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    Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

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    TheArmenian

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  TheArmenian on Fri Dec 15, 2017 1:52 pm

    One more unit (5th of class) will be laid down at Sredny Nevsky shipyard before the end of this year. The name will be Yakov Balyaev.
    A 6th one will be laid down in 2018 and the 7th in 2019.
    A contract for an 8th unit has been signed too.

    Admiral Korolyov wants to build 40 of them. He wants to have an additional shipyard in the far east for the class.
    But, it seems he is not getting his way. I guess because of budget limitations.
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    KomissarBojanchev

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  KomissarBojanchev on Tue Dec 19, 2017 10:26 am

    Why is the building the building and testing of these minesweepers not getting any faster even if the first ship of the class is comissioned already?
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    George1

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  George1 on Wed Dec 27, 2017 2:00 am

    The minesweeper "Yakov Balyayev" of Project 12700 was laid

    On December 26, 2017, the JSC "Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant" (SNCZ, part of the United Shipbuilding Corporation JSC) in St. Petersburg hosted the official ceremony of laying the fifth ship of the mine-protection mine (a sea mine-sweeper, formerly officially was classified and the enterprise is still designated as the base minesweeper) of the project 12700 (cipher "Alexandrite", developer of JSC "TsMKB" Almaz "), named" Yakov Balyayev "(serial number 525).





    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3021598.html
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    KomissarBojanchev

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  KomissarBojanchev on Fri Dec 29, 2017 11:17 pm

    https://vpk.name/news/170149_vopros_neboesposobnosti_vmf_rossii__protiv_sovremennoi_minnoi_ugrozyi_obyazan_byit_razreshen_v_kratchaishie_sroki.html

    The issue with the inability of the Russian navy to combat modern mines should be resolved immediately
    "That's when the ships begin to undermine, then we will take measures and we will"

    "Responsible officer" of the Navy on the issue of MIP. January 2015


    On December 9, 2016g. The media announced the transfer of the Navy's new base minesweeper (BTSH) "Alexander Obukhov".

    Undoubtedly, the fleet, whose mine forces are currently incapacitated against the current mine threat, has been waiting for a new anti-mine ship (PMK). However, it should be noted that the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin", the first new-generation Mine-borne Vehicle (PMK), adopted by the Navy back in 2008, according to media reports, is still unable to use new mine-fighting systems, participating in combat training of the Navy only with obsolete with arms.


    "To the war" (combat services) today go "units" having a purely decorative "combat" value. For example, naval minesweepers from the Navy in the Mediterranean go to the combat, having absolutely obsolete, "antique" radioelectronic weapons, the complete absence of modern anti-mine means (only obsolete trawls), and the "good old" rowing sails Yal-6 . Only "white sails" are missing from the navy minesweeper!

    Repeatedly the issue of shameful for the Russian Navy "details" of joint exercises of mine action forces when other countries' PMCs (including the Baltic Fleet) were engaged in a real deal - the search and destruction of actual mines, and our antiquarian mine-sweepers, incapable of real combat work, The Germans put training anchor mines (that they would not "miss").


    In accordance with all the "official statements" of the Navy, it is planned to solve problems with the MIP by building a series of PMK pr.12700. How much is this a solution?


    Two principal reservations.


    The first. Despite the objective need for a tough open discussion on the topic, there are a number of questions, "technical and tactical opportunities" for mine and mine action that are not subject to public disclosure. And this is due not only to formal "regime requirements", but also to "a significant reduction in frankness" in Western publications on the topic. Today they do not negotiate much (which unfortunately, some of our Navy experts, reminiscent of "Negroes with Beads", who have allegedly seized beautiful western avenues and very controversial ideas, do not always understand it).


    The second. Mine-affected defense (MAP) and mine action (Mine Action) talks can not be without defining objective criteria of effectiveness. These are in fact:

    Search performance (search for mine-like objects).
    Productivity for the classification and destruction of mines.
    Extremely low probability of passing and non-mitigating mines while conducting mine action.
    Correspondence of the capabilities of mine protection complexes with a real mine threat (first of all, by the number of mines and the possibility of their destruction in the required time).

    Project 12700.


    The construction of a series of new minefields of Project 12700 among specialists caused an ambiguous reaction, which is connected with three circumstances:

    a significant displacement and the cost of the newest PMK (formally, the new "base mine-sweeper" turned out to be much larger than the naval minesweepers of the Navy, and more than twice the displacement of the Soviet Naval Forces of the USSR, it is also evident a significant increase in the cost of serial БГЩ from the main (5, 5 billion rubles));
    problems with the creation of a new anti-mine complex ISPUM ( "We are standing on the threshold of another Tsushima" );
    a very ambiguous situation with the attempt to install on the BTSH pr.12700 French mine systems.

    However, the main thing is the concept of the PMK 12700 project itself, which was questioned by a number of specialists as obsolete, which, given the high cost of the BSHP pr.12700, in their opinion, made the construction of their series inexpedient.


