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    Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

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    Singular_Transform

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Singular_Transform on Sat Jul 08, 2017 10:13 am

    Actually, as I think about it the lack of passive X band illuminators controlled by the S band radar ( like on the aegis ships) showing that the Russian military is quite confident it can hit the stealth planes with the current configuration .

    Enera

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Enera on Sat Jul 08, 2017 11:51 am

    Either their ARH perform bad, or the illumination power of their engagement radars offer still more RF energy on target or there are other benefits for a SARH seekers.

    Assuming you're talking about S-400, the GRAVESTONE engagement radar offers higher energy and ECCM potential than what you can put on the missile. SARH is also cheaper than ARH but considering latest Russian AESA development, they're slowly getting there; some S-350 missiles use ARH now.

    In regards of bistatic SARH, I agree with Singular_Transform. S-400 will never act alone but a part in greater IADS. We can look at what's known on S-400 air defense regiment where they have three batteries and each battery have a GRAVESTONE radar to direct the TELs after getting initial data from BIG BIRD. So within S-400 itself, you have three (three, not one!) engagement radars that can look at the same target. One can emit while other two listen. It won't be a bistatic situation but a multi aspect one.

    The super VLO F-35 (or so they claim) can fool one GRAVESTONE but it won't be fooling the other two hidden and listening engagement radars. There is also BIG BIRD whereby by collaborating BIG BIRD track with GRAVESTONE, you can know you're dealing with a stealth bird as BIG BIRD gives high reading but the latter give low reading.

    This also didn't account for other assets that will support the S-400 like forward deployed Pantsir-S2, Tor-M2, Sturna bistatic early warning radar, Vega passive ELINT, A-50U AWACS and Nebo series complexes to provide additional sources of radar energy and observation from other directions that are not within the mythical low RCS, low aspect angle zone of the threat aircraft. Western experts only considered phantasmal one-on-one VLO engagement but the ugly truth is that, there won't be one GRAVESTONE or radar watching.

    By the way, it is technically impossible to have the same tiny X-band RCS in VHF as EM absorption quickly changes with lower frequency. I am pretty sure you are aware on why, thus reasoning posited by american stealth 'expert' is dead wrong. lol!

    I also read your post on keypub on your idea PeeD; it astounded me that they're mostly talking about one-to-one interception. Russian high level SAMs don't work one-to-one. They are straight up multi aspect, even within single operational SAM regiment. You can see the trend even with Buk-M 1 to 3 where every TEL have their own radars.

    That means they're prepared to deal on not only when their main engagement radar was taken out but also high confidence detection as you can learn more of the target when you see it from different directions. Granted this arrangement is very expensive when it's scaled up to S-400 level but even then they don't simply have one engagement radar but multiple. They are further supported by other radioelectronic units.
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    GarryB

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  GarryB on Sat Jul 08, 2017 12:50 pm

    It is probably more mundane than that.

    The ARH seeker on the R-77 was made in the Ukraine.

    ARH seekers are rather more expensive than SARH seekers.

    The Russians had three seeker types for AAMs... SARH, passive radar homing, and IR.

    The passive radar homing AAMs were not for ARM missions, they were for use against aircraft like the F-15 firing Sparrow missiles... once it has fired a Sparrow missile it need to illuminate the target to get a hit... that illumination beam is what the passive radar homing missile was guided to.

    It makes sense that the same type of guidance would allow a passive AAM to hit any active radar homing beam... whether from a fighter aircraft using SARH missiles or an ARH missile itself.

    Would that mean that modern BVR western AAMs and heavy SAMs are now vulnerable to 1980s Soviet AAMs like R-27EP and R-27P?

    (The R-27T and R-27ET being IR guided and R-27R and R-27ER being SARH models)

    I would suggest a new way forward would be command guided missiles... so instead of a radar beam directed at the target for the missile to home in on, a wider frequency  sensor suite with IIR and L band radar as fitted to the Su-35 could be used to precisely locate a stealth target and an X band or L band datalink via the main radars could be used to direct the missile to impact the target... no matter how stealthy it was in X band or any radar frequency.

    Both of the smaller S-400 missiles use ARH AFAIK.

    The 9M96 and 9M96D that will form part of the S-350 family are ARH.

    Granted this arrangement is very expensive when it's scaled up to S-400 level but even then they don't simply have one engagement radar but multiple. They are further supported by other radioelectronic units.

