Russian military gets ready for large-scale drills in Far East

    Post  Russian Patriot on Mon Mar 22, 2010 10:47 pm

    Russian military gets ready for large-scale drills in Far East

    RIA Novosti

    22/03/201020:13

    MOSCOW, March 22 (RIA Novosti) - The commander of the Russian Ground Forces has arrived in Russia's Far East to inspect the preparation for upcoming strategic military exercises in the region.

    The Russian Armed Forces will conduct large-scale Vostok-2010 military exercises in Siberia and the country's Far East in June-July.

    "Col. Gen. Alexander Postnikov will focus on practical details of the exercises while visiting the locations where the drills will take place," the Ground Forces press service said in a statement.

    The upcoming drills will involve units from the Far Eastern, the Siberian and the Volga-Urals military districts, as well as the Pacific Fleet.

    As part of the drills, the Armed Forces will practice the deployment of additional troops in Siberia and the Far East to strengthen the existing military contingent in the region in case of a potential military conflict.

    Russia holds Vostok strategic command-and-staff exercises every two years. More than 8,000 troops took part in Vostok-2008.

    The Russian military conducted the Caucasus 2009, Zapad 2009 and Ladoga 2009 strategic exercises, and 15 brigade-level and 161 battalion-level drills last year.

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2010/russia-100322-rianovosti01.htm
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    Vostok 2010 Drills start

    Post  Russian Patriot on Wed Jun 30, 2010 2:17 am

    Large-scale military maneuver drills kick off in Russia's Far East

    RIA Novosti

    16:47 29/06/2010

    KHABAROVSK/MOSCOW, June 29 (RIA Novosti) - The Vostok 2010 military drills started off in the Russian Far East after motorized, missile and artillery brigades were raised on alert on Tuesday, a drills spokesman said.

    The spokesman said the brigades had already moved to their designated positions, where they would practice tactical maneuvers including live fire exercises.

    He said the Vostok 2010 drills will take place in the Russian Far East training areas from June 29 through July 8, involving as many as 20,000 troops, 2,500 armored vehicles, 70 warplanes and 30 warships.

    The drills will also feature the heavy nuclear-powered cruiser Pyotr Veliky of the Northern Fleet and the Guards guided missile cruiser Moskva of the Black Sea Fleet.

    As many as 12,500 troops took part in last year's intermediate drills, while the previous large-scale Vostok 2008 drills involved more than 8,000 troops.

    Gen. Nikolai Makarov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, said this year's strategic drills would include the firing of live ammunition, simulated airborne assaults and amphibious assault landings.

    As part of the drills, the Armed Forces will practice the deployment of additional troops in Siberia and the Far East to reinforce the existing military contingent in the region in case of a military conflict.

    Makarov stressed on Monday that the Vostok 2010 drills were not aimed against any one country.

    "This exercise...is not directed against any specific country or military-political bloc. It has a purely defensive nature in ensuring the security and national interests of the [Russian] state in the Far East," he said.

    Russia holds Vostok strategic command-and-staff drills every two years.


    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2010/russia-100629-rianovosti01.htm


    Last edited by Russian Patriot on Wed Jul 14, 2010 11:59 pm; edited 1 time in total
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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Vladimir79 on Wed Jul 07, 2010 1:47 pm


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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  milliirthomas on Fri Jul 16, 2010 11:50 am

    Russian president Dmitry Medvedev speech for this exercise
    It is important that we can now conduct regular training exercises in different locations; we now focus on Asia Pacific issues and the current training has shown that Russia is ready to promote the country’s security as well as that of the whole of Asia and the Pacific region.
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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Viktor on Mon Jul 19, 2010 8:22 pm

    Whats the main idea of VOSTOK-2010 ... testing new comunications or?
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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Russian Patriot on Mon Jul 19, 2010 9:53 pm

    Viktor wrote:Whats the main idea of VOSTOK-2010 ... testing new comunications or?

    I guess to rehearse and case China or terrorists for some reason attack our Far East.
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    Russian Military: Strategic issues, Doctrines and Threats

    Post  Vladimir79 on Mon Jul 19, 2010 10:34 pm

    Viktor wrote:Whats the main idea of VOSTOK-2010 ... testing new comunications or?

    To sharpen the skills of the Far East divisions. Every military district undergoes large exercises every year.

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Austin on Sat Feb 25, 2012 7:02 pm

    Putin: ‘The West wants regime change in Iran’

    To begin with, Putin addressed the longstanding issue of NATO’s AMD plans for Europe and Russia’s involvement in the project.

