NATO ΑΒΜ Shield in Europe and Russia's response

For the same reasons if Russia is launching nuclear missiles at the US it will be expecting to be wiped out by the reply so it will likely also target countries like Japan and China to ensure the "love" is shared to all those countries that supported Russias enemies or acted like Russias enemy.

...no point in destroying the US several times over if the conventional forces of China and Europe then march in and take over the ashes of Russia.

Pervius wrote:There is no reason for a nuclear war between US-Russia. If it came up for a vote today most Americans would elect Putin as US President.

Both countries are facing huge population loss from Baby Boomer Generation which created nuclear arsenals....all dying off.

If Russia and US can avert War both countries will finally see their economy come back after old people die off. We all just need to survive trying to provide for all the old people. Hence why Russia and US people are suffering in poverty. Too many old people to clothe/feed.

1/3rd of US will be dead by 2020. Russia and US will have to join together to survive Chinese Century of domination. We both will be minority countries in the world soon.

Families with both parents working pay hundreds of dollars a week for childcare, in other cultures the grandparents share in the upbringing of the grandkids.

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENCE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS

Author: Andrei Mikhailov

Andrei Mikhailov, special correspondent of the Military Parade magazine

Addressing the entire international community, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev made a crucial statement during his visit to India in late 2010: "Any curtain, any wall, whether ideological or technological, is dangerous." The ideological wall collapsed just over two decades ago, simultaneously with the symbolic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, the technological barrier, which prevents partnership integration of the countries to strengthen security, remains intact.

Mikhail Gorbachev was the first to use the term 'partnership' with regard to defence during Soviet-American negotiations. At first, the attitude to this word was extremely wary. Two years before the fall of the Berlin Wall the-then US President Ronald Reagan, making a speech at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, had urged Mikhail Gorbachev: "General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace... tear down this wall!" Nowadays, the appeal to 'tear down the wall' is made in reverse - addressing the NATO-Russia Summit in Lisbon in November 2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev called on NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and 28 NATO heads of state to get over the mistrust and become equal partners: "If Russia takes a corresponding part in the NATO missile defence programme, participates in the dialogue, plays a certain role in developing a joint missile defence system..., it will be acceptable for us."

This appeal was primarily addressed to the US, since Europe is as concerned as Russia about the terms and conditions of deploying the global missile defence shield. At the 11th Missile Defence Conference, hosted by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) in 2010, head of the US Cevasco International, a company specialising in defence cooperation and aerospace defence, Frank Cevasco pointed out that, according to experts, outsourcing of the global missile defence deployment, with European states playing a secondary role of hosting US missile defence system elements on their territories, would make Europe subordinate to the US, deprive it of its voting right, and fail to solve the entire range of European security problems. Europe has its own missile defence potential and invests in new projects, though they are less ambitious than those of the US.

However, while the US and Europe have managed to overcome the legacy of previous wars and become allies, the Russian brass have yet to erase the German Fulda Gap, a section of territory between the former East German border and Western Europe, from their maps. History proves that it was fear, rather than goodwill, that launched the process of nuclear arms control and partnership. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 became the critical moment. The-then US President John F. Kennedy ordered the US Armed Forces to be put on Level 2 combat readiness (DEFCON 1 (defence readiness condition), i.e. preparations for nuclear missile launches).

Addressing a round table meeting on the US-Russian nuclear arms control at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, in 2009, chair of the meeting, former Deputy Secretary of State (1994-2001) Strobe Talbott called on nuclear powers to take on greater responsibility, team up their efforts, and establish defence cooperation. To make a pun on the acronym of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III), signed this year, let's say the process got off to a good start. It is the beginning of a new stage, the motto of which should be 'trust' between Russia and the USA, and Russia and NATO, because otherwise missile defence integration will be next to impossible.

Three Points of European Missile Defence Development

How to start deploying a joint missile defence system, given the ever increasing threat of surprise ground-, sea-, air-, and even space-based ballistic missile strikes, involving nuclear, chemical, or biological WMDs? Will this process be based on the principle of complementarity, or will the parties remain counter-partners?

