Military Forum for Russian and Global Defence Issues


    State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Share

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Sat Feb 26, 2011 6:41 am

    Regarding the cutting of the BMPT programme:

    With the move to light, medium, and heavy brigades, and the medium being
    described as BMP level protection I think the Russian military will
    face a dilemma with the cancellation of the BMPT programme.



    For an APC in the heavy brigades to have tank level protection will
    require vehicles like the BTR-T which was a tank chassis modified into a
    heavy APC role.

    Because of the weight and design its armament will consist of a 30mm
    cannon at the most and more likely it will be a 12.7mm heavy machinegun
    which will mean the firepower of the heavy units will drop considerably
    over the BMP equipped medium brigades.

    I think the decision to drop the BMPT was premature because it is a
    heavy brigade vehicle that was not an APC... it was a fire support
    vehicle to compliment tanks that was able to operate where infantry
    would not survive long in the open.

    I have said before and I will say it again, I think that the BMPTs
    armament is wrong and if they are serious about having such a vehicle
    they need to rethink the design that has been shown.

    I think the corner gun turrets should be replaced with proper turrets with a decent field of fire... perhaps external guns like the gun on the Mi-28N but upside down and with protected ammo belt feed into the vehicle separated by blast walls and blow out roof panels.

    I think the ATAKAs on the BMPT should be replaced by the 100mm rifled gun of the
    BMP-3 in an external mount with a turret bustle autoloader with the
    100mm shells separate from the crew compartment and protected, and I
    think that a faster firing 30mm gun like the GSh-30-2K as fitted to the
    Hind should be mounted coaxially and given the fire options of single
    shot, slow burst (about 300 rpm) and fast burst (2,500 rpm) fire options
    for single targets, ground target suppression, and anti aircraft fire
    respectively.

    The 100mm shells will have more effect on target and on the BMP-3 has
    elevation limits of -6 degrees up to +60 degrees so an externally
    mounted 100mm gun with a coaxial twin barrel 30mm gun should be able to
    do the same or better... perhaps -15 to +75 degrees? For point targets at long range guided missiles with HE warheads can be tube fired... but most targets like enemy ATGM teams a long way away can be engaged by the T-90s main gun with HE armed guided missiles or ANIET fused shells.


    The vehicle could carry 20-30 rounds of 100mm ammo and say 1,000 30mm
    cannon shells of all types, and perhaps 400 30mm grenades for the front
    turrets or perhaps 2,000 7.62mm rounds per PKT.

    This is far more HE power than 4 Atakas that will be cheaper per round, and the external bow guns will be more flexible and able to engage a wider range of targets than the current mounts.


    What I am getting at is that the light brigades will likely have wheeled
    vehicles perhaps with 125mm guns and BMP-3M turrets with 30mm cannons
    and 100mm rifled guns and therefore plenty of firepower, and the medium brigades will likely have Sprut
    with 125mm guns, and BMP-3Ms with BMP-3M turrets with 30mm guns and
    100mm guns and therefore plenty of firepower, but the heavy brigade at the moment will likely have T-90s
    with 125mm guns... and BTR-Ts with 12.7mm machineguns.

    So what is the future upgrade path of the BMP-3?

    Is it going to 57mm or will it go for a mix of 57mm and the current
    100mm/30mm mix... the latter being very complimentary with each other,
    and more importantly will the amphibious capability be retained or will
    the demands for more armour prevail?
    This is important as it will impact on the firepower of all three brigade types as the heaviest calibre the light brigade has might be the BMP level armament if there is no 125mm gun equipped wheeled vehicle.


    More armour of course meaning a new engine and improved transmission and running gear etc etc and increased costs in fuel etc and might spell the end of their amphibious capability which will seriously effect mobility in Russia.

    Vladimir79
    Grand Marshal
    Grand Marshal

    Posts : 2193
    Points : 3099
    Join date : 2009-07-10

    State defense order in 2010 fell short by 30%

    Post  Vladimir79 on Thu Mar 03, 2011 8:20 am

    State defense order in 2010 fell short by 30%

    The state defense order in Russia in 2010 was not met by about 30 percent, writes Nezavisimaya Gazeta .

    Such a conclusion is made of journalists, publication of recent statements by Russian officials about the breakdowns of individual authorized to state defense order supplies. In particular, the deputy chief of management the formation of the state defense order the Defense Ministry, Boris Nakonechny said that in 2010 had not been ordered surrendered Project 20380 corvettes, three submarines of Project 955 and 885, six of the nine planned Yak-130 and half of the 151 units of BMP-3.

    As a measure to combat the failure of the state order Nakonechniy proposed to involve the administrative responsibility of the heads of factories were not able to finish work on time. He noted that the reason for failure of public procurement is inefficient operation of the federal Institute of Constructors and the weak organization of prime contractor.

    Also earlier Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said that of 11 satellites, the creation of which was included in the government order was prepared by only five. In thwarting the plan to build the spacecraft Ivanov accused the Federal Space Agency. In the department recognized that control over the creation of satellites is insufficient. In particular, the Russian Space Agency head Anatoly Perminov has declared that the cause of accidental launch of three GLONASS satellites in late 2010 that led to the loss of devices is the lack of control over the development of new modifications of the apparatus.

    Meanwhile, representatives of the defense plants, writes "The Independent", pay attention to the conditions of contracts for public procurement, under which it works are considered guilty in the case of supply disruption, regardless of the reasons for delays. Orders for defense in 2010 was spent 1.159 trillion rubles.

    It is worth noting that the state defense order for 2009 also was defeated, but the Audit Chamber found that there was no holds about 50 per cent laid down in his work.

    It is worth noting that the state defense order for 2009 also was defeated, but the Audit Chamber found that there were 50 per cent failed in his work.

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Thu Mar 03, 2011 9:39 pm

    2009 was the first year they were actually serious about rearming the Russian military.

    50% short of expectations is to be expected... the problems were never going to be solved with money over night and certainly not in one year.

    The following year they fell 30% short, but did they allow for the completion of the previous years work in their calculations?

    They completed the 2009s order in 2010 and also completed 70% of 2010s order in 2010 which sounds like a significant improvement during an "economic melt down" and 20 years of stagnation and about 3 or 4 economic meltdowns Russia went through that no one else did.

    From the article there seems to be fundamental problems with the procurement system that need to be addressed.

    I am sure there are plenty of changes that need to be made because this system is basically the one the Soviets used isn't it?

    Has it been reformed in any way?

    In the next few years hopefully it will be improved and made more efficient, but even if it was perfect then I think there would still be problems moving from companies making one off prototypes to show at airshows and arms exhibitions, and full production standard weapon systems in significant numbers.

    Another aspect is of course export orders would take priority over Russian Armed forces orders because foreign orders have larger profit margins, so if you have the production capacity to make 300 BMP-3s a year and you have an order from the Russian military for 150 and an order from Algeria for 250 is it any surprise that the Russian military get 50 this year and the remaining 100 the following year?

    Russian Patriot
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 1168
    Points : 2062
    Join date : 2009-07-21
    Age : 25
    Location : USA- although I am Russian

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Russian Patriot on Sun Mar 13, 2011 2:55 am

    Well this is more connected to this topic than any other so:

    Russia to prioritize modern weaponry in new arms acquisition program

    RIA Novosti

    15:31 11/03/2011

    MOSCOW, March 11 (RIA Novosti) - Russia will focus on purchases of advanced weaponry in a new state arms procurement program until 2020, First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said.

    "The state arms procurement program until 2020 prioritizes the acquisition of advanced weaponry. Their share is about 70 percent," Popovkin said in an interview with the Izvestia newspaper published on Friday.

    Popovkin said the Russian government had allocated 22 trillion rubles ($730 billion) on the new program, which includes purchases of eight missile-carrying strategic submarines, equipped with Bulava ballistic missiles, 600 aircraft, S-400 and S-500 air defense systems.

    The Navy will receive new conventional submarines, destroyers and corvettes equipped with advanced Kalibr missile system, which can fire anti-ship cruise missiles (3M-54) and long-range cruise missiles (3M-14) to destroy land-based targets.

    The priority will be given, however, to the development and the maintenance of Russia's nuclear triad, Popovkin said.

    The official reiterated that Russia did not plan to buy weaponry abroad unless it did not have domestic equivalents to fill the assigned roles, like reconnaissance drones, amphibious assault ships and sniper equipment.

    The Russian Armed Forces are mostly equipped with outdated Soviet-era weaponry. According to official data, the share of modern equipment in the strategic nuclear forces is about 20 percent, while in the conventional forces it does not exceed 10 percent.

