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    NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

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    GarryB

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Sun Jun 12, 2011 12:44 pm


    Austin

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Austin on Wed Jun 22, 2011 7:36 am

    Missile Defense: Old Problem, No New Solution
    Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant publishing house

    The signing of the New START treaty and US President Obama’s decision to review the previous administration’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans had given rise to hopes that Russia and the United States could reach a compromise on this very sensitive issue. But after a year of fruitless “consultations” it is becoming obvious that the two sides’ positions on a new missile defense system for the 21st century are incompatible. The very idea of the Western and Russian missile defense systems being “interoperable” or “integrated” is facing a crisis. That crisis could well spill over into other areas of the strategic balance, as well as the two sides’ military doctrines and their relationship as a whole.

    New problems

    The reasons for the incompatibility of Russia’s and America’s positions on the new BMD and EuroBMD are twofold. On the one hand, Washington is convinced that new missile threats are real, or will become real in the very near future. It is determined to have in place a system that would guarantee protection from such threats. On the other hand, the Russian military and political leadership is certain that the new BMD system, including elements of EuroBMD, have the Russian strategic deterrence capability in the crosshairs. Both sides are making earnest and very public attempts to dissuade each other of their respective fundamental beliefs. It appears that these attempts have monopolized all the energies of the negotiators taking part in the ongoing “consultations”.

    The arguments used by the Russian military leadership – i.e the General Staff and its key departments involved in the formulation of the Russian position at the negotiations – are especially interesting. Up until recently, voicing the Russian stance on the BMD issue was the remit of the president or senior Foreign Ministry officials. But in the past few months the generals have been increasingly talkative. It appears that the General Staff, rather than the political officialdom, is now formulating Russia’s stance at the 2010-2011 “consultations” on missile defense. The truth of that assumption was amply demonstrated in May 2011 during the open scientific and practical conference headlined “The Russian position on EuroBMD”. The event was attended by the head of the General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov; his deputy, Col Gen Valeriy Gerasimov; the head of the Main Operational Directorate, Lt Gen Andrey Tretyakov; and the deputy head of the Main Intelligence Department (GRU), Lt Gen Vyacheslav Kondrashov.

    Russian generals do not deny that the “potential threat from the south” really exists. But they insist that the threat is very vague and uncertain, and that it does not require any urgent countermeasures. Neither Iran nor North Korea has any delivery systems with sufficient range. Neither has any hope of acquiring them any time soon. That is the official position of the GRU, which has never made such public forecasts before. The Russian generals believe that creating long-range missiles will require many years and many test launches, which will not go unnoticed. When that happens, that will be the time to react, they say.

    In terms of technology, no-one is saying that the first ICBM created by the “problem nations” will be on par with the Topol-M or the Trident II. These nations are developing technology that is fifty, forty or thirty years old. The intercontinental delivery means such technology can offer are simple, but reliable. From the military point of view, the argument that the threat is not urgent does not hold water. Once the problem nations have built their first ICBM, it will be too late to develop an BMD system in an effort to catch up with the situation. The best way to deal with threats is to anticipate and pre-empt them, not play catch-up.

    But the Russian generals have got it into their heads that America’s new BMD system and its EuroBMD segment are aimed against the Russian ICBMs. All attempts to persuade them to the contrary are falling on deaf ears.

    Ever since the first (now abandoned) plans were announced to station heavy silo-based GBI missile interceptors in Poland, the Russian generals have argued that these interceptor sites could become a serious threat to the Russian ICBMs stationed in the west of the country. It is true that the flight paths of the missiles heading from Bologoye or Kozelsk to the Eastern seaboard lie in the same general area, not directly over Poland but to the north of it. If official US information is to be believed, however, the location of the interceptor sites in Poland is a far better match for the flight paths originating in Iran, not Bologoye. In order to pose a threat to the Russian ICBMs, the GBIs stationed in Poland must be able to intercept missiles launched in their near vicinity. That requires either a lightning-fast response time or enormous acceleration plus mind-boggling trajectory to catch up with the Topol ICBMs.

    Such incredible specifications of the GBI interceptors (i.e. lighting-fast response time and the interceptor’s ability to reach any point of the threat missile’s trajectory with lighting speed) would mean that United States has achieved a technological breakthrough on par with the invention of the nuclear bomb. The GBIs have been abandoned – but now the same implausible specifications are being ascribed to the SM-3 missile interceptors, the core of the new-configuration EuroBMD system.

    The real (rather than imaginary) capabilities of the proposed American BMD system still remain an open question. Washington is being quite honest about the projected numbers of interceptors - although the figures can of course change. The need for honesty here is explained by the budgetary and congressional procedures, the obligation to inform NATO partners, and the long-standing general principles of America’s defense policy. Moscow, meanwhile, has always accepted that in the currently proposed configuration and scope, the new American BMD system is a much better match for the Iranian type of threat. It will not be able to neutralize the entire Russian strategic deterrence capability, even once the Russian nuclear arsenal has shrunk to the size specified in the New START treaty, i.e. 700-800 delivery systems and 1,550 warheads. Countering that type of threat would require a far more complex BMD system, with thousands of interceptors and probably dozens of interceptor launch sites. The validity of these considerations has always been recognized in Moscow - but they have never been seen as proof that America’s missile defense system is not aimed against Russia.

    Old thinking

    The Russian generals’ firm rejection of the very idea of an American missile defense system, in whichever shape or form, informs the entire Russian negotiating position. First, Moscow demands “legally binding guarantees” that the BMD system will not be aimed against Russia. And second, it proposes that a joint system should be built instead of a purely Western one, with each side responsible for countering missile threats in its own geographic sector.

    The notion of unilateral “legally binding guarantees” seems to be a curious new invention by the Russian negotiators, since there are no historical precedents of such guarantees. Why didn’t Leonid Brezhnev simply ask America for “legally binding guarantees” that its nuclear missiles are not aimed against Russia? Why did he choose instead to spend all that time and effort on the strategic arms limitation talks? And what about Brezhnev’s own unilateral “legally binding guarantees”, given of his own free will to the world, that the Soviet Union would never be the first country to use nuclear weapons? Why did the international community view such guarantees as nothing but an empty political declaration?

    How exactly are the “guarantees” demanded by Russia supposed to work? Will Moscow be satisfied by a declaration that “the United States will never use its missile defense system against Russian missiles”? How much would such a declaration be worth, exactly? Even in peacetime the principles of sovereignty make it possible for any country to withdraw from any of its international commitments. In the event of war or a real and imminent threat, such guarantees are worth precisely zero. If, on the other hand, Moscow requires more specific commitments, with restrictions on the numbers, capability and geography of the interceptors, then it must understand that such guarantees cannot be issued unilaterally. By rights they should be part of a new treaty about a new missile defense system – but that is not the subject of the negotiations now under way.

    Russia’s sectoral BMD proposal stems from its fears about the launch sites in Poland, as well as in the Baltic region and northern Europe in general. Moscow has already said officially that it would not really care about BMD sites in Romania. But it is becoming increasingly obvious that the region Russia wants to be assigned to its own sector of the proposed sectoral BMD system includes Poland, the Baltic states and Scandinavia. That poses a number of intractable problems. First, why exactly should the NATO member states in the region entrust their defense to Moscow? Russia may be a partner of the alliance, but it is not a member. Second, can these countries ever accept such an arrangement as sovereign states? And finally, will Russia actually have the technical capability to protect from missile threats the region it wants assigned to its sector?