At the present time it is dramatically important not only to define the missile defence deterrence strategy, but to choose the best option after examining
all aspects, all possible threats and challenges. This is exactly what NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy James Appathurai talked about at a news conference in Moscow in February 2011. He outlined three points of development in the ongoing international discussion of the specific European missile defence structure.

The first 'point of development' is the most complicated issue of reaching a consensus on the best technical and organisational algorithms of taking a decision on engaging a target within the framework of the joint information component of the NATO and the Russian missile defence systems, including their transparency.

James Appathurai underlined that there would be completely independent, though mutually coordinated, NATO and Russian missile defence systems. He added that the best solution should be arrived at, and that NATO would be defending its territory, and Russia its own territory. "It is only NATO's responsibility to defend its territories and we cannot pass this responsibility to anyone else. It is clear that Russia is going to protect its territory itself and will not give up this duty. It would also seem strange if Russia asked the other part for permission to defend its territory," he pointed out, stating that the best missile defence system structure should not undermine the defence potential and the sovereignty of any country, involved in the joint missile defence.

The logic of averting a missile threat consists in detecting and knocking down an incoming missile as soon as possible. However, experts started disagreeing on whether NATO or Russia should, for instance, knock down ballistic missiles, posing a threat to Europe, over the territory of a non-member state, for example, Russia, Ukraine, or Georgia?

NATO has already embarked on developing sophisticated automatic command and control (C2) systems, based on top-notch technologies, for the joint Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) system. It tests interoperability of different national air command and control systems so that they could function as a single C2 centre, given a decisionmaking time limit of less than one minute. NATO expands the number of allies, integrated into the revamped missile defence system, adds mobile components, based wherever possible, and exchanges tactical and intelligence data. As a result, every national C2 body will get access to a more complete and updated digital map, facilitating defence against a wide scope of missile threats.

The new NATO joint missile defence command structure, the Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC), incorporating C2 systems of five allies, including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the US, and France, was opened in Germany earlier this year, with the ceremony attended by NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero. In December 2010 NATO tested its new ALTBMD C2 system. The tests were aimed at checking command and control over the multinational coalition's weapon systems and sensors during a missile interception operation. Claudio Bisogniero officially confirmed that NATO had begun shifting to a new TMD configuration, since the CAOC became operational. Under the decisions, adopted at the Lisbon Summit, the new theatre missile defence system will constitute the backbone of the future strategic European missile defence. The US-French Thales Raytheon Systems was appointed principal technology integrator in the international missile defence market.

Within the framework of the NATO Air Command and Control First Level of Operational Capability (ACCS LOC1) programme Thales Raytheon Systems is to replace NATO's existing air command and control systems in Europe; set new standards of interoperability for air operations by providing a single, integrated approach, including sensor and weapon system configuration, detection, identification, early warning, monitoring, coverage, air and missile track processing, display, management, and engagement. Interoperability of revamped national C2 systems will lead to an Initial Operational Capability (IOC). The next stage of the theatre missile defence extension, headed by the ALTBMD Programme Office, is slated for 2013. The ultimate configuration of the upgraded and integrated TMD system is to cover the entire territory of NATO member-states (Final Operational Capability).

Balanced Defence

The second 'point of development' in the international discussion of the European missile defence is the partnership network of its participants. What should the logic of partnership be? What should the format of cooperation within the framework of the joint missile defence system be? NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy James Appathurai emphasised that in order to establish NATO-Russia partnership within the framework of the joint missile defence it was necessary to clearly realise the goal of and the reason for the project. He said that the main political message of joint missile defence efforts was that NATO did not expect Russia to deliver a nuclear strike, and neither did NATO have such plans. James Appathurai stressed that the European missile defence system was not designed to undermine

Russia's deterrent potential, and that NATO and Russia should jointly counter increasing missile threats. He also called on the Russian side not to resort to resounding statements on counter-measures during negotiations and not to attempt to define the last steps when the joint work had only started.