    “When it comes to developing our relationship towards joint AMD [in Europe] they do not want to talk seriously with us. They avoid direct talks about it. This is what happens – they try to make it look as if our relationship is developing.

    “It is absolutely clear that national security is vital, but one has to do it without creating new global threats and without shifting the balance of strategic powers,” he added.

    The US claims AMD is not aimed against Russia, while Putin says Russia’s growing arsenal of Topol-M and Yars and radio location stations are also not aimed against the US.

    There have been several attempts to negotiate building a joint AMD shield that have shown no results, but Putin says there is a reason why NATO should reconsider the option.

    “We have something that should push our colleagues and partners towards more constructive work than we’ve seen so far,” he said.

    Regarding the state of national armaments Vladimir Putin said the West is far from understanding the potential.

    “A few years ago we were told – not directly – but we know that the US told their colleagues in NATO ‘let Russia do whatever, all they have left is rust.’ Well today this is not the case.”


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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Mindstorm on Wed Jul 04, 2012 12:09 am



    Yes 16 launchers, up to 24 in some instances.

    Those modern S-300V4 brigades surely represent an excellent long range anti-aircraft/missile component for the mobile IADS at protection of Russian Ground Forces in any major conflict, but naturally the problems for Russian Armed Forces lie elsewhere.....

    As well explained in facts by Rogozin, Russian Federation has ,and will even more markedly have in future, a great abundance of offensive and defensive weapon systems ,of level equal or superior to those available to other major competitors ,useful for major conflicts against major opponents ; what instead the 2020 plan miss completely is the sector of "special" weapons and sensor systems useful for regional conflict ,under the critic eyes of International Community and global Public Opinion.

    The situation will be not different from now : TOS-1A is surely an unique and very efficient weapon for its role ,but what would be its role in a minor ,low intensity conflict... under the censorious eyes of International Community ?
    The same could be said for Kh-22M or Kh-32 ,surely unique and outstandingly efficient weapons ,but with what role in a regional conflict ?
    And so on with the immense stock of KAB-1500 (and FAB up to 9000...), BM-30 “Smerch” brigades, heavy artillery of any type, PBK heavy gliding munition dispenser, etc..etc...



    Practically Russia Armed Forces lack today and will continue to lack in the near future, any mean to control collateral damages to civilian lives and infrastructures and any efficient small scale reconnaissance/data collecting systems to acquire an high selective application of fire power for COIN missions or operations under scrutiny of Global media (some technology acquired from aboard is aimed just to that segment).

    Realization or R&D effort for S-300V4, S-400/S-500, Vityaz, Morfei, Poliment-Redut, Samolet-M ABM, Sokol-Eshelon/Dueliant, Armata/Kurganet/Boomerang vehicle family, Voronezh radar family, Nebo-M nultispectral radars, Bulava, Liner, Yars (and all the future sate of the art ICBMs and manoeuvrable warheads) PAKFA, PAKDA, Zirkon-S, etc...etc...etc...all surely represent today or will represent in the next years outstanding weapon systems offering capabilities often without any equal at world in large scale conflicts against very powerful enemies , but will result completely useless for majority of the most likely low intensity conflicts.


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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  GarryB on Wed Jul 04, 2012 1:39 am

    Sorry Mindstorm, I don't agree.

    With Glonass guidance packages for 152mm and larger calibre rounds plus Kornet-EM and lots of other guided munitions the Russian Army will not lack precision attack capability.

    Their development of UCAVs with ATGM size missiles and reportedly KAB-50 guided bombs suggest they will have plenty of precision capability and work on the C4IR infrastructure suggests not only will they be able to hit point targets but will also be able to find them too.

    Just look at Iskander... its predecessor would be the SS-1 Scud... when a formation of armour was detected on a town square in Georgia in 2008 it would have taken hundreds of Scuds to even have a chance of doing damage to that force, yet a single Iskander hit that square (reportedly) and took out many of those vehicles.

    The Russian Army will be able to engage in COIN warfare... especially now that it has introduced sniper brigades, but also the introduction of well armoured and well armed vehicles from light to heavy should reduce losses as well.

    FAB-9000s are a specialist weapon and could be used for a shock and awe demonstration, or like Russias nukes they might never be used in anger. That just means you shouldn't buy a lot of them... that is all.