    The Daryal-type early warning radar in Gabala (Azerbaijan) is Russia’s first proposed contribution to the EuroBMD system. It must be said that the radar would be a valuable asset as it covers the southern areas where the potential missile threat might originate. The radar can be integrated into a joint BMD system – but for reasons of its original design and specifications, it will not actually be able to guide American or Russian interceptors to their targets. Theoretically, Russia could also contribute the Don-2N multirole surveillance station near Moscow. The station, which has a 360 degrees field of view, would have to be upgraded before it can be integrated into the joint BMD system. But the Don-2N is part of Russia’s own missile defense system that covers the area around Moscow, so it is not clear whether Russia would be prepared to share that vital facility in any capacity.

    Be that as it may, there is nothing else Moscow could usefully contribute. It has an advanced Voronezh-DM early warning radar in Armavir, which many commentators include in the list of the proposed joint BMD system’s potential Russian assets. But it is not at all clear whether that would be possible and, more importantly, necessary. According to open-source information, the edge of the Armavir radar’s field of view runs along the middle of the European continent from east to west. In the east the line runs from Armavir to the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, then on to Turkey, Syria and further south. In other words, the radar’s field of view includes part of the Middle East, the Mediterranean and almost the whole of North Africa – but not Iran, which is shielded from the radar by the Caucasian Mountains. Another Voronezh-DM radar station now being built near Kaliningrad is even less useful, since it is directed towards Europe. In any event, all these radars can potentially be used as elements of a missile attack warning system, but not of an actual missile defense system.

    The situation with interceptors and guidance radars is even less certain. After Russia specified the boundaries of the sector it wants to claim for itself in the proposed “sectoral” BMD system, the commander of the Russian Space Troops, Lt Gen Oleg Ostapenko, made a sensational statement. He insisted that Russia can defend that sector without actually stationing any of the interceptors or guidance radars on its territory. How exactly Russia is supposed to pull off such a feat is a mystery. All its existing BMD systems, both strategic (around Moscow) and tactical, are built on the opposite principle.

    What little is known about the Russian missile defense efforts from official documents and open sources suggests that the available financing is woefully inadequate, given the monumental scale of the task. More information is available about the missile defense capabilities of the advanced S-500 SAM system now being developed. But it is not clear when that system might be ready or how many units the Russian defense industry can realistically deliver. Given that Russia is still struggling with the less complex S-400 (SA-21) SAM system, the prospects for the S-500 do not look very rosy. The bottom line is that it is not clear what exactly Russia could contribute to the EuroBMD system, other than one or two early warning radars.

    Another thing to consider is that Russia’s threats to station missiles near Kaliningrad or to start building intermediate range missiles again if America stations elements of its BMD system in Europe run counter to the very idea of joint missile defense. The crisis is compounded by the rhetoric which only serves to unnerve the opposite side even further. One way or another, both sides are demonstrating that they are not ready for meaningful cooperation on an issue which both of them have declared as vital. A return to the Cold War, or at the very least a major chill in the relations between Russia and the United States over the BMD crisis now seem a distinct possibility.

    The obstinacy, suspiciousness and mistrust over missile defense contrast sharply with the spirit and letter of the New START treaty, which was a real breakthrough in terms of openness, compromise and mutual trust. It appears that the generals and the conservatives in the diplomatic community have been given too much say in the ongoing missile defense “consultations”. The talks urgently need a major political impulse at the highest level from both sides, similar to the impulse given to the New START talks at their final stages. Unless that happens, chances for meaningful progress are slim. Whether the meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Barak Obama in Deauville has provided such an impulse will become clear in the coming months.

    Pervius

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Pervius on Sat Jun 25, 2011 6:38 pm

    """Will Moscow be satisfied by a declaration that “the United States will never use its missile defense system against Russian missiles”? """"


    Only if they are fools. What's that USAF spaceship been doing up there? Has Russia countered that with one of their own yet??



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    GarryB

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Mon Jun 27, 2011 3:25 am

    The west has a long post cold war record of making all sorts of promises and with a change of government they break those promises because it was verbal and not written on paper.

    Is it any wonder that the Russians now ask for written promises regarding ABM systems in Europe?

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    GarryB

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Tue Jun 28, 2011 2:34 pm

    How many missions has Russia sent to Mars that failed? 30? 40? Deep Space isn't Russia's forte.

    Actually Russia has only really had failures in regard to the red planet.

    Its successes with Venus have been impressive with the atmosphere of Venus being a much more challenging environment to operate in.

    The laser on the moon could zap any attempt to get out there.

    What laser on the moon?

    There are reflectors on the moon that you can bounce a laser off, but the signal on Earth is tiny... a few photons that require large telescopes to detect.

    ""An introduction to atmospheric radiation"" By Kuo-Nan Liou. The suns emissions if focused with a mirror could overload your satellites ability to release heat. Hence why Satellites have gone offline the last year. The sun alone took those satellites out. Now imagine you had a mirror setup able to focus that energy onto an ant...I mean satellite....burn baby burn.

    L2 is 4 times the distance from Earth as the Moon... it would be much more efficient to get a 6 metre diameter mirror on Earth to shine light up at satellites to knock them out.

    Have another satellite able to re-direct that energy to Earth.....and you sir have THE most powerful weapon.

    As I said the mirrors need to be kept cryogenically cool to keep their shape and look at deep space objects. Shine sunlight on them and they will warp and will not focus anything anywhere. They will be useless till the entire mirror is a uniform temperature again and the difference in temperature between cryogenically cold and the temperature of sunlight in open space would crack the mirrors and make them useless... that is why it needs a sunshield... to protect the mirrors.

    The telescope has a focal length of 135m. The pieces of the mirror will not be able to focus the sun to a small point at any distance other than this distance.

    Hold a magnifying glass at its focal length distance from an insect... you can determine that distance but moving the glass till the sunlight forms the smallest sharpest bright circle you can manage. That is the focal distance and it is fixed by the shape of the glass.

    It is the same for the telescope except its focal distance is fixed by the curve of the mirror segments.

    Using the telescope as a weapon is like trying to use that hand held magnifying glass to focus light 100m away... physics wont allow it as its focal length is fixed by its physical shape.
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    Russian Patriot

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    Turkey To Host NATO Missile-Defense Radar

    Post  Russian Patriot on Sat Sep 03, 2011 9:54 pm

    Turkey To Host NATO Missile-Defense Radar

    02.09.2011 10:12

    Turkey says it has reached agreement on the deployment of a radar on its territory as part of NATO's missile-defense system.

    The Turkish Foreign Ministry said in a statement issued on September 1 that discussions "have reached their final stages."

    Leaders of the 28-member NATO alliance endorsed plans in Lisbon last year to launch a Europe-wide ballistic missile shield.

    The statement said the Turkish contribution will "strengthen NATO's defense capacity and Turkey's national defense system."

    It did not say when or where the radar would be stationed.

    Under the NATO plan, a system of U.S. antimissile interceptors and radars already planned for Europe -- to include interceptors in Romania and Poland as well as the radar in Turkey -- will be linked to European-owned missile defenses.

    Russia opposes the planned system, arguing that it could threaten or undermine its own security.

    compiled from agency reports

    Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/turkey_to_host_nato_missile_defense_radar/24315682.html

    Copyright (c) 2011. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/library/news/2011/space-110902-rferl01.htm
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    Viktor

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Viktor on Sat Sep 03, 2011 10:13 pm

    Well this will spark retaliation. X-band radar instead of SM-3/THAAD in EU is gonna piss off Russkies.
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    GarryB

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Sun Sep 04, 2011 4:11 am

    Russia has a range of options for retaliation... my personal favourite would be to withdraw from the INF treaty.
    Russia is developing a Space and Air Defence Force to protect Russian airspace and above which should at the very least be able to deal with all sorts of ballistic missiles from theatre based right up to intermediate range weapons, so banning IRBM development is only harming Russian interests.