    Popovkin said the purchases under the new program would allow Russia to bring the share of modern weaponry to 70 percent of the total by 2020.

    http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2011/russia-110311-rianovosti01.htm

    Russian Patriot
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 1168
    Points : 2062
    Join date : 2009-07-21
    Age : 25
    Location : USA- although I am Russian

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Russian Patriot on Tue Mar 22, 2011 12:22 am

    Russia to invest $100 bln in defense industry until 2020
    Sergei Ivanov

    Russia will invest 3 trillion rubles ($100 bln) in the development of the country's defense industry in the next decade, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said on Monday.

    "We have prepared a state program on the modernization of the defense industry until 2020 with a budget of 3 trillion rubles," Ivanov said after a meeting of defense industry officials in the southern Siberian republic of Udmurtia.

    Russia will invest 77 billion rubles ($2.6 bln) in the production of ballistic missiles alone in the next ten years.

    Ivanov said a ballistic missile production holding will be set up with the participation of Russia's Federal Space Agency. The holding will include the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, which designed the Topol and Bulava missiles.

    Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said at the same meeting that Russia would double production of ballistic missiles after 2013.

    http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110321/163131244.html

    Vladimir79
    Grand Marshal
    Grand Marshal

    Posts : 2193
    Points : 3099
    Join date : 2009-07-10

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Vladimir79 on Tue Mar 22, 2011 2:14 am

    The goods news is that delivery is up 17% from 2009 but it is 30% short of what is demanded. The order demand has yet to be great.

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Tue Mar 22, 2011 3:38 am

    It still think the fundamental problem at the moment is that the Russian military and Russian MIC are communicating via media.

    I think there needs to be a linking organisation that ensures communication between the two so the MIC and the military can plan properly.

    An example is UVZ. They are told their T-90 is a T-34, they are told it needs an upgrade and the tank you have been developing to replace it is a cold war dinosaur and BTW it is cancelled.
    UVZ has product facilities to turn out 1,000 tanks a year but it gets little or no warning about production requirements. Should it shut down and sell its production capacity and save a lot of money... only to get an order next year for 500 tanks? Of course it has to guess what production capacity it needs for next year because the military wont tell it what its plans are... assuming it knows what its plans are... so as insurance they maintain the production capacity to fill jobs they might or might not get. The government wont pay for that, it comes out of UVZs profit from its Rail division... which is hardly fair for them is it? I am sure they want to expand and retool and give the workers pay increases.

    Russia needs an organisation that looks at new technology and its military implications and to form requirements based on what the military could use and what the MIC can achieve. There is no point in keeping all technology secret within its sector. A sophisticated cooling system for spacecraft might be useful in armoured vehicles and submarines but you only want to develop the technology once and adapt it to different applications.

    30 years ago if someone had suggested a small portable phone you could carry around with you and take photos with it, I would have asked why anyone would want such a thing. Now some people can't do without it.
    Often the real talent is linking new technologies to new applications... for example embedding Bluetooth wireless transmission technology into a digital cameras flash memory card allows someone to take photos with a small portable digital camera and save photos taken directly to a laptop on their knee.
    Two different unrelated technologies used together for a new application.

    For the military replace that laptop with a palmtop that is part of the communications system and a recon operator can take digital photos that are linked by bluetooth directly to his encrypted satellite link and sent directly in real time to HQ that is 10,000km away in Moscow.

    Vladimir79
    Grand Marshal
    Grand Marshal

    Posts : 2193
    Points : 3099
    Join date : 2009-07-10

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Vladimir79 on Tue Mar 22, 2011 6:10 am

    GarryB wrote:It still think the fundamental problem at the moment is that the Russian military and Russian MIC are communicating via media.

    Russian military needs to sell MIC wares when they think it is junk? That would be lying wouldn't it?

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Tue Mar 22, 2011 8:01 am

    They need first of all to separate out what they think is junk... I rather doubt they are talking about Su-35s being junk and below NATO and Chinese standards.

    In fact instead of trash talking they should compile a confidential report listing what they like and what they don't like... and more importantly why they don't like it and pass that on to the relevant makers.

    Airing their dirty laundry in public is just counter productive... if some third world country is happy buying upgraded T-72s why should the Russian military care?

    Venezuela seems happy with its AK-103s despite them being 7.62 x 39mm calibre warmed over AK-47s.
    I have read India is looking at changing calibre to 7.62 x 39mm ammo... which is quite interesting.

    There is certainly room for experimentation... perhaps loading 90 grain bullets from 7.62 x 25mm Tokarev ammo into a 7.62 x 39mm case with a larger than normal propellent charge to get muzzle velocities up to almost 900m/s might be something worth trying.

    Vlad, you posted an article a while back about a lack of development in the small arms ammo sphere... perhaps new more modern propellent that generates muzzle velocities of 1,000m/s for standard 30 cal 120 grain bullets as used in the 7.62 x 39mm round could flatten the trajectory and increase the terminal effects.

    A drop in calibre to 6mm created world class bench rest rounds still dominating the ranges today out to 300-400m or so... with current powders.

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Tue Mar 22, 2011 8:05 am

    I agree there are just taking their personal view or frustration in Public.

    The statement on T-90 is very damaging considering most believe its devoid of facts and gives a bad name to Russian industry.

    I just wished the Army Chief got kicked out for falsifying information to the parliament

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Mon May 23, 2011 3:37 pm

    MODERN ARMAMENTS - BACKBONE FOR MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES
    Author: Anatoly Gulyaev

    Anatoly Gulyaev - Chief of Armaments Department, RF Ministry of Defense
    Military Parade, No. 2, 2011

    The past two decades saw the emergence of new warfare assets, primarily precision guided weapons. Their use in conjunction with advanced IT-based intelligence, command & control and targeting systems has drastically changed the forms and methods of warfare. A new type of wars has appeared where there are no fronts, continuous lines of contact of the parties. Combat actions are conducted through the entire depth of the country's territory. In fact, the notion of "rear" no longer exists.

    In these wars, precision guided weapons and information management systems that ensure rapid detection of the most vulnerable elements of enemy forces and the immediate employment of weapons against them are keys to winning victory over the enemy. In other words, it is not the quantity but the quality of weaponry that shapes the "look" of future armaments systems.

    With regard to clarifying the look of the Armed Forces and the trends in the evolution of armaments in leading foreign countries, the Russian Ministry of Defense has studied the necessary measures that involve re-equipping the services and arms of the Armed Forces with modern weaponry at an accelerated pace, including systems and complexes capable of providing an adequate response to a high-tech enemy.

    According to the new national security strategy, the strategic nuclear forces continue to play a major role in ensuring security of the Russian Federation and its allies. They can deter a wide range of possible threats - from the enemy's use of weapons of mass destruction to full-scale employment of large conventional forces.

    To achieve military-strategic and political goals and counter current and emerging threats to national security of Russia, the various options for using nuclear and conventional offensive weapons are considered by the leaders of the country as necessary.

    The major direction of Russia's military-technical policy is to preserve its strategic triad consisting of ground-, sea- or air-based striking weapons.

    In the Strategic Missile Forces, the existing ICBM systems are being re-equipped with fifth-generation fixed and mobile missile systems. To preserve missile systems with heavy-class missiles in the SMF grouping, a new missile is being developed to replace the existing Voevoda (SS-18 Satan) missiles, which have demonstrated high deterrence capabilities over the whole period of their service. All future ICBM systems will be able to penetrate the future US BMD system and remain in service through 2030-2040.

    The naval strategic nuclear forces are undergoing another upgrade through re-equipment with fourth-generation SSBN submarines armed with the new SS-NX-30 Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Compared to existing SSBNs of the previous generations like Dolphin (Delta-IV) and Akula (Typhoon), new submarines have higher operational and fighting performance, a high degree of automation of the engagement processes, which will enable them to accomplish missions in any military-strategic situations.

    In general, air-based missile systems operational with the air component of the strategic nuclear forces meet the requirements placed for this class of weapons. However, for better efficiency of mission accomplishment, the existing fleet of Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear strategic bombers is undergoing upgrade and is being re-equipped with new missile and bomb models.

    In addition, continuous improvement of aids for penetrating the potential adversary's BMD and the development of new warheads for strategic missile systems of all basing types are under way.

    The command and control system for strategic nuclear forces is a key support element of the strategic armaments system. In the period through 2020 it is planned for undertake a number of key efforts to improve the reliability of its functioning and resistance to enemy countermeasures.

    As regards space weaponry, it is planned to develop advanced space systems and complexes before 2020 that will qualitatively improve information support of the Russian Armed Forces.

    As to space communications, there are plans to develop an integrated satellite communications system with new generation spacecraft launched into geostationary and highly elliptical orbits. The deployment of this system will provide reliable communications and command and control of the RF Armed Forces at all levels of control, from strategic to tactical.

    The evolution of space reconnaissance assets through the development and deployment of spaceborne imagery, radar and electronic intelligence systems and complexes in space will significantly improve the quality of intelligence data and promptness of its delivery to users.