    An entire Integrated Air Defence Network to support the detection and interception... a layered system that uses sensors from man portable radars and optics up to satellites and over the horizon radar, and man portable missiles up to satellite killers...  Including Army, Navy, and Air Force systems together with Aerospace systems too.

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  PeeD on Sat Jul 08, 2017 11:21 pm

    We have to talk and think about X-band SARH guidance performance of "stealth" assets. We have two driving parameters on electromagnetic waves that can be perfected to various degrees, airframe deflection shaping and RAM/RAS absorption. Naturally we assume the worst case because X-band stealth is easier feasible and SARH systems are mostly operate in that band. So the suggested operation regime is not suggesting that it is even necessary against current threats F-35/-22/B-2 but for a scenario where X-band stealth performance is so high that illumination becomes ineffective.

    Singular_Transform, your passive illumination concept you say to be in use with the Aegis system would be the method I suggest to enable SARH illumination of a invisible target. I further suggest to additionally exploit the bi static seeker position to make use of deflected RF energy (caused by stealth shaping).
    I also think that such a operation mode could be already implemented in S-300PM/S-400 as there is no real hardware change necessary.
    I can even go further and ask if a, as you call it "passive illuminator" with no active receive function could work at a higher transmission power level.

    Singular_Transform and Enera, your concept of multiple CW illumination would proportionally increase the RF energy on the target. It is a valid point of course, more so because the illuminator is a electrical steered array that can almost instantly switch between targets. Such a operation mode should be built into the overall system. The multi-directional illumination should of course vastly improve the system performance.

    In total we have all this potential effects of SARH missiles which a ARH concept would lack. The most important effect could be the bi-static seeker position effect for deflected RF energy, but I seem to be the only one talking about this potential effect. Carlo Kopp of APA just went so for as to suggest command guidance based on Nebo-SVU position information.
    In my view this operation would be the lowest tier back-up mode --> "blind"/passive illumination the main method --> off-set bi-static seeker positioning to catch deflected RF energy the "stealth-relativising" effect (feasibility questioned) --> multiple, multiposition illumination the brute force final backup for successful engagement.

    I'm not a friend of command guidance, it should be only a back-up in modern systems.
    I suggest a hidden Soviet/Russian wisdom, not technology for the use of SARH systems. The S-350 could be ARH because it is lower tier than S-400 and has a mission such as the interception of cruise missiles in an over horizon mode, same as naval S-400.

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    Isos

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Isos on Sun Jul 09, 2017 6:49 pm

    http://theboresight.blogspot.fr/2016/07/the-end-of-primacy-russian-federation.html

    Rumors of a Russian Su-30 Sm detecting F-22 at more than 40km in Syria.
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    JohninMK

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  JohninMK on Sun Jul 09, 2017 8:11 pm

    Isos wrote:http://theboresight.blogspot.fr/2016/07/the-end-of-primacy-russian-federation.html

    Rumors of a Russian Su-30 Sm detecting F-22 at more than 40km in Syria.
    Interesting link but it stopped a year ago.
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    Singular_Transform

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Singular_Transform on Sun Jul 09, 2017 8:31 pm

    One S-400 regiment has three - four X band radar, one S (2HGz and bigger than AEGISSPY-1) radar .

    Means the three X band radar will give to the rocket passive seeker illumination from three different point.


    The S band radar OR a NEBO-M radar can direct the illuminators to the target.
    The X band radars can be used as pencil beam illuminators, working 100% duty cycle.


    The missile seeker head is closer to the target say ten times than the radars, means the stealth is quite useless even for passive mode rockets.
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    GarryB

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  GarryB on Tue Jul 11, 2017 5:52 am

    I'm not a friend of command guidance, it should be only a back-up in modern systems.

    Why?

    Command guidance is cheap and simple and very effective... the SA-15, SA-19 and SA-22 all use command guidance for cheap simple missiles that are accurate enough to hit small fast targets including air launched munitions.

    The lack of onboard guidance or sensors makes them vastly cheaper than any other type of weapon so they can be bought in enormous numbers and used widely... an important feature the west ignores.

    Most ATGMs operational around the world are command guided... regarding Russian missiles, the radio command guided AT-2, AT-6 (shturm), AT-9 (Ataka) and the command and laser beam riding Krisantema are all powerful air launched weapons, while the AT-3, AT-4, AT-5, AT-7, and AT-13 wire guided missiles use command guidance and are cheap and simple weapons, while the replacement long range Kornet and Kornet-EM use equally cheap laser beam riding guidance, but all are pretty much command controlled weapons.

    There is talk of an optically guided ATGM but so far that is just talk.