    Russia could build IRBMs that simply don't have the range to reach the US, but do have the range to reach all of Europe and China, and would be much cheaper to produce than the ICBMs they have to use at the moment to target Europe and China.
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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Viktor on Sun Sep 04, 2011 12:41 pm

    Depending on what S-500 system is going to be by simple placing it close to US ABM you could ensure protection for ICBM flying towards US.

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    GarryB

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Sun Sep 04, 2011 4:16 pm

    Not really.

    There is a significant difference between a missile like S-500 designed to hit long range ballistic missiles, and a missile that can shoot down missiles that shoot down ballistic missiles...

    They are completely different problems.

    The best solution to an ABM defence is instead of firing 5 or 10 ICBMs, you fire about 500 IRBMs instead and completely overwhelm the system... especially when over half the missiles target the components of the ABM system directly.

    Removing the INF treaty means that Russia could simply build thousands and thousands of Kh-55 like cruise missiles, which are incredibly cheap and mobile.

    Cruise missiles carried by strategic bombers are limited by treaty as strategic weapons, but land based cruise missiles with a range of less than 5,500km are by definition not strategic weapons and Russia can have as many as they want. The current problem is that any weapon with a range of more than 500km and less than 5,500km that is surface launched... whether it is ballistic or cruise missile is covered by the INF treaty... which bans Russia and the US from having them... but it bans no one else from having them.
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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Viktor on Sun Sep 04, 2011 6:28 pm

    GarryB wrote:Not really.

    There is a significant difference between a missile like S-500 designed to hit long range ballistic missiles, and a missile that can shoot down missiles that shoot down ballistic missiles...

    They are completely different problems.


    Well Radar can be the only problem depending of what is looking at but why not shoot down ICBM in its boost phase with system like S-400 or S-500. For example in its original plan ABM interceptors where to be launched from Poland. Having S-500 in Kaliningrad would pose no trouble for S-500 to shoot down GBI during its boost phase.



    GarryB wrote:The best solution to an ABM defence is instead of firing 5 or 10 ICBMs, you fire about 500 IRBMs instead and completely overwhelm the system... especially when over half the missiles target the components of the ABM system directly.

    Removing the INF treaty means that Russia could simply build thousands and thousands of Kh-55 like cruise missiles, which are incredibly cheap and mobile.

    Cruise missiles carried by strategic bombers are limited by treaty as strategic weapons, but land based cruise missiles with a range of less than 5,500km are by definition not strategic weapons and Russia can have as many as they want. The current problem is that any weapon with a range of more than 500km and less than 5,500km that is surface launched... whether it is ballistic or cruise missile is covered by the INF treaty... which bans Russia and the US from having them... but it bans no one else from having them.


    Agree with that part buy S-500 example was one of the ways to ensure safe ICBM launch. Cozz if it comes to a point where US launch its ICBM first, Russia must do the same within 30 minutes. In such situation Russia will not launch IRBM at EU ABM first and than ICBM at US. There is no time for that. You need to launch right away and for you to do that in safe manner you need something to shoot down GBI.

    Other than that previous scenario Russia has range of option to destroy ABM in EU. Iskander/Iskander-M/Kh-555/101 and other cruise missiles launched from bombers/fighters.


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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Mindstorm on Sun Sep 04, 2011 7:30 pm

    In my opinion among the concerns ,perfectly grounded, by part of Russian military analysts for the NATO ABM project in East Europe, the radar with base in Turkey is by far the less worrying.

    The basis of the "problem" for which the ABM program (included the very quick abandonin by part of USA of the ABM treaty) is born, is ,at its root, an fast growing technological gap between Russian and American nuclear delivery systems ; in particular with the fast paced advent of Topol-M , Yars and now Bulava the gap turned in a truly security emergence ,above all in a scenario of reduced number of nuclear delivery means.

    About all western most authorative analysts in the sector was in fact united and adamantine in declaring that ,by reason of the astounding capabilities achieved by Topol-M class (and obviously even more the derived RS-24) of ICBM ,the only chance for even only attempt an intercept would have been ,of course, during boost phase (while its speed ,vector, signature and capability to maneuvre would have still offered a chance) and with interceptor placed or within or near to Russian borders.
    That is an extract from the analysis of Duncan Lennox on the subject:


    " The Russian SS-27, or Topol-M, is an intercontinental-range, ground-based, solid-propellant ballistic missile. It represents the pinnacle of ballistic missile technology, incorporating modern fuel and warhead designs, as well as being capable of being launched from both missile silos and Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicles. Current Russian accounts stress that the SS-27 is invulnerable to any modern anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses. Yuriy Solomonov, director of the Moscow Institute of Heat Technology and designer-general of the Topol family of missiles, has stated that the SS-27 will be the foundation of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal by 2015.


    The SS-27 is currently portrayed by Russian accounts as being immune to any ABM defense the United States can put into being. The missile is capable of making evasive maneuvers as it approaches its target, enabling it to evade any terminal phase interceptors. It almost certainly also carries countermeasures and decoys to decrease the chances of a successful targeting. The missile is shielded against radiation, electromagnetic interference and physical disturbance; previous missiles could be disabled by detonating a nuclear warhead within ten kilometers. This vulnerability is the basis behind the use of nuclear ground-based and orbital interceptors, to detonate or damage the missile before it reaches its target. However, the SS-27 is designed to be able to withstand nuclear blasts closer than 500 m, a difficult interception when combined with the terminal phase speed and maneuverability. While the boost phase is the most vulnerable time for the SS-27, it remains protected. Hidden safely within missile silos and mobile launchers, a successful boost-phase interceptor would have to be fired from near or within Russian borders or from space. And the SS-27 is also designed to survive a strike from any laser technology available, rendering any current space-based laser useless. The missile highlights the need for considerably more research into missile defenses, as the United States is currently defenseless while Russia is protected by a functional defense system.

    The SS-27 can strike any target within the continental United States. The deployment from hardened silos and hidden TEL vehicles makes it nearly impossible to successfully prevent launch and current ABM technology is insufficient to prevent its successful impact. As a solid propellant design, it can be maintained on alert for prolonged periods of time and can launch within minutes of being given the order. Its confirmed single 550 kT warhead is sufficient for the depopulation of cities, which combined with its survivability, makes it an ideal retaliatory weapon. The SS-27 enables Russia to guarantee a successful nuclear response."


    In this coldly technical perspective, become absolutely clear that last generation of russian strategical nuclear delivery systems has rendered suddenly obsolete any current ABM placed in the North America theatre and that the only credible response ,or for better say the only forced response, by part of NATO for this unacceptable fast growing gap in the technological level and efficiency of nuclear delivery systems (which even widen if we take into consideration the new prototypes of high hypersonic gliding re-entry vehicles, like IGLA - probably the yesterday test on an old Topol involved just that type of warhead-) was to exit quicly from the ABM treaty and prepare a new startegic anti-missile plan with basis in East europe ,for attempt to neutralize the Topol-M/Yars in the boost phase over the North Pole's vectors [the Wikipleaks's revelations on the long term plans,by part of USA, to lure also India in this titanic encircling anti-ballistic-missile project close to Russian borders is exemplary and in the same way ,obviously, totally unrelated to the wastly backward almsot not-existent Iranian menace.