    Their theses are the following:

    We should prepare for the fight against modern ground mines surrounded by robotic autonomous combat complexes.
    Existing bottom mines have fuses, which allow ignoring most of the combined non-contact trawls (magneto-acoustic drops completely), i.e. simple trawling is simply a senseless waste of time
    If earlier (more than 20 years ago) a mine-sweeper was required for mine action, equipped with an anti-mine uninhabited submarine (AP) and either a downhole GAS or a mine detection apparatus that was forced to approach the minefield at a distance equal to the length of the apparatus cables and, accordingly, lowered physical fields, a system of dynamic positioning, etc. Today, these methods are outdated, and no one (primarily the fleet) did not care about the concept change.
    Today, the task of an anti-mine ship should be the descent / lifting of the apparatus and the task of the program, then simply wait and process the results at a safe distance (kilometers). As a result, we have abandoned the requirements for physical fields, the refusal of the positioning system, but the installation of slips, cranes and other lifting equipment.
    Since the bottom monitoring function coincides with the functions of hydrographic support, projects of overlapping appear in one ship. A ship armed with such systems does not need to approach mines (hence the reduced requirements for physical fields). Accordingly, the minesweeper is not a unique hull and equipment with minimal physical fields, but an automated mine action control system (AMM) and bezekapazhnye complexes, for which the ship is designed.
    Development should be in the direction of container basing on unspecialized ships.

    Logical and convincing? No! For the key problem of modern mine action is the appearance in the 90s of the last century of highly sensitive multi-channel non-contact fuses (NV) of mines with "fine processing" of target signals. The possibility of setting up such HBs for triggering from physical fields of mine-action NPA (primarily discrete components of noise) called into question the whole modern concept of mine action, - with the GAS mine detection and specialized mine action mines, additional exploration and destruction of mines, working ahead of the PMC course. At the same time, the possibility of decreasing the NLA fields (primarily the noise discrepancy) below the level of operation of the HB min is an extremely complex technical task.


    For this reason, since the beginning of the 2000s, in the west, disposable mine-action NPA-destroyers have become a priority. However, the high cost of such disposable funds has made such mine action not only exceptionally expensive. The extremely high cost of such destroyers excludes the very possibility of solving the MIP problem, with any significant mine risk.

    However, this problem was successfully solved in the West in the form of new integrated MIP systems: "search - non-contact trawling - destruction of mines". Today, in the west, there has been a "revival" of such an "outdated" mine-action weapon as a non-contact trawl, but with its application at a modern technical level - from bezekipazhnykh or helicopter carriers.


    The essence of the matter is that the setting of the NW mines in the "mine protector" mode reduces its counter-resistance, making it possible to effectively use non-contact trawls against them. Those. mines - "mine defenders" (set up for the destruction of NPA) are destroyed by non-contact trawls, and the remaining mines (with high counter-resistance) are NPA. At the same time, taking into account the solution of the problem of "mine defenders", the requirements to the physical fields of the NPA can be reduced, up to the possibility of using civil-purpose civil defense for the purposes of the PMO tasks.

    Thus, the key element of the prospective system for the destruction of mines of the Navy should be a set of jointly used and managed PMA ACS facilities:

    non-contact trawl - BEC
    "Heavy" (more than 500 kg) mine action SPA;
    "Light" (50-100 kg) anti-mine remote-controlled NPA (possibly on the basis of civil)

    To solve a number of problems (primarily for non-specialized ships of MIP), a limited use of costly disposable LPA-destroyers is possible.


    In the form accepted today in the Navy, the use of non-contact trawls in the form of towing their minesweeper by trawler is outdated and is a direct prerequisite for the death of a minesweeper.


    In turn, the requirement to place on board a full set of mine funds means the requirement of areas, volumes, and, respectively, displacement of the carrier. In these conditions, the possibility of upgrading the PMK of Project 12700 to new mine measures completely covers its considerable displacement.


    Those. "Complete set" of MIP facilities on board, is a fully grounded factor in favor of the construction of PMK "dimension 12700".


    Work in conditions of serious mine danger requires specialized ships that have not only reduced physical and modern mine complexes, but also specially trained crews. "Universal ship" can be built, but it is good to prepare a "universal crew" for all tasks - no. Specialized mine crafts will be retained in the Navy of developed countries in the future.


    Nevertheless, we can not fail to note the obvious problems with the combat effectiveness of the ISPUM mine action project 12700, in the solution of combat missions:

    in spite of the large displacement on board, there is only one anti-mine self-propelled underwater vehicle (for comparison, there are three anti-tank missiles of the type "Tripartite", having a displacement of half the size, there are three PMO), which will live on the minefield only until the first " mine protector ";
    the domestic concept of towing non-contact trawls through the minefield today means deliberately sending a trawler to slaughter.

    This raises the question of whether it can be a "salvation" for 12700 of the possibility of its equipping with French MIS systems (especially since they are partially a "Diamand" complex for the control of an unguided boat (BEC) "Inspector Mk2" and was installed at BTSC "Alexander Obukhov" ).


    ...