    Of course progress in IIR seekers and QWIP technology means a CCD based IIR sensor could come down in price to a few dollars each... making them cheap enough...

    You could have thousands of SA22 missiles with dumb command guidance for one active radar homing model. Sure you could fire off all your ARH missiles at once each at its own target but until it gets within lock on range you need to command direct the missiles to intercept points and continue to track their targets to make sure they make no serious course changes that would require the interception point to be recalculated... which means the 4 missiles the SA22 can fire at 4 different targets at once is almost as good but dramatically cheaper... in other words you can have 10 times more missiles and still save money... you can actually use a lot of missiles during training rather than use cheap training rounds...

    The sad fact is that many in the west see the Russians doing something different and don't appreciate the real reasons... they can afford more expensive active radar homing missiles... it just makes more sense to go with cheaper options... it is like Javelin... expensive thermal imager in a missile that is destroyed with every use... Metis-M1 has a thermal sight but super cheap missiles that is cheap enough to make thousands of systems...
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    miketheterrible

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  miketheterrible on Tue Jul 11, 2017 7:29 am

    most are worried that command guided are easy to jam simply because the command module can be jammed. Which could render the whole complex useless because 1 system is effectively jammed or destroyed.

    PeeD

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  PeeD on Tue Jul 11, 2017 8:22 am

    Russians use command radio guidance in systems which are short range. They are generally expected to be much less subject to jamming efforts as their normal enemies are cruise missiles and PGMs without EW capability. EW assets of the adversary will concentrate on the longer range systems threatening the carrier aircraft.

    None the less command guidance was last used in the earlier S-300P variants and we should expect a Russian wisdom behind this. Command guidance was surely deemed as too fragile. In Iran for example, export Tor-M1 were soon upgraded with a separate indigenous command guidance antenna/channel because the system was already compromised via the Greeks. However Iran is likely to be forces to use the Tor-M1 against carrier aircraft because the state of it's IADS, Russia on the other hand has a IADS where the Tor-M1 could easily never face a carrier aircraft, just CM/PGM.

    In my last point I counted the benefits of SARH/SAGG guidance plus a potential effect I think that exists. Neither ARH nor radio command guidance have those benefits for robustness.

    Singular_Transform described the brute force method in which 3 radars illuminate the stealth target and hope for a lock-on of the SARH seeker once radio command guidance (feed by Nebo-M position data) has got it close enough to the target. At one point there must be a burn trough. In general the S-400 should be simply to strong to even successfully jam its radio up-link channel to disrupt radio guidance with current EW systems. SARH/SAGG potentially also have higher discrimination capability and it simply gets better and better the more it closes to the target.
    The command link remains a potential weak spot, possible that the S-400 is by pure power strong enough to neglect that against current EW systems, but there must be a good reason why smaller/shorter ranged systems like the Buk family avoid it. If there is a bi-static effect against stealth as I described, the benefits of SARH/SAGG are even clearer.

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Enera on Tue Jul 11, 2017 3:28 pm

    PeeD wrote:Russians use command radio guidance in systems which are short range. They are generally expected to be much less subject to jamming efforts as their normal enemies are cruise missiles and PGMs without EW capability. EW assets of the adversary will concentrate on the longer range systems threatening the carrier aircraft.

    None the less command guidance was last used in the earlier S-300P variants and we should expect a Russian wisdom behind this. Command guidance was surely deemed as too fragile. In Iran for example, export Tor-M1 were soon upgraded with a separate indigenous command guidance antenna/channel because the system was already compromised via the Greeks. However Iran is likely to be forces to use the Tor-M1 against carrier aircraft because the state of it's IADS, Russia on the other hand has a IADS where the Tor-M1 could easily never face a carrier aircraft, just CM/PGM.

    In my last point I counted the benefits of SARH/SAGG guidance plus a potential effect I think that exists. Neither ARH nor radio command guidance have those benefits for robustness.

    Singular_Transform described the brute force method in which 3 radars illuminate the stealth target and hope for a lock-on of the SARH seeker once radio command guidance (feed by Nebo-M position data) has got it close enough to the target. At one point there must be a burn trough. In general the S-400 should be simply to strong to even successfully jam its radio up-link channel to disrupt radio guidance with current EW systems. SARH/SAGG potentially also have higher discrimination capability and it simply gets better and better the more it closes to the target.
    The command link remains a potential weak spot, possible that the S-400 is by pure power strong enough to neglect that against current EW systems, but there must be a good reason why smaller/shorter ranged systems like the Buk family avoid it. If there is a bi-static effect against stealth as I described, the benefits of SARH/SAGG are even clearer.

