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    Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

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    d_taddei2

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    Post  d_taddei2 on Fri Nov 18, 2016 1:06 am

    going on from the talk of success, isn't it crazy that one of the most successful pieces of equipment in all recent conflicts from Syria, Libya, and Iraq, that the ZSU-23-2, ZSU-23-4, ZPU-1/2/4, ZPU-57-2, S-60, and 61-K, something which was thought be outdated and worth taking out of service (in some forces) and who's original design was anti air, has suddenly been the main stay of an effective fight force in the ground support role, from being mounted on 4x4 pick ups, trucks, MT-LB, tank chassis (i.e T-54/55), and other armoured vehicles has proven to be very effective, cheap, and in good quantities. With the combination of range, penetration, ease of transport and hit and run tactics has proven ideal for the type of conflicts experienced in all three conflicts. The Iraqi army has extensively used MT-LB mounted with ZSU-23-2 during the conflict. Greece a couple of years ago after donating some BMP-1 to Iraq had some of the remaining ones, decided to convert some of their BMP-1A1 Ost, removing the original turret and replacing with ZSU-23-2, Greece was quite impressed with the upgraded and decided to have more upgraded, this was done as a cost saving technique due to not having the funds to buy new IFV although they still seek to buy new IFV once funds are available. The upgrades were done as a stop gap. Another Vehicle that has proven its worth and worth a mention is the T-55 with various homegrown upgrades such as rocket screens etc, haven proven to be a great asset. Some pictures of various anti aircraft guns on various mounts during conflicts.


    ZPU-4 mounted on Humvee/Humvee copy


    M113 with ZPU-4 mounted on top


    S-60 57mm truck


    S-60 57mm truck


    S-60 57mm truck


    ZPU-1 on 4x4 pick up


    ZPU-2 on 4x4 pick up


    ZPU-4 on 4x4 pick up


    ZSU-23-2 on 4x4 pick up

    and some greek BMP-1 with ZSU-23-2




    Last edited by d_taddei2 on Fri Nov 18, 2016 2:59 pm; edited 1 time in total
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    GarryB

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  GarryB on Fri Nov 18, 2016 8:51 am

    Nice pics, but the second pic claiming to be a ZU-23 on an M113 is actually a four barrel KPV mount... Smile
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    d_taddei2

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    Post  d_taddei2 on Fri Nov 18, 2016 3:01 pm

    GarryB wrote:Nice pics, but the second pic claiming to be a ZU-23 on an M113 is actually a four barrel KPV mount... Smile

    what a silly mistake of course its a ZPU-4 it was in the early hours of the morning and too many Z's, S's, U's, and P's looool, now corrected.
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    GarryB

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  GarryB on Sat Nov 19, 2016 7:53 am

    No worries... thanks for posting the pictures.

    I remember reading an interview with a US pilot who fought in Vietnam and he said the 14.5mm ZPU was the most dangerous ground based gun system he regularly came up against.

    His main reasons were that because it was relatively small it could be well hidden so you didn't know it was there until it opened fire, and it fired powerful ammo that was effective at short range. Larger weapons had more powerful ammo but the larger gun setups were much harder to disguise and their lower rate of fire meant it was less likely they would hit you.
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    eehnie

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  eehnie on Sat Dec 24, 2016 5:44 pm

    franco wrote:Damascus and his chariots

    After five and a half years after the start of the Civil War, and one year after the entry into fighting Russian aviation Syrian Arab Army (SAA - the official name of the Syrian Armed Forces) is a very heterogeneous forces.

    Land forces consist of three army corps, three separate divisions of the Republican Guard and the MTR.

    1st AK includes 5th Mechanized division (it includes 15, 112, 132-th mechanized, 12th Armoured Brigade, 175th Artillery Regiment), 7th Mechanized (68, 88, 121 th mechanized, 78 th Armoured Brigade artillery regiment) and the 9th armored division (33, 34, 43th armored, 52 mechanized brigades, an artillery regiment), 61st and the 90th infantry Brigade.

    2nd AK - 1st Armored division (76, 91, 153 armored, 58 mechanized brigades, an artillery regiment) and 10th Mechanized division (18, 62, 85th mechanized, 56th Armoured Brigade).

    3rd AK includes 3rd division (47, 65, 81st armored, 21th Mechanized Brigade) and 11th division (60, 67th armored, 87th mechanized brigade).

    Separate divisions - 4th Armored (40, 41, 42th armored, 138th Mechanized Brigade, 154th artillery, 555th MTR regiment), 18 Armored (131, 134, 167 Armoured, 120th mechanized Brigade, 64th artillery regiment), 17th Reserve mechanized (137th mechanized, 93 Armoured Brigade, artillery regiment).

    Republican Guard includes the 105, 106th Mechanized, 103rd Commando, 124th Brigade Special Forces, 101, 102nd Infantry, 104th Airborne, 100th Artillery, regiment of marines.

    MTR -14 th (36, 554, 556th Regiment MTR) and 15th (35, 127,  MTR 404-armored regiments) division, the division "Tigers" (Brigade "Cheetahs" and "Panther") , the team "desert Hawks", 41, 45, 46, 47, 53, 54 MTR regiments.

    Republican Guard, MTR and the 4th Armored Division are the most capable and loyal to the regime of the compounds on them bear the brunt of the civil war. A significant part of the remaining compounds destroyed in the fighting, and exists only on paper. All three army corps, or rather what was left of them, are involved in the protection of rear areas, which in the conditions of the Syrian "quilt" is not much easier than keeping the fighting on multiple fronts.