Only two countries possessed nuclear missiles in the early 1970s. At the present time in excess of 30 states either have or seek to develop missile technologies, while 44 countries enjoy a nuclear-power engineering capability. Nuclear-capable China and India combined are thrice as large as NATO in terms of population. At the same time India is neither a signatory to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor a permanent member of the UN Security Council, where only five nuclear powers - the US, Russia, the UK, France, and China - seat on a permanent basis. Therefore, India is maximally distanced from the partnership negotiations. Pakistan and North Korea have not signed the NPT Treaty either. For instance, according to some sources, North Korea possesses more than 1,000 ballistic missiles. Generally, according to data presented at the 11th RUSI Missile Defence Conference, nuclear powers that are not included in the 'Nuclear Five' have a combined total of about 6,000 sub-strategic (non-strategic or theatre) ballistic missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the target specified in four (maximum 40) minutes.

The European missile defence sys tem is considered to be a defensive potential against the threat of nuclear proliferation outside NATO member-states and partner states, involved in the project. In other words integration of missile defence potentials of these countries means that they do not expect missiles strikes against each other and believe that this threat is only posed by those outside of their partnership. It is a fundamental shift in thinking, which on the one hand will lead to a gradual involvement of all nuclear powers in the partnership (otherwise they will be on the list of threats to NATO's security), and on the other hand it will boost development of missile defence technologies in partner states that have yet to acquire such technologies.

The problem of global defence against a surprise nuclear ballistic missile attack from an unpredictable corner of the compass already prompts the military lobby to develop the best defence option - a stratosphere- or a space-based missile defence system, radar-carrying warships, and modular interoperable missile defence facilities (the so-called 'building blocks' principle) (the latter envisions global integration of the military cooperation market). For instance, the UK has designed the Zephyr High-Altitude Long-Endurance (HALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), powered by solar batteries, featuring a flight altitude of over 20,000 m, and designed to be used as part of a missile defence system.

Experts also discuss a possibility of deploying nuclear weapons into orbit - a nuclear warhead may be built into an ordinary satellite (in this case the early warning time will decrease dramatically). Therefore, special attention will be paid to countries capable of launching spacecraft.

In light of missile defence technologies, development of laser weapons capable of destroying orbital satellites (anti-satellite weapons, ASAT) has seen a significant boost. Ground-, air-, and sea-based laser systems have been tested since the late 1990s. Such projects are pursued by Russia, NATO, and China.

The third 'point of development' in the international discussion of the European missile defence consists in striking a balance and preventing an arms race, refining international laws on non-proliferation, and preventing escalation of technological rivalry in the defence cooperation market, which may result in negative political consequences. It will be impossible to adequately develop the European missile defence without progressing to the so-called McNamara's figure (US Secretary of Defence Robert Strange McNamara, the Pentagon's famous reformer during the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson in 1961-1968), i.e. reducing the number of nuclear warheads possessed by each side down to 1,000. The world no longer has economic resources for an unrestrained arms race. As far as the global missile defence is concerned, the US does not have enough resources to cover the whole of Europe; Europe does not have enough resources to build a European missile defence system on its own; Russia does not have enough resources to cover its entire territory; and CIS member-states rely on partnership assistance even more than NATO member-states.

Robert McNamara once calculated that it would take mere 400 nuclear warheads to completely destroy the US or Russia. Strategic nuclear weapons are just the tip of the iceberg, sub-strategic weapons pose an event greater problem. Theatre nuclear weapons (TNW) have been reduced to a certain extent since the Cold War: NATO has cut its TNWs by 85% (about 240 nuclear warheads are left Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Turkey), Russia by 55% (the number of warheads exceeds 12,000), the US operates over 9,000 TNWs, the UK - 250 pieces, France - up to 400 pieces, China - about 500, India - around 100, and Pakistan - approximately 100.