    To date, most of the aircraft fleet is above 20 years old and consists of models, whose design and capabilities were laid back in the 1970s. Until the mid-1990s, they had still been able to maintain parity with foreign counterparts. Today, most of in-service domestic aircraft cannot provide parity with weapon systems operational with the armies of developed countries.

    In the near to medium term, a fundamental change in the situation is expected (planned). Modernization of the Air Force fleet will be provided through the joint efforts of the RF Ministry of Defense and the domestic aircraft industry through the development of advanced aviation equipment and armament and their supplies to troops.

    In the near term it is planned to complete the development of a future frontline aircraft system (PAK FA) and an inter-service airborne early warning and guidance system (A-100).

    Procurement of the An-70 medium military transport aircraft offering unique takeoff/landing performance and a spacious cargo cabin, as well as the adoption of the II-76MD-90A and An-124 versions, being superior to their foreign counterparts, will help the Armed Forces enhance their troop mobility capabilities.

    Besides, the troops have begun taking deliveries of such new high-performance air materiel models as the Su-35S multi-role fighter, Su-34 frontline bomber, Mi-28N and Ka-52 attack helicopters, as well as new air weapons, primarily precision guided missiles. The procured aviation equipment represents the state-of-the-art in terms of technology and performance levels and is superior to its foreign counterparts on some indicators.

    Prospects for the development of air defense weapons and equipment are associated with inter-service commonality efforts undertaken as part a unified air defense missile weapon system (ADMWS), further expansion of the target classes engaged, and increase in combat sustainability. Development of new ADMWS models has been organized within a comprehensive target program linking the development efforts on new generation SAM systems, new circuit components, new materials and technologies envisaged by SAP 2020 with a draft federal target program "Development of Russia's Defense Industrial Complex in 2011-2020."

    The future armaments system for the Air Defense Forces will comprise the following main types of armaments and equipment:

    Mobile multichannel long-range SAM system (S-400);

    Mobile multichannel versatile long-range SAM system capable of intercepting ballistic targets at high altitudes (S-500);

    Inter-service medium-range SAM system (Vityaz PVO) with a circular engagement area;

    Common shipborne air defense missile/gun system for air defense of surface ships of various classes from future air threats;

    Air-based laser system for soft kill (suppression) of electro-optical systems of spacecraft to be used in a future US BMD (Sokol-Eshelon)

    Prospects for military radars are associated with the development of a unified automated radar system as the information and technical backbone of Russia's Federal Airspace Intelligence and Control System, reduction in the range of radar types due to standardization of radars used in the services of the Russian Armed Forces, development of inter-service modular radars, automation equipment sets (AES), repair and maintenance facilities, as well as the creation of high-performance secondary radars and facilities.


    Reduction in the number of radar types will supposedly be done through equipping ELINT units mainly with two basic types of radar systems: medium- and high-altitude duty-combat mode radar system (Nebo-M) and low altitude radar system (Podlyot). In addition, to enhance the capabilities of radar groupings, the SAP 2020 provides for the following development efforts:

    Inter-service mobile 3D programmed-scan multiband early warning radar system for solving the air defense and national missile defense tasks;

    Inter-service mobile solid 3D low-altitude surveillance duty radar operating in the UHF band.

    Automation of AD and ELINT command posts and control posts is currently being implemented in the following areas:

    Development of advanced standardized AES as part of a future Air Force C2 system;

    Re-equipping the troops with the Fundament series AES aimed at establishing a common automated radar system that will allow ELINT command posts (control posts) to get information on the air situation from the radars operational with ELINT units of the Air Force and other combatant arms, as well as from radars of Russia's Air Navigation System;

    Modernization of the existing Krym series AES for establishing interaction with zonal (enlarged) centers of a common air traffic control (ATC) system, with regard to setting up the Federal Air Navigation Service.

    Armaments Program's measures will help re-equip AD Forces with current and advanced weapons with the required number of SAMs and equip AD groupings with combat sustainment capabilities by 2020.

    Currently, Russia still has a quantitatively large naval fleet, whose performance level does not meet present-day requirements. The current ship strength is characterized as follows:

    Quantitatively, the submarine and surface ship fleets have approached the minimum level required to accomplish their missions;

    Qualitatively, the naval equipment and armaments of general-purpose naval forces (GPNF), except for a number of systems, are inferior to their counterparts that are in service with the leading world powers;

    Technical condition of GPNF's naval equipment and armaments is characterized by a low serviceability rating, the ships are operated with various limitations mainly due to the expiration of ship machinery life.

    On this basis, two main strategic areas for Navy development have been identified to increase its combat capabilities.

    The first area encompasses an in-depth upgrade of ocean-going surface combatants like the heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser Admiral Kuznetsov that will ensure its staying in service with the Russian Navy through 2030, cruising and big nuclear-powered submarines with equipping them with precision guided missile systems, and the construction of multimission surface combatants operating in the off-shore maritime zone - Project 22350 frigates and Project 11356 destroyers, surface combatants operating in the inner maritime zone - Project 20380 and 20380M corvettes and water area patrol ships - a new-project corvette combining the functions of mine countermeasures and small antisubmarine ships, as well as the completion of small artillery ships (Project 21630) and missile ships (Project 21631) before 2020.

    The second area includes:

    Development and construction of Project 885M attack nuclear-powered submarines and the development of a new-project nuclear submarine;

    Development of an advanced nonnuclear submarine with a new powerplant;

    Development of a new-project advanced multimission destroyer for operations in the off-shore maritime zone;

    Construction of new-project diesel submarines;

    Construction of four large landing/helicopter dock ships, and completion of a Project 11711 large landing ship.

    To qualitatively upgrade and build a modern fleet, it is necessary to apply advanced system solutions and state-of-the-art naval shipbuilding technologies like:

    Precision guided weapon technologies;

    Unconventional weapon technologies, use of robotic systems and unmanned aerial vehicles;

    Signature reduction technologies (stealth technologies), use of special coatings made using nanotechnology, and selecting special forms of ship hull lines;

    Intersystem standardization technologies;

    Technologies for developing new types of powerplants;

    Technologies for creating new materials;

    Information technology.

    Through the qualitative upgrading and re-equipment of the Navy, it is expected that the share of newly-built ships in the Navy will exceed 50% by 2020, and at least 85% by 2030.

    As to missile armament of the Land Forces, in 2011 it is planned to adopt a missile with longer range and better firing accuracy for the Iskander-M theater missile systems. By 2016, the development of the Udarnik advanced tactical precision guided missile system will be completed.

    In the area of tube artillery, work is underway to increase the range and accuracy of fire of artillery shells of all calibers and systems, as well as automation of artillery guns and MRUs launch vehicles has been conducted. A promising inter-service 152mm self-propelled artillery system as well as 120mm and 152mm self-propelled artillery guns for the Airborne Troops are undergoing tests.

    In the field of anti-tank missile systems, work on a homing system realizing the "fire-and-defeat" principle is proceeding. Its results will be implemented in self-propelled antitank missile systems like the Kornet-D and Khrizantema-S and will provide round-the-clock and all-weather capabilities. Also, by 2020, it is planned to adopt the Baikal type ATGW.

    As for the armored vehicles, the existing fleet includes more than 20,000 tanks, while their requirement for 2020 is much lower. However, only T-90 tanks and a portion of T-72 tanks have the required upgrading potential. The rest tank versions will have to be decommissioned from the Armed Forces.

    To replenish the armored vehicle fleet, by 2015 it is planned to develop:

    Common inter-service tracked platform for a combat vehicle and a support vehicle on its basis;

    Common inter-service wheeled platform for a combat vehicle and a support vehicle on its basis;

    Medium tracked platform for a combat vehicle and a support vehicle on its basis;

    New-generation medium- and heavy-capacity automotive platform for a family of multipurpose tactical protected automotive vehicles and modular mobile workshops on its basis.

    In the field of soldier equipment, by 2020, the troops will receive close combat weapons and individual soldier gear comparable to their foreign counterparts in their characteristics and surpassing them in weapons.

    In today's conditions, the accomplishment of tasks facing tactical units and the most effective use of strike weapons are impossible without a well-functioning information management system. The Unified Tactical Command and Control System (YeSU TZ), which is being developed, belongs to such systems.

    Under the State Armaments Program, the supplies of the YeSU TZ kits are scheduled for 2011.

    It should be noted that creating a unified tactical command and control system meeting current requirements in the transition of the Russian Armed Forces to a new look is a critical scientific and technical problem.

    The unified tactical control and control system is part of the lower-level of the automated troop control system for the Russian Armed Forces. It is a set of interconnected tactical-level automated control systems and communications facilities of the Russian Armed Forces' groupings.

    The main goal of creating the YeSU TZ is to increase the effectiveness of tactical units through the development of advanced software / hardware systems, which will enable control of subordinate the subunits to a platoon, a squad, a crew, and to an individual soldier inclusive, both as part of a grouping of troops (forces) and in cooperation with units of other military formations.

