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    Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

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    Vote (multiple choice allowed) for the aircrafts and helicopters performing well enough to avoid a total decommission by the end of this decade.

    [ 6 ]
    4% [4%] 
    [ 21 ]
    16% [16%] 
    [ 12 ]
    9% [9%] 
    [ 7 ]
    5% [5%] 
    [ 6 ]
    4% [4%] 
    [ 9 ]
    7% [7%] 
    [ 15 ]
    11% [11%] 
    [ 19 ]
    14% [14%] 
    [ 20 ]
    15% [15%] 
    [ 20 ]
    15% [15%] 

    Total Votes: 135
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    eehnie

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  eehnie on Thu Dec 22, 2016 11:44 pm

    Some aircrafts which decommission must be confirmed, in some cases, to remain as monuments:

    Looking monuments:
    Be-12: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/31995
    Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/34650
    Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69173
    Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69164
    Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69176
    Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/69167
    Tu-16: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/82229
    Be-6: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/80108
    MiG-9: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/23004

    Remains captured in Crimea:
    Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/35769
    Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/49190
    Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/35823

    Remains in Ukraine:
    Yak-38: http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/34974


    Last edited by eehnie on Thu Jun 01, 2017 5:29 pm; edited 7 times in total
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    eehnie

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  eehnie on Thu Feb 09, 2017 3:40 pm

    The number of active units of the Be-12 reduced to 5 (all in Sebastopol):

    http://russianplanes.net/planelist/Beriev/Be-12

    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33411
    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33282
    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33405
    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33345
    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/32997

    Also, there are today 34 units in the reserve.

    These are the 2 units that go to the reserve in 2016.

    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/33396
    http://russianplanes.net/reginfo/32991

    The aircraft seems almost exhausted. A total retirement of the aircraft seems to be near.
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    eehnie

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  eehnie on Wed Apr 12, 2017 9:02 am

    In the refered to the air material, the analysis of the results of the scrapping process in the first half of 2017, detailed in the references 17.0001 to 17.0049 plus 17.0071 to 17.0072, gives the following results:

    - In the refered to the combat aircrafts and helicopers, in this quarter it has not been material from the scrapping process of no-one type of combat aircraft or helicopter in the cited references. The scrapping activity seems stopped. There is some report of complete engines of the following types of combat aircraft and helicopter offered to auction:

    Yak-28: 13 engines (It seems a total liquidation of the components stored of this aircraft).

    Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177: 75 engines (Mi-8=46, Mi-24=29)
    MiG-23: 15 engines


    Last edited by eehnie on Thu Jul 20, 2017 7:00 am; edited 3 times in total
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    eehnie

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  eehnie on Sun Apr 23, 2017 2:11 pm

    Like in the case of the land warfare, the evolution of the air warfare in the War in Donbass always has been take into account in this topic.

    The recent publication of The Military Balance 2017 allows to make an homogeneous comparation with the data published by the same source in The Military Balance 2014.

    These would be the differences in the refered to the air warfare:

    - 080.00% Be-12

    - 047,93% Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177
    - 013.88% Su-25/28/39

    - 080.00% First group
    - 043.08% Second group
    - 044.49% Total subsonic air warfare

    - 061.02% Su-24
    - 058.89% MiG-29/35
    - 005.56% Su-27/30/33/35

    - 049.19% Total supersonic air warfare

    - 046.43% Total air warfare

    Note that like in the case of the land warfare, this would not be a recount of war loses. It would be the variation between the begin of 2014 and the begin of 2017 for every model of combat aircraft and helicopter, according to the source that publish The Militrary Balance (which is clearly pro-Western). Then it would include the variation caused by loses in the war, the variation caused by own decommissions and the variation caused by incorporation of new units of these models.

    If we compare these data with the most reliable source about air loses of Ukraine during the war

    https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/dblist.php?Country=UR

    we can see how the data offered by The Military Balance are not compatible with the certified loses in the one case, except if it has been an incorporation of new foreign units during this time. The case is bolded and signaled in red in the previous list. The transfer to Ukraine of material of Su-25/28/39 would not be limited only to spare parts, also would include material for aditional units.