James Appathurai pointed out that nuclear arms reductions would only be effective if agreement was reached on missile defence. He said that when talking about nuclear arms reductions it was worth mentioning that there were more nuclear weapons in the world than necessary. However, both NATO and Russia would maintain their nuclear deterrence capabilities so long as nuclear weapons existed, he emphasised. The international community should seek a nuclear-free world and create every necessary condition to this end, he added. Prudent and controlled nuclear arsenals reduction would be the most sensible way to go, he stressed.

Such a comprehensive approach to the nuclear threat problem is nowadays called "balanced defence". In addition to the balance between offensive and defensive missile technologies, the balanced defence also includes cyber security (cyber attacks can disable missile defence systems, nuclear power plants, etc.), as well as the fight against international terrorism in general (including denial of access to TNW storage facilities).

The sum vector that will shape the ultimate configuration of the future global missile defence of the XXI century will comprise a great many viewpoints of experts, representing various schools of thought on missile defence and tactical decisions on deploying missile defence system elements, national defence and economic interests of the Allies and the partner countries, and fundamental political views on the progress in WMD non-proliferation and missile threats.

U.S. wants to use India in missile shield against Russia, China
Vladimir Radyuhin

Russian daily quotes WikiLeaks cables to reveal Washington's plan

The United States has been trying to rope in India for its plans to build a global missile defence system threatening Russia and China, the Komsomoloskaya Pravda, a popular Russian daily published from Moscow reported on Thursday.

In a story based on the WikiLeaks releases, the report said the U.S. has not only been planning to deploy a missile shield against Russia in Europe, but had also been negotiating with countries along Russia's borders, such as Japan and India, to jointly build missile defences that would also target Russia.

“The noose [around Russia] is tightening,” the newspaper said. “Thanks to WikiLeaks, it has become known that Washington has been simultaneously conducting talks with countries in other parts of the world for building U.S. missile defences on their territories. Those are different countries, but they form a chain around Russia.”

A 2007 confidential cable from the U.S. embassy in New Delhi carried by the daily refuted media reports that India had abruptly turned its back on a 2005 agreement with the U.S. to cooperate on missile defences. The cable said the Indian media had misinterpreted remarks by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee after the Russia-India-China trilateral meeting in Harbin, China, on October 24, 2007. Mr. Mukherjee had dismissed as “groundless” the idea that India was going to join a U.S.-led missile defence system.
Misconstrued

“MEA contacts confirm this did not mean India was not interested in continuing to cooperate with the U.S. on missile defence technology and that there has been no change from the current level of bilateral missile defence cooperation,” the U.S. embassy cable said.

The “MEA contacts” explained that Mr. Mukherjee's comments were “misconstrued” by the Indian press. When Mr. Mukherjee said that “India does not take part in such military arrangements,” the officials said, he had had in mind the U.S. plan to install a missile-detection system in Europe, which his Russian and Chinese counterparts referred to in the same press interaction.

“MEA Director Amandeep Singh Gill [Disarmament and International Security] confirmed to PolOff on October 26 that Mr. Mukherjee's comment in Harbin cannot be interpreted as a deviation from the status quo of current U.S.-India Military Defence cooperation,” the cable said.

The embassy recalled: “Then-Defence Minister Mukherjee and SecDef [U.S. Secretary of Defence] Rumsfeld agreed to expand collaboration relating to missile defence in the July 2005 U.S.-India Defence Framework Agreement.”

Indo-U.S. collaboration on missile defence “has thus far been confined to technical and fact-finding discussions,” the cable said, noting that “the GOI has focused its attention increasingly on developing indigenous MD system capabilities.”
Ring of systems

The Russian newspaper said the U.S. had “cast a fishing net over India” to get it to join the U.S. plans for building a ring of missile defence systems encircling Russia.
Eyeing resources?

Washington's “plans to deploy missile defences along Russian borders — first in Europe, then in other places — may result in a situation where they will twist our hands to make us share our natural riches,” the daily said.

GarryB wrote:Don't really see the point of radars or missiles in India to oppose Russia.

It might be more of a case of an attempt to get into bed with India so the US can start asserting control over Indias nukes.