    Development and adoption of the YeSU TZ will ensure the integration and combined use of weapon systems, information support, electronic warfare, control, communications and data exchange, while their field practice may clarify the requirements for further improvement and development of such systems.

    In addition, equipping the troops with advanced equipment models and support facilities will ensure the mission accomplishment by troop groupings in different climatic conditions, at any time of year and day.

    Thus, the implementation of measures aimed at establishing a modern armaments system, as well as the complete delivery of new armament and military equipment models (complexes, systems) to troops will provide the required and sufficient level of equipment of the RF Armed Forces.

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Tue May 24, 2011 2:55 am

    Excellent post there Austin... very interesting... lots of good stuff there.

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Tue May 24, 2011 8:47 am

    GarryB wrote:Excellent post there Austin... very interesting... lots of good stuff there.

    Thanks , yes it almost lists out most of the development that can be expected in SAP 2020 in a broader way and touches many subject.

    It very much comprehensive program if they can implement it and remains well funded.

    medo
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 3052
    Points : 3150
    Join date : 2010-10-24
    Location : Slovenia

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  medo on Tue May 24, 2011 3:52 pm

    I have a question about Kornet-D, which is mentioned in article. Is it known self propelled version of Kornet on BMP-3 chassis or is it special version for airborn units placed on BMD chassis?

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Wed May 25, 2011 1:41 am

    I have a question about Kornet-D, which is mentioned in article. Is it known self propelled version of Kornet on BMP-3 chassis or is it special version for airborn units placed on BMD chassis?

    Both the Shturm/Ataka and the Krisantema systems based on ground vehicles are -S systems, and according to the Wiki page on the BMP-3 the version with Kornet is called Kornet-T.

    I suspect the Kornet-D will be the missile with a fire and forget terminal seeker.

    Regarding the original article I find it interesting the unification of tube artillery with goals to extend range and accuracy.
    Perhaps Coalition is not cancelled either?

    A new SSN design sounds interesting... Would expect it to be smaller than current models and most likely cheaper too so that it can be made and manned in numbers.

    Interesting that they want a new ATGM (Baikal) and to add terminal homing seekers to Kornet and Kristantema... the latter will make the Ka-52 and Mi-28N/M more powerful of course. Wonder what features the Baikal will add over and above what Kornet and Krisantema with terminal guidance offers?
    More powerful warhead? Extra range? Perhaps lower production costs for large scale production? Perhaps diving top attack or manouvering side attack?


    A new missile to replace Tender/Iskander is interesting too considering it is supposed to already have a range close to that allowed by the INF treaty.

    Perhaps the Russian military is planning to withdraw from this cold war dinosaur?

    With S-400s and S-500s and even a few S-300s the threat of the IRBM is no longer something that cannot be stopped, so it would make sense for Russian to be able to use all its ICBMs for long range targets and to produce smaller cheaper IRBMs for targets closer by like China and NATO.

    The unification and standardisation of air defence radars sounds like a good thing too.

    That magazine you posted Austin that included an article on naval SAMs included current efforts to incorporate the Pantsir-S1 missiles and electronics into Kashtan suggests that the naval, army, and PVO/space and air defence forces short range gun and missile defence system will be Pantsir-S1 based. There should still be room for simple systems like SOSNA-R with a trailer mounted EO system with 4 ready to launch missiles and a twin barrel 30mm cannon as a more effective alternative to the old ZU-23 but not as expensive as an actual vehicle mounted system.

    Viktor
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5630
    Points : 6283
    Join date : 2009-08-25
    Age : 36
    Location : Croatia

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Viktor on Wed May 25, 2011 11:15 am

    GarryB wrote:

    A new SSN design sounds interesting... Would expect it to be smaller than current models and most likely cheaper too so that it can be made and manned in numbers.

    There where articles published now and then about this new SSN. At one time it was even suggested to abondon Graney class construction due to high cost and go along with this new smaller SSN.

    Anyway as it new seems Graney class will go on with up to 6 units but this new smaller class will carry on also.

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Thu May 26, 2011 2:44 am

    6 would be a useful number of Graneys without breaking the bank.

    The whole new focus in the Russian Navy is to standardise... that is hull forms, propulsion, sensors, and weapons.

    The result should be instead of x number of Sovremenny class destroyers and x number of Udaloy ASW vessels they will have X + X number of multipurpose vessels with the gun and anti ship power of the Sov and the sonar and anti sub capacity of the Udaloy along with the helicopter... perhaps even 2 x Ka-226 instead of 1 heavier helo.

    The result will be a savings in production and service and more flexible ships with the mission role determined when the vertical launch tubes are filled with weapons with anti ship and anti sub and land attack missiles as options for each tube.

    Certainly smaller cheaper more automated SSNs will be useful too to make up numbers and allow more area to be covered at any one time.

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Thu May 26, 2011 7:02 am

    Actually they are planning to build 10 Granney class

    http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20110319/163086398.html

    Considering Granney class is a very expensive subs even by Russian standards more expensive then SSBN YD at more than $1 billion per sub.

    They plan to build an affordable , smaller ( 6000 T ) submarine , a project to develop 5th Gen Sub is under works at Malachite.

    This new sub will be developed from 2020 onwards and will replace bulk of Akula SSN fleet and other attack submarine plus they would provide cover to SSBN.

    The Granny will eventually play the role that Oscar-2 is currently doing.

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Thu May 26, 2011 7:46 am

    10 is a good number as well... I think with the plans to develop more in the far east and the upgrading of the military in the Kurile region that the Pacific Fleet might get at least half of those.

    And small but capable SSNs will be rather interesting and likely multipurpose vessels with all sorts of bits and bobs like UAVs that can be launched and recovered while the sub is submerged and of course all sorts of unmanned underwater vehicles and diver facilities too.

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Thu May 26, 2011 1:46 pm

    MODERNIZATION OF ARMY - A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE
    Military Parade, No. 2, 2011

    MODERNIZATION OF ARMY - A PRIORITY OBJECTIVE

    In March, President of Russia - Supreme Commander of the RF Armed Forces Dmitry Medvedev held two important meetings on national defense capacity issues: an enlarged meeting of the RF Ministry of Defense's Board and a meeting with the heads of defense industry enterprises. The results of activities in 2010 were summed up and the objectives for 2011 were outlined.

    The President gave top priority to force development issues. Back in 2008, he tasked the Ministry of Defense and the Security Council to shape a new "look" of the army through its comprehensive modernization. Over the past period all four core sectors were involved in the army reformation process: the command structure of the armed forces, legal and regulatory framework, personnel, and equipment of troops with modern weaponry.

    Setting the objective for 2011, the Russian President has identified three main areas of force development: new armaments, a new quality of troop management and a new status of the officer. Unlike most countries in world, Russia, due to its geopolitical position and size of its territory, has to develop and maintain a high level of combat readiness of the full range of weapons available in all possible services and arms of the armed forces. Dmitry Medvedev out lined this primary condition of national security as "a comprehensive modernization of the armed forces", stressing at the same time that absolutely eliminates "drawing our country into a costly arms race."

    LAGGED BEHIND THE FOREFRONT

    Modernization of the armed forces is carried out according to the State Armaments Program (SAP) for 2010-2020, for whose implementation 20 trillion rubles have been budgeted. Its target is to bring the level of equipping the Russian Armed Forces with modern types of armaments to 70% by 2020, while the level of fitting with military equipment will reach 100% by 2016. The new documents - SAP-2020 and the Federal DIC Development Program 2011-2020 - are also focused on advanced research and development.

    In 2010, the share of supplies of new military hardware has reached 15%. Troops received 20,000 pieces of new military equipment, including 27 ICBMs, 34 strategic air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), 21 aircraft and 37 helicopters, 19 SAM systems, 61 tanks and 325 combat armored vehicles, six spacecraft were launched.

    In 2011, it is scheduled to deliver: 36 ICBMs, 20 strategic ALCMs, two strategic missile submarines (SSBN), three attack nuclear submarines (SSN), five spacecraft, 35 aircraft, 109 helicopters, 1 surface combatant ship and 21 SAM systems.

    Commenting on the SAP-2020, First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin said that deep modernization of the Russian armed forces' assets lies ahead and three new approaches to the transformation of the Russian Armed Forces will help accomplish this objective.

    The first approach is as follows: priority for the Ministry of Defense is not support of the whole domestic industry but equipping the Army with armaments and military equipment competitive in the global market in order to meet the necessary requirements for defense capabilities under conditions of modern challenges and threats. That is, if the domestic industry does not manufacture any kinds of competitive armaments, this should not deprive the Russian armed forces of the opportunity to purchase advanced weapons abroad.