    The primary purpose of TOS is to rapidly clear minefields, but with good intel it could as easily be used to remove a rebel force from a mountain hideout because TOS consumes oxygen so even those under cover have to be able to breath...

    With increased precision and improved C4IR a forces ability to be mobile and flexible and capable against a range of different targets greatly increases.

    For many COIN ops it wont even be a Russian Army mission.. they will likely just support the MVD and FSB.


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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Mindstorm on Thu Jul 05, 2012 1:25 am

    With Glonass guidance packages for 152mm and larger calibre rounds plus Kornet-EM and lots of other guided munitions the Russian Army will not lack precision attack capability.

    Their development of UCAVs with ATGM size missiles and reportedly KAB-50 guided bombs suggest they will have plenty of precision capability and work on the C4IR infrastructure suggests not only will they be able to hit point targets but will also be able to find them too.


    GarryB I understand perfectly your line of reasoning, but think that introducing some empirical factors will allow you to realize how some rooted ideas or subliminal links between concepts are totally not grounded.


    Precision attack capability =/= Collateral damage control ; in particular i am interested to point out that ,to the contrary of common opinions on the subject Russian armed forces don't lack absolutely high precision weapons , but it strongly lack precision guided munitions that can be safely employed in a regional conflicts under the eyes of international institutions and foreign media coverage, in areas with middle to high density of civil infrastructures and peoples (as well highlighted ,in 2008, in the South Ossetia War against Georgia).


    For the subject in question (today and perspective capability of Russian Armed Forces to produce high volume of fire power generating a very low level of collateral life/infrastructural losses in low scale conflicts) two main factors enter into play.

    1) 99% of precision guided munitions DON'T HAVE (and ,up to a certain point, will never get for unavoidable and incomputable aerodynamics variables ) a level of precision even only near to those present in collective imaginary - often influenced and deceived by images or video representing the usual "bull's yes" hits by part of those type of weapons and that in reality represent ,instead, cases attentively chosen among an high number of attempts .
    The parameter used in the West to define the degree of precision of those type of weapons is the CEP - Circular Error Probability- ,a circle with the intended target to the centre and within the radius of which will fall ,on average , 50% of the weapons delivered .

    A typical JDAM has a CEP of about 13 meters - therefore delivering 10 JDAMS of 1000lb each ,only 5 will come on average within 13 meters radius from aimed point and ,of those, only about two will land within kill radius of its warhead for a small, lightly armoured, target -.
    Naturally anyone is perfectly capable to realize as those type of weapons represent surely an enormous improvement in respect to legacy unguided ammunitions, but the return offered is directly proportional to the size of the fixed target attacked (a typical not hardened building with a side of 24 meters will be hit and destroyed 93-94 % of the times by a similar 1000 lb JDAM ) and inversely proportional to target resilience to overpressure solicitations.
    Precision guided munitions can offer ,therefore, only an assisting effect in reducing collateral damages, the main factor instead become obviously management of detonation power for the desired effect and control of damage potential delivered in the target area (not forgetting that in a detonation radial distance of a peak overpressure variate in the space with the cube root of the explosive energy release)


    2) From what said in point 1 result absolutely evident that in the optic of the design of a weapon optimized for reduction of collateral damages in low intensity conflicts ,reduction at minimum of the detonation potential become a key feature.
    The staple weapon in this class is surely GBU-39 SDB, a weapon purposely conceived for low intensity conflicts where its very small (....only 17 kg of explosive filler !!) detonation power (which would render its employment against even moderately armoured targets like SAM TELARS very inefficient with its 8-13 m. of CEP), its JDAM-class CEP, its moderate penetration capability and its relative small volume allow not only to attack, in the same sortie, with each aircraft several of the "soft"/not hardened targets characteristic of low intensity conflicts ,but also to enormously reduce chances of collateral damages ; is important to remark that the penetration capability of GBU-39 greatly contribute to this purpose , in fact typical misses by part of this weapon usually cause its 17 kg of explosive to detonate usually some meters under the level of soil.



    Now GarryB do you know what is the most common air delivered PGM (its amount in Russian stock is simply impressive) in Russian armed forces ?
    KAB-1500L (followed by KAB-1500Kr); now those high precision weapons show a CEP even significantly better than satellite guided ammunitions like JDAM ; the little problem is that those weapons (in 3300 lb class, when the maximum for western-made guided bombs is 2000 lb ) instead of the 17 kg of HE of GBU-39 have a filler of .....460 and 440 Kg of HE !!! moreover with an energetic yield superior of 18% to that employed in GBU-39 !!!