    On arms consist of 12 PU on modern TP "Point", from 18 to 30 PU old TP "Moon", from 24 to 48 PU OTP-P 17, and their North Korean counterparts "Hwaseong".

    Tank fleet of T-54/55 (635), T-62 (496), T-72 (1145) to T-90 (15) and possibly up to 80 old PT-76.

    There are up to 700 BRDM-2, more than 1,700 infantry fighting vehicles (up to 1546 BMP-1, 98 BMP-2), to the 1400 BTR (300 BTR-152, and 500 BTR-50, 600 BTR-60PB, not less than 10 APCs -80 and BTR-82A).

    Artillery comprises about 300 self-propelled guns (up to 280 2S1, 36 howitzers D-30 on the chassis of the T-34/85, not less than 3 guns M-46 trucks, to 53 2C3) 1,200 towed guns (up to 150 M-30, to 100 A-19 230 D-30 600 M-46 20 A-20 50 ML-20 20 D-1 10 P-23) of about 1,100 mortar (up to 200 PM-37 to 210 2B11, 700 PM-43, 25, M-160, 8 M-240), more than 400 MLRS (up to 110 Chinese towed Tour 63, and 300 Soviet BM-21, 35 "Hurricane", a few units "Tornado" and flamethrower 1A-TOC).

    There is a significant amount of ATGW (up to 200 French "Milan", 410 Soviet "Baby" (including up to 199 self-propelled on the BRDM-2), 150 "Fagot", 40 "Competition", to 1000 contemporary Russian "Cornet") and to PHE 300 BS-3.

    Most of the army air defense assets transferred to the air defense troops. On suhoputchikov arsenal remains until 5000 MANPADS (up to 4000 "Strela-2", 100 "Strela-3" to 500 "Igla", 200 "Igla-S"), more than 300 ZSU (up to 344 "Shilka", up to 25 ZSU -57-2), about 1400 anti-aircraft guns (up to 500 ZU-23-2, 300 61-K and Chinese Tour 65 to 600 C-60, up to 25 KC-19).

    It must be emphasized that all of these figures represent the maximum possible values ​​for each of the types of equipment, the actual number of combat-ready armed SAA samples can be much (by tens and even hundreds of units) is less. In addition to huge losses in the case of severe physical wear and tear during the fighting, as much of the AME carried out in the 70s or even 60s. APCs in battle almost never used, they are replaced by "carts", ie commercial vehicles (trucks and SUVs) with mounted weapons (ATGM, PU Nursi, memory, recoilless rifles, machine guns, and so on. D.). In fact, war tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and "carts", and this applies to the SAA itself, and to its numerous enemies.

    The Air Force also suffered heavy losses, the remaining equipment is worn strongly out, so it is the real number may be considerably less than indicated below.
    - Shock aviation includes about 50 bombers (up to 16 Su-24M, up to 32 MiG-23BN), and up to 72 attack aircraft (up to 42 Su-22, and 30 lung Czechoslovak L-39Z).
    -Fighter aircraft from 35 to 46 MiG-29 (including 6 MiG-29UB), up to 82 MiG-23 (up to 77 MS / MF / MLD, to 5 UM), up to 96 MiG-21 (up to 87 MF and bis, 10 UM and CM), and 40 interceptor MiG-25 (including 8 reconnaissance MiG-25RB, 2 combat-capable MiG-25UB).
    -Transport planes - 3, IL-76, AN-24, 1, 5 An-26, Yak-40 4-6, 4 Tu-134, US 2 RA-31, 2 "Falcon-20", 1 "Falcon-900." Training - 6 Pakistan "Mushak" to 32 Italian MV-223.
    -In service is available up to 90 combat helicopters (up to 44 Soviet Mi-24 and Mi-25, and 46 French SA342L), and up to 73 multi-purpose vehicles (34-53 Mi-8 and Mi-17, Mi-20 2).

    Of all the aviation equipment relatively new can only be regarded as the MiG-29, and with a very big stretch of the Su-24M. Despite the deterioration of the fleet and heavy losses, it is the CAA Air Force helped to hold more than four years and wait for Russian assistance in the first place, providing support to the ground forces, and secondly, providing numerous isolated garrisons besieged.

    Air defense troops in Syria, as it was in the Soviet Union - a single type of aircraft. They include 10 divisions (33-36 teams). In service is up to 53 battalions of S-75 (up to 318 PU), 40 battalions of S-125 (160 Pu), 8 battalions of S-200 (48 CP), 5 regiments of "Square" (up to 25 batteries to 100 PU), 3-6 divisions "Buk-M1" and "Buk-M2" (PU 18-36, 9-18 ROM), 61 SAM "Wasp", and 100 SAM "Strela-1" to 60 SAM " Strela-10 ", 36 ZRPK" Carapace-C1 ". From all this modern technology are SAM "Buk" (especially "Buk-M2") and ZRPK "Carapace-C1".

    Navy suffered no losses during the civil war, but the technique is outdated, completely worn out, her fighting ability is questionable.
    - There are 2 very old Soviet patrol boats 159A of the project and up to 13 as the age of the project 205 missile boats (including 5 205U project to project 5 205ER). Relatively modern Iranian are lightweight missile boats "Tyr-2 '(RCC" Nur ", an analogue of the Chinese C-802), of which 6 to 10 units.
    - The composition of the Navy also has 14 patrol boats (8 1400M Soviet project, 6 Iranian type MIG-S-1800), 5 Soviet trawlers (1 project in 1265, 4 projects in 1258) and 3 770 KFOR project (Polish built).
    - Naval aviation includes old Soviet helicopters - 10 Mi-14PL, 2-4 Ka-28 and possibly up to 5 Ka-25.
    - It has a significant potential for the Syrian coastal defense. It consists of two divisions of the newest Russian SCRC "Bastion", 6 divisions of Soviet SCRC P-5, 6 divisions SCRC U-15 Division 1 Iranian SCRC "Nur" 36 Soviet coastal guns CM 4-1.