    The second approach involves reaching defense R&D expenditure parity with the United States. In the reporting financial year, the US spent 11% of its 2010 defense budget (79.1 billion dollars) on R&D. The Russian SAP-2020 envisages a 10% level of R&D costs (about US $70 billion), which corresponds to annual spending on innovation in the US defense sector and is approximately 9% of all US expenses on defense research and development.

    The third approach to military modernization envisages creating a common information space - from the General Staff to every single soldier on the battlefield. This is a so-called future soldier gear, which in addition to body armor, ammunition and weapons will include a special helmet with two displays and microphone, communication and data exchange means, as well as other high-tech devices (a full-fledged communication system). At the initial stage the Russian army will buy several kits of the French FELIN system from Sagem Defense Securite/SAFRAN, and then the Russian defense industry will develop a similar system.

    Chief of General Staff - First Deputy Defense Minister General of the Army Nikolai Makarov said that outdated military equipment was often procured in the past. As a result, over 20 years of the post-Soviet period the Russian army continued to share views of the 1970's and essentially "lagged behind the front line" - he noted. Priority in military affairs, as Nikolai Makarov highlighted, is given today to precision-guided weapons, space facilities and information technologies. The digital technology and automated troop command and control systems determine everything in the modern theater of operations - the effectiveness of combat operations, interoperability of interservice task forces, maneuverability of forces and facilities, pace of warfare, precision of strikes, losses of personnel and equipment.

    Reporting on the progress in the replacement of analog automated troop control equipment with digital systems, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said that by the beginning of this year a comprehensive upgrade aimed to establish a modern information / telecommunications infrastructure in the army was completed at 259 military facilities. By the end of the year the number of re-equipped facilities will reach 500 and thus the Russian President's order will be accomplished on time and in full. The deliveries of a sixth-generation radio to troops will begin already this year, and an advanced military communications satellite constellation will be completed by 2018.

    "Means of communication are a key issue of improving the combat capability of our armed forces," - the RF President stressed the importance of this priority area.

    "I will control supplies of armaments and military equipment," - said Dmitry Medvedev, adding that the fulfillment of obligations will be monitored in all phases - from development to deliveries. In this respect, the President proposed to maintain a balance between the customer and the contractor: state order should ensure a reasonable level of profitability for companies (in order to develop and introduce new technologies), but the prices of DIC products should be transparent, while the responsibility for meeting the obligations under state defense order will be raised. Beginning next year the total defense expenses will reach 4.5% of GDP, exceeding that of the US (3.5% of GDP).

    Addressing the heads of defense enterprises and the Russian government, the Russian President categorically stated that today, under conditions of sufficient government funding of the defense industry, dependency, manipulation of prices and a steady increase in contract price in the industrial sector are no longer welcome. "The vicious system must be broken, otherwise we will not be able to meet the objective, which I said about - to equip our army and navy with new weapons by 2020. The money is available, it is necessary to bring order," - said Dmitry Medvedev, assuring that since part of the obligations under state defense order have not been met, hearings will be held soon and responsible persons from industry and government institutions will be determined.

    TRANSFROMATION OF ARMED FORCES' STRUCTURE


    Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces Nikolai Makarov, speaking at a general session of the Academy of Military Sciences, strongly criticized the approaches to the organizational structure of the Russian army, where emphasis is still placed on a massive Soviet-style army for flank confrontation along the front line. "The past 20 years have seen rapid development of the forms and methods of warfare. These changes are associated with the transition from large-scale linear actions of multi-million armies to new generation maneuvering defense of professionally trained armed forces and network-centric warfare, "- he explained, adding that this experience of leading Western armies has not been reviewed and not taken into account in Russia yet. The main requirement for modern armed forces in the world is the ability to conduct expeditionary military operations.

    Chief of General Staff's critical statements were made after the meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense's Board, where Russian President - Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces instructed the military to drastically improve the quality of command and control, especially at the level of joint strategic commands and armies. The new organizational structure of the Russian Armed Forces established last year consists of four military districts and four operational Joint Strategic Commands - West (St. Petersburg), Center (Yekaterinburg), East (Khabarovsk) and South (Rostov-on-Don).

    Due to recent changes in the deployment of troops to improve their mobility and firepower capabilities in strategic sectors, eight (instead of 33) large bases of army aviation were established and the airfield network was optimized. Such a transformation helps maintain the country's military infrastructure multi-layered in the main strategic directions. The Supreme Commander of the Russian Armed Forces has set the objective - "to thoroughly test the new troop management structure during the Center 2011 Exercise, moreover, taking into account Russia's ensuring interregional security, jointly with its CSTO allies (much attention will be paid to interservice interaction of Russian armed forces and operative cooperation with armies of the Allies).

    The new effective fighting strength of the Russian Armed Forces with the established number of 1 million servicemen and an updated troop training and command and control system is today strong interservice groupings in all strategic directions. According to the President of Russia, the most important areas for defense strengthening and security maintenance are the eastern and far eastern sectors, where increased attention will be given to modernization of the defense infrastructure.

    Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov considers the separation between the operating and supporting functions within the army management system as the major results of the ongoing reform. "Two areas of responsibility have been established: the first area includes force planning, implementation and development, the second - logistic support of the Army and Navy," - said Anatoly Serdyukov. - The main objective of the next stage of the military reform is to increase the fighting capabilities of force groupings in the strategic sectors. To this end, in 2011 it is planned to complete forming new formations and units, three combined arms, one missile, two artillery and seven air defense missile brigades (out of 12 planned), nine reconnaissance brigades and three engineer brigades, implement a package of measures to improve the battle readiness of the formed units."

    As to logistic support of the Armed Forces, a unified system of logistic support of troops with armaments, military equipment, ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and other property has been established, a stocks storage system has been optimized - eight integrated bases and 10 logistic brigades have been stationed in the areas where the formations and units are deployed.

    This year the aerospace defense (ASD) troops will be formed by bringing together the existing air defense, missile defense, missile warning and space control systems under common command & control. All the decisions will be adjusted depending on negotiations with NATO over Russia's participation in EuroBMD. In order to build a common ASD system, as well as to further strengthen the Strategic Missile Forces with three missile divisions, form 14 new army aviation brigades, 12 air defense missile brigades for army air defense, and other fighting units, which will be equipped with high-tech weapons and unmanned aerial vehicles, it was decided to increase the number of officers by about 70,000 people.

    Earlier, summing up the results of 2010 on the central state TV channels, the Russian President emphasized that in general the Ministry of Defense carefully implemented his instructions on forming a functioning army. "Our army still remains largely Soviet. Not because the Soviet army was bad - the time was different, the size of the country was different, and the objectives were different. We must reform the army,"- said Dmitry Medvedev. He approved the MoD's proposals concerning maintenance of 220,000 officers and 425,000 soldiers serving under contract. At the same time, approaching the NATO countries' practice, the number of conscripts will be reduced to 10-15% in future.

    All the force development processes in Russia help more successfully promote the interests of the state in the international arena. A new treaty on strategic offensive arms with the US has heavily affected the military reform. Multilateral and bilateral areas of military cooperation are developing. Our military capabilities are improved taking into account also international commitments for the rapid delivery of peacekeeping forces for UN and EU missions. In the framework of international agreements, the missile and ammunition storage system is optimized (74,000 rail cars with explosion-hazardous armaments will be destroyed within the next two to three years).

    NEW STATUS OF SERVICEMEN

    The issues related to military personnel like strengthening the officer corps, improving the education system, improving combat training, fight against corruption, providing social guarantees for servicemen and military pensioners, improving service conditions, as well as well-being of service families are under priority control of the country's president.

    In 2010, the amount of combat training in troops was increased by 30% (over 2,000 exercises were conducted). The main event - Vostok (East) 2010 operational / strategic exercise - involved 56,000 servicemen, more than 10,000 pieces of equipment, including 170 combat planes and helicopters, 54 warships. This year it is scheduled to hold about 3,000 exercises, including the Center 2011 operational / strategic exercise jointly with the armed forces of CSTO countries, and the Cooperation 2011 Russian-Belarus exercise.

    Dmitry Medvedev stressed that only fully trained officers are able to carry out modernization of the armed forces: "The troops should be replenished with the commanders who can not only use sophisticated weaponry and modern equipment, but also train the conscript soldiers who now serve just 1 year." To this end, the Ministry of Defense has bought two training simulators in Germany with a capacity of 3,000 workstations for combat training of brigades' personnel. In the process of training, the initiative and leader commander qualities, the ability to work quickly and in a non-routine manner, save forces and facilities, and avoid personnel losses will be assessed rather than mechanical actions of the trainees. To enhance the fighting readiness of troops, personnel will be fully excused from doing fatigue duty and non-core activities since 2012.