    "When the ships start exploding, only then will we take the appropriate actions"
    -The VMF on the problem with the obsolescence and ineffectiveness if its anti-mine weapons

    hoom

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  hoom on Sat Dec 30, 2017 8:15 am

    Why is the building the building and testing of these minesweepers not getting any faster even if the first ship of the class is comissioned already?
    There is that 'minor' issue where the 2nd boat had a big fire on it...
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    KomissarBojanchev

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  KomissarBojanchev on Sat Dec 30, 2017 11:16 am

    hoom wrote:
    Why is the building the building and testing of these minesweepers not getting any faster even if the first ship of the class is comissioned already?
    There is that 'minor' issue where the 2nd boat had a big fire on it...

    Damn it I forgot. What about the 3rd boat?

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  hoom on Sat Dec 30, 2017 11:46 am

    Was only laid down Jan 2017 so not likely to be launched particularly soon I expect.
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    KomissarBojanchev

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  KomissarBojanchev on Sun Dec 31, 2017 8:20 am

    We are on the threshold of another" Tsushima
    The Russian Navy today is not capable of a modern mine threat. This fact has long been known not only to specialists but also to all who are interested in the Navy in one way or another. Of course, it is well known to our "so-called partners".


    On February 12, the media published a message, citing the statement of the Director General of the Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant Seredocho VA, about the failure to deliver the new basic mine sweeper-searcher, Alexander Obukhov, project 12700 ("because of the refusal of the French partners to supply the necessary equipment" ).

    Alas, the real situation is much worse. And here there is no fault of Vladimir Aleksandrovich, a respected and deserved shipbuilder, he himself is a hostage to the current situation (without being able to influence her permission). JSC "Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant" is actively working and developing, and the Navy's mine issues have completely different reasons than the work of the plant.


    The issue of the critical state with the mine defense system (MIP) of the Navy was repeatedly raised earlier by a number of specialists (including in the media):


    2007, V.A. Katenin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, А.V. Katenin, Ph.D. (GNINGI MO RF): the Navy's naval forces are not able to effectively combat the current mine threat. ... are obsolete not only morally, but also physically and by 2016 one can expect the practical disappearance of mine-trod forces as such. The recognition by the political and military leadership of the country of the mine threat and the degradation of the national mine-troop forces should be the first step towards solving this acute problem "(Defense Order No. 15-2007).


    2010, "MIC", MA Klimov: "... the general unsatisfactory state of mine-and-mud forces of the Russian Navy. Its mine action capabilities are so low that they call into question the fundamental possibility of ensuring the deployment of Russian Navy forces from its ba in the conditions of a modern mine threat. ... despite the successful passage of the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin" of state tests, today he is alone in the Navy! For comparison: in the Polish Navy - 3 modernized TSCHIM project 206FM, Estonia - 5 TCHIM, Latvia - 5 TCHIM »


    2014, "MIC" M.A. Klimov: "by 1991 the Soviet Navy came with numerous but morally obsolete ground forces, incapable of combating the current mine threat. ....


    Due to the difficult economic situation and the presence of the ship-building vessel of the 266ME with a high degree of readiness, a decision was made to install new anti-mine systems on it. Completion of the corrected project of a single steel MTSH, obviously not having serial production, became a fatal mistake of the Navy. New mine protection systems had to be installed in the body of the massive wooden trawler (BTSC) of Project 1265, with the modernization of the BTSCH for them and the construction of a small series of new .... If we went along this path, the Navy would now have a couple of dozen modern TCHIM.


    A sad monument to this amazing blindness of the Navy are the last two corps of the project 1265, from the completion of which the fleet refused. The construction factory (Petrozavodsk Avangard) was ruined, and the ships that remained without a berthing wall for a long time mooed along the lake until they died.


    ... the indicated rates of construction of the BSTT project 12700 in no way provide a solution in the coming years of the critical MIP problem.


    Alternatives to emergency upgrading of minesweepers are not available "
    From the report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral Chirkov V.V. of 19.11.1477 of 21.11.14:


    "The present situation with the naval underwater weapons (ISS) of the Navy can be briefly described as" ships (PL) unarmed and defenseless. " We are on the threshold of another "Tsushima", which we can get not only from the US Navy, but even ......... (due to the antiquity and incapability of the Navy's mine forces against the current mine threat).


    The planned measures ("Concept of the development of the Ministry of Defense of the Navy", OCD .... ..... ..... etc.) not only do not solve these acute problems, but they preserve a huge gap with Western countries (reaching 50 years!) and further.


    There are four main reasons:

    absence of a modern scientific and technical reserve (and complex experimental R & D for its production);
    scanty and biased statistics of firing both during the Navy's Navy and the testing of new samples, and under obviously simplified conditions, - there has not yet been ANY real test ...;
    The system of falsification of information in the system of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the situation with IGOs ​​and trials (here, deliberately and consciously "loosening up" in the Programs and test methods), disinformation of the leadership and command about the real state of affairs and the scale of the backlog from the probable enemy;
    conscious actions (inaction) of persons (including the RF Ministry of Defense and the Navy) and leading organizations (and their lobbyists) to exclude the development and adoption of the modern IGO for the Navy.

    ...