    The initial plan was to place the high-end ground based interceptors in Poland, a good position for the task ,but the menace of Iskander-M from Kalingrad ,which would have pratically rendered the ABM interceptor totally useless (Iskander-M has an apogee by far too low to be intercepted by ABM in the boost phase and ,after that,it enjoy almost the same type of "invulnerability" to ABM of Topol-M) has persuaded NATO planners to accept a less advantageous position -Romania- requiring obviously much more interceptor for attempt the same task and a more long term plan to realize but completely out of reach of Iskander-M from Kalingrad.

    GarryB i perfectly agreewith you on the eventuality by part of Russia to exit from INF treaty ; i could bet my right arm,without any risk ,that this move would render the Iranian menace suddenly....not so dangerous....and that the immense and immensly costly anti-ballistic-missile project in East-Europe would be abandoned at light speed.



    Last edited by Mindstorm on Sun Sep 04, 2011 11:00 pm; edited 1 time in total
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    Viktor

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Viktor on Sun Sep 04, 2011 7:57 pm

    Mindstorm wrote:In my opinion among the concerns ,perfectly grounded, by part of Russian military analysts for the NATO ABM project in East Europe, the radar with base in Turkey is by far the less worrying.

    I dont think so. Cozz Turkey X-band is not the end of the story.

    At first you had a plan to put radar i Cezh republic and missiles in Poland. Now you have radar in Turkey with no idea where its looking or where the GBI/KEI missiles will be placed. Besides you have Patriot missiles in Poland and idea of placing SM-3 in Black Sea. Furthermore you have Romania and Bulgaria requesting some elements of ABM placed on its territory. So basically you have diversity with no end in sight and no will whats so ever about cooperation with Russia.


    Mindstorm wrote:The basis of the "problem" for which the ABM program (included the very quick abandonin by part of USA of the ABM treaty) is born, is ,at its root, an fast growing technological gap between Russian and American nuclear delivery systems ; in particular with the fast paced advent of Topol-M , Yars and now Bulava the gap turned in a truly security emergence ,above all in a scenario of reduced number of nuclear delivery means.

    About all western most authorative analysts in the sector was in fact united and adamantine in declaring that ,by reason of the astounding capabilities achieved by Topol-M class (and obviously even more the derived RS-24) of ICBM ,the only chance for even only attempt an intercept would have been ,of course, during boost phase (while its speed ,vector, signature and capability to maneuvre would have still offered a chance) and with interceptor placed or within or near to Russian borders.
    That is an extract from the analysis of Duncan Lennox on the subject:

    At the moment yes. Gap is too big. US had two failed SM-3/IB launchers in a row.
    Next GBI launch is scheuldered next year only after failed attempt and KEI has
    being cut off funds. More to it even US has more nuclear delivery systems they
    are way to old and reliable as last Minuteman test showed. Russia has modern
    ICBM/SLBM getting ever newer but with US close to 1 trillion defense budget who
    can tell you situation will not get worse. KEI getting funded, GBI/SM-3 break trow in capabilities and reliability? Who can ensure Russia that working GBI/KEI besides Patriot for its protection wont eventually be placed in Poland after all. So if you have 1 trillion defense budget state looking to develop ABM shield and place it all around you, you have a very big problem no matter how much its ABM shield is not working at the moment.


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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Mon Sep 05, 2011 1:43 am


    Well Radar can be the only problem depending of what is looking at but why not shoot down ICBM in its boost phase with system like S-400 or S-500. For example in its original plan ABM interceptors where to be launched from Poland. Having S-500 in Kaliningrad would pose no trouble for S-500 to shoot down GBI during its boost phase.

    It is a question of speed and distance and positioning.

    By putting the radar in the Czech republic and the missiles in Poland the US basically positioned the radar and the missiles directly under the flight path of Russian missiles heading for the UK or France or Germany.
    This makes it an ideal position to fly up an intercept them... remember GBI is the size of an IRBM at about 10 tons and has a range of about 3,500 miles and is designed to intercept a ballistic target high up in its trajectory. Its path is not curved or parabolic, it will depend which target it is chasing and it will try to lead its target, but its target will be moving much faster than it will be moving.

    The S-500 on the other hand will have a horizontal range of 600km and maybe an operational height of 250km at best in the first versions. Later versions might extend that further out into space, but S-500 will not be able to intercept GBI when GBI is intercepting targets 500-2,000km up.... whether it is stationed in Kaliningrad, or indeed if they let it be stationed in Poland.

    Other than that previous scenario Russia has range of option to destroy ABM in EU. Iskander/Iskander-M/Kh-555/101 and other cruise missiles launched from bombers/fighters.

    Cruise missiles are not really fast enough for ABM targets... by the time your cruise missiles get to the target US ICBMs would have landed in Russia... Russia can't wait that long to launch its ICBMs.

    Keep in mind with START the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs and strategic bomber launched cruise missiles is limited, while the number and strength of ABM systems will only increase... if Russia lets it.

    This is not about Russia wanting to destroy the EU with nuclear missiles. This is about Russia wanting to retain MAD because MAD actually works.

    The idea of MAD is that he wont fire at me or escalate to all out war with me because he knows I have unstoppable weapons that will mortally wound his country... and I wont attack him for the same reasons. ABM defences creates doubt about whether those unstoppable weapons really are unstoppable, and when 10 interceptors turn into 50 and each interceptor starts getting multiple warheads to deal with MIRV and MARV warheads and the START treaties keep reducing the number of warheads you are allowed pretty soon you get to the point where you think... hey... if I can sneak some stealth bombers in there and they can take out this that or the other airfield with all his strategic bombers and that ICBM field there and my SLBMs can carpet his only base with SSBNs and my seawolfs and virginias that are shadowing his SSBNs currently at sea that might leave only a few ICBMs that might get launched and with an ABM system in Europe and an ABM system in the US with 50 missiles...though there is no verification regime in place so they could just as easily have 200, then a first strike might start looking like a real option.

    I think a first strike being an option is bad for everyone because full scale nuclear war is not good for the environment and is something that should be avoided.

    The US seems to think they can build this ABM system and ignore Russias feelings because the cold war is "over". The Russians know that relations are that good that such a system would never be part of the military force that is NATO that is still directed largely against them, so they are naturally suspicious and they have had all sorts of promises from the west... give up communism and be welcomed into the international community, NATO will not expand east, Nato will not expand into former soviet republics, NATO will not base troops in eastern europe or former soviet republics...

    The lesson they learned was that they didn't get any of that on paper, which is presumably why they want a signed document saying the US ABM system in Europe will not be used against Russia, and also presumably why NATO doesn't want to sign it... they plan to back track when needed.

    In my opinion among the concerns ,perfectly grounded, by part of Russian military analysts for the NATO ABM project in East Europe, the radar with base in Turkey is by far the less worrying.

    The sea based component would have to be based in the Med and the Black Sea... I doubt that will make Russia very happy with such a build up of US vessels, though the Black Sea is a barrel when it comes to shooting fish if you know what I mean.

    The big problem is not what their immediate plans for the ABM system are, but with future upgrades it becomes a layered system that will be improved and made much more effective... and more to the point such plans and upgrades will not need to be revealed because there is no treaty or agreement limiting the parameters of an ABM system... it will become another arms race.

    [the Wikipleaks's revelations on the long term plans,by part of USA, to lure also India in this titanic encircling anti-ballistic-missile project close to Russian borders is exemplary and in the same way ,obviously, totally unrelated to the wastly backward almsot not-existent Iranian menace.