    In addition to the SAA itself on the side of the Government of Syria fighting groups, the position of which is due to confessional and political circumstances. Syrian President Bashar Assad and much of the leadership of Syria belong to the Alawite religious movement to which belong to the 15 percent of the population. Therefore, on the side of government forces battle militia Alawites and other ethnic and religious minorities - Christians and Druze. They are united in the National Defence Force. In addition, on the side of the government are fighting some left (Marxist) groups combined in the Syrian resistance, as well as some secular pan-Arab group, united in the Arab National Guard (not to be confused with the Republican Guard - the elite units of the Armed Forces of the country). All of these forces (except Alawites themselves) support Assad is not so much out of love for him, but because of the absolute unacceptability of all his opponents.

    The main external ally of Damascus since the beginning of the Civil War - Tehran. On the Syrian side of the Armed Forces in the war involved units of the Revolutionary Guards, Special Forces Revolutionary Guard "Quds" and militia "Basij" (also included in the structure of the IRGC). Due to Iran's efforts to fight on the side of Damascus, Shiite volunteers Lebanon (grouping "Hezbollah"), Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In addition, the military allies of the government forces perform some Palestinian factions. The indirect, but very important for the supporters of the Damascus steel Yemeni rebels housity (local Shiites). The war against them, begun Arabian monarchies in March 2015, was for Riyadh and its allies extremely unfortunate and distracting very significant resources that would not be war in Yemen, go to support the Syrian opposition.

    Since September 2015 the most important military ally of the SAA is the Russian Armed Forces. In addition to actually participate in the hostilities it comes to the supply of arms and ammunition. However, heavy equipment is transferred to a small extent, is dominated by small arms and ammunition.

    In general, without internal and external allies SAA it would long ago have lost the war, however on Middle Eastern standards, its fighting capacity is very high, and front-line experience simply unique.

    All SAA opponents are fighting against it mainly by her former weapons. Accordingly, a very significant loss of these opponents (the Islamists and the so-called moderate opposition, mostly also consisting of Islamists) in essentially the technique of simultaneously becoming and final loss of the Syrian army. Such is the sad logic of civil war.
    Author: Alexander Khramchikhin

    Very interesting. Do you know if it would be some additional warfare in the reserve?
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    franco

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  franco on Sat Dec 24, 2016 6:08 pm

    Very Happy  There is not a lot of "warfare" in the regular forces.
    Most units are very under-strength in manpower and equipment. They are trying to mobilize some reservist now to put on guard duties to free up regular forces for offensive actions. An example of this was that earlier in the year, there was one time that 3 regular SAA brigades were sent into battle and they could muster 4,000 men between them. This when a normal SAA brigade calls for 2,500 - 3,500 men. Priority is given to the Republican Guards and Tiger Force plus a few regular SAA brigades that show they can fight (unfortunately not many). Most units are only good for holding the line in a defensive role.

    The Tiger Force commander is sometimes criticized even for refusing to accept recruits to fill up his ranks. Maintains that he can do more with 1,000 men trained and motivated then a rabble of 2-3,000 poor soldiers.
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    Militarov

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  Militarov on Sat Dec 24, 2016 8:12 pm

    franco wrote:Very Happy  There is not a lot of "warfare" in the regular forces.
    Most units are very under-strength in manpower and equipment. They are trying to mobilize some reservist now to put on guard duties to free up regular forces for offensive actions. An example of this was that earlier in the year, there was one time that 3 regular SAA brigades were sent into battle and they could muster 4,000 men between them. This when a normal SAA brigade calls for 2,500 - 3,500 men. Priority is given to the Republican Guards and Tiger Force plus a few regular SAA brigades that show they can fight (unfortunately not many). Most units are only good for holding the line in a defensive role.

    The Tiger Force commander is sometimes criticized even for refusing to accept recruits to fill up his ranks. Maintains that he can do more with 1,000 men trained and motivated then a rabble of  2-3,000 poor soldiers.

    I am noticing severe shortage of manpower, even those so called graduates from NCO school they promoted few weeks ago look like they got no clue wtf they are supposed to do.
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    eehnie

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  eehnie on Sat Dec 24, 2016 8:27 pm

    Militarov wrote:
    franco wrote:Very Happy  There is not a lot of "warfare" in the regular forces.
    Most units are very under-strength in manpower and equipment. They are trying to mobilize some reservist now to put on guard duties to free up regular forces for offensive actions. An example of this was that earlier in the year, there was one time that 3 regular SAA brigades were sent into battle and they could muster 4,000 men between them. This when a normal SAA brigade calls for 2,500 - 3,500 men. Priority is given to the Republican Guards and Tiger Force plus a few regular SAA brigades that show they can fight (unfortunately not many). Most units are only good for holding the line in a defensive role.

    The Tiger Force commander is sometimes criticized even for refusing to accept recruits to fill up his ranks. Maintains that he can do more with 1,000 men trained and motivated then a rabble of  2-3,000 poor soldiers.

    I am noticing severe shortage of manpower, even those so called graduates from NCO school they promoted few weeks ago look like they got no clue wtf they are supposed to do.

    After 5.5 years of war, and many thousand of loses, it is not realistic to think that the new fighters are in the schools until become aces. At this point they are lucky if they can go to the front line with some training.