    The critical problem of the Navy is mine action defense (MIP). In March this year [2014] handed over to the Chief of the Naval Submarine Weapons Service of the Navy .... a document (in attachment) on the situation, possible consequences and necessary measures .... taking into account the current military and political situation. Necessary measures are not taken. "Hopes" on ISPUM do not have a reliable basis.


    ...

    What of this is done?


    On the modernization of minesweepers - nothing.


    Modernization of the "Mayevka" - and the preparation of its mass production - both was not, and is not. In mine warfare of the Black Sea Fleet's mine-and-mine forces (with the "application" for the prize of the Commander-in-Chief), the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin" participated without any new anti-mine weapons (as anyone in Sevastopol could see), which exhaustively characterizes the technical "state" a complex of the only trawler-searcher in the Navy. The question arises, what kind of "Glavkom Prize" can there be in a situation where the main weapon of a ship is not in the ranks?


    BEC PMO - as there was no, and no.


    The Russian Navy is incapable of combating modern ground mines ...


    All this was "justified" by "hopes" ... for new ISPUM and the series of BTSCh of the project 12700, ... even though the planned dates for the receipt of these ships of the Navy "promised" until 2025. only about ten new BTSh.Dlya compare today in the "leading world fleets" trawlers-seekers: Estonia - 3, Latvia - 5, Lithuania - 3, Turkey -11, Japan - 23. That is. series BSTT project 12700, even in the medium term, does not in any way solve the problem of mine-affectedness of the Navy, even when fulfilling all the terms and requirements for the development of its anti-mine complex ISPUM.


    On February 12, openly sounded what the experts had known for a long time (and they were waiting - that's it!) - the timing of the creation of ISPUM for at best will be disrupted (on the worst, I do not want to think ...).


    "Everybody knows everything" (including Chirkov VV), but practically nothing is being done.


    And here the question arises of the available technical reserve.


    MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin": successfully passed the tests:

    Automated mine action control system (ACS) of the mine "Dies" (OJSC "Mars");
    Self-propelled remote-controlled mine-finder-destroyer (STIUM) "Maevka" (JSC "SSPP" Region ");
    the subversive GAS "Livadia" (ZAO "Aquamarine").

    Tests of the self-propelled vehicle (STA) with GAS Livadiya ended in failure (after 2009, STA Livadia in the promotional materials of Aquamarine CJSC was replaced by a towed side-scan sonar (SBS)). To cover this, at the level of high-ranking officials, rumors of a supposedly "failure of tests" by Mayevka (which does not correspond to the truth) were actively spreading. Unfortunately, the real characteristics of Aquamarine products do not always correspond to their advertising characteristics. Nevertheless, as the subversive GAS (PGAS) "Livadia" turned out to be quite worthy.


    Thus, we have a new mine-affected complex that has been tested at the MTSH "Vice Admiral Zakharin": STIUM "Maevka" - ASU PMD "Diez" - PGAAS "Livadia", which has significant reserves for modernization and upgrading of TTX. For example, the installation at the STIUM "MAYEVKA" HBO sharply increases the search performance of the mine-sweeper, "blocking" the possibilities of the unsuccessful STA "Livadia".


    In addition, as part of the R & D "Mayevka", a container modification of the complex was successfully developed and tested in 2007. at the MTSH "Valentin Pikul" of the Black Sea Fleet, but after that it was taken to "long-term storage" in Moscow.

    The mine sweepers of the Navy projects 1265 and 266M have, quite good for their time, the GAS mine detection MG-89 (developed at the turn of the 60s-70s). Okeannopribor has been proposing the modernization of this SAS for many years, with a significant increase in its TTX (both in the Navy and even without docking operations), but the Navy did not interest these offers (unlike the navies of other countries that had long ago modernized (or replaced) these GAS in their own).
    A set of upgraded GAS MG-89M (or GAZ "Kabarga" on projects 10750 and 12660) and a containerized STIUM "Mayvka" could quickly restore the combat capability of the existing mine action forces and give them the ability to combat modern landmines. Certainly, the capabilities of such minesweepers will be somewhat limited due to the lack of PMU ACS, but it is still better than nothing (especially since the functions of the automated control system are partially implemented in the "Mayevka" complex).
    Here there is a "reef", - the requirement of dynamic positioning when working with STEUM, which our trawlers do not have. The exorbitant financial requirements of the Central Design Bureau Almaz for the cost of modernizing the mine-sweepers (I will give just one example, the claimed cost of the mechanical cable tapping device was 10-20 million rubles !!!) largely formed a negative attitude towards the issue of the mine-sweeper modernization in the Navy. However, this problem has a simple and effective solution - modernization without the "Diamond", with the installation of container systems (first of all, "Maevka", with the inclusion of UOK in its composition). According to some experienced commanders of minesweepers, the presence of adjustable pitch screws (on 1265 and 266M projects) makes it possible to dispense with working with STEUM and without the system of dynamic positioning (or anchoring), Another "counterargument to modernization" is that "trawlers will soon have to write off, but what about the new complexes?", While the real results and possibilities of ISPUM are completely incomprehensible (and here the modernized "Mayvka" would be a real and obviously working reserve) and most importantly - the BSTU of the project 12700 not only does not provide a solution to the MIP problems in the rate of construction, but also has (due to the large displacement) significant limitations when working at shallow depths.