    The thing to keep in mind about wikileaks is that it is the opinions and goals of the US officials concerned... even if they could fool India into joining this ridiculous scheme all it will buy them is a new confrontation against a new high tech Russia with a hair trigger.
    As I said the first thing to go will be the INF treaty but it might cost them the new START treaty too.
    The Russians are reportedly working on a new heavy missile to replace the SS-18... and with the accuracy achieved with new missiles and technology reducing the warhead size and weight there were estimations in the west that the SS-18 could carry 30 warheads if they wanted it to, well lets make it 40 with the new missile... and don't target military objectives... they can be city busters... each aimed at a population centre for maximum megadeath counts.

    If the US wants the cold war back so bad let them have it... building ICBMs is much cheaper than stopping them.

    The initial plan was to place the high-end ground based interceptors in Poland, a good position for the task ,but the menace of Iskander-M from Kalingrad ,which would have pratically rendered the ABM interceptor totally useless (Iskander-M has an apogee by far too low to be intercepted by ABM in the boost phase and ,after that,it enjoy almost the same type of "invulnerability" to ABM of Topol-M) has persuaded NATO planners to accept a less advantageous position -Romania- requiring obviously much more interceptor for attempt the same task and a more long term plan to realize but completely out of reach of Iskander-M from Kalingrad.

    Hense the talk a while back about plans to increase the range of Tender-M (Iskander) and an eventual replacement missile with longer range... with the INF treaty gone there is no practical limit to the Tenders range... they can fit ICBMs on trucks they can carry very heavy missiles if need be.

    .and that the immense and immensly costly anti-ballistic-missile project in East-Europe would be abandoned at light speed.

    The sooner they dump it the safer we will all be.
    I think the whole purpose of the program is to get Russia to react in ways that will alienate it from Europe... in other words it is the US keeping Russia and Europe separate.

    It amuses me that Europe is so dumb to be played like that, but then when it comes to keeping Russia out of Europe there will always be Eastern European countries lining up to volunteer.

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Mindstorm on Mon Sep 05, 2011 4:19 pm

    Hense the talk a while back about plans to increase the range of Tender-M (Iskander) and an eventual replacement missile with longer range... with the INF treaty gone there is no practical limit to the Tenders range... they can fit ICBMs on trucks they can carry very heavy missiles if need be.

    Yes GerryB this is surely true ,but we must also realise that if the ABM plan in East Europe would for any reason need more time than initially planneed ....cough...cough.... repeated failures of the latest intercept tests against short range thetare balistic missiles devoid of any type anti-intercept capability ...cough ..cough..., probably the time window of its operative introduction will "unluckily" coincide with the entry on the scene of new type of intermediate range menaces which will render also the placement of the ABM's elements in Romania,out of reach of actual Tender-M, at least in theirs officially declared engagement range, , completely pointless : hypersonic cruise missile.

    http://lenta.ru/news/2011/08/18/hyper/

    In this optic i can bet that the NATO plan will change face several more times;in fact the elements of the ABM complex placed in East Europe for attempt to "patch" the problems caused by the new Russian balistic nuclear delivery systems ,vulnerable exclusively while still in their boost phase, will always be extremely frail against intermediate nuclear offensive systems of different nature which can count obviously on the combined military resources and assets present in the more than half of Russian Federation ,already in place in the theatre; hypersonic cruise missile will have, among those offensive means, both the range and ,above all ,the speed to allow the employement of russian nuclear triad also in case of response scenario.

    The problem will be that those type of weapons (nuclear hypersonic missile) ,to remain efficient in a retaliation scenario, would be used in a "shoot on warning" mode, and this will only enormously deteriorate ,instead of increase ,the security level of Europe.

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Tue Sep 06, 2011 1:44 pm

    and this will only enormously deteriorate ,instead of increase ,the security level of Europe.

    The main problem with the MAD philosophy is that is sounds mad, but in actual fact it is the most sane and rational approach between to powerful forces that have no trust.

    It worked all through the cold war and it works now.

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Pervius on Tue Sep 06, 2011 4:16 pm

    GarryB wrote:
    and this will only enormously deteriorate ,instead of increase ,the security level of Europe.

    The main problem with the MAD philosophy is that is sounds mad, but in actual fact it is the most sane and rational approach between to powerful forces that have no trust.

    It worked all through the cold war and it works now.



    The problem now is old people in America truly are MAD. Start looking up "Toxic LEAD water in Washington DC". Due to too many peoples poo they had to start heavily chlorinating water supply to Washington DC. Excessive chlorine ate away LEAD water pipes. Made water supply toxic. For 2 years they didn't tell anyone, as they all drank toxic levels of LEAD.

    Washington DC/Pentagon truly IS MAD. Poisoned themselves.

    This could be the tipping point in human history where irrational plans/actions are done by true......madmen. Make sure global history books remembers this point.
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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Viktor on Tue Sep 06, 2011 8:23 pm

    GarryB wrote:It is a question of speed and distance and positioning.

    By putting the radar in the Czech republic and the missiles in Poland the US basically positioned the radar and the missiles directly under the flight path of Russian missiles heading for the UK or France or Germany.
    This makes it an ideal position to fly up an intercept them... remember GBI is the size of an IRBM at about 10 tons and has a range of about 3,500 miles and is designed to intercept a ballistic target high up in its trajectory. Its path is not curved or parabolic, it will depend which target it is chasing and it will try to lead its target, but its target will be moving much faster than it will be moving.

    The S-500 on the other hand will have a horizontal range of 600km and maybe an operational height of 250km at best in the first versions. Later versions might extend that further out into space, but S-500 will not be able to intercept GBI when GBI is intercepting targets 500-2,000km up.... whether it is stationed in Kaliningrad, or indeed if they let it be stationed in Poland.

    I know what you mean but I was not thinking the same thing. ABM in EU is projected to counter Russian ICBM launched from its European part, flying over North Pole, no mater US ABM stationed in Alaska. Thats why X-band in Cezch republic besides Iran is able to cover Russia all the way to the Urals region. Forward part of ICBM launch path would cover radar placed in Britain. So GBI launched toward ICBM from Russian missile silo would have to pass over or near Kaliningrad. I think it could be cached with S-500 like system even from Belarus not to mention Kiliningrad while gaining speed and attitude in its boost phase. Nuclear tipped Iskander placed in the same area would be assigned to punish puppet states having ABM on its territory (to avoid such threat Topol-M has ability to manouvre during its boost phase for the same reason). What I mean to say you dont need space attitude S-500 to shoot down ICBM like missiles. You just need to be close to it.


    GarryB wrote:Keep in mind with START the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs and strategic bomber launched cruise missiles is limited, while the number and strength of ABM systems will only increase... if Russia lets it.

    Thats why Im looking foward S-500 missile system that will form basis for Russia national missile defense system. Cozz basically every missile can be used as ABM as long as it has enough time to be in the right place at the right time and in order for it to do so it needs proper radar coverage/range to got there. S-500 will be linked to Russia EW radar system and EW satellites. That should ensure parity of some kind.

    GarryB wrote:This is not about Russia wanting to destroy the EU with nuclear missiles. This is about Russia wanting to retain MAD because MAD actually works.

    The idea of MAD is that he wont fire at me or escalate to all out war with me because he knows I have unstoppable weapons that will mortally wound his country... and I wont attack him for the same reasons. ABM defences creates doubt about whether those unstoppable weapons really are unstoppable, and when 10 interceptors turn into 50 and each interceptor starts getting multiple warheads to deal with MIRV and MARV warheads and the START treaties keep reducing the number of warheads you are allowed pretty soon you get to the point where you think... hey... if I can sneak some stealth bombers in there and they can take out this that or the other airfield with all his strategic bombers and that ICBM field there and my SLBMs can carpet his only base with SSBNs and my seawolfs and virginias that are shadowing his SSBNs currently at sea that might leave only a few ICBMs that might get launched and with an ABM system in Europe and an ABM system in the US with 50 missiles...though there is no verification regime in place so they could just as easily have 200, then a first strike might start looking like a real option.