    In the other side, looking at the maps I was seeing more pockets in the areas of Homs and Damasc. Also in the orders of Liban. In the border of Israel, Jordan and the East there is more like a continuous front, despite to reach sometimes the borders of Jodan.
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    KiloGolf

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  KiloGolf on Sat Dec 24, 2016 9:20 pm

    eehnie wrote:After 5.5 years of war, and many thousand of loses, it is not realistic to think that the new fighters are in the schools until become aces. At this point they are lucky if they can go to the front line with some training.

    In the other side, looking at the maps I was seeing more pockets in the areas of Homs and Damasc. Also in the orders of Liban. In the border of Israel, Jordan and the East there is more like a continuous front, despite to reach sometimes the borders of Jodan.

    There's very little excuse for not getting better since 2012. SAA has made very little, if any progress in terms of organization and taking pointers from the war. Strategy-wise they kinda accepted they can't control half the country's landmass, but that's about it. Their main capitals and cities are in their hands, they have tremendous amount of airports and road infrastructure to move around, free ports to receive Russian aid. And more importantly nobody is bombing them with air power, or blockading them from the sea.
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    eehnie

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  eehnie on Sat Dec 24, 2016 9:44 pm

    KiloGolf wrote:
    eehnie wrote:After 5.5 years of war, and many thousand of loses, it is not realistic to think that the new fighters are in the schools until become aces. At this point they are lucky if they can go to the front line with some training.

    In the other side, looking at the maps I was seeing more pockets in the areas of Homs and Damasc. Also in the orders of Liban. In the border of Israel, Jordan and the East there is more like a continuous front, despite to reach sometimes the borders of Jodan.

    There's very little excuse for not getting better since 2012. SAA has made very little, if any progress in terms of organization and taking pointers from the war. Strategy-wise they kinda accepted they can't control half the country's landmass, but that's about it. Their main capitals and cities are in their hands, they have tremendous amount of airports and road infrastructure to move around, free ports to receive Russian aid. And more importantly nobody is bombing them with air power, or blockading them from the sea.

    It is not excuse, it is the reality. It is not possible, not in the refered to formation not in the refered to armament. It is out of touch to think that some army can keep the standards with 60000 to 95000 soldiers died in 5.5 years of war.

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    d_taddei2

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    Post  d_taddei2 on Tue Jan 03, 2017 11:33 am

    pictures can be found on the links provided, not sure creditable the site is but interesting.
    and there is also a nice bit about T-55 here: http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/syrias-steel-beasts-t-55.html


    Syrian T-55 Upgrades : North Korean FCS
    One of the mysteries of the SAA's arsenal are the soviet T-55 tanks that have been upgraded with North Korean equipment. Today, we brought you an exclusive close look at the details of these old yet stubborn and reckless metal beasts.

    The most visually distinctive factor of this version of Syrian t-55s is of course the famous laser rangefinder situated above the barrel's base, for most people, this was the only known added device.

    A closer look at the rabbit's hole, however, shows that there is a whole new fire control system added.

    On the outside, the only visible part besides the 4km rangefinder is the sensor complex, which includes a barometer, a hygrometer, and a thermometer.

    On the inside, a new ballistic computer is added, below is a picture of the control panel, which allows the gunner to add additional info like ammunition type/make, and wind speed and direction. The ballistic computer makes the calculations automatically based on the measurements it receives from the meters and the rangefinder.

    The computer updates the output on the periscope. The periscope has also been modified for this purpose. The whole process is automatic and requires no human input other than the optional wind measurements ,with the ability to input in case any sensor was damaged . the LRF can be moved to make sure the laser is hitting the wanted object ,below the control panel of the LRF.


    The computer also has a digital screen which shows the environment measurements and the range to the target. The last addition is panel that is used to control and synchronize the rangefinder.


    Although this upgrade focus was the fire controls system, some t-55 that were fitted with this system were also fitted with a KPV 14.5 HMG, and smoke screen launchers.

    But that is not all, although some parts were initial designed and manufactured in the PRK, the pictures we got shows all control panels are labeled in Arabian. That is due to the fact that the system as a whole, was also developed by the Syrian Military Research Center ,and with technology provided by the Korean part.

    The upgrade is not new, and it is obviously not comparable to its modern counterparts. But the fact that Syrians were able to fetch this development despite the technological blockage that Russian arms industry practices shows how much they are determined to developing and manufacturing heir own systems based on their study of the Korean (maybe Ukrainian, and/or Italian?) fire control systems they received .

    http://within-syria.blogspot.co.uk/2017/01/syrian-t-55-upgrades-north-korean-fcs.html

    and

    Viper-72 thermal sight ,A Syrian solution
    since the SAA armors engaged in the ongoing war in Syria in late 2011 Syrian tanks been suffering from many maintenance problems due to the complexity of the urban warfare .
    many old systems on SAA tank have proven to be unreliable and unsuitable for urban warfare among them is the TPN-3-49 night vision sight on T-72 tanks ,as SAA T-72 tanks start to take on the streets it become clear that protecting the IR lamps from the enemy fire is impossible just like the idea of fixing it again and again
    after two years into the fight most of the tanks in urban area have lost it's night capabilities with all or almost all of it's IR lamps broken some even the TPN-3-49 night sight it self .

    when the Syrian scientific research center was tasked with finding a solution for this problem in 2013 they were fast to come with an idea for the perfect replacement
    a thermal sight ,as thermal vision don't need illumination ,and they have already some experience working with thermal sights
    the Syrian scientific research center did before upgrade some of SAA's T-55MV with a Syrian thermal sight for direct engagement.

    so the work was on and soon after the Viper thermal sight was born to replace the existing night TPN-3-49 vision sight .