The US can't use the IAEA like they do with Iran et al to force them into corners or make them play the games the US wants everyone to play for them.

Beware the big shiny white straight teeth... what lies behind those eyes would make a crocodile blush.

I'd assume that SM-3s in India would be able to whack nuke silos that are to the east of the Urals. Perhaps Kazakhstan.

medo wrote:

I'd assume that SM-3s in India would be able to whack nuke silos that are to the east of the Urals. Perhaps Kazakhstan.

If Russia want to attack US, than ICBMs will fly over Arctic, so I don't think missiles in India will do any help in this case. Also time is working for Russia and US will be more and more broke, so it will be wiser for US to make Russia strong ally, than enemy.

IronsightSniper wrote:

medo wrote:

I'd assume that SM-3s in India would be able to whack nuke silos that are to the east of the Urals. Perhaps Kazakhstan.

If Russia want to attack US, than ICBMs will fly over Arctic, so I don't think missiles in India will do any help in this case. Also time is working for Russia and US will be more and more broke, so it will be wiser for US to make Russia strong ally, than enemy.

We're going broke now?

The signing of the New START treaty and US President Obama’s decision to review the previous administration’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) plans had given rise to hopes that Russia and the United States could reach a compromise on this very sensitive issue. But after a year of fruitless “consultations” it is becoming obvious that the two sides’ positions on a new missile defense system for the 21st century are incompatible. The very idea of the Western and Russian missile defense systems being “interoperable” or “integrated” is facing a crisis. That crisis could well spill over into other areas of the strategic balance, as well as the two sides’ military doctrines and their relationship as a whole.

New problems

The reasons for the incompatibility of Russia’s and America’s positions on the new BMD and EuroBMD are twofold. On the one hand, Washington is convinced that new missile threats are real, or will become real in the very near future. It is determined to have in place a system that would guarantee protection from such threats. On the other hand, the Russian military and political leadership is certain that the new BMD system, including elements of EuroBMD, have the Russian strategic deterrence capability in the crosshairs. Both sides are making earnest and very public attempts to dissuade each other of their respective fundamental beliefs. It appears that these attempts have monopolized all the energies of the negotiators taking part in the ongoing “consultations”.

The arguments used by the Russian military leadership – i.e the General Staff and its key departments involved in the formulation of the Russian position at the negotiations – are especially interesting. Up until recently, voicing the Russian stance on the BMD issue was the remit of the president or senior Foreign Ministry officials. But in the past few months the generals have been increasingly talkative. It appears that the General Staff, rather than the political officialdom, is now formulating Russia’s stance at the 2010-2011 “consultations” on missile defense. The truth of that assumption was amply demonstrated in May 2011 during the open scientific and practical conference headlined “The Russian position on EuroBMD”. The event was attended by the head of the General Staff, Army General Nikolay Makarov; his deputy, Col Gen Valeriy Gerasimov; the head of the Main Operational Directorate, Lt Gen Andrey Tretyakov; and the deputy head of the Main Intelligence Department (GRU), Lt Gen Vyacheslav Kondrashov.

Russian generals do not deny that the “potential threat from the south” really exists. But they insist that the threat is very vague and uncertain, and that it does not require any urgent countermeasures. Neither Iran nor North Korea has any delivery systems with sufficient range. Neither has any hope of acquiring them any time soon. That is the official position of the GRU, which has never made such public forecasts before. The Russian generals believe that creating long-range missiles will require many years and many test launches, which will not go unnoticed. When that happens, that will be the time to react, they say.

In terms of technology, no-one is saying that the first ICBM created by the “problem nations” will be on par with the Topol-M or the Trident II. These nations are developing technology that is fifty, forty or thirty years old. The intercontinental delivery means such technology can offer are simple, but reliable. From the military point of view, the argument that the threat is not urgent does not hold water. Once the problem nations have built their first ICBM, it will be too late to develop an BMD system in an effort to catch up with the situation. The best way to deal with threats is to anticipate and pre-empt them, not play catch-up.