    I think that anyone can now realize why ,in spite of the immense amount of this type of weapons, neither KAB-500 or ,even worse, KAB-1500 bombs has been ever employed in Georgia.
    Similar reasoning is true ,naturally, also other heavy Russian PGM weapons such as the "Smel’chak" round for 2S4 super heavy mortar or majority of Russian guided missile both ground and air delivered.


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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  GarryB on Thu Jul 05, 2012 5:00 am

    The problem is that the Russians have a different force structure than the west.

    The west uses its military in very much a policing role, and certainly in interventions that have a much lower threshold than Russia has.

    In many ways NATO is becoming a diplomatic tool to force opposing parties to capitulate so there is less need for discussion and compromise. Nothing more persuasive than the threat... do it or we will bomb you.

    The Russians on the other hand have the MVD for internal security problems and the FSB for external security problems.

    The real question is why does the west use military force in situations where it is really a police matter, and what business do they have dropping Hellfire missiles into civilian communities to murder people? With no state of war it would be like the local police force barricading themselves in large buildings and setting up sniper positions where anybody walking past they suspect of criminal activity they shoot on sight. Who do you call when it is the police that is the problem?

    Precision attack capability =/= Collateral damage control ; in particular i am interested to point out that ,to the contrary of common opinions on the subject Russian armed forces don't lack absolutely high precision weapons , but it strongly lack precision guided munitions that can be safely employed in a regional conflicts under the eyes of international institutions and foreign media coverage, in areas with middle to high density of civil infrastructures and peoples (as well highlighted ,in 2008, in the South Ossetia War against Georgia).

    I disagree. There is no credible evidence that the Russian military forces killed a large number of innocent civilians in that conflict. Even with all their problems and shortcomings indiscriminate use of artillery and firepower on innocent civilians was not an issue for the Russian forces. The Georgians on the other hand happily rained Grads on the capital or SO and also reportedly attacked columns of fleeing civilians... the negative media coverage the Russians got in the western press was coming from the press offices in Tiblisi written by people who never went anywhere near the front lines and was probably largely written weeks before the conflict even started.

    1) 99% of precision guided munitions DON'T HAVE (and ,up to a certain point, will never get for unavoidable and incomputable aerodynamics variables ) a level of precision even only near to those present in collective imaginary - often influenced and deceived by images or video representing the usual "bull's yes" hits by part of those type of weapons and that in reality represent ,instead, cases attentively chosen among an high number of attempts .

    When you reduce the payload of a shell to a fraction of what it can carry then absolute precision does become critical.
    When the target is an enemy ATGM position landing a 40kg 152mm HE Frag shell within 10m and air bursting 3m in the air then a direct hit is not necessary or possible, but the effect is the same as if it was a direct hit.

    It is like the footage from the NATO campaign in Kosovo when NATO was showing footage of a train passing over a bridge and then half a second later the bridge is obliterated... at the press conference the NATO official joked at how lucky those on the train were for their lucky escape, but the size and proximity of the explosion it is very unlikely the passengers got away unscathed.

    When the target is a bridge then a 17kg HE bomb just wont cut it... how innocent are the civilians that are within 50m of enemy forces setting up a roadside bomb and an ambush? There are civilians and there are innocent civilians. We have all seen the Libyan civilians armed with AKs and RPGs.

    Having said all that the Soviets were using ATGMs launched from Hinds to hit point targets from a distance since the 1980s.

    The parameter used in the West to define the degree of precision of those type of weapons is the CEP - Circular Error Probability- ,a circle with the intended target to the centre and within the radius of which will fall ,on average , 50% of the weapons delivered .

    A typical JDAM has a CEP of about 13 meters - therefore delivering 10 JDAMS of 1000lb each ,only 5 will come on average within 13 meters radius from aimed point and ,of those, only about two will land within kill radius of its warhead for a small, lightly armoured, target -.
    Naturally anyone is perfectly capable to realize as those type of weapons represent surely an enormous improvement in respect to legacy unguided ammunitions, but the return offered is directly proportional to the size of the fixed target attacked (a typical not hardened building with a side of 24 meters will be hit and destroyed 93-94 % of the times by a similar 1000 lb JDAM ) and inversely proportional to target resilience to overpressure solicitations.