    Viper in outer design is similar to TPN-3-49 but with an arch shaped protection ,it also use many of TPN-3-49 components .

    Viper range is up to 4km for big objects ,however the useful range for aiming is 1.5-2km tops
    the tank gunner aim through an electronic scoop ,however an LCD can be attached .

    as firearms flash is more visible in thermal imagery ,Viper is used even in day to detect snipers in urban areas ,giving the Syrian tank crew not only a better vision with less maintenance but also with a chance for revenge

    http://within-syria.blogspot.co.uk/2016/11/viper-72-thermal-sight-syrian-sulotion.html
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    KiloGolf

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  KiloGolf on Tue Jan 03, 2017 8:46 pm


    A Syrian regime tank sits in front of heavily damaged and abandoned buildings in the former rebel-held Sukkari district in the northern city of Aleppo on December 23, 2016 after Syrian government forces retook control of the whole embattled city. Syrian troops cemented their hold on Aleppo after retaking full control of the city, as residents anxious to return to their homes moved through its ruined streets.
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    George1

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  George1 on Sun Mar 05, 2017 11:39 pm

    Tanks T-90A of the Syrian Arab Army





    http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2473086.html
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    Cheetah

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  Cheetah on Sun Apr 02, 2017 3:34 am

    Found this recently.



    So, it's a T-90 right, Shtora-1 is a dead give away, no?

    Some in the comments seem to wager it was one of the captured tanks.

    In any event, looks like it's been through a lot.
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    kvs

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  kvs on Sun Apr 02, 2017 5:09 am

    Cheetah wrote:Found this recently.

    PWkj3tL7-f0

    So, it's a T-90 right, Shtora-1 is a dead give away, no?

    Some in the comments seem to wager it was one of the captured tanks.

    In any event, looks like it's been through a lot.

    It is a T-90. The T-72B3 has different features in the APS.

    I wonder how many TOW hits it took.
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    bhramos

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  bhramos on Sun Apr 02, 2017 5:24 pm

    kvs wrote:
    Cheetah wrote:Found this recently.

    PWkj3tL7-f0

    So, it's a T-90 right, Shtora-1 is a dead give away, no?

    Some in the comments seem to wager it was one of the captured tanks.

    In any event, looks like it's been through a lot.

    It is a T-90.   The T-72B3 has different features in the APS.  

    I wonder how many TOW hits it took.

    this was captured in Aleppo battle by some small daesh group later sold to alnusra.....
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    galicije83

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  galicije83 on Mon Apr 03, 2017 5:48 pm

    Its a T-90A and he can be easily identified by his turret. Its welded not cast. This first batch of T-90A has long been withdrawn from service from Russian army. Also in Syria we see T-90 tanks made from 1992-2003 before Russians upgrade them to T-90A also known as T-90A Vladimir.
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    Militarov

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    Found this recently.

    Post  Militarov on Mon Apr 03, 2017 6:13 pm

    Cheetah wrote:Found this recently.



    So, it's a T-90 right, Shtora-1 is a dead give away, no?

    Some in the comments seem to wager it was one of the captured tanks.

    In any event, looks like it's been through a lot.

    T-90, the one Nusra captured, but i have my doubts about it actually functioning. One thing is making the damn thing move, totally another making it actually work as tank should, just zeroing the turret is probably far beyond their capabilities.
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    George1

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  George1 on Wed Apr 12, 2017 11:35 pm

    Syrian T-72B3

    In my opinion the first normal photo is already in the area of military operations, somewhere south of Palmyra. Earlier there were only footage from the video of not very good quality. Let me remind you that the first photo from T-72B3 from Syria appeared in early March and it was made in February at some base or temporary parking lot.



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    franco

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  franco on Mon May 01, 2017 10:13 pm

    Syrian Armed Forces in the Seventh Year of the War: From the Regular Army to Volunteer Corps

    On April 28, 2017, the website of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs (INF) published an interesting article by the head of the Center for Islamic Studies of the Institute for Innovative Development (IIS), Kirill Semenov, "The Syrian Armed Forces for the Seventh Year of the War: From the Regular Army to the Volunteer Corps" The current state of the Syrian government armed forces.

    Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the regime of B. Assad has carried out measures to adapt his loyal armed formations to the conditions of internal conflict, to which they were absolutely unprepared.

    Syrian Arab Army

    In particular, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) was dominated by extremely heavy armored and mechanized divisions. In total, there were eleven such formations (as well as two divisions of the "special forces" - the 14th and formed right before the start of the Civil War, the 15th). They were an overabundance of tanks and other armored vehicles and a shortage of light mobile, well-trained units. They also had a cumbersome organizational and organizational structure and could not solve the set tasks in the course of internal conflict.

    Mass desertion finally put an end to the combat effectiveness of these divisions, with the exception of the 4th Mechanized, 14th and 15th Special Forces Divisions, and the "Republican Guard." Of the other divisions, whose headquarters were also the headquarters of the military sectors, their combat-ready component was isolated, usually reduced to one of four staff brigades. For example, in the 1st Panzer Division, such a brigade became the 76th and in the 10th division - the 56th Brigade. On the basis of the headquarters of the divisions, it was possible to create elements of command on the territorial principle, the majority of which are still in effect (except for the headquarters of the division in Rakka). They served as the basis for territorial or positional forces.