    I forgot to mention this;PeeD, you need to make an introduction thread in the http://www.russiadefence.net/f6-member-introductions-and-rules as it's a forum rule.

    I remember reading through RDF about command guidance. Command guidance is not easy to jam as you think since:-

    1) The command is done through a narrow beam link which makes signal intercept difficult.
    2) The missile would basically have its communication antenna to only look backward, to the command link device and ignore others coming from front. To disrupt this you need to be physically located between the missile and command device. By the time you're there (which is quite impossible if the missile is already on top of you), there are also short ranged defenses that can shoot you down.

    I'm not sure why you heavily advocate bistatic SARH, PeeD. It's basically a downgraded SAGG or TVM and Russians have something better, which is SAGG and GAS/GAI. The missile would come from the top so any 'stealth' the F-35 in your picture have would be less useful as the radar beam would be diffracted upward which the SAM can pick up. Then the missile can tell the X-band radar that the readings from early warning radar is correct where there is a stealth plane. The X-band radar can then give command to the missile to get as close as it can, depending if it's TVM or SAGG, relying on updates from the missile to roughly gauge the target's position.

    Depending on the guidance mode, the engagement radar don't even need to continuously illuminate the target for endgame but just a few pings to determine where is the target and set the optimum intercept solution. At the end of engagement, the X-band radar can do another brief signal but stronger so the missile knows precisely when and where to explode. As far as I know, S-300V operated that way where the intense CW is only done at endgame. No need to emit all the time since that will draw attention of HARMs.

    Again I stress that you need to see this as a multi-aspect situation; Russian SAMs never operate alone but a part of network. One radar can emit and others listen. The command vehicle can get extra info from the listeners and then help the emitting radar to adapt to the target. Assuming it as one-to-one engagement which I perceived from your bistatic SARH idea isn't correct at all. They're more complex than you think.

    ARH have its uses as you said, to intercept inbound cruise missiles. It can do fine for the job, the West don't have cruise missile as sophisticated as ancient P-700/1000 any time soon. For general work, ARH would be logically combined with command guidance.....which makes it a better version of SAGG since now the missile can know the target better as it can use LPI waveforms to burn through target's self protection jammers.

    Please don't discount ARH concept in general either since Russians already have AESA through Agat (http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Legacy-SAM-Upgrades.html#mozTocId705713) . While expensive than SARH, they can deal with advanced threats like Growler or an AWACS protected by DRFM jammers. If you want to know further on Russian SAM guidance methods, you can refer to http://stealthflanker.deviantart.com/journal/SAGG-TVM-and-GAI-Today-s-Modern-SAM-Guidance-335340027 . Majority of Soviet/Russian SAMs have datalink so even if the missile terminal guidance is broken for some reason, they can still fall back to command guidance through datalink if within LOS. At the time of S-300P creation, it have command guidance because it was the cheapest to apply. Appearance of Growlers and decoys in Iraqi wars provided impetus to further develop the system to include TVM and then SAGG; technology improvement didn't happen overnight.


    Last edited by Enera on Tue Jul 11, 2017 3:46 pm; edited 4 times in total (Reason for editing : removed some sentences)

    PeeD

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  PeeD on Tue Jul 11, 2017 5:48 pm

    @Enera

    I neither do think that radio command guidance is easy to jam nor is my view on TVM/SAGG simplistic. The question is whether SAGG or radio command guidance is more robust. The former is more redundant and in total more robust (also more than ARH imo)

    My bi-static effect is perfectly in line with SAGG+GAI, it's just a effect which occurs against stealth targets that I predict.
    I have some doubts on the amount of RF energy scattered to the upper hemisphere due to stealth designs. They are basically divided in the horizontal plane (well visible by the radome). Hence it is possible that a great amount of RF energy is scattered downwards below the aircraft (but away from the emitter), leaving less for the top attacking SARH seeker. However this is a general problem, a bi-static engagement would work in top attack and in a below-attack maneuver.

    GAI and illumination just in the last seconds is a given, any modern system with SARH method must have it otherwise no energy optimized trajectory can be flown etc.

    To make it clear: this is a adverse condition analysis with a stealth target with the best physically possible shaping and RAM. I never claimed the use of a bi-static effect is necessary for the F-35/-22/B-2. The same adverse condition approach let me ignore the rest of the IADS network, just the S-300PM-S-400 battery and a Nebo-M should be sufficient for the scenario.