    You also need to keep in mind that CEP is a mathematical measure and applies in all weathers and conditions. A CEP of 13m might actually be much worse with high winds at ground level, and as it is GPS guided in certain locations and latitudes it might not even be usable. CEP is normally given as the worst possible result.

    Iskander was given a CEP of 20m with optical guidance, yet during actual testing was found to have a CEP of more like 7m.

    Against most targets such a CEP will be effective.

    In fact the Vikhr-M ATGM has a CEP of 80cm at 8km.

    Multiply the CEP by 4... it is all based on a bell curve so CEP = 50% of the possible results... the centre of the bell curve, multiply by 4 and you get the 99% area under the curve. In other words draw a circle that is 2.4m and 99% of all shots from a Vikhr should land within that circle.

    Of course the problem with mathematical models is that they don't always follow reality.

    What happens if your batch of missiles was damaged in transport or were not assembled properly and 99% of the missiles don't even reach the target?

    Precision guided munitions can offer ,therefore, only an assisting effect in reducing collateral damages, the main factor instead become obviously management of detonation power for the desired effect and control of damage potential delivered in the target area (not forgetting that in a detonation radial distance of a peak overpressure variate in the space with the cube root of the explosive energy release)

    Generally in combat collateral damage is not a huge concern except if what you are doing is more of a police action than a military one.

    Truly innocent civilians rarely stand next to enemy air defence radars, or enemy military units.

    2) From what said in point 1 result absolutely evident that in the optic of the design of a weapon optimized for reduction of collateral damages in low intensity conflicts ,reduction at minimum of the detonation potential become a key feature.
    The staple weapon in this class is surely GBU-39 SDB, a weapon purposely conceived for low intensity conflicts where its very small (....only 17 kg of explosive filler !!) detonation power (which would render its employment against even moderately armoured targets like SAM TELARS very inefficient with its 8-13 m. of CEP), its JDAM-class CEP, its moderate penetration capability and its relative small volume allow not only to attack, in the same sortie, with each aircraft several of the "soft"/not hardened targets characteristic of low intensity conflicts ,but also to enormously reduce chances of collateral damages ; is important to remark that the penetration capability of GBU-39 greatly contribute to this purpose , in fact typical misses by part of this weapon usually cause its 17 kg of explosive to detonate usually some meters under the level of soil.

    You are contradicting yourself... in your first point you suggest that CEPs of 10m or more are not accurate enough to pick out point targets so presumably the goal should be tiny CEPs measured in cms or mms, and in this point above you say they reduce the HE weight to reduce the effective radius of the weapon to reduce the effective radius of damage... the clear problem is that to effectively use it you would need very precise information about the exact location of the target along with the location of targets that are to be spared so you know when to release the weapon. Targets underground would make such a determination impossible... how can you tell who is in that bunker? Is it an Al Quada meeting of high level officials or is it the community air raid shelter full of women and children?

    The problem you have identified... lack of being useful as a world police force, or should I say a vigilante force that murders suspects without trial, is not a problem in my opinion. The Russian military should never find itself with such a role I hope.

    If they did then there are plenty of ATGMs that would be ideal to be released from UCAVs to hit point targets from a decent stand off distance and lots of similar long range options.

    They have the precision strike weapons... it wouldn't be that hard to scale them down to make smaller lighter weapons... I just hope they realise what a slippery slope that would be if they choose to follow it.

    Now GarryB do you know what is the most common air delivered PGM (its amount in Russian stock is simply impressive) in Russian armed forces ?
    KAB-1500L (followed by KAB-1500Kr); now those high precision weapons show a CEP even significantly better than satellite guided ammunitions like JDAM ; the little problem is that those weapons (in 3300 lb class, when the maximum for western-made guided bombs is 2000 lb ) instead of the 17 kg of HE of GBU-39 have a filler of .....460 and 440 Kg of HE !!! moreover with an energetic yield superior of 18% to that employed in GBU-39 !!!

    I think we both know the reason for that... up until recently the only Russian or Soviet aircraft that actually regularly carried guided weapons was the Su-24 and its targets were bridges and HQs and similar key targets deep behind enemy lines in a WWIII scenario where collateral damage was simply not an issue.

    The new weapons they are buying include smaller weapons like the KAB-250 etc and missiles like Kh-29 and Kh-38 which will likely replace the Kh-29 as a heavy precision missile. (Export models of the Kh-38 are supposed to reach 40km targets and the domestic model is supposed to double that range with a variety of seekers for different targets under different conditions.)