    The military education system based on a common approach to training at military and civilian schools is being actively reorganized. Military educational institutions, together with civil universities and defense enterprises, have developed new federal state educational standards to train primary level officers. At a March meeting of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with the heads of industrial enterprises held at Metrovagonmash, a defense plant in Mytischi, near Moscow, the creation of a unified national qualifications map was discussed (RUIE is preparing 170 standards), which will take into account the lack of engineering skills determining not only the future of the defense industry, but also the combat readiness of the armed forces, because the servicemen admitted to new high-tech types of weapons must have engineering education.

    A continuous professional officer education system will be established, much attention is paid to the professional sergeant training system. To give the children of servicemen an opportunity to get military education, the MoD has 19 military schools. Last year the first Presidential Cadet School was opened in Orenburg, and the second one will be set up in Stavropol (it is planned to open a total of eight such educational institutions).

    Military compensation is dramatically changing: from 1 January 2012 the officers will receive between 50,000 rubles (platoon commanders) and 150,000 rubles or more (senior officers), which is comparable with money allowances of officers in the developed countries. The average amount of military pensions will increase 1.6 times.

    Over the past two years the officers discharged from military service have received 100,000 apartments. The program to provide housing for officers will be completed within the next two years. Later, it is planned to provide apartments within a year after the servicemen are included in the waiting list.

    The infrastructure of military camps is being optimized - only 184 out of the existing 21,000 camps will remain and their integrated infrastructure will be built.

    To strengthen anti-corruption measures, the Anti-Corruption Council will be set up under the Ministry of Defense, while the Main Organization Inspection Department, Personnel Inspection, Military and Financial Inspections will be vested with additional powers.

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Thu May 26, 2011 1:55 pm

    DEFENCE INDUSTRY PIVOTAL MODERNISATION - A PRIORITY
    Military Parade, No. 2, 2011

    DEFENCE INDUSTRY PIVOTAL MODERNISATION - A PRIORITY

    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting in Votkinsk, the hub of the Russian rocket and missile engineering, in March 2011. The meeting discussed development and modernisation of the national defence industry and assessed readiness of the Russian industry and scientific centres to fulfil the new State Arms Programme for 2011-2020. A successful implementation of the programme will enable Russia to shape modern mighty Armed Forces, capable of countering any contemporary threat.

    In his opening address the prime minister pointed out that a total of over 20 trillion Russian roubles were expected to be earmarked to implement the programme. "As compared with the previous programme, the amount will increase almost three-fold. Indeed, that is a lot of assets and much money for Russia. Naturally, we will have to divert the money from other lines of activities, but I believe it to be reasonable. What we see today is an extreme ease of adopting decisions on the use of force in international affairs. Developments in Libya are as good confirmation as any, which proves that our resolve to strengthen Russia's defensive capacity is justified."

    Vladimir Putin emphasised that budgetary allocations would not be the only thing to grow, what was even more important requirements to armament quality, capabilities, and specifications would be toughened as well. "We need real new-generation hardware. It is unwise to waste money on manufacturing morally obsolete systems, therefore, much of the money, earmarked within the framework of the state arms programme, will be spent on advanced defence and technology developments," he stressed.

    "Our objective consists in ensuring a comprehensive re-equipment of the Russian Armed Forces. It means that we have to establish really integrated and efficient Navy, Army, and Air Force, rather than separate outfits with modern materiel. For instance, Air Defence Forces will have to be re-equipped completely. The output of strategic and theatre missile systems will be doubled from 2013 on. All surface-to-air missile (SAM) regiments will get new S-400 Triumf and Pantsyr-S systems.

    Troops will also field new strategic and theatre missile systems, such as Yars, Bulava, and Iskander-M," the prime minister stated.

    "At the same time strategic offensive arms and missile defence systems will be developed in strict compliance with all international agreements, including the START Treaty. It will guarantee strategic stability and safety across the globe. However, all such agreements are structured in such a manner that nothing can prevent us from upgrading our offensive arms and maintaining their efficiency," Putin stressed.

    According to the Russian prime minister, in excess of 1,300 pieces of arms and materiel will be procured under the state arms programme. A total of 70% of weapon systems to be fielded with the Russian Armed Forces by 2020 are expected to be top-notch, as opposed to simply new, arms. Development of 220 pieces of materiel will require opening new or expanding existing production facilities, and establishing cooperation between defence and civilian contractors. To cut the long story short, to drastically modernise Russia's Armed Forces it is a must to revamp its defence industry, introduce state-of-the-art technologies, attract promising managerial staff, engineers, and workers, as well as establish powerful top-notch production facilities, capable of manufacturing high-quality products by the deadlines, specified in corresponding contracts, at reasonable economically sound prices.

    "Last year we took comprehensive stock of defence industry enterprises: in effect, we evaluated all branches of the defence industry, determined its realistic capabilities and readiness to manufacture new advanced products, and what is more important, to fulfil big-ticket mass-production contracts. The defence industry naturally requires investments in its development, therefore in addition to the state arms programme we have finalised the federal target-oriented programme for defence industry modernisation until 2020," Vladimir Putin said.

    The draft federal target-oriented programme for missile system mass production envisions allocation of almost 77 billion Russian roubles, including 9.6 billion Russian roubles for the Votkinsk plant, over the afore-mentioned period of time.

    "The Votkinsk plant is our basic leading production facility, manufacturing missile systems. The enterprise has gained vast scientific and production experience, however, the wear of it production equipment is quite high. We will invest almost 1.7 billion Russian roubles in revamping the Votkinsk plant by 2013 within the framework of the state-guaranteed defence order. A total of approximately 15 billion Russian roubles will be earmarked for enterprises, manufacturing missile systems, i.e. your related enterprises, over a period of three years. The amount of finance allocated to this end will gradually grow in the upcoming years. This is exactly what is envisioned by the Federal Programme "Russian Defence Industry Development through to 2020," Vladimir Putin pointed out.

    "Modernisation will cover all major sectors of the national defence industry: rocket and missile engineering, military aircraft industry, command and control, communications, and reconnaissance systems, ammunition, and shipbuilding. It is of paramount importance to start funding main development projects, procurements of new equipment, and design documentation development as soon as possible. The government discussed these issues several days ago and came up with the following proposal. In order to step up a full-scale modernisation of production facilities the government proposes that financial assets be allocated even before the Defence Industry Development Programme is officially adopted.

    In the course of the meeting Vladimir Putin charged the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Economic Development, and the Russian Federal Space Agency looking into the viability of this pattern in relation to the rocket and missile engineering among other things.

    In conclusion the Russian prime minister underlined that state customers should strictly fulfil their obligations and sign contracts on time, and should not delay payments and advance payments, while enterprises should manufacture "high-quality products by the deadlines, specified in contracts, at reasonable prices."

    Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin chaired a meeting in Votkinsk, the hub of the Russian rocket and missile engineering, in March 2011. The meeting discussed development and modernisation of the national defence industry and assessed readiness of the Russian industry and scientific centres to fulfil the new State Arms Programme for 2011-2020. A successful implementation of the programme will enable Russia to shape modern mighty Armed Forces, capable of countering any contemporary threat.

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Thu May 26, 2011 2:32 pm

    ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASIS FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
    Vasily Burenok
    Military Parade

    ORGANIZATIONAL AND TECHNOLOGY BASIS FOR NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE

    Vasily Burenok – chief of RF MoD’s 46th CNII Central Research Institute, Doctor of Engineering, Professor, Major General

    Russia’s Armed Forces are undergoing major changes associated with shaping their new look and creating an armaments system matching this look. The objective is to ensure that the new Russian Armed Forces are able to cope with the military threats that may emerge in the first half of the 21st century. One of them is network-centric warfare (integration of forces by a common electronic network system for continuous sharing of information).

    Although it may seem strange, despite a rather large controversy concerning network-centric warfare in the domestic specialized publications, the problem is often considered superficially, without a thorough analysis of its essence and content, what even leads to a distortion of the concept itself. Perhaps for this reason polar, sometimes even radical views, not counting a set of intermediates, formed. Some, even very distinguished military scholars are trying to prove that the problem is far-fetched, nothing new, and so no changes to the RF Armed Forces development plans, field manuals and regulations are needed. Others believe that we have lagged far behind: “As to Russia, it is now simply has fallen out of the world military mainstream: in fact, its armed forces are in a state of collapse.” In order not to lose future wars, it is necessary “... to ensure the rapid development of next-generation weapons, primarily network-centric robotic systems, which are not now available in sufficient numbers in the armies of leading foreign countries as well.” Of course, the opposite opinions and emotional judgments can hardly serve as a basis for constructive solutions. As is known, the truth is always in the middle.

    Accordingly, the discussion on this topic should be continued with greater attention to detail so that it would be possible to competently and convincingly come to the problem of identifying the areas for improvement in the structure and composition of Russia’s Armed Forces and in the principles for conducting warfare in the era of high-tech wars.