    SAGG was no response to Prowlers over Iraq'91. I highly doubt special waveforms of a small ARH seeker is in any form superior in an EW environment than a high power, potentially multiple position illumination, and SAGG system to ranges of up to 300km.

    PS: You linked a article by stealthflanker, if yourself are stealthflanker I have a interesting information for you. Let me know.

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Enera on Wed Jul 12, 2017 1:45 am

    PeeD wrote:@Enera

    I neither do think that radio command guidance is easy to jam nor is my view on TVM/SAGG simplistic. The question is whether SAGG or radio command guidance is more robust. The former is more redundant and in total more robust (also more than ARH imo)

    Well of course SAGG will be more robust but you need to see this in cost effective terms like GarryB explained; there are tools for specific situations. I already put my conjecture that command guidance was initially used in S-300P because it's the cheapest to do. At that time I doubt USSR have enough money and it was the shortest way to get the complex to service.

    PeeD wrote:My bi-static effect is perfectly in line with SAGG+GAI, it's just a effect which occurs against stealth targets that I predict.


    Okay. So I'm not sure what's to be discussed because it looked like you were trying to push a new concept? SARH missiles would home into scattered RF energy from the engagement radar's beam regardless so it's non-sequitur.

    PeeD wrote:I have some doubts on the amount of RF energy scattered to the upper hemisphere due to stealth designs. They are basically divided in the horizontal plane (well visible by the radome). Hence it is possible that a great amount of RF energy is scattered downwards below the aircraft (but away from the emitter), leaving less for the top attacking SARH seeker. However this is a general problem, a bi-static engagement would work in top attack and in a below-attack maneuver.

    It doesn't matter for Soviet/Russian SAMs as they're linked to each other and have lots of supporting listeners. Even if the engagement radar and/or the missile can't catch enough RF energy deflected by the target, other linked equipment can help advice them both on where the target is.

    PeeD wrote:GAI and illumination just in the last seconds is a given, any modern system with SARH method must have it otherwise no energy optimized trajectory can be flown etc.

    No comment.

    PeeD wrote:To make it clear: this is a adverse condition analysis with a stealth target with the best physically possible shaping and RAM. I never claimed the use of a bi-static effect is necessary for the F-35/-22/B-2. The same adverse condition approach let me ignore the rest of the IADS network, just the S-300PM-S-400 battery and a Nebo-M should be sufficient for the scenario.

    No, you can't ignore the rest of the IADS. The SAM complexes are specifically built to work together in a big ecosystem. You can make it singular case all you want but the way Russian SAMs work is that they become world's best by integration and networking with other systems at deep level. Remove that and you will have something resembling a slightly better Western SAM system. It would be by far, a decade more advanced than any Western system however.

    PeeD wrote:SAGG was no response to Prowlers over Iraq'91. I highly doubt special waveforms of a small ARH seeker is in any form superior in an EW environment than a high power, potentially multiple position illumination, and SAGG system to ranges of up to 300km.

    Different situation calls for different tools. SAGG can work with ARH too because SAGG is just that the missile and engagement radar work out an intercept solution. The missile can gain information from either the RF energy of the radar scattered by the target (SARH) or the missile actively detect the target (ARH) before committing to SAGG. Of course ARH would be the future because the missile is closer to the target than the engagement radar.

    The target then need to deal with two kinds of RF source; the engagement radar and the missile seeker. If it tries to jam either one, the ADMS can triangulate where is exactly the target. If it wanted to jam both, it will be forced to distribute jamming power between the two, enabling both the radar and missile figure out they're being jammed because the jamming signal will be weaker.

    PeeD wrote:PS: You linked a article by stealthflanker, if yourself are stealthflanker I have a interesting information for you. Let me know.

    No, I'm not stealthflanker. stealthflanker is a member of RDF. No

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  PeeD on Wed Jul 12, 2017 1:26 pm

    @Enera

    So I'm not sure what's to be discussed because it looked like you were trying to push a new concept? SARH missiles would home into scattered RF energy from the engagement radar's beam regardless so it's non-sequitur.

    It's not a new concept. It is a effect that I have not seen anyone mentioning. The trajectory can be optimized to exploit that effect.

    It doesn't matter for Soviet/Russian SAMs as they're linked to each other and have lots of supporting listeners. Even if the engagement radar and/or the missile can't catch enough RF energy deflected by the target, other linked equipment can help advice them both on where the target is.

