Leaving a part the clumsy attempts to "parry" the possible ,for its committers, by part of the poor and unprepared P. Podvig (i remeber vividly how it escaped at light speed from elaborating from a series of titanical self-embarrassing technical mistakes, about the difference of standard measure for precision and accuracy of ballistic missiles between western and Soviet testing literature, that it had employed in a interchangeable way like it was the last of elementary school kids) also taking into account that if someone want to control what was already the reasons for abandon the INF Treaty can read this very interesting piece titled "A Cold War missile treaty that’s doing us harm" wrote by John R. Bolton himself (and A. De Sutter) in the far 2011, much before the ridicule excuse of the NATO designated "9M-279",
The bulk of the question is centered at today around the attempt by USA to "employ" the potential placement of INF systems on foreign soil as an "exchange money" to gain the inclusion of the new type of Federation weapons among the banned ones in the formulation of the renovated START.
We must take into consideration that Federation's authorities are perfectly aware that all the new class of perspective weapons do not technically fall under any agreed characteristics of limited systems contained in the START, that is clear from December 2018 confidential missive concerning START related issues envoyed by Federation specialists to US Congress (the translation of which was obtained by the Wall Street Journal)
You can read it at point V ,pag 9
How clearly imaginable, at the moment USA cannot put on the other plate of the balance startegic systems with the same, or even similar, technical characteristics and capabilities in order to exert the necessary pressure on the Federation to lead it to come to an agreement using the procedure contained in the first paragraph of the article XV of the START.
Therefore like happened for the technological gap in new gun and tube artillery, MBTs, IFVs, theatre range missiles, point/medium and long range AD systems, anti-ship missiles anti satellites and space defence systems etc.... US response usually consist in the mass deployment of modifications of inferior existing systems rendered in some way relevant thanks to the..........transitory..........complacency of its allies/vassals; this happened already in the '80 years and is reproposing itself today with theirs attempts with low yield warheads on theirs outdated ballistic missiles and possibly the placement of technically largely inferior CM of the BGM-109 family (and may be also a variation of AGM-154 that in its LRASM iteration has been already tested from MK-41 launchers ) in Poland, Japan and Sud-Korea.