    I think that anyone can now realize why ,in spite of the immense amount of this type of weapons, neither KAB-500 or ,even worse, KAB-1500 bombs has been ever employed in Georgia.

    Technically they have used 500kg weapons in the form of the Iskander and Tochka missile launches, but most of the support needed was provided by Su-25s with rocket and cannon and light bombs. If they adopt a guidance kit for unguided weapons like Ugroza then they will be even better equipped to deal with such problems... one 80mm rocket will deal with most light vehicles it can hit directly and the laser guidance kit would ensure a high hit rate even from ballistic distances.

    Similar reasoning is true ,naturally, also other heavy Russian PGM weapons such as the "Smel’chak" round for 2S4 super heavy mortar or majority of Russian guided missile both ground and air delivered.

    The vast majority of the Russian weapons are designed for real war, and as such do the job they are designed for while not being suitable for lynch mob duty. The branches of the Russian forces that would be assigned roles in COIN operations would need Tulip or TOS to do their job, but that is not to say the Russian Army doesn't need them either.

    When Russia needs to murder someone I am sure they have plenty of methods and no reason to create SDBs. Of course for the purpose of maximising the internal payload of stealth aircraft a small compact bomb design would be useful but its warhead should be sufficient to make it actually effective.


    _________________
    “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion […] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”

    ― Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

    Mindstorm

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  Mindstorm on Thu Jul 05, 2012 10:53 am




    The problem is that the Russians have a different force structure than the west.

    The west uses its military in very much a policing role, and certainly in interventions that have a much lower threshold than Russia has.

    In many ways NATO is becoming a diplomatic tool to force opposing parties to capitulate so there is less need for discussion and compromise. Nothing more persuasive than the threat... do it or we will bomb you..............

    The real question is why does the west use military force in situations where it is really a police matter, and what business do they have dropping Hellfire missiles into civilian communities to murder people? With no state of war it would be like the local police force barricading themselves in large buildings and setting up sniper positions where anybody walking past they suspect of criminal activity they shoot on sight. Who do you call when it is the police that is the problem?


    I agree perfectly with you on all what you have expressed here.
    While Russian Armed Forces are designed to figth wars against major enemies capable to putting in peril national integrity ,security and stability, Western Military Forces are, instead, conceived and even "optimized" to project influence and exert pressure on weaker actors at planetary level, with the goal ,often even not excessively veiled, to gain indirect control of regional resources through the local implantation of puppet governments.



    I disagree. There is no credible evidence that the Russian military forces killed a large number of innocent civilians in that conflict. Even with all their problems and shortcomings indiscriminate use of artillery and firepower on innocent civilians was not an issue for the Russian forces.


    Probably i has been not clear on this point: my recall to the 2008 conflict with Georgia was NOT intended to infer that Russian armed forces had used indiscriminately military fire power in populated area and even less that Georgian civilian losses was higher than what could be expected (to the contrary Georgian civilian losses resulting from Russian actions was very contained); i was instead interested to point out that the enormous stock of Russian PGM ,among which stand out for sheer number KAB-1500L/Kr some of which even near to end of theirs operative live, remained ,on overall, totally unused because virtually none of them could had been used in this conflict without the risk to cause enormous collateral losses among Georgian civilian lives and infrastructures .

    The Russian "problem" with weapons designed to demolish in the most efficient and quick way NATO's assets and military structures, but unsuitable for low intesity conflicts under the observation of international community and global media, is obviously not merely limited to guided bombs : majority of Russian precise guided weapons ,even when them show a level of precision superior to theirs western counterparts ,suffer of that proclivity to "hypertrophy" ; only for example : the typical air to ground missile of Russian aircraft is the Kh-29 family with a 320 kg warhead against the.....57 kg of the smaller AGM-65.


    You are contradicting yourself... in your first point you suggest that CEPs of 10m or more are not accurate enough to pick out point targets so presumably the goal should be tiny CEPs measured in cms or mms, and in this point above you say they reduce the HE weight to reduce the effective radius of the weapon to reduce the effective radius of damage...

    GarryB the goal to reach CEP in the order of cm or mm is not achievable -in particular for gliding weapons - and not for limits inherent to guidance systems but for problems linked to aerodynamics variables in the gliding phase and that are possible to offset only partially.
    About limiting warhead's potential to limit collateral damages (up to the 17 kg of low potential HE of the GBU-39) i think that the effects of the detonation of an high yield HE heavy JDAM warhead can renderer the concept more clear :



    As you can easily imagine weapons in this class are not usable in area with civilian infrastructures and people ,in particular when one of those land 20-25 meters from its aimed point in an urbanized area, and you can image what would happen with a KAB-1500L/Kr with a warhead potential 50-60% greater that that....