    I think a first strike being an option is bad for everyone because full scale nuclear war is not good for the environment and is something that should be avoided.

    Im well aware of how MAD works and its implications during Cold War but thx for
    such amusement way of telling info. LOL.


    GarryB wrote:The US seems to think they can build this ABM system and ignore Russias feelings because the cold war is "over". The Russians know that relations are that good that such a system would never be part of the military force that is NATO that is still directed largely against them, so they are naturally suspicious and they have had all sorts of promises from the west... give up communism and be welcomed into the international community, NATO will not expand east, Nato will not expand into former soviet republics, NATO will not base troops in eastern europe or former soviet republics...

    The lesson they learned was that they didn't get any of that on paper, which is presumably why they want a signed document saying the US ABM system in Europe will not be used against Russia, and also presumably why NATO doesn't want to sign it... they plan to back track when needed.

    And for that reason INF needs to go. US has broken so much promises it can not be trusted any more. More to it, it does not want to sign treaty of no use of weapons in space Russia and China are insisting but at the same time complaining every time China shoots down one of its satellites while at the same time doing same thing and developing global strike weapon project. I have a feeling it wont take long Star wars like project will appear at each of those big states.

    GarryB wrote:The sea based component would have to be based in the Med and the Black Sea... I doubt that will make Russia very happy with such a build up of US vessels, though the Black Sea is a barrel when it comes to shooting fish if you know what I mean.

    I know. Thats why BSF got few Bastion systems. Nuff said. But still having US AEGIS/SM-3 armed ships in barrel does not mean you will have only that. The rest will follow and situation could get complicated. I wonder is Iskander able to target ships. Its stated ability to target moving object and has range of guidance - radar/optical/IC etc. Having to keep your head from cruise and ballistic missiles complicated things.

    GarryB wrote:The big problem is not what their immediate plans for the ABM system are, but with future upgrades it becomes a layered system that will be improved and made much more effective... and more to the point such plans and upgrades will not need to be revealed because there is no treaty or agreement limiting the parameters of an ABM system... it will become another arms race.


    The only problem is time and money and US has both. It out of question that in near future Russia will have to face working GBI/KEI and tactical THAAD/SM3 all connected with EW satellites and EW radars (at sea and land). Russia responses could led to new cold war. Only real looser in such race is passive Europe who time and time again lets animosities occur on its territory. If like two world wars was not enough to realise. US has always fought wars well away from its territory living its cities and industries intact. Came to think of it in Libya they learned others to fight their wars.


    GarryB wrote:The thing to keep in mind about wikileaks is that it is the opinions and goals of the US officials concerned... even if they could fool India into joining this ridiculous scheme all it will buy them is a new confrontation against a new high tech Russia with a hair trigger.

    I read about it few days ago. Interesting. Im have a feeling India might pop in because of China. China and India are amassing its armies near border. Besides standard items like tanks and planes and roads and runway big missiles started to appear. That and Pakistan relentless drive toward nuclear tipped IRBM on the one hand and NATO offer on the other could prove just to much for India. Implications could ruin Russia India relations.


    GarryB wrote:As I said the first thing to go will be the INF treaty but it might cost them the new START treaty too.
    The Russians are reportedly working on a new heavy missile to replace the SS-18... and with the accuracy achieved with new missiles and technology reducing the warhead size and weight there were estimations in the west that the SS-18 could carry 30 warheads if they wanted it to, well lets make it 40 with the new missile... and don't target military objectives... they can be city busters... each aimed at a population centre for maximum megadeath counts.

    If the US wants the cold war back so bad let them have it... building ICBMs is much cheaper than stopping them.

    Agree, INF must go. Strangely it has not gone when US pulled of ABM treaty.

    GarryB wrote:Hense the talk a while back about plans to increase the range of Tender-M (Iskander) and an eventual replacement missile with longer range... with the INF treaty gone there is no practical limit to the Tenders range... they can fit ICBMs on trucks they can carry very heavy missiles if need be.

    I like FOBS batter. Very Happy


    GarryB wrote:The sooner they dump it the safer we will all be.
    I think the whole purpose of the program is to get Russia to react in ways that will alienate it from Europe... in other words it is the US keeping Russia and Europe separate.

    It amuses me that Europe is so dumb to be played like that, but then when it comes to keeping Russia out of Europe there will always be Eastern European countries lining up to volunteer.

    I know, but as I said it will be EU that will gone like collateral victim in case of a shoot out.
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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Wed Sep 07, 2011 9:18 am

    Washington DC/Pentagon truly IS MAD. Poisoned themselves.

    This could be the tipping point in human history where irrational plans/actions are done by true......madmen. Make sure global history books remembers this point.

    The term "Mad as a hatter", comes from the result of the chemicals used in hat making that included lead that often led to madness.

    Not totally without president then...

    I know what you mean but I was not thinking the same thing. ABM in EU is projected to counter Russian ICBM launched from its European part, flying over North Pole, no mater US ABM stationed in Alaska. Thats why X-band in Cezch republic besides Iran is able to cover Russia all the way to the Urals region. Forward part of ICBM launch path would cover radar placed in Britain. So GBI launched toward ICBM from Russian missile silo would have to pass over or near Kaliningrad.

    That is the problem though... Russian ICBMs launched at the US would go over the north pole and any GBI missile fired to intercept would be a waste as ICBMs are much faster than the much smaller and much slower GBI missiles.
    To intercept missiles coming from Russia to the continental US they would need to be placed much closer to the US... like Alaska.
    In the time it takes for the Russian missiles to get airborne and on their way the US satellites will have detected their launch and confirmed their targets, missiles in Alaska would be prepared and launched as the targets came over the north pole to intercept them somewhere high in space over Canada.
    The only targets missiles in Poland could hit would be ICBMs being used against Britain and France and they would be very very high to reduce their range from intercontinental down to intermediate range, or a high speed depressed trajectory to trade speed for range... meaning range would be greatly reduced, but speed would be greatly increased.

    Either way shots at France and the UK and Belgium would go over Poland and the Czech republic.

    Shots at the US would go over the north pole.

    What I mean to say you dont need space attitude S-500 to shoot down ICBM like missiles. You just need to be close to it.

    The current new Russian ICBMs are designed for a very hot, very fast first stage burn to get the missile up and out of the atmosphere as quickly as possible to minimise any boost phase interception opportunities... with missiles or lasers.

    Unless the US system gets 10 minutes warning of an attack then it would simply not be possible to intercept Russian ICBMs going to the US with missiles in Europe.

    Very simply the interceptor missiles is a little kid throwing a rock, while the ICBM is a big powerful adult man throwing rocks and getting the kid to stand 50m behind and beside the man and not letting the kid throw the rock till he has seen the man throw the rock and hoping the kid can hit the mans rock with his rock.

    The GBI doesn't accelerate to as high a speed as the ICBM, and would have no chance of catching up in a race... and the GBI is always launched second.

    Would be like two planes flying in formation, one armed with an Igla missile and the other with an R-77. If the rules are that the R-77 gets fired first and a few seconds later once the other aircraft has determined the target of the R-77 it can fire an Igla at the R-77 then the Igla will never shoot down the R-77...

    Thats why Im looking foward S-500 missile system that will form basis for Russia national missile defense system. Cozz basically every missile can be used as ABM as long as it has enough time to be in the right place at the right time and in order for it to do so it needs proper radar coverage/range to got there. S-500 will be linked to Russia EW radar system and EW satellites. That should ensure parity of some kind.

