Слободан човек wrote:
Слободан човек wrote:I don't discuss with shills.
Dude, B-2 most definitely was not shot down.
They fly at very high altitudes and if our AD had missiles capable of reaching targets that far up we would not be discussing this because there would have been no war to begin with.
Neva could reach them actually in ideal situation even during approach, however situation is never ideal and gap for detection and guidance is tiny, IF we got lucky and detected it. Furthermore after launch the site would get bombed, as they were anyways. Barely any Nevas survived the war, actually only those that did not engage survived.
What we could not reach was U2, which for we tried reintroducing one battery of S75, which was not completed as it was bombed half way though being prepared for service.
Major issue was that we could alot easier detect stealthy targets with recon radars P15, P12, P18.. but our guidance radars couldnt. So it was like "we know you are there, but we cant do anything about it".
So how did NATO identify positions so fast after launches?
From the moment of detecting our radar to the moment of actual bombing of the radar position, it took NATO at least 12 hours. So our army knew that they had to change positions every 12 hours (or ideally less).
12h is hell of time window, if they actually had 12h windows they would suffer minimal loses. And that is not how SEAD works i am afraid, tho i wish it did.
NATO force in 1999. above Yugoslavia used 48 AF Block 50 F-16CJs (Wild Weasel) and 30 Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B Prowlers, unknown number of Tornados from UK and Germany and Spanish F-18s to perform SEAD operations, mostly carrying HARMs. Now, window between detection of emitting radar and actual launch of HARM depends, but it was not even remotely close to hour, especially because crews never had radars on for prolonged period of time, they often turned on and off radars every 20ish seconds to evade HARM guidance aganist them which on maximum ranges required constant source of radiation to be guided.
Majority of strike groups were escorted by HARM equiped aircraft, to defend bombers from "guided" missiles, as our crews would often launch them on unguided balistic trajectories to break enemy formation in hope to force them to lower altitudes in reach of MANPADS and AAA. Many radars were hit just seconds after turning radar on, especially Giraffe and P12/P15 which were part of AAA batteries.
In total NATO spent 743 HARMs against various radiation sources, some of which were imitators, or old decomissioned radars but many radars were destroyed or damaged.