    In this case is easy to identify the countries that helped to Ukraine to improve their number of units of Su-25/28/39. Clearly would be Bulgaria.


    Last edited by eehnie on Thu Jul 20, 2017 7:08 am; edited 3 times in total
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    GarryB

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  GarryB on Mon Apr 24, 2017 3:04 am

    In terms of what to keep and what to get rid of I think it is pretty clear that you need to decide what remains useful, and what has a replacement ready to replace it in the time period and also what needs replacing.

    For instance the list in the poll:

    MiG-25
    Su-25
    Tu-95/142
    Il-38/18
    Be-12
    Mil Mi-14
    Ka-27/29/31/32
    Mil Mi-24/35
    Mil Mi-28
    Ka-50/52

    We can divide them into front line service, vs no longer in service... the only aircraft not in front line service in that list is the MiG-25.

    Of the remaining there are those with no replacement in sight like the Su-25, Il-38, Mi-14, Ka-27/29/31/32, and the Mi-28 and Ka-52.

    The aircraft with replacements in sight are the Tu-95/142, and Mi-24/35, and Be-12.

    Of course we have to add the time scale too... the next decade will take us through to 2025 or so.

    By then I would expect the MiG-25 might be used for testing if not totally withdrawn from service and reserve.

    By 2025 there should be the PAK-Sha future CAS aircraft but I doubt it would have replaced the Su-25 by then, a naval model of either the A-42 or Tu-214 to start replacing the Il-38, but there will likely be Il-38s still in service. There should also be a new Mi-14 replacement hopefully based on the Mi-38, and the Kamov series navy helos will likely also be getting replaced by new upgraded models that likely will look very similar to existing models. The Mi-28M and Ka-52 will likely be mature and very capable systems by 2025.

    By 2025 the Tu-160M2 should have started production and the PAK DA would be getting final design changes and modifications ready for serial production in the next few years so the Tu-160s and Tu-95s in service will continue for a fair time yet.

    As numbers of the Mi-28M and Ka-52 enter service the numbers of Hinds will likely decline and might be shifted to paramilitary use, or specialised use where their troop carrying capacity might be better suited.

    The Be-12 offers the unique capability of being able to land on the sea surface. If the Russian Navy decide the extra cost and complication is justified then they can go for the Be-200 and A-42 or A-40, and if not then more Tu-214s in the MPA role might be an alternative. Indeed an MPA model of the PAK DA might be considered too.

    So to be honest in the short timescale of a decade I would suspect the MiG-25 and Be-12 would be the main types withdrawn as superior replacements are available now, though whether the replacements actually enter service is largely dependent on whether the Russian military decides those unique capabilities need to be kept.

    An amphibious aircraft is expensive compared with an equivalent non amphibious aircraft... in terms of drag and operational costs and maintainence. Of course the ability to land on water could be further exploited by landing on the water and lowering a variable depth sonar, which can be reused multiple times and can be sent to a particular depth to find targets, while expendable sonar buoys are expensive and being disposable often not as sensitive as a reusable model.

    A hull mounted sonar could also be used as well as wing mounted torpedoes that could be released from the water surface to engage targets detected immediately.


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    eehnie

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  eehnie on Mon Apr 24, 2017 8:05 pm

    My point about the reserve is a little different. The reserve is not, or should not be simply a storing of the oldest material. The material in the reserve should be to be used first, without touch the capabilities of the active forces. The material in the reserve should be combat ready, especially the oldest part of the reserve that would be to be used first.

    Then it is important to reach a saturation of the reserve, and to create a continuous rythm of production that allows to a continuous renovation of the material. Habitually the level for a saturation of the reserve depends mostly of the size of the active force, that is not a totally fixed amount.

    Also it is important to take into account the different roles, but with an open vision. It is possible to find different ways to do the same, technological innovations allow to it.