    The obvious error of the Navy is the refusal to build new 10750E project minesweepers, which the Navy categorically needs, primarily for working in shallow water. Here, of course, the question arises: what kind of anti-mine complex should be put on them? The question that has the obvious answer is the modernized Livadia - Mayevka - Diez (including the "rearrangement" of the container "Mayvka" with the minesweepers being written off).


    One of the effective measures to resolve the problems of MIP and the modernization of the Navy minesweepers is equipping them with unmanned boats (BEC) MIP.


    At the same time, the organization of development and delivery of the BMS PMO should optimally provide for the phasing of work, with the creation of a "basic minimal modification" in the shortest possible time, with the further building of the BEC's capabilities with separate modules, with self-passing tests and receipts of the O1 for serial production.


    It is absolutely necessary to change the attitude of the interested structures of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy of the Russian Federation in relation to domestic BECs, first of all the development of the sane and real TTZ of R & D ensuring completion of work carried out by a number of organizations in the "minimal configuration" to receive the O1 letter in the shortest time and the start of serial deliveries to the fleet.


    With the purpose of the speedy introduction of modern robotic complexes (BEC) in the Russian Navy and solving a number of problematic issues of the Navy, the development of the BMS PMO to lead as the creation of an integrated modular system in several stages:

    Stage 1 - ROC BEC-PMO "zero version", to complete the development of the BMS PMO in the "minimum configuration" (only the search for mines) and ensure their delivery of the Navy in the shortest time.
    2 stage of NIER BEC, with elaboration of the concept of application and perspective systems and tasks of BEC in full-scale conditions (including in complex with Navy ships) to obtain the necessary reliable scientific and technical R & D and development of a well-founded TTZ BER, BEC-PMO "zero version".
    Stage 3 - OKR BEC of the Navy, with the introduction of mine destruction and modular target loads (reconnaissance, weapons, EW).

    Founded idea of ​​the idea of ​​creation of the BKO PMO "zero version" - providing high search performance on bottom mines (including at shallow depths) due to the group application of the BMS PMO with HBO with cartography (during the initial search) or comparison (if repeated) earlier the saved sonar picture of the ground, followed by a survey of mine-like objects by divers or TNPA.


    The facilities of the BMS PMO complex should provide accommodation with minimal modifications on all the Navy surface ships (including mine crafts). Due to the provision of group application of the BEC, high search performance (many times superior to BEC Inspector Mk 2) can be achieved, and a significant reduction in the requirements for search tools is possible (because at a sufficient level, further increase in their TTX is of no practical value due to geometric limitations of search conditions at shallow depths) to reduce the cost of BEC and ensure their mass serial shipments of the Navy. At the request of the developers of the control and communication system of the Orlan-10 UAV, simultaneous control from one SSU to 4 UAVs is possible, and this should be realized for the BMS PMO!


    An example, - the overall dimensions of the stern of the deck of the RTG of Project 10750E provide accommodation on it to 4 boats of the type BL-540 and BEC. At the same time, 3 of them can be used in the search option (BEC with HBO), providing a high "comb" of high search performance, and from the fourth boat - to provide access for divers of minelayers for inspection of mine-like objects and their undermining.


    At the same time, it is advisable to place BEC facilities on both standard BL-680 and БЛ-540 boats in the form of modernization kits (including those with an operational installation in the fleet) and the development of a specialized light small-sized BPS PMO. Taking into account the need for group basing and ensuring the launching of ships (including minesweepers of combat composition) by standard means, it is advisable to limit its mass to 600-700 kg, and constructive design, for maximum seaworthiness in the use of search tools, according to the trimaran scheme.


    However, today "Mayevka" is the only real anti-mine complex, which has a significant modernization potential, which provides a sharp increase in anti-mine productivity of STIUM (both in search and in mines) in a short time, in parallel with the preparation of serial production. The subject of conversation on ISPUM will be only after the completion of its State tests (not to mention the fact that ISPUM has no container modification).


    At the same time, the "Mayvok" series was deleted from the state defense order, its modernization was disrupted, exports were blocked ("unofficial refusal" in the approval of the Export Certificate in the military representation). is not exploited, "while" the complex is remarkable, personally took part in the tests "(statements of the representatives of the 1st Central Scientific Research Institute at the forum" Army-15 ").


    In fact, this sabotage is on the verge of deliberately undermining the combat capability of the Navy. And here there is no fault of the "active fleet", all questions to the "capitals" (especially since VV Chirkov was aware of all this).


    More examples, in 2013. a tender was announced on "Technical and service maintenance) and repair of instruments ... miners", which provided for the commissioning of "Mayevka" on "Vice Admiral Zakharina." The result of this tender is "The auction for this lot was declared invalid (no applications were filed)." The reason - allegedly "accidentally" no one in a timely manner has notified the artist about this tender.