But the Russian generals have got it into their heads that America’s new BMD system and its EuroBMD segment are aimed against the Russian ICBMs. All attempts to persuade them to the contrary are falling on deaf ears.

Ever since the first (now abandoned) plans were announced to station heavy silo-based GBI missile interceptors in Poland, the Russian generals have argued that these interceptor sites could become a serious threat to the Russian ICBMs stationed in the west of the country. It is true that the flight paths of the missiles heading from Bologoye or Kozelsk to the Eastern seaboard lie in the same general area, not directly over Poland but to the north of it. If official US information is to be believed, however, the location of the interceptor sites in Poland is a far better match for the flight paths originating in Iran, not Bologoye. In order to pose a threat to the Russian ICBMs, the GBIs stationed in Poland must be able to intercept missiles launched in their near vicinity. That requires either a lightning-fast response time or enormous acceleration plus mind-boggling trajectory to catch up with the Topol ICBMs.

Such incredible specifications of the GBI interceptors (i.e. lighting-fast response time and the interceptor’s ability to reach any point of the threat missile’s trajectory with lighting speed) would mean that United States has achieved a technological breakthrough on par with the invention of the nuclear bomb. The GBIs have been abandoned – but now the same implausible specifications are being ascribed to the SM-3 missile interceptors, the core of the new-configuration EuroBMD system.

The real (rather than imaginary) capabilities of the proposed American BMD system still remain an open question. Washington is being quite honest about the projected numbers of interceptors - although the figures can of course change. The need for honesty here is explained by the budgetary and congressional procedures, the obligation to inform NATO partners, and the long-standing general principles of America’s defense policy. Moscow, meanwhile, has always accepted that in the currently proposed configuration and scope, the new American BMD system is a much better match for the Iranian type of threat. It will not be able to neutralize the entire Russian strategic deterrence capability, even once the Russian nuclear arsenal has shrunk to the size specified in the New START treaty, i.e. 700-800 delivery systems and 1,550 warheads. Countering that type of threat would require a far more complex BMD system, with thousands of interceptors and probably dozens of interceptor launch sites. The validity of these considerations has always been recognized in Moscow - but they have never been seen as proof that America’s missile defense system is not aimed against Russia.

Old thinking

The Russian generals’ firm rejection of the very idea of an American missile defense system, in whichever shape or form, informs the entire Russian negotiating position. First, Moscow demands “legally binding guarantees” that the BMD system will not be aimed against Russia. And second, it proposes that a joint system should be built instead of a purely Western one, with each side responsible for countering missile threats in its own geographic sector.

The notion of unilateral “legally binding guarantees” seems to be a curious new invention by the Russian negotiators, since there are no historical precedents of such guarantees. Why didn’t Leonid Brezhnev simply ask America for “legally binding guarantees” that its nuclear missiles are not aimed against Russia? Why did he choose instead to spend all that time and effort on the strategic arms limitation talks? And what about Brezhnev’s own unilateral “legally binding guarantees”, given of his own free will to the world, that the Soviet Union would never be the first country to use nuclear weapons? Why did the international community view such guarantees as nothing but an empty political declaration?

How exactly are the “guarantees” demanded by Russia supposed to work? Will Moscow be satisfied by a declaration that “the United States will never use its missile defense system against Russian missiles”? How much would such a declaration be worth, exactly? Even in peacetime the principles of sovereignty make it possible for any country to withdraw from any of its international commitments. In the event of war or a real and imminent threat, such guarantees are worth precisely zero. If, on the other hand, Moscow requires more specific commitments, with restrictions on the numbers, capability and geography of the interceptors, then it must understand that such guarantees cannot be issued unilaterally. By rights they should be part of a new treaty about a new missile defense system – but that is not the subject of the negotiations now under way.