    I think the S-500 will be cool too, but it wont be cheap, and the cost burden of trying to match a system the west wants to build is folly in my opinion.

    I think it will be very productive to build an air defence network with good coverage, but something that will stop everything is like the safe bank... it doesn't exist.

    Im well aware of how MAD works and its implications during Cold War but thx for
    such amusement way of telling info. LOL.

    It worked an it was cheap. What they are trying now will be enormously expensive... probably quite straight forward to defeat, and with little guarantee it will even work.

    And for that reason INF needs to go. US has broken so much promises it can not be trusted any more. More to it, it does not want to sign treaty of no use of weapons in space Russia and China are insisting but at the same time complaining every time China shoots down one of its satellites while at the same time doing same thing and developing global strike weapon project. I have a feeling it wont take long Star wars like project will appear at each of those big states.

    THe huge irony is that the US actually relies the most on space based assets and would have the most to lose from a weaponisation of space.

    ABM systems they are developing will lead to Russian and Chinese equivalents... and it is a very small step from an ABM that can hit an incoming ICBM, to a missile that can hit satellites in orbit. It is like the difference between an IRBM and an ICBM and both China and Russia can make that step easily... in fact the Russians were the first to put a satellite in orbit... taking out a satellite is simply a case of putting something large in an opposite orbit and waiting... every 45 minutes the satellite and the expanding cloud of debris will cross paths and even a paint chip at 22km/s can penetrate several centimetres of armour... let alone a payload of several hundred kilos of nails or small metal cubes.

    The only problem is time and money and US has both.

    Actually I would suggest the US has less money than it seems to think it has and US spending billions to "protect Europe" might lead to some in the US thinking that Europe can pay for its own defence if it wants it.
    This is just a US ploy to put US troops in Eastern European bases... a very expensive way, but the US is built on technology and this new ABM stuff will lead to new technology being developed... just like the space race did before it.

    It out of question that in near future Russia will have to face working GBI/KEI and tactical THAAD/SM3 all connected with EW satellites and EW radars (at sea and land). Russia responses could led to new cold war.

    But Russia doesn't need its own equivalent system to respond to this european system... it just needs the ability to defeat this system... lots of 2,000km range cruise missiles and 3-4,000km range ballistic missiles will suffice and not break the bank.

    Of course any response by Russia will lead to a new cold war... that is what the US wants... new cold war and Russia to blame for it even though the actions Russia takes against this American system they would not have done without the American system being built.

    BTW NATO has not be consulted at all with any of these ABM schemes, this is an American system that is supposed to be protecting Europe which Europe seems to have no say in... which in itself is curious don't you think?

    Unless its purpose is to get US troops into Eastern Europe and it is directed at Russia which some of western europe might not approve of.

    Implications could ruin Russia India relations.

    If Russian/India relations are that shallow then perhaps an end now would be better than later.

    I simply don't think they are that shallow.

    Of course there are likely a lot of Russians who think the biggest threat is a different skin colour, yet it has been those white skinned Brits and Germans and Americans, not to mention that white skinned Georgian bastard that has done the most damage to Russia over the last few centuries.
    There will also be a number of Indians who might believe the silver tongued Americans who couldn't tell a native American from someone from India when they first arrived on the US continent and racial relations have not improved since then.

    Agree, INF must go. Strangely it has not gone when US pulled of ABM treaty.

    It suits the US to keep it, and even enforce it on countries that did not sign it... they put lots of pressure on the Ukraine and Hungary to give up their IRBMs even though they didn't sign the INF treaty.

    I like FOBS batter.

    Currently FOBS would be a bad thing for Russia to use against Europe... sure the EMP pulse will wipe out most electronics in Europe, but it will also take down most of Russias satellites too because of their proximity... they would in effect be blinding themselves to strategic nuclear attack.

    I know, but as I said it will be EU that will gone like collateral victim in case of a shoot out.

    But that is the problem... they wont. As ICBM numbers are reduced and SLBM numbers are also reduced the number of targeting options diminishes and targets get left off the list... add to that any ABM defences and all of a sudden Russia might find itself made very vulnerable after all the bombs have gone off to a land attack from China and Europe...

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Mindstorm on Wed Sep 07, 2011 12:04 pm

    Russian ICBMs launched at the US would go over the north pole and any GBI missile fired to intercept would be a waste as ICBMs are much faster than the much smaller and much slower GBI missiles.
    To intercept missiles coming from Russia to the continental US they would need to be placed much closer to the US... like Alaska.


    Sorry GarryB for evidentiate that,but what is up asserted is simply, plainly technically untrue.
    As well explained by Duncan Lennox in person - and obviously that is the position shared by pratically the entire expert community both in West and in East by titanic western names of the field like Bruce W. MacDonald or Tom Z. Collina and eastern like Major General Vladimir Dvorkin or Aleksei Arbatov - the (still not operative ) ABM systems in Alaskla are completely useless against the new class of ICBM that Russia has deployed in the last decade; to obtain even only a chance to defend against those class of truly monstrous ballistic missile,an high end ABM systems require absolutely to have the chance of an interception of in the ICBM's initial boost phase by part of systems placed :or in the space by part of satellite above Russian territory (at now technically wastly out of reach by anyone )or from very near to Russian borders.

    "Hidden safely within missile silos and mobile launchers, a successful boost-phase interceptor would have to be fired from near or within Russian borders or from space. And the SS-27 is also designed to survive a strike from any laser technology available, rendering any current space-based laser useless. The missile highlights the need for considerably more research into missile defenses, as the United States is currently defenseless while Russia is protected by a functional defense system."


    Like you well know,in fact, the optimum (or forced ,in case of retalatory response) trajectory for Topol-M ICBM coming from Russia in theirs boost phase and early sub-orbital collimating pre-apogee phase would be slightly westward of North Pole to capitalize,among several other factors ,Earth rotation ; therefore in theirs boost-phase Topol-M /Yars and Bulava shooted from West or central Russia ,virtually "invulnerable" in any other segments of theirs flight pact, would be still vulnerable just and only above East Europe .

    That's exactly the reason for which US unilaterally withdrew from ABM treaty in 2002 and for decision of the same admnistration ,contextually, conceiving the plan for the ABM project in Europe.



    Last edited by Mindstorm on Wed Sep 07, 2011 3:47 pm; edited 1 time in total
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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Wed Sep 07, 2011 2:43 pm

    I both agree and disagree... Twisted Evil

    What you are saying is basically what I am saying except where you are saying what I am not saying.. Twisted Evil Twisted Evil

    I would happily agree that the GBI interceptors would be useless against Topol-M and Yars (RS-24) simply because these missiles were designed from the outset to have short boost phases and an early release of warheads so any interceptor not based directly in the flight path of these weapons will have zero chance of intercepting missiles with warhead buses loaded, and would also have no chance of catching up to them either... even if they could by the time they did instead of hunting hundreds of missiles they will be hunting almost thousands of warheads and decoys and jammers and other debris with a very short period of time to work out which is which.

    Most of the current ICBM fields in Russia are in the north and so far away from Poland any missiles going over the pole even if they are fired slightly to the west because of the earths rotation will never result in an equal start for a fair race with a slower missile.

    The amount of Earth rotation during the 30min flight time of these missiles will certainly shift their trajectory, but not enough to allow GBIs from Poland or Turkey to catch up.

    GBIs in Poland however would have ample opportunity to intercept missiles headed for the UK or France... remember these missiles don't just have to get to the correct coordinates, they also have to climb to the correct altitude as well which means they need to track the targets for a period determine their targets and assess which represents the greatest threat and then calculate an intercept point and then start launching missiles.