    Creating the Armed Forces suited for the conduct of network-centric warfare is an extremely challenging problem, covering both technical and human aspects and their synergy – the area of human-computer interaction. In any case, the approach of the US specialists to the problem is precisely this. Although, we might be able to tackle the problem in another way, having immediately jumped over to the “mass network-centric robotics,” but something leads one to doubt such a possibility. But seriously speaking, it is not “something”, and the lack of theoretic achievements and practical experience of conducting such wars by the Armed Forces of Russia. And if you do not know how to conduct such a war, it is impossible to verbally describe and mathematically strictly formalize the procedures for the conduct of network-centric combat, develop software on this basis to control robots, as well as determine their balanced model range, ensuring the effective result of such a war.

    As is known, and this fact is disputed by nobody, the principles of network-centric warfare (at least at this stage of evolution of its theory and practice) are aimed primarily at achieving information superiority over the enemy. Information superiority is not a transfer of large amounts of information to combat formation elements (headquarters, units, soldiers), but achieving a deeper situational awareness and understanding on the battlefield, a more clear understanding of own advantages and enemy disadvantages, the ability to form an action plan in which these advantages will be realized to the greatest extent, faster making decisions fully relevant to the current situation and disseminating them immediately to subordinates and neighbors, their continuous follow-up.

    Information superiority, according to foreign experts is achieved, given the following preconditions are met:

    1. Creation of the armed forces (their structure and composition), adapted to the network-centric warfare conditions, including the development of evidence-based concepts of their use, detailed military manuals and regulations and troops tested during training.

    2. Availability of trained personnel with appropriate education, technical and tactical training and hands-on experience. This, in turn, implies the formation of a personnel training system, starting with developing a set of instructional aids and trainer training and ending with the creation of a set of simulators and properly equipped classrooms.

    3. Availability of equipment and environment (hardware and software interfaces) for information gathering, sharing and communication organization. This involves equipping the troops with dedicated computers, data collection, processing and transfer systems, as well as the development of the appropriate software, including displays adapted to different users.

    4. Creating conditions for self-synchronization of troop actions, assuming that a common (uniform) understanding of the situation at any time is achieved and ensuring efficient, syn-ergetic teamwork in actions.

    As is seen, foreign experts believe that the objective of forming an army structure adapted to actions in network-centric warfare should be met first. The most common requirements for it are as follows: structural identity (similarity) of elements (units and subunits), information compatibility, and information passability (lack of nodes where information will be delayed or distorted). The second requirement concerns solving the problem of the questionable human factor, creating a soldier of network-centric war trained for it in theory, technically and psychologically. And the technical component - to which our analysts pay major attention -ranked only third.

    Under self-synchronization is meant the ability of units and subunits to plan and carry out their missions there, at that time and in such a way, where, when and as they will ensure the highest effectiveness of both own actions and the actions of other units which they support (interact with). Hence, self-synchronization can be called self-optimization. But, as is known, solving an optimization problem requires an objective function (concept) and constraints (on resources and information awareness).

    Therefore, in turn, self-synchronization involves:

    1. Clear and logical formulation of a command’s plan, ensuring its adequate and uniform (common) perception by troops.

    2. Competence across all levels of command.

    3. Completeness of the information disseminated to troops in the field (to the extent necessary and sufficient for them for taking their decisions).

    4. Ensuring the flawless information transmission.

    5. The availability of a system of rules for coordinated actions by the units and subunits during the preparation and conduct of warfare. Moreover, these rules should rely not on the traditional hierarchical control principle, but on the result of solving the optimization control problem, with regard to the current situation.

    The first and second self-synchronization conditions are essentially interrelated, since the logic and clarity of the concept formulation implies much the same level of competence at the lower levels of command. If it differs considerably, the principle of self-synchronization will not be fully realized. That is the concept of network-centric warfare is based not only on the technical and technological principles, but also on the improved intellectual abilities of the warfare actors. Recognizing this, the military leaders of foreign countries, on the one hand, create a system of continuous professional growth of military personnel, and on the other are seeking ways to increase the level of decision making process automation.

    The last condition, which can be correctly and adequately realized only if the third and fourth conditions are met, involves decision support systems focused on continuous situation monitoring.

    Thus, even a quick overview of the conditions and requirements set forth by foreign military experts for forming the technical component and the level of training of the military personnel and headquarters, suggests, first, a fundamental approach to achieving information superiority and, second, an extremely high complexity of problems to be solved on this way.


    Moreover, they are complex and require systemic solutions. Otherwise, the synergetic effect, i.e. gaining information superiority, may prove not so obvious and adequate to costs.

    As to forming a structure of the Armed Forces corresponding to the network-centric warfare conditions, a number of requirements are placed on it, whose implementation should ensure the achievement of so-called structural and functional adaptation of the troops. These requirements include:

    1. Stability
    - the ability of troops to effectively perform all missions assigned to them.

    2. Recoverability - the ability of troops to operate or restore their capabilities after a defeat inflicted on them by the enemy.

    3. Responsiveness - the ability to timely respond to the changing operational environment.

    4. Flexibility - the ability to generate (form) and implement various options to achieve the objective.

    5. Innovativeness - the ability to use new equipment and new ways of handling tasks.

    6. Adaptability - the ability (non-criticality) to change the mission implementation processes and organizational structure to fit changed troop employment concepts.

    If we consider the first four requirements, they are not new and were always placed on any military organization or troop unit in one form or another. As regards the fifth and sixth requirements, they need to be dwelt on.

    Recently, innovativeness has become not so much a requirement as a fundamental principle for the development of the armed forces of advanced foreign countries. This is especially true for the US Army, which has surpassed the armies all over the world in the number of innovations. And this is owing not only to investments into the development of new types of weapons, but also through creating an environment when new weapon models are quickly fielded to the US Army units, subunits and formations. But this task is not easy. Its solving involves not only issuing a trivial order on the adoption of a weapon model, but its inclusion into the table of organization and equipment of one or another troop unit, revision of field manuals and regulations on the operational employment and equipment support of the troops, determining the customer of this model, procedures for its procurement, deliveries to troops, operation (including consumption rates for all types of resources), repair, and disposal. According to foreign experts, without implementing the principle of innovativeness, it makes no sense to expect the new armed forces to meet the requirements of the new information age.

    The next requirement - “adaptability” - on the one hand, is linked to innovativeness, on the other has an independent significance. Adaptability suggests such organization and establishment of the formations in which the introduction (exclusion) of additional units or subunits, a change of their combat use conditions (for example, transfer to another theater of operations) do not disrupt the information flow process, decision support and making algorithms, and subunit control. This requirement is very important in terms of a network-centric scheme for troop command & control: any combat formation element needs to be able to quickly join or disconnect from the network in the process of its functioning, without a negative impact on its own and network performance. Speaking the programmer’s language, this means that the network must be able to «identify» a new subunit and support its effective functioning within itself. Similarly, when the theater is changed, the network should be able to «read out» the new data and adapt the algorithms of communication between the network elements, based on new conditions.

    The structural and functional adaptation can be achieved through implementing the “Interface and Functional Integration of Command, Control, Computer, Communications and Intelligence for the Warrior” (C4IFTW) concept and strategic Command and Control Warfare (C2W) concept. These concepts are the core of a military-technical policy aimed to ensure the conduct of network-centric warfare by armed forces.

    The C4IFTW concept involves the implementation of the requirements listed above (concerning the technical component of the network-centric armed forces):

    1. Extensive use of modular design in equipment development and infrastructure formation to ensure continuous modernization (innovativeness) and survivability (recoverability).

    2. Fielding of multi-user computer systems with shared databases to troops and creating a common battlefield information space.

    3. Conduct of an Armed Forces’ agreed policy for procurement of information systems and computer equipment.

    4. Global standardization of communication procedures for the means which are forming the systems of collection, processing and distribution of intelligence information.

    5. Standardization of data presentation forms and methods and realtime data processing procedures.

    6. Extensive use of the recent advances in commercial information technologies and standards for data transmission and information processing.

    7. Sharing and, in some cases, integration of military and information infrastructures, given the information security is ensured.

    8. Protection of information and computing resources from the information warfare means, reducing the likelihood of information distortion or loss during transmission through the use of new exchange algorithms and data presentation forms.

    The concept is being implemented in a phased manner as the plans for reorganizing the armed forces and bringing them to a structure specified by the US Armed Forces Transformation Program are implemented.