    2014, despite a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation and a "complete zero" with the Navy's PMO, none of the officials moved to put the Mayevka into operation (not to mention modernization and the series).


    And here we come to the essence of what was happening.


    First. The obvious negligent and unprincipled attitude of officials to ensuring the real combat capability of the Navy. For example, today the launch of the 955 "Alexander Nevsky" combat service "provides" only two sea minesweepers to the OKVS (Kamchatka), the mine weapons of which correspond to the western end of the 1960s, and unable to deal with modern bottom mines. At the same time, earlier "Mayevka" was planned primarily to Kamchatka, to provide "Borei" (from the GOZ were excluded). In fact, today, the release of the Pacific Fleet of Pacific Fleet is not assured. Everybody knows about this (including V. Chirkova). There are no measures.


    The second. One of the favorite occupations in our defense industry was the "process" (and not the desire for result), on the principle of "either the donkey or the padishah." In these conditions, the very existence of a domestic, successfully tested and developed at a given time and the financing of the complex ("Maevki"), some members of the OPK caused a lot of negative feelings (and actions).


    Third. "Personal aspects". For example, a person who blocked the registration of an advertising passport (and exports of Mayvok), once gave the oath, but could not put a sense of duty and business above personal petty grievances.


    Fourth. "Import". "Some time ago" it was "very fashionable" to borrow new types of military equipment in the west. I should especially note that there is nothing wrong with this, for example, the purchase of a series, even obsolete western mine-sweepers, would be very useful for the fleet, This is not only a "new iron", but first of all "experience embodied in iron" - experience (modern mine action), which the Navy simply does not have. However, this should not be done at the cost of "strangling" successful domestic developments. In the situation with the new minesweepers of the situation it was simple - almost all knew the problems of ISPUM, moreover, there were those who hoped for them and hoped to replace ISPUM with the French complex.


    Those. There were people to whom the possible failure of the domestic complex was very profitable. In these conditions, the presence of an effective and operating reserve in the form of "Maevka" (in the modernized version) caused this extremely negative reaction (and actions) to it.


    It is this factor (the desire to "drag" import complexes at any cost) was the main reason for counteraction to the "Mayvka". It is clear that the Navy did not care about the combat readiness issues.


    It should also be noted here that the Chief Designer of ISPUM Arzhanov MI probably is not fully aware of the degree of importance for the country's defense capability of the task that he is solving. At the forum "Army-15" frank perplexity among the experts present was caused by the report of M.I. Arzhanov. not about the development and possibilities of ISPUM, but about the development of a "helicopter anti-submarine station". Actually, participation in the discussion of mine action subjects by Arzhanov M.I. was reduced to negative comments on the "Mayvka". Undoubtedly, higher ISTs were laid in ISPUM than in "Mayevka", however it already exists (and with a multiple increase in capacity, in a modernized form), and ISPUM has yet to prove during the tests that it took place. The main thing is the lack of container modification,
    Logical in this situation would be pre-emptive, to the construction of the main building of the project 12700, the testing of ISPUM on another carrier (minesweeper, or anyone-to the barge), as it was previously done for "Mayvka". This would allow timely opening and realizing the existing problems, work out ways to solve them, and not drag them to the ship of a new project.


    Unfortunately, those who took decisions at that time, the issues of combat readiness of the Navy worried much less than their own tranquility - they knew the problems about which they wanted to delay as much as possible ("either the ass or the padishah"). They hoped (to a large extent wishing this themselves) to "French."


    A drastic change in the military-political situation has become a "cold shower" for such "dreams". However, they were incapable of recognizing and recognizing the entire disastrous nature of the previous technical policy.


    And here the question arises - what is it? Cowardice? Myopia and negligence? Self-interest? Or "something more"?


    The problems of the Mine Action Defense (MPS) of the fleet are only a part of its acute problems (but the most "obvious" - both in terms of critical combat capability problems and reluctance to solve them).


    "The history of the" Mayvka "is very similar to the story of the torpedo" Physicist "...


    Rear Admiral in resignation Lutskiy AN: "Current means of anti-torpedo defense of domestic submarines are ineffective against modern foreign torpedoes ... It is proposed to equip the" Yasen "and" Borei "submarine submarines with anti-torpedo systems (PTZ), TTZ for development of which were compiled in 80 -th years of the last century, the results of research on the effectiveness of these weapons against modern torpedoes testify to the extremely low probability of non-evasion of the evading submarine "(" The Sea Collection "2010) - is still relevant.


    And this list can be continued ...


    "We are on the threshold of the next" Tsushima "... only after Tsushima the" decaying revolution "" flashed ". And the question is, is it really "innocent" for obvious inaction (or actions on the verge of sabotage) of officials to resolve the most acute problems of the Navy's combat readiness (including in terms of naval underwater weapons and mine defense)? - has the right to exist.


    Maxim Klimov




    While the dreadful state of Russian anti-mine warfare is believable, what about the last claim that sub decoys are obsolete?
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    GarryB

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  GarryB on Mon Jan 01, 2018 9:13 am

    Mine warfare is the same at sea as it is anywhere else... neglected.