    Fighter Interceptors:
    - Valoration of the role: To remain.
    - Outdated models as military concept: -
    - Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: MiG-25.
    - Saturation of the reserve: In saturation. My stimation is that Russia would need 7 or less aircrafts to reach a saturation of the reserve.
    - Production of new aircrafts for the role: -
    - New projects in development: MiG-41-PAK-DP
    In my view the role continues being very actual and useful and is to remain, mantaining their main feature and advantage, that is to have significantly bigger speed than aircrafts of other roles. Then, as long as the development of the MiG-41 is not finnished and its production is not started, I do not expect a retirement of the MiG-25, because it would mean a reduction of the fleet of fighter interceptors that I do not expect. Also the aircraft still remains actual as military concept. In my view these are the main reason why aircrafts of this role (MiG-25) are not being transfered to Syria.

    Fighters:  Including Air Superiority and Multirole
    - Valoration of the role: To remain.
    - Outdated models as military concept: -
    - Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: MiG-23.
    - Saturation of the reserve: Not satured. My stimation is that Russia would need 120 aircrafts to reach a saturation of the reserve.
    - Production of new aircrafts for the role: Su-PAK-FA, Su-35, Su-30
    - New projects in development: MiG-35
    In this case, the main problem that I see for the retirement of the MiG-23 is that after the retirement of aircrafts in the previous two decades, today the reserves of aircrafts of this type are not reaching the saturation. Also the aircraft still remains actual as military concept. In my view these are the main reasons why aircrafts of this role (MiG-23) are not being retired or supplied to Syria.

    Strategic Bombers: Including long range Maritime Bombers
    - Valoration of the role: To remain.
    - Outdated models as military concept: Il-38, Tu-95/142
    - Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: Tu-22.
    - Saturation of the reserve: Not satured. My stimation is that Russia would need 88 aircrafts to reach a saturation of the reserve. But would be reduced if the joint active fleet decreases.
    - Production of new aircrafts for the role: Tu-160 (to restart)
    - New projects in development: Tu-PAK-DA
    The role has been under question but is proving to be useful, not only for the use of nuclear weapons but also in its orignial activity of longe range bombing. It requires a configuration and a size of aircrafts that is clearly different to other roles. In the last years, with the adition of maritime reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol, the long range bombing hability has been considered a different role, but today, the trend is to see unmanned smaller aircrafts assuming reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol roles, and it helps to unify the entire long range bombing hability. The difference between ground and sea targets and types of weapons is not big enough to keep the difference of roles, and very likely future strategic bombers will be able to afford land and sea, including submarine targets.
    Looking at the form that is taking this role for the future, the speed is becoming a feature more important still than it was in the past. With independent reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol (on sea and on land), sometimes done by unmanned aircrafts and spacecrafts, plus detection installations (radars,...), there is a factor of fast answer of increasing importance for the strategic bombing, in adition to the important value of the speed in the safety of the strategic bombers facing the weapons of the adversary in contested areas.
    While the development of unmanned shipborne longe range aircrafts for reconnaissance, surveillance and patrol, is less advanced than the development of man-portable air defense (in the case of the FGA), at this point, subsonic aircrafts for long range bombing (today Il-38 and Tu-95-142) are becoming also outdated. The Be-12 has not enough range to be considered a long range bomber, and as consequence is not in this cathegory.
    But looking at the state of the reserve of long range bombers, it should not be decommissions still until to reach a saturation of the reserve. In fact, the lack of saturation of the reserve is a sign of lower strenght of the fleet of Strategic Bombers compared with the fleets for other roles, and this would be in my view, the main reason for the restart of the production of the Tu-160, with an important order of 50 aircrafts.