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Mindstorm on Thu Sep 08, 2011 1:39 pm


    "if they are fired slightly to the west because of the earths rotation will never result in an equal start for a fair race with a slower missile"

    Excuse me, but here i don't follow you ; do you truly believe that the GBI to be constructed in Romania when completed will be slower than actual ICBM in theirs boost-phase ?
    I am sorry but Americans have planned the employement of 10 Km /sec class interceptors with very fast burnout and acceleration for boost-phase ICBM's neutrtalization since end of '90 years !!

    Not even a single expert of the sector in Russia believe that future high-end GBI placed in East Europe will be slower than a Topol-M in its boost phase and is just that the reason for the deep concerns expressed unanimously by russian strategists on the heavy effect which the placement of similar anti-ballistic assets...just in East Europe in the only position where them would have a chance to destroy Topol-M/Yars in theirs boost-phase ...would have on the capabilities of Russian main branch of nuclear triad.

    GarryB do you remember when in American startegic community at the end of '90 years ,when Russia was still in the deep of the crysis, was very popular the idea of an ABM project,in hypotetical "collaboration" with Russia Razz Razz to be placed just..... at south of Vladivostok !!! (and try to guess why , cough....cough ...China and Russia far East ICBM's interception...cough.. cough ) selled at the time as a response against a presumed North Korea ICBMs Razz Razz -the "puppet" menace of the time to try to justify the project conceived around ,obviously ,totally different aims ?

    The situation ,today is not different, what is changed is the priority ; the wide technological gap established by Topol-M and Yars at beginnig of '00 has rendered suddenly them the greater danger for NATO's strategists so the old plan has simply.....changed the puppet menace : North Korea in 5-6 yeras is passed from capital danger for USA security to the complete nothing while Iran ,the most near puppet menace available to justify the placement of high end ABM assets the most near possible to russian borders ,become at light speed a planetary menace Rolling Eyes .






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    GarryB

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Fri Sep 09, 2011 5:32 am

    Excuse me, but here i don't follow you ; do you truly believe that the GBI to be constructed in Romania when completed will be slower than actual ICBM in theirs boost-phase ?
    I am sorry but Americans have planned the employement of 10 Km /sec class interceptors with very fast burnout and acceleration for boost-phase ICBM's neutrtalization since end of '90 years !!

    Against older ICBMs, yes the interceptor will be faster, but range equals speed in ballistic missiles, and the 3,500 mile range GBI will not ultimately go faster than 11,000km+ range ICBMs.

    In a foot race the GBI will outsprint an SS-18 because an SS-18 is a very heavy missile so despite its much more powerful first stage it is a motorbike racing a truck.

    The TOPOL-M and Yars on the other hand were designed with a rapid initial acceleration to greatly reduce the boost phase to reduce their vulnerability during this period and to get to the point where they can release their warheads as soon as possible so that any interceptor will have to deal with each individual warhead and decoy rather than the warhead bus like it would with an older missile.

    GBIs in Poland or the Black Sea are thousands of kms from ICBM fields in Russia and even allowing for the shift in trajectories because of the Earths rotation even with 10 minutes warning... which the GBI wont get... even in an ideal situation against the older missiles the earliest time they could catch up would be over the north pole... and the radar in the Czech republic can't track ICBMs there.

    On the other hand both the missile placement and radar placement would be ideal for Russian ICBMs heading to EU countries.

    Missiles in Alaska on the other hand will get much more warning from satellites monitoring launches in Russia and radars covering Canada/Greenland etc etc.

    Remember interceptor missiles don't fly towards the incoming missiles simply because the incoming missiles are flying so fast they wont be there, so the interceptor missiles are fired to a point where the incoming missiles will be when the interceptors arrive... firing them from Alaska means they are as far north as they possibly can be while still being in the US, which is the ideal place to base them from the perspective of the US.

    From canadas point of view it means interceptions above its territory and all sorts of crap raining down on them... but why would the US care about that?

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  Mindstorm on Fri Sep 09, 2011 11:28 am

    "GBIs in Poland or the Black Sea are thousands of kms from ICBM fields in Russia and even allowing for the shift in trajectories because of the Earths rotation even with 10 minutes warning... which the GBI wont get... even in an ideal situation against the older missiles the earliest time they could catch up would be over the north pole... and the radar in the Czech republic can't track ICBMs there."



    10 minutes warning ? GarryB i don't understand what you mean with that figure ,but hope that you don't believe that an inteceptor would be shooted after 10 minutes from ICBM ignition ,because this time window is completely out of line (but would explain why you don't understand the concerns of....the whole russian strategic defense scientifical community).

    In any document i have read in those years (even those of the end of '90 years of Richard L. Garwin and William Priedhorsky of Los Alamos National Laboratory !!) postulate an interceptor launch in a time window extending from 50 to 95 seconds from ICBM ignition and in particular with sensors placed at the borders of the attacking nation (with both over the horizon and long range atmospheric layer penetrating radars) the time for a fire solution ,obtained conversely only with space based sensors, would be significantly cutted.

    Is just for those technical elements that Duncan Lennox and Bruce W. MacDonald in theirs technical examination of Topol-M was adamantine asserting that the only hope ,at today, to intecept a similar ICBM (by far the faster,more manoeuvrable with most unpredicable trajectory and the most depressed apogee at world )would be through : 1) space based means -not lasers against which it is also heavily protected - or high end ground based interceptors placed near or within the borders of Russian Federation.

    The scenarios possible at this point are completely at the antipodes : in the first Russia mantain its wide technological primacy in ICBM technology adn the ABM in Europe is or abandoned or rendered pointless by ad-hoc countermeasures , elements which combined with the introdction of the mobile S-500 and the new generation of revolutionary satellites to be launched within the end of this decade and capable to detect from space submerged submarine within an error circle compatible with MIRV/MARV lethal radius, would become a mix destabilizing the nuclear equilibrium in a dramatic way ; in the second scenario NATO complete its ABM "encirclement" of Russian Federation (the second phase will be placement of ABM elements in India and/or Japan) preventing that it deploy any credible counter ,using like now the political/economical leverage ...cough...cough... WTO accession eternally delayed...cough...cough..., with Russia losing a good fraction of the offensive potential of its nuclear triad.

    The only sure solution for Russia,like you have cleverly guessed, is to exit unilaterally and quickly from INF treaty, you can bet that Iran will become suddenly a paper tiger not requiring the stratospheric cost of the ABM project in East Europe.

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

    Post  GarryB on Sat Sep 10, 2011 3:25 am

    The 10 minute warning comment is an exaggeration to prove a point.

    There is never likely to be a case where they would get 10 minutes advanced warning of an attack, what I am trying to say that even with 10 minutes warning they could not shoot the ICBMs down because they need data from the targets to work out interception points and they don't get those till after the target missiles have launched and can be tracked for a short distance to determine what their targets might be and therefore also what trajectory they might use.

    With old missiles like the SS-18 and SS-19 the warheads stay in the warhead bus for most of the flight which limits the targets they can hit and makes them more predictable.

    With the new missiles (TOPOL-M, and YARs) with basically self guiding warheads that are pretty much released after the last stage has burned out then the problem is multiplied because instead of intercepting a warhead bus with half a dozen warheads in it they now have half a dozen separate warheads to find and intercept...

    Also something I haven't mentioned... because of the fact they are pretty much tail chasing the effect of their impact will likely be reduced... a head on impact combines the enormous speed of each object into destruction of both objects. A tail chase impact has much less energy.

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    Re: NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

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