    Most divisions or brigades with their numbers were units of this divisional and brigade level only on paper and in news bulletins. In reality, they do not represent the corresponding combat value. Rather, they resemble divisions and brigades of the Russian army during the first Chechen campaign. This situation continues and at the present time, and the second fall of Palmyra in December 2016, this clearly demonstrated. The military units located nearby in the Homs province could not identify any significant reinforcements and send them to help the Tadmore garrison, despite the fact that on paper these forces looked very menacing. Thus, the main problems of the regime in the first phase of the war were the acquisition of SAA personnel, as well as the absence of mobile forces and light infantry in it capable of quickly closing gaps in the event of a threat in one direction or another, as well as fighting in urban conditions And in the terrain with a complex terrain.

    The main problems of the regime at the first stage of the war were the acquisition of SAA personnel, as well as the absence of mobile forces and light infantry in it capable of quickly closing gaps in the event of a threat, as well as fighting in urban conditions and terrain with complex terrain.

    Formed after 1982 for operations in the mountains of Lebanon, four infantry brigades quickly lost combat capability, being recruited from disloyal Syrians regime. As a result, at the first stage of the war, the Asad regime could only rely on the 14th and 15th divisions of the special forces as mobile light infantry forces. Their units operated throughout the country, moving to various sites. The same combat work was carried out and individual shelves for special purposes. Special forces, of course, all these forces could be called very conditional, since they were used exclusively as light infantry and assault forces. But it should be noted that according to the level of combat training, they surpassed other Syrian formations and units.

    As mobile armored and mechanized units that were used throughout Syria, brigades and battalions of the 4th mechanized division were reinforced by units of other "heavy" divisions on the most threatened areas. The tank and mechanized battalion groups of these formations were often used together with units of the 14th and 15th divisions of special forces, providing them with armored support. Subsequently, Lebanese Hezbollah detachments were often used as an infantry component of the 4th Division, as was seen, for example, in the fighting for Aleppo.

    Nevertheless, all combat-ready SAA formations, including parts of the Republican Guard, which also retained combat capability, but were oriented primarily to the defense of the government districts of Damascus, and one brigade was deployed to protect Latakia, was clearly not enough not only for offensive operations, but Even for the defense of the so-called. "Useful to Syria". Actually, even now the number of SAA can hardly exceed 70 - 80 thousand soldiers.

    Shabiha and the National Defense Forces

    The regime did not have the opportunity to restore to full the combat effectiveness of the SAA due to mass evasion from service in it. In this situation, B. Assad was forced, in fact, to follow the path of his opponents, allowing any groups, parties and social movements loyal to him to create their own armed groups without any control over this process from Damascus.

    Due to the formation of a large number of paramilitary structures of various origins, which were taken over by the local party units of the Baath Party, large businessmen associated with the B. Assad regime, or even criminal communities, during 2012 the problem of manning the armed forces was partially solved. They were fortified by the infantry divisions, which these paramilitary paramilitary units became. They were called the generalized name "Shabiha". Starting in 2012, Shabiha appears in all regions of Syria, controlled by the regime. At that time, the strength of these forces was estimated at 40,000. However, in the following it only increased.

    Some units acted exclusively on a limited territory - in a city district or township, where they were formed. Others, for example, created by influential magnates, could be used throughout Syria. These units were also very different in terms of equipment and weapons, training of fighters, discipline. Some represented exclusively local forces, others had a complex hierarchy leading to Damascus. In any case, Shabiha saved the army from exhaustion and was in some cases even more effective and sustainable in city battles and in the defense of settlements than the SAA.

    Many of these detachments gained fame, primarily related to their crimes against the civilian population, which is reflected in the UN documents. Contrary to popular belief, not all Shabiha groups were Alawite. Some were formed from Sunnis. For example, in Aleppo the role of Shabihi was played by the Sunni gangster clan "Barry", famous for its cruelty; Exactly the same reputation was won by a Christian criminal clan that had previously controlled the smuggling routes that had become Shabih in the area of ​​Al Quseir.

    In the next stage of the military conflict, those "irregular" irregular units were actually reformed, which they tried to bring to a common denominator and give them a more or less uniform structure. In this regard, the Syrian authorities, starting in 2013, create the "National Defense Forces" (NSO), subordinate to the "People's Committees". In the formation of these units, Iranian military advisers took part, who, as a model, offered the structure and training program for Basij, the Iranian paramilitary militia.

    Foreign Shiite groups

    Given that the SAA, even with the help of the NSO, was not able to reverse the course of the war, during this period, "Shiite jihadists" - foreign militants of various Shiite organizations from different countries appear in the country, which since then have become an integral part of the regime's armed forces. The most famous of them are the Lebanese Hezbollah and numerous Iraqi groups such as "Liva al-Zulfikar" and "Liva Asadullah al-Ghalib", which emerged on the foundation of the "pioneers" of the Shiite jihad in Syria from the Iraqi forces - "Liva Abu Fadl Al-Abbas "and a conglomerate of Iraqi Shiite groups associated with" Asaib Ahl al-Hakk ".

    In the RAA, the units directly subordinate to the Iranian command of Al-Quds also operate. In particular, the Fatimiyun recruited from the Afghan Shiites (their total strength in the camps in Iran is 18,000, of which 3-5,000 are in Syria and are being changed on the basis of rotation) and the Pakistani Zeynabiyun.