    Fighters Ground Attack: Including Close Air Support aircrafts and short range Maritime Bombers
    - Valoration of the role: To remain.
    - Outdated models as military concept: Be-12, Su-25/28/39
    - Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: MiG-27, Su-17/20/22.
    - Saturation of the reserve: In saturation. My stimation is that Russia would have 27 aircrafts over the necessary number for a saturation of the reserve.
    - Production of new aircrafts for the role: Su-34/32
    - New projects in development: -
    With the development of the man-portable air defenses, the military concept, the fighting style, of Close Air Support is declining. The CAS is becoming an obsolety fighting strategy only usable where the adversary has not man-portable air defense. Today there is not an aircraft that can resist the impact of a man-portable air defense system, and it will not be in the future. As consequence the aircrafts that based its fighting strategy in armour to resist projectiles coming from the land adversary, in order to remain attacking them close to the land lost their strategic advantage, and as consequence become fairly outdated. These aircrafts today, in order to fight vs adversaries with man-portable air defense must adopt an strategy of ground attack from higher distance, like the rest of the FGA, with the disadvantage of being not prepared for it like the rest.
    Obviously there are also longer range air defense systems that can defeat other types of FGA, but are far less common, and only the biggest powers control more to who supply them.
    Under these conditions, despite to be a decade older, I think the MiG-27 and the Su-17/20/22 have advantage over the Su-25/28/39 in order to remain in the Russian Armed Forces. It means not that the Su-25/28/39 is not useful still. In cases like Syria, under Syrian flag the aircraft would be able to fight still in Close Air Support style (taking some risks that under Russian flag would not). But the less modern of all in terms of performance would be the Be-12, which place is fairly uncertain out of the previous role of maritime bomber.
    Looking that the alternatives in production, and at the state of the reserve, there is not problem to begin decommissions in this group. First in line would be the Be-12 (5 active and 34 in the reserve today).

    Helicopters of Combat:
    - Valoration of the role: To remain with unmanned vehicles.
    - Outdated models as military concept: Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177, Mi-28, Ka-52/50
    - Oldest model that remains actual as military concept: -
    - Saturation of the reserve: Not satured.
    - Production of new aircrafts for the role: Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177, Mi-28, Ka-52/50
    - New projects in development: Not public.
    In this case the entire concept of combat helicopter is under revision. Helicopters for combat roles are vulnerable, and new technologies are showing the way to avoid the casualties, going to unmanned helicopters.
    Today, the unmanned combat aircrafts/helicopters, are still less developed than unmanned aircrafts/helicopters for reconnaissance, surveillance or patrol roles, but we begin to see something. Maybe still early to have real alternatives to the current helicopters in the battlefield, even maybe be too early to cut the production and procurement of new units of the current combat helicopter models, but in other stages, as example looking at the development of new models to replace the current fleet of combat helicopters, surely we are in the right time to rule out the development of more manned combat helicopters. Another example is that it would not make sense to reach the level of saturation of the reserves with warfare of a military concept that begins to decline.
    While there is not an advanced unmanned alternative in production, I expect the current fleet to remain stable.
    Note that the difference between combat helicopters and auxiliary helicopters (transport, training, utility,...) is in the hability to carry and use armament. The Ka-27/28/29/31/32 seems closer to what would be an auxiliary helicopter (also some non-military ships of the coast guard are able to carry some torpedo).

    -----------

    As resume:
    1.- In the short term I only expect the total decommission of the Be-12, including of the reserve. To Syria?, like France used the Breguet Atlantique 2? Maybe.
    2.- Next in line for a total decommission? Uncertain.

    3.- Five models of combat helicopter in production maybe redundant. In the short term it is possible the stop of the production of the Mi-8/9/13/14/17/18/19/24/25/35/171/172/177 (also from an air transport point with the new Mi-38).
    4.- I do not expect the development of new models of only subsonic Strategic Bombers.
    5.- I do not expect the development of new models of only subsonic Fighter Ground Attack aircrafts. I do not expect the old order of Be-200 to be completed (to work as short range maritime bomber).
    6.- I do not expect the development of new models of manned Combat Helicopters.


    Last edited by eehnie on Thu Jul 20, 2017 7:16 am; edited 5 times in total
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    GarryB

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  GarryB on Tue Apr 25, 2017 10:34 am

    The purpose of reserves is to equip reserve forces as they are called up.

    The fact that the reserve equipment is a little dated is actually an advantage because the reserve troops being called up likely trained on this older equipment and is probably more familiar with it that they would be with newer material.


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    eehnie

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    Re: Older warfare performance and short/mid-term decommissions

    Post  eehnie on Tue Jul 11, 2017 8:18 am

    This would be compatible with my point about the reserve. I see it compatible.

    Also the material stored, in the reserve, or even decommissioned, is logically the material for helping to allies.

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