    Most modern western navies only have token anti mine forces and most of their equipment is so state of the art they can't afford to buy any either.
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    KomissarBojanchev

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  KomissarBojanchev on Mon Jan 01, 2018 10:26 am

    GarryB wrote:Mine warfare is the same at sea as it is anywhere else... neglected.

    Most modern western navies only have token anti mine forces and most of their equipment is so state of the art they can't afford to buy any either.

    Which western navies neglect mine warfare? I understand the US but AFAIK France, the UK, and Germany have extremely advanced minesweeper forces. Also NATO doesn't have the black sea or baltic as their home base so they can worry a bit less about minefields.
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    GarryB

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  GarryB on Mon Jan 01, 2018 10:47 am

    All of them do.

    A minefield can be laid anywhere and if western shipping moves through that ship way they are going to demand their navies make them safe for their passage....

    According to World Naval Review the Russians had 40 mine countermeasures vessels in service in mid 2017.... in comparison the US had 11, the French had 14, the Brits had 15, Italy had 10 and Spain had 6... compared with Japan who has 25... the NATO levels are pathetic considering they are ocean going navies that need to keep their ocean water ways clear for their commercial interests...

    The evidence you have is an article that quotes:

    2007, V.A. Katenin, Doctor of Technical Sciences, А.V. Katenin, Ph.D. (GNINGI MO RF): the Navy's naval forces are not able to effectively combat the current mine threat. ... are obsolete not only morally, but also physically and by 2016 one can expect the practical disappearance of mine-trod forces as such. The recognition by the political and military leadership of the country of the mine threat and the degradation of the national mine-troop forces should be the first step towards solving this acute problem "(Defense Order No. 15-2007).

    So in 2007 a PhD doctor says the Russian Navy is not able to deal with the current mine threat and his predictions that by 2016 there will be no mine countermeasures forces in the Russian Navy... are you trying to wind us up or do you not read what you post?

    I can post an article from the 1807s written by a US PhD that US battleships are fucking useless and that by the 1860s they wont be able to take on even the British fleet on equal terms.... is the US Navy crap too? NATO didn't even exist then so they must be rubbish too...

    The quote from which the article name comes from is hilarious:

    "The present situation with the naval underwater weapons (ISS) of the Navy can be briefly described as" ships (PL) unarmed and defenseless. " We are on the threshold of another "Tsushima", which we can get not only from the US Navy, but even ......... (due to the antiquity and incapability of the Navy's mine forces against the current mine threat).

    So their anti mine vessels are not properly armed to defend themselves... not that they can't deal with mines, but that they are not armed fighting ships... which NATO MCM vessels are well armed?

    "We are on the threshold of the next" Tsushima "... only after Tsushima the" decaying revolution "" flashed ". And the question is, is it really "innocent" for obvious inaction (or actions on the verge of sabotage) of officials to resolve the most acute problems of the Navy's combat readiness (including in terms of naval underwater weapons and mine defense)? - has the right to exist.

    Are there any opinions in that article published more recently than 2014?

    Sounds like someone with an axe to grind wants more money spent on their programme...
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    Isos

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  Isos on Mon Jan 01, 2018 11:30 am

    Mines of today are torpedo put on the bottom of the sea and they work in passive mode. It is hard to detect them anyway. Maybe they should first find new detection modes. Mine warefare vessels of cold war era will be useless. Most frigates can detect normal mines with their sonars and go away from that zone.

    Its the same for russian navy.
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    GarryB

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  GarryB on Tue Jan 02, 2018 6:49 am

    Like I said the technology is very expensive so even the US navy does not have the hundreds of boats it should have to keep all the waterways it wants to operate in safe... for goodness sake they can't even reliably find an Argentine sub or a Boeing 777 that fast, let alone an irregularly shaped object on the ocean floor.

    hoom

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  hoom on Sat Apr 14, 2018 11:32 am

    https://flotprom.ru/2018/%D0%A1%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%B77/
    Apparently the order has been increased from 8 to 10, but also a big extension for the completion date which equates to a big delay on the currently incomplete ships.
    Was 8 by 2021, now 10 by 2027.
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    franco

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  franco on Tue Apr 17, 2018 9:58 pm

    Second 12700 to be launched

    On April 25, in St. Petersburg, the solemn ceremony of launching the newest 12700-meter anti-mine defense ship for the Russian Navy, Ivan Antonov, will take place at the Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard.

    It is planned that the solemn ceremony dedicated to this event will be attended by representatives of the Main Command of the Russian Navy, the Committee for Industrial Policy and Innovation of the Government of St. Petersburg, the General Director of the JSC "Sredne-Nevsky Shipbuilding Plant" Vladimir Seredocho, the General Director of JSC "Central Marine Design bureau "Almaz" Alexander Shlyakhtenko, the daughter of a sailor-Baltic of Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Antonov - Natalia Antonova, representatives of the leadership of the United Shipbuilding Corps orations.

    By order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Korolev, the new ship of mine protection was given the name "Ivan Antonov" - in honor of the famous sniper-Baltic of the Great Patriotic War, Hero of the Soviet Union, midshipman Ivan Antonov.