    "Syrian Hezbollah" - Syrian Shiite groups

    Many of these foreign Shiite groups are starting to form their "sister structures" in Syria - both directly related to them and financed from Shiite funds. This is the so-called "Syrian Hezbollah", which includes the forces of the "Syrian national ideological resistance" - local branches of the Lebanese Hezbollah, as well as "Syrian Islamic resistance", to which the local Syrian factions of the Iraqi Shiite groups can be attributed. These forces consist of Syrian citizens - both Shiites and "Khomeiniized" Sunnis and Alawites. For example, the Iraqi "Kataib Sayyid ash Shuhada" formed its local branch from Syrians - "Liwa Sayyida Rukaya". "Acting in the besieged Deir-az-Zor" Liva Imam Zayn al-Abidin "is one of the many branches of the Lebanese Hezbollah in the Syrian Arab Republic. Most of these factions have virtually never entered the NSO and continue to enjoy independence.

    Other groups, on the contrary, even became divisions of the AAA. So, in the 4th division there is a Shiite regiment of the local (Syrian) Hezbollah - "Liva Seif al-Mahdi". The total number of all formations connected with Iran can be estimated at 130,000 people. Of these, 30,000 are foreign Shiite militants and 100,000 are Syrian Shia groups and an NSO unit made up of Sunnis and Alawites and other Syrians, but under the control of Iranian military advisers and partially or fully funded by Iran.

    "Tiger Forces", "Falcons of the Desert" and private military factions

    It should be noted that there has been a clear "division of labor" between the SAA and the NSO, where the army largely plays the role of tank and heavy mechanized units, and the NSO - infantry units, sometimes even planted in armored vehicles (armored personnel carriers, armored vehicles) belonging to the army. Nevertheless, the army command makes efforts to create its own infantry assault component, which was supposed to supplement the forces of the Spn of the 14th and 15th divisions. Thus, in the autumn of 2013, the "Tiger Forces" appear, deployed in the eponymous division. Their formation reflects the general picture of the state of decline of the regular parts of the CAA, its complete decentralization and chaotization.

    So, initially called to become another "elite army unit", these forces find serious sponsors associated with the Air Force intelligence and pursuing their own goals. As a result, they not only strengthen the 14th and 15th divisions, but, on the contrary, weaken them, luring the most prepared fighters. They also weakened the remaining army units, such as the 4th Mechanized Division or the 11th Panzer Division, from which the best officer cadres were also taken to the divisions of the "Tiger Force" division and its separate brigades - "Forces of the Cheetah" and "Forces of the Panther". In doing so, they submit to the SAA headquarters very formally, being, in fact, the units associated with the air force reconnaissance. Until finally, the Tiger Forces are turning into a fully autonomous "faction" of Syrian pro-government forces with their own tank units (equipped with the newest Russian T-90 tanks) and other units that provide them with a wide degree of independence.

    The emergence of the Desert Falcon, already exclusively a private military company, albeit affiliated with the SAA, also weakens the composition of the 14th and 15th divisions. Now their names are very rarely seen in combat reports, unlike the same "Tigers" or "Desert Falcons".

    Thus, in addition to the SAA and the defense forces, another component of the armed formations operating on the side of the regime appears, private units. In addition to the already mentioned compounds, they include the units Kataib al-Jabalaui and Leopards Homs (but there are others) formed by Rami Maklouf and his Al Bustan Association.

    The Russian track is the volunteer assault corps

    Finally, with the participation of Russian military advisers, the 4th Volunteer Assault Corps began to be formed. The place of its formation was the province of Latakia. The "Shield of the Coast" brigade, created in Latakia from local Alawite volunteers with the support of the "Republican Guard", served as an example.

    The difference of the 4th Corps from the militia and territorial NSOs is that the service in it was not an alternative to the service in the AAA. The corps was to be formed from already served "veterans" or those who for one reason or another were exempt from service. But in fact, his manning, as it often happened, happens by enticing the fighters of other, including competing, structures, that is, the divisions of the Army or the NSO. Upon admission to this unit, civilian salaries were preserved, to which new payments were added, which indicates serious sources of funding.

    As a result, by autumn 2015, of the 6 local volunteer brigades recruited (some, probably, the reconfigured brigades of the FNL) and the 103rd brigade of the Republican Guard, which served, most likely, as the headquarters and reserve of heavy equipment, as well as a number of other parts And the 4th Volunteer Volunteer Corps was deployed. He was able to achieve some success during the offensive operations in Latakia in late 2015 - early 2016. The very name "assault" indicated a changed trend. Now, instead of defensive structures like NSO and spontaneously arisen Brigades "Shields" (defense of the coast, etc.), the regime's forces are aimed at offensive operations.

    After the end of the formation of the 4th building, the creation of a structure close to it, the 5th Volunteer Volunteer Corps, but not the regional one (Latakia), but of general importance, begins. It should be manned, including through the use of "hidden reserves". In particular, amnesty insurgents and deserters, as well as other persons avoiding military service will be involved in the service in his brigades. At the same time, there is a serious material incentive for entering the building in the form of preserving pre-war salaries and military prizes.

    If the 4th Corps was deployed exclusively in Latakia and was more experimental, the places of formation of the 5th Corps are scattered throughout Syria, and the conditions of service in it are somewhat different from the 4th Corps. It is not excluded that the forces of the 5th Corps will work closely with those units at the military facilities on which they are formed (5th Panzer Division, 15th Division of the Spinoz Division). It is also expected that these forces can create the necessary infantry component for interaction with the "heavy" SAA battalions instead of the Iran-dependent FNL. This provides an opportunity to give the Russian military command a wide degree of independence in conducting military operations without the need to involve pro-Iranian formations and to change the course of an operation. This causes caution in Tehran. And, according to some information, Iran insists on its more active participation in the creation of the 5th corps.