Russia’s sectoral BMD proposal stems from its fears about the launch sites in Poland, as well as in the Baltic region and northern Europe in general. Moscow has already said officially that it would not really care about BMD sites in Romania. But it is becoming increasingly obvious that the region Russia wants to be assigned to its own sector of the proposed sectoral BMD system includes Poland, the Baltic states and Scandinavia. That poses a number of intractable problems. First, why exactly should the NATO member states in the region entrust their defense to Moscow? Russia may be a partner of the alliance, but it is not a member. Second, can these countries ever accept such an arrangement as sovereign states? And finally, will Russia actually have the technical capability to protect from missile threats the region it wants assigned to its sector?

The Daryal-type early warning radar in Gabala (Azerbaijan) is Russia’s first proposed contribution to the EuroBMD system. It must be said that the radar would be a valuable asset as it covers the southern areas where the potential missile threat might originate. The radar can be integrated into a joint BMD system – but for reasons of its original design and specifications, it will not actually be able to guide American or Russian interceptors to their targets. Theoretically, Russia could also contribute the Don-2N multirole surveillance station near Moscow. The station, which has a 360 degrees field of view, would have to be upgraded before it can be integrated into the joint BMD system. But the Don-2N is part of Russia’s own missile defense system that covers the area around Moscow, so it is not clear whether Russia would be prepared to share that vital facility in any capacity.

Be that as it may, there is nothing else Moscow could usefully contribute. It has an advanced Voronezh-DM early warning radar in Armavir, which many commentators include in the list of the proposed joint BMD system’s potential Russian assets. But it is not at all clear whether that would be possible and, more importantly, necessary. According to open-source information, the edge of the Armavir radar’s field of view runs along the middle of the European continent from east to west. In the east the line runs from Armavir to the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, then on to Turkey, Syria and further south. In other words, the radar’s field of view includes part of the Middle East, the Mediterranean and almost the whole of North Africa – but not Iran, which is shielded from the radar by the Caucasian Mountains. Another Voronezh-DM radar station now being built near Kaliningrad is even less useful, since it is directed towards Europe. In any event, all these radars can potentially be used as elements of a missile attack warning system, but not of an actual missile defense system.

The situation with interceptors and guidance radars is even less certain. After Russia specified the boundaries of the sector it wants to claim for itself in the proposed “sectoral” BMD system, the commander of the Russian Space Troops, Lt Gen Oleg Ostapenko, made a sensational statement. He insisted that Russia can defend that sector without actually stationing any of the interceptors or guidance radars on its territory. How exactly Russia is supposed to pull off such a feat is a mystery. All its existing BMD systems, both strategic (around Moscow) and tactical, are built on the opposite principle.

What little is known about the Russian missile defense efforts from official documents and open sources suggests that the available financing is woefully inadequate, given the monumental scale of the task. More information is available about the missile defense capabilities of the advanced S-500 SAM system now being developed. But it is not clear when that system might be ready or how many units the Russian defense industry can realistically deliver. Given that Russia is still struggling with the less complex S-400 (SA-21) SAM system, the prospects for the S-500 do not look very rosy. The bottom line is that it is not clear what exactly Russia could contribute to the EuroBMD system, other than one or two early warning radars.

Another thing to consider is that Russia’s threats to station missiles near Kaliningrad or to start building intermediate range missiles again if America stations elements of its BMD system in Europe run counter to the very idea of joint missile defense. The crisis is compounded by the rhetoric which only serves to unnerve the opposite side even further. One way or another, both sides are demonstrating that they are not ready for meaningful cooperation on an issue which both of them have declared as vital. A return to the Cold War, or at the very least a major chill in the relations between Russia and the United States over the BMD crisis now seem a distinct possibility.

The obstinacy, suspiciousness and mistrust over missile defense contrast sharply with the spirit and letter of the New START treaty, which was a real breakthrough in terms of openness, compromise and mutual trust. It appears that the generals and the conservatives in the diplomatic community have been given too much say in the ongoing missile defense “consultations”. The talks urgently need a major political impulse at the highest level from both sides, similar to the impulse given to the New START talks at their final stages. Unless that happens, chances for meaningful progress are slim. Whether the meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Barak Obama in Deauville has provided such an impulse will become clear in the coming months.