    The problem you have identified... lack of being useful as a world police force, or should I say a vigilante force that murders suspects without trial, is not a problem in my opinion. The Russian military should never find itself with such a role I hope.


    Of course GarryB, none want Russian Armed Forces to transform in another World's ...Selfish and Corrupted...Police on the track of NATO ,what worry me is the recent tendency by part of....some nations... to secretly foment attentively planned revolts or aggressive stances within or near the borders of international competitors (2008 Georgia war, and the whole "Arab Spring", are clear and recent examples of that new frontier of covered, engineered attacks to key foreign interests and stability).
    In those type of conflicts the western media system ,controlled by the same actors guiding from behind the scenes the visible actions, use literally civilian losses as a weapon to attack the image ,the credibility and ultimately delegitimize the Governments attempting to defend themselves from those armed, terrorist-like and foreign backed and guided rebellions .


    Best regards.


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    GarryB

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    problems for Russian Armed Forces

    Post  GarryB on Thu Jul 05, 2012 12:06 pm

    Probably i has been not clear on this point: my recall to the 2008 conflict with Georgia was NOT intended to infer that Russian armed forces had used indiscriminately military fire power in populated area and even less that Georgian civilian losses was higher than what could be expected (to the contrary Georgian civilian losses resulting from Russian actions was very contained); i was instead interested to point out that the enormous stock of Russian PGM ,among which stand out for sheer number KAB-1500L/Kr some of which even near to end of theirs operative live, remained ,on overall, totally unused because virtually none of them could had been used in this conflict without the risk to cause enormous collateral losses among Georgian civilian lives and infrastructures .

    Sorry, I did not intend to suggest that you were arguing that the Russians created a lot of collateral damage in the Georgian conflict, I was trying to make the point that different weapons are tools and having a wide tool set means that the Russian military can choose the right tool for the job for when it is needed.

    The west loves to use terms like smart weapons and surgical strikes, when in reality most old generation weapons were sledgehammers even the latest weapons cannot be described at scalpels.

    When surgeons start operating on patients using hand grenades then perhaps war can be described as a surgical operation.

    The point is that war doesn't come in one size so there needs to be a variety of weapons and weapons platforms.

    Low intensity wars make UAVs and UCAVs even more useful but there will always be a lot of cross over.

    I think a high altitude released KAB-1500L-Pr set on delayed action to penetrate the floors of a certain building in Tiblisi to penetrate into the underground bunker beneath to kill a certain tie eater would have been worth the international flak they would get for it.

    only for example : the typical air to ground missile of Russian aircraft is the Kh-29 family with a 320 kg warhead against the.....57 kg of the smaller AGM-65.

    The Kh-29 was designed to take out large structures with lots of concrete... whether it was a bunker or a bridge. For targets the US would be loosing Mavericks at the Russians should be firing Kh-25s... but they really didn't order many of those except for the anti radiation models and SALH models (NATO codename AS-12 and AS-10 respectively). The TV and IIR guided models at 300kgs each could have made the Su-25 more interesting with 90kg warheads were not bought or deployed in any numbers. With a new CAS aircraft being worked on I suspect the Kh-25 will largely be replaced by the Hermes in packs of 8 per pylon... with a 20km range and a 30kg warhead and terminal guidance to hit point targets like tanks.

    As you can easily imagine weapons in this class are not usable in area with civilian infrastructures and people ,in particular when one of those land 20-25 meters from its aimed point in an urbanized area, and you can image what would happen with a KAB-1500L/Kr with a warhead potential 50-60% greater that that....

    But that is the problem... if the target is particularly hard and needs a powerful weapon to reach it then that is the weapon you use and civilians in the region be damned. If the target does not require that size bang then you use a smaller tool in your tool kit.

    Often the more accurate the tool the smaller the tool needs to be to do the job. In clear weather during the day a laser target marker with a laser guided bomb will be more accurate than a satellite guided bomb, but harder to coordinate. In a snow storm at night then satellite guided bombs might be the only option and based on the known miss distance you might want to go for the bigger bomb and accept the higher casualties.

    The point is that if Russia is dropping the bombs I would assume this isn't about controlling oil, it is something Russia finds it has to do.