    In addition, a new trend in the development of the armed forces of the regime could be the strengthening of the "Republican Guard", which in the end will have to absorb all the most combat-capable parts of the SAA. As a model, a new compound formed in Aleppo, which will unite in its ranks all the units and subdivisions of the Syrian Arab Army operating in the area of ​​the city, into a new formation - the 30th division of the "Republican Guard", can be used as a model.

    ***

    At each new stage of reforms and attempts to strengthen the fighting efficiency of loyal forces, B. Assad's regime creates more and more new superstructures, each of which has a different degree of dependence or independence from Damascus. And each of them relies on the support of one or another foreign or domestic sponsor, being, in fact, his "proxy".

    In itself, the presence of such a number of structures scattered and not fully controlled by Damascus lays a time bomb under Syria (and not only under the regime), impedes the implementation of ceasefire agreements, and requires the development of a clear line for their future.
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    George1

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  George1 on Tue Jun 13, 2017 12:24 am

    Photos from the enterprises of the Syrian military-industrial complex

    http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2665826.html
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    eehnie

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  eehnie on Tue Jun 13, 2017 1:53 am

    George1 wrote:Photos from the enterprises of the Syrian military-industrial complex

    http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2665826.html

    I was just expecting to see this from somewhere in Syria. Impresive amounts of armoured vehicles stored in the pictures.

    It seems like there is a strong process of rebuilding and repairing armoured vehicles in Homs.
























    Also in Damascus at lower scale












    And the same about towed artillery systems in Hama:




















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    George1

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  George1 on Sun Jun 25, 2017 1:32 am

    The user of social network "Twitter" Wael Al Hussaini (@WaelHussaini) posted on his page a short video on which SAA T-90 in a high speed pursuit of retreating #ISIS terrorists in the Syrian Desert

    http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2684700.html
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    George1

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  George1 on Tue Jul 04, 2017 12:07 am

    Another BMPT in Syria

    There were new photos of one of the prototypes of the BMPT tanks support tank (Object 199) delivered to Syria, designed and manufactured by NPK Uralvagonzavod JSC, the first time "lit up" when visiting the air base of Khmeimim on June 27, 2017, Syrian President Bashar Assad and the Chief General of the Armed Forces of Russia General of the Army Valery Gerasimov.Now new photos of the BMPT (already with a camouflaged network removed) are promulgated with the commander of a well-known pro-government Palestinian brig "Liwa al-Quds" by Muhammad al-Said.



    It can be clearly seen that this model of BMPT is equipped on-board screens with a set of removable modular protection in the so-called "soft" case, which is also installed on the T-72B3 tanks in the latter version "with additional protection."

    Colleague Gur Khan Gur Khan informs in his blog about this sample of BMPT:

    It's all the same about the .99, but with a modernized combat module. The module is already manufactured using serial technology - just like the BMPT for Kazakhstan - with the replacement of cast parts with welded parts. A new variant of launchers for B07S1.01.000 missiles is option 2 - it is distinguished by the presence of anti-bullet and anti-fragmentation protection. However, unlike the BMPT variant for Kazakhstan, there is a commander's panorama without a thermal imager - only with a low-level television channel. This makes the car cheaper, but for the conditions of Syria, it does not make it less effective. Also on the "Syrian" BMPT a serial version of the DZ "Relikt" module is installed, additional blocks of DZ in the soft case are hung on the sides, as in the most modern variant of the modernization of the Russian Army T-72B3 tank, anti-slip coatings are made



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    George1

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

    Post  George1 on Sun Jul 23, 2017 4:26 pm

    Syrian military forces produced locally 130mm M-46 8x8 self-propelled howitzer.

    The Syrian military forces against Daesh uses their own technology to manufacture wheeled self propelled howitzer using the Soviet-made 130mm towed field gun M-46 as main armament mounted at the rear of 8x8 civilian truck chassis.

    The Syrian military forces against Daesh uses their own technology to manufacture wheeled self propelled howitzer using the Soviet-made 130mm towed field gun M-46 as main armament mounted at the rear of 8x8 civilian truck chassis.

    According to a picture released on twitter, July 2017, the Syrian military forces have build an 8x8 self-propelled howitzer to offer more mobility to artillery units. This type of artillery system can be quickly produced locally using towed gun in service with the Syrian armed forces, mounted on a civilian truck chassis. it offer also high level of cross-country mobility compared to a towed gun.

    The Syrian-made 130mm M-46 self-propelled howitzer is based on an 8x8 IVECO truck chassis with a crew cabin which was armoured to offer protection against firing of small arms. The truck keeps the original windscreen but the front of the crew cabin is fitted with armour plates. There is also two doors on each side but without any windows.

    A Soviet-made M-46 130mm towed gun is mounted at the rear of the truck chassis. The M-46 is a manually loaded, towed 130 mm artillery gun, manufactured by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The first prototypes of the 130 mm M-46 was completed in mid-1948. It has seen combat in Asia and the Middle East and has also been built in China as the Type 59-1 and in Egypt.

    Ammunition originally used by the M-46 included HE fragmentation, Armour Piercing solid shot, smoke, illuminating and chemical. HE shells weigh some 33 kg. Maximum rate of fire is 5 -6 rounds/minute, and about 70 rounds/hour. It can fire at a maximum range of 27 km.

    In road position the gun is held in position by a clamp, located to the immediate rear of the crew cab. When the system is deployed in the firing position a large spade is hydraulically lowered at the rear to provide a more stable firing platform.

    http://www.armyrecognition.com/weapons_defence_industry_military_technology_uk/syria_m-46_130mm_8x8_self-propelled_howitzer_syrian_military_forces_11807173.html

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    Re: Syrian Arab Army (SAA)

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