    Foreign military experts focus only on the forms and methods of building an information shell of network-centric warfare. However, information superiority is not simply the transfer of large amounts of information. The information needs to be filtered, processed and presented to the consumer in the form of ready-made solutions or some “semis” around which it is possible to quickly take a solution adequate to the current situation. In the specialized publications, including foreign, devoted to the theory of network-centric warfare, it is practically impossible to find a description of decision-making algorithms for HQ elements at different levels (except, perhaps, the simplest ones). On the one hand, it is understandable for the reasons of secrecy, but on the other the benefit of such information wouldn’t be as large as it seems at first glance. The nature of decisions made depends on a lot of factors including even such as the national mentality and domestic military school traditions. Therefore, the elaboration of formalized decision support procedures is another, and perhaps the most challenging task that needs to be addressed in creating the armed forces adapted to network-centric warfare conditions. Its complexity is due to the fact that you can fearlessly instruct the computer to produce only those solutions and “hints” for command staff, which are based on known physical phenomena and strict mathematical relations. But it is difficult to formalize the thinking process of a commander, when he often takes an intuitive decision based on analyzing large amounts of unformalized and semi-structured data. Therefore, a reasonable balance between the actions of the computer and man, between the different decision-making levels is needed. But, on the other hand, the lack of formalized decision-making procedures can become an absolute obstacle to self-synchronization of the troop actions.

    The list of problems associated with the creation of network-centric forces could go on and on. But talking about them is not enough. They need to be addressed. Moreover, this should be done actively and consistently (much time was lost, our lag is very noticeable), competently and soundly (errors may be too costly, both financially and militarily), without trying to indulge in wishful thinking (separate automated command & control systems existing in our armed forces and a large number of computers on the desktops of commanders at various levels are not the occasion to talk about the implementation of the principles of network-centric warfare).

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Tue May 31, 2011 4:49 am

    I did a search on the Baikal ATGM and found this page:

    http://www.network54.com/Forum/211833/thread/1306337745/last-1306337745/Russian+general+opens+mouth+and+discloses+dozen+new+weapons+programs

    which has a nice summary of the same article:

    Summary:
    Ground Forces
    1. Fire and forget version of Kornet called Kornet-D is in testing
    2. Baikal ATGM in development to replace Kornet and Khrizantema
    3. 2011 will see the introduction of a new super long range version of Iskander!!!
    4. Udarnik system in development to replace Iskander
    5. New 152mm SPG in development for AIRBORNE troops! A 152mm air dropped gun would be amazing.
    6. New 152mm inter-service SPG is also in development -- this is probably the Koalition gun they leaked pics of a few years back.
    7. Nothing new on the tank front except that the T-80 is definitely history.
    8. They plan to standardize around several new common chassis for other armored vehicles -- no details disclosed.
    9. New C2 or C4I system called YeSU currently going through its rounds with a Future Soldier type system in development that will utilize it all the way down to the individual level.

    Navy
    1. They plan to build a new specialized mine-warfare and ASW corvette. The 20380's seem to be lacking in the mine warfare and ASW areas so a new class in development to fill this role.

    Other than that same old news -- Gorshkovs's, Talwars, and 20380's will form the bulk of the fleet. Subs will see upgrade and more Yasens and Boreis will be built as well as the usual promises to build more SSK's.

    Air Force/Air Defense
    1. The A-100 program is funded.
    2. The A-60 laser program is funded and its primary mission is to f*ck up US BMD sensors and not any incoming missiles.
    3. Buk is going to be retired, and replaced with Vityaz SAM's.
    4. New standardized radars and AES systems are being developed to do away with the Soviet practice of inducting 20 different air defense and early warning radars. The current Krym system will be modernized while its replacement is in development.


    Of course it isn't perfect... the fire and forget all weather day/night seeker/guidance in testing for the Kornet will also be fitted to Krisantema according to the article...

    His comment about Vityaz replacing Buk is interesting. Calling the Vityaz an interservice system could just mean that both the Space and air defence force and the Navy will adopt it. Whether the army want to withdraw their Buk systems and replace them with Vityaz is not clear to me.

    Of course it would make sense as the 40km and 120km plus 10-15km 9M100 missiles of the Vityaz system would be doing the same job as Buk... mounted on the appropriate chassis there would be no mobility issue as the Armata chassis model Vityaz would have the same mobility as the other armata based vehicles in the unit, and the same for the Kurganets-25 and Boomerang based models.

    Reduced price sale for BUK systems in the near future? Backwards compatible with SA-6 is a feature.

    Maybe gift them to Serbia?

    Austin
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 5680
    Points : 6086
    Join date : 2010-05-08
    Age : 40
    Location : India

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Austin on Tue May 31, 2011 5:32 am

    First and formost he is posting my article without due acknowledgement from the website he has posted from .... just joking Laughing

    Coming back to the point of F&F yes they have been working on F&F kornet , I recollect reading some time in 2004 that they would like to develop a seeker for Kornet to give it F&F capability.

    On Vityaz replacing BUK its totally wrong , Vityaz will replace the S-300PM and early model PMU in the Russian Defence force , BUK M2E and BUK-M3 are very new mobile SP system and is here to stay for a long time , they both compliment each other.

    GarryB
    Colonel
    Colonel

    Posts : 15482
    Points : 16189
    Join date : 2010-03-30
    Location : New Zealand

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  GarryB on Wed Jun 01, 2011 6:17 am

    {quote]Coming back to the point of F&F yes they have been working on F&F kornet , I recollect reading some time in 2004 that they would like to develop a seeker for Kornet to give it F&F capability.[/quote]

    The fact that the same company that makes the Kornet also makes the Hermes which is also to be fitted with a range of terminal guidance seekers including IIR, MMW radar, and SALH, I would suspect a mix of guidance methods to be chosen. Not all targets can be fired upon using MMW radar or IIR alone as their signature compared to their background obviously has to make them stand out.

    A tank with its engine running will be an easy target for MMW and IIR, but with its engine off for long periods suddenly its IR signature is not so useful. A machine gun position in a window of a building is another difficult target as MMW will target the whole building and IIR might have many hotspots on the building it might lock on to that is not the target.

    Perhaps like Krisantema they might choose two or more guidance methods so that for any specific target one method will work.

    For a tank Krisantema can use MMW radar guidance, but to hit a window in a building it would use laser beam riding guidance as an alternative.

    On Vityaz replacing BUK its totally wrong , Vityaz will replace the S-300PM and early model PMU in the Russian Defence force , BUK M2E and BUK-M3 are very new mobile SP system and is here to stay for a long time , they both compliment each other.

    Yes, that is what I thought. BUK retained by Army and Vityaz can be adopted by Airforce, Airdefence, and Navy.

    But the more I think about it perhaps reducing the number of missiles types could be a good thing.

    The Buk is an evolution of Kub whose role is to provide mobile air defence for armour.
    One improvement of BUK over KUB was that the central radar of the KUB unit is supported by radars on each TEL vehicle in Buk so that if the central radar is taken out by ARMs then at least the TEL vehicles can still shoot down aircraft and are not defenseless like the KUB TELs.

    (Kub is better known in the west as SA-6, and Buk as SA-11 in the early version and SA-17 in the later model. TEL is transporter erector launcher... and is the vehicle that carries the missiles ready to launch and launches them.)

    Taking S-400 missiles in the two smaller versions, if they could be mounted in tracked vehicles with the mobility of the Buk and Kub with radars on the vehicles and ready to launch then perhaps they might be good replacements for Kub and Buk.

    Buk has a large warhead that would be very effective against a wide range of targets, but is quite large for its purpose. A vertical launch system with the smaller model S-400 with the smallest missile with a range of 40km is only 10km less than the best model Buk in service. (The best model in service is a 50km range weapon though there is talk of a new 75km range model).
    The point is that the larger of the smaller S-400 missiles has a range of 120km that easily outranges any known model of the Buk, the question is, is it possible to mount it in a vehicle in a vertical manner so it is ready to launch in any direction.

    The TOR system has relatively small missiles but they are mounted in a relatively bulky launch arrangement.

    I was thinking of the DT series of tracked carriers.

    Specifically the DT-10PM and the ST-30PM trailor... which are ironically upgraded versions of the Vityaz(Knight) series two unit carriers.

    Basically they are large box shaped vehicles, the front vehicle has a crew cabin in the front, and they are joined together by a hydraulic system that is fully articulated. Both section vehicles are amphibious and with the arm between them they can do things like climb up on floating pieces of ice by using the arm between them as leverage to lift the front section onto the ice and then drive the rear section up onto the again using the leverage of the other cab.

    A very neat vehicle.

    My point is that the rear cab is a large box shape that would be ideal for a vertical missile arrangement. The front box has the cabin in front, the large engine directly behind it and then a small area for cargo. The front vehicle can carry 10 tons of cargo, which should be plenty for a radar system and roof mounted AESA antenna and passive sensors like EO and ELINT for passive operation. The rear vehicle can carry 30 tons which should be plenty for a significant number of 120km, 40km and even Morfei (10-15 km range 9M100) missiles in ready to launch vertical arrangements.


    The vehicle itself is very mobile and is fully amphibious.

    http://www.bolotohod.ru/en/ecat1/ecat13/337.html

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vityaz_%28ATV%29

    Sponsored content

    Re: State Armaments Program 2011-2020

    Post  Sponsored content Today at 8:20 pm


      Current date/time is Fri Dec 09, 2016 8:20 pm