    The ship of the PMO "Ivan Antonov" will differ from the main ship of this project "Alexander Obukhov" with improved characteristics, as well as the architecture of the hull.

    The 12700 mine defense ships of the project 12700 are designed to deal with sea mines, including new so-called "smart sea mines," which can be found in a ship of the Ivanovo Antonov type, both in water and in the seabed. According to the Chief Command of the Russian Navy, the ships of the Mine Action Plan (MIP) of the new generation of the 12700 project will significantly enhance the potential and effectiveness of Russian Navy's naval minesweep forces.

    The 12700 mine defense ship of the project 12700 was designed by Almaz Central Design Bureau and is a new generation of MPS ships, in the construction and design of which, SNCZ and Almaz CJSC have accumulated extensive experience. Based on this experience and the world's leading trends in the field of mine protection, it is envisaged to form an anti-mine contour using the latest, highly effective hydroacoustic stations located both on the ship itself and on remote-controlled and autonomous underwater vehicles, an integrated bridge system, the main command post-the automated control system mine action. At the same time, the ship is able to use traditional and conventional weaponry.

    The ship's displacement is 890 tons, length 61 meters, width 10 meters, speed at full displacement of 16.5 knots, crew of more than 40 people. The ship has a high maneuverability due to the use of an effective complex of various thrusters. A new approach to the creation of comfortable conditions for crew service is realized in the project of the ship.

    This ship has a unique, the world's largest body of monolithic fiberglass, formed by the method of vacuum infusion. The method of vacuum infusion is a method of molding of fiberglass products, in which a working cavity with reinforced material (fiberglass or coal cloth) is created by means of a sealed film adjacent to the matrix. A vacuum is created in the cavity, and due to the difference in atmospheric and intracavitary pressures, the binder is drawn into the working cavity and impregnates the reinforcing material. The method significantly improves the "fiber-resin" ratio in the laminate, resulting in a stronger (~ 25%) and light (~ 20%) product.

    The advantage of the ship's hull is higher strength in comparison with steel hulls, which provides greater survivability of the ship when searching for mines. The service life of a body made of monolithic fiberglass is greater than that of a case made of low-magnetic steel, and the body weight is much smaller.
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    George1

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  George1 on Thu Apr 26, 2018 1:17 pm

    The minesweeper "Ivan Antonov" project 12700 was launched

    On April 25, 2018, the ceremony of launching the 1270000 (Alexandrite code) sea mine trawler "Ivan Antonov" (serial number 523) under construction for the Russian Navy was held at the Sredne-Nevsky Shipyard (SNAZ) in St. Petersburg. became the second ship of this type. The ceremony was attended by Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy for Armament, Vice-Admiral V.I. Bursuk, vice-governor of St. Petersburg, M.P. Mokretsov, general director of Almaz JSC (project developer 12700) AV Shlyakhtenko.

    The sea minesweeper "Ivan Antonov" is being built as part of the first contract for the construction of the first three serial ships of the project 12700 (factory numbers 522-524), concluded in April 2014, with the SNHS with the Russian Ministry of Defense. The first serial ship under this contract was to be the trawler "George Kurbatov" (plant number 522), officially laid on the SNSS on April 24, 2015, but the hull of the ship was seriously damaged in the fire on June 7, 2016, after which it was subjected to almost complete recovery. As a result, the minesweeper "Ivan Antonov" laid on January 25, 2017 became the first serial ship of the project 12700, launched. The third mine-sweeper under this contract, Vladimir Yemelyanov (plant number 524) was laid on April 20, 2017. The delivery of these three ships under the terms of the contract was to be made in 2016-2018, however, now the first "Ivan Antonov" will be delivered at best by the end of 2018.

    Prior to that, the SNHS under the contract with the Russian Defense Ministry on March 30, 2007, renamed June 10, 2014, carried out the construction of the head minesweeper project 12700 "Alexander Obukhov" (plant number 521). The trawler "Alexander Obukhov" was started by construction on the SNHS in 2007, officially laid down on September 22, 2011, launched on June 27, 2014, and began factory road tests on April 29, 2016. The transfer of Alexander Obukhov to the Russian Navy took place in Kronshtadt on December 9, 2016.

    In 2016, the SNCZ signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense of Russia for three mine-action ships of the 12700 project. The head minesweeper for this contract, Yakov Balyayev (plant number 525), was officially laid on the SNSZ on December 26, 2017.

    As Captain 1st Rank Mikhail Krasnopeev, Deputy Chief of the Shipbuilding Department of the Russian Navy, declared at the ceremony of laying the Yaakov Balaev trawler, the Russian Navy expects to receive 10 ships of the project until 2027 [that is, under the State Arms Program for 2018-2027] 12700.









    https://bmpd.livejournal.com/3174577.html

    hoom

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    Re: Project 12700 Minesweeper thread

    Post  hoom on Wed May 30, 2018 10:01 am

    https://flotprom.ru/2018/%D0%A1%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%B716/
    Apparently Ivan Antonov is going to BSF, gonna be towed via river/canal system.

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