    In those type of conflicts the western media system ,controlled by the same actors guiding from behind the scenes the visible actions, use literally civilian losses as a weapon to attack the image ,the credibility and ultimately delegitimize the Governments attempting to defend themselves from those armed, terrorist-like and foreign backed and guided rebellions .

    I appreciate what you are saying, but would counter that Russia has experience with the western media from the Georgian invasion of South Ossetia and the subsequent Russian efforts to restore the borders there where the western media btched and moaned but in the end no one actually did anything about it.

    The lesson for Russia is basically the west doesn't like or trust you and is only interested in pretending to be your friend when there is something in it for them... like transport of material to Afghanistan. In all other areas all bets are off so you might as well just suit yourself rather than jump around like a lap dog trying to impress its master.

    Russias military force should first and foremost protect Russia from external and internal threats.
    The problems in Chechnia don't come from Iran, they come from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

    Creating some pansy force afraid of its own shadow... well, lets say when you are a colonial power shooting at the natives occasionally to keep them in line then rubber bullets make sense... you want them in line... not dead.

    For Russia on the other hand dead is good because we are not talking about potential subjects, we are talking about enemies and threats.


    _________________
    “The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion […] but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact; non-Westerners never do.”

    ― Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

    calripson

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    War With China

    Post  calripson on Sat Dec 21, 2013 4:36 am

    There is zero chance of a war between China and Russia. It will not happen. No one could fight a land war with a country of 1.5 billion people (Russia or the USA) without it going nuclear pretty quickly. The US might engage in a naval/air conflict with China because of their superiority in naval and aerial technology but that would be extremely risky.

    ali.a.r

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  ali.a.r on Sat Dec 21, 2013 4:44 am

    I dont really see a Russia-China war happening. They depend too much on each other, in terms of economy, oil and gas and even technology. Also they frequently stick with each others decisions on the diplomatic side of things. Besides, just like any war between superpowers, it will not remain conventional for long before whoever is on the losing end uses nukes to 'level up the playing field', and ends up flattening the world.  Neutral 

    I dare say Russia has more to worry from radical Islamist organizations, and other terrorist threats, than from any sovereign state or bloc of countries.

    After all, the way Russias military reform is going, its no longer oriented to fight a massive conventional war against NATO or China anymore, but smaller and more flexible, maybe used in neighbouring countries like with Georgia, or to fight possible Taliban incursions into the 'stan' countries of Central Asia.

    russianumber1

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  russianumber1 on Sat Dec 21, 2013 4:54 am

    I see that it is possible to have problamas china border with china and russi currently has a little afraid that seja.possivel that China in search of natural resources to where to place a population that continues to grow Some typical in Russia are taking muinto aserio a possible war with china because sa Siberia is not only possible but I think that muintas military people and find possible war with china porcausa resource

    russianumber1

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  russianumber1 on Sat Dec 21, 2013 5:00 am

    large-scale reform to increase nuclear capacidad and you think it is for a small nation like Georgia))))))

    ali.a.r

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

    Post  ali.a.r on Sat Dec 21, 2013 5:53 am

    russianumber1 wrote:large-scale reform to increase nuclear capacidad and you think it is for a small nation like Georgia))))))

    Of course not.  Razz 

    The nuclear triad is meant for deterring the big boys like NATO (and China too, I guess). You dont need nukes to stop a small country like Georgia, no need to even send boots on the ground; a handful of strategic Iskander strikes mixed with some Su-34s should do the job nicely I'd imagine.

    Thing about nukes is that, even though they are so devastatingly powerful, they are not going to be used against say insurgency in the Russian Caucasus, or the Taliban in Central Asia (I mean after all what is Russia going to do, drop nukes on Dagestan just because of insurgency?  Rolling Eyes ) And for that same reason, nukes are hardly a factor when considering such a small (and in a sense) insignificant country like Georgia.

    Way I see it is, Russia keeps its powerful nuclear deterrent, for exactly that; as a a deterrent (because of MAD and all that). At the same time its getting rid of the old Soviet style military (which was geared for a massive WW3 scenario in Europe, and to a lesser extent in China too, presumably), and creating a more mobile, more versatile, military that doesn't need 20,000 tanks (because well 20,000 tanks are ideally suited for overrunning NATO in Europe, but since that is not something Russia will ever attempt or consider again, such a massive force becomes just a white elephant).

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    Re: Russian National Security Strategy: Issues

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