    We talk here about a SAGG/SARH engagement, just knowing position would force the system to work in radio command guidance mode (which accuracy at 200km+ could be questioned). If a stealth design scatters 90% of illumination RF energy below the aircraft, a top attack trajectory could be inefficient. A "dive --> climb" engagement trajectory would be a solution to that problem if kinematic reserves are sufficient. In such a operation regime the bi-static seeker angle could be optimized to go for stealth design scattered RF-energy

    No, you can't ignore the rest of the IADS. The SAM complexes are specifically built to work together in a big ecosystem. You can make it singular case all you want but the way Russian SAMs work is that they become world's best by integration and networking with other systems at deep level. Remove that and you will have something resembling a slightly better Western SAM system. It would be by far, a decade more advanced than any Western system however.

    Sure it is integrated. Point is, if my prediction of the bi-static effect is true, shaping stealth can be countered by a S-300PM+Nebo-M only, without any hardware change (potentially already there). So for a analysis of the case all other systems can be excluded.


    Different situation calls for different tools. SAGG can work with ARH too because SAGG is just that the missile and engagement radar work out an intercept solution. The missile can gain information from either the RF energy of the radar scattered by the target (SARH) or the missile actively detect the target (ARH) before committing to SAGG. Of course ARH would be the future because the missile is closer to the target than the engagement radar.

    The target then need to deal with two kinds of RF source; the engagement radar and the missile seeker. If it tries to jam either one, the ADMS can triangulate where is exactly the target. If it wanted to jam both, it will be forced to distribute jamming power between the two, enabling both the radar and missile figure out they're being jammed because the jamming signal will be weaker.

    There is a certain envelope where SARH/SAGG will always be superior to ARH and a limit at which ARH becomes stronger than SARH illumination.
    So no, ARH would not be the future. With a aperture size and power output of a S-300PM it is well possible that at up to 200km it is literally always stronger than ARH in terms of on-target RF energy. It's RF source is also 200km away which makes jamming harder.

    ARH RF-energy is always limited to SAM diameter/battery power and even with a GaN AESA aperture its power will only be superior to a S-300PM class system at a long range. So it's about envelopes and yes at some range, ARH becomes certainly better than SAGG/SARH.

    The future could be a hybrid ARH seeker that works with own illumination at very long ranges or over horizon engagements and goes for SARH in cases of jamming and stealth targets. Against stealth targets the multi radar illumination could proportionally increase RF-energy for the SARH seeker and/or the proposed bi-static effect neglect shaping stealth.

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  PeeD on Tue Jul 25, 2017 4:12 pm

    About the topic. The stealth asset I have the biggest respect of is the B-2.

    Reason is that I find it convincing that its bottom surface area is smooth almost monolithic with feature sizes large than metric VHF-band wavelenght. All its features like cockpit, intakes and exhaust are on the upper half.

    If we exclude assets like space based sensors, OTH radars, AEW aircraft and high performance long range high altitude interceptors like the Mig-31 and only consider ground based assets, we might have troubles with it. Such a scenario is not unlikely in a nuclear war where static assets like airfields and OTH radars are not operational anymore.

    Mindstorm posted very useful professional analysis of stealth asset RCS estimation. But in the mentioned scenario a horizontal RCS would not be representative. At operationally relevant angles of ground based radars, the upper, half of the B-2 with the smaller feature sizes could be completely blocked.

    There are still plenty other sensors left such as IIR with emerging performance levels, "radar traps" such as the Barrier series and the complete passive and ESM/ELINT world.

    However it's the large B-2 which could neglect the benefits of VHF-band systems. A Nebo-M could have just small range penalty against F-22/-35 and -117 stealth, mainly due to the VFH asset of the system but a much larger penalty against the B-2.
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    GarryB

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  GarryB on Thu Jul 27, 2017 11:20 am

    The problem for the B-2 is that in a fight against Russia it is primarily a first strike weapon and would therefore have to penetrate an active air defence network... most of the OTH radars would pick it up... the Aussie OTH network supposedly picked them up too.


    Obviously its other problem is that if it is intercepted by pretty much anything from an armed Yak-130 through to MiG-31 it really has no defence or escape... even an Su-25 could shoot it down.

    I am not that convinced it is that safe from IR systems (sensors or missiles) as it was easily tracked by a Rapier unit at Farnborough in the 1990s.

    PeeD

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  PeeD on Thu Jul 27, 2017 12:00 pm

    A possible counter-VHF effect due to size/feature size for the B-2 would also explain why the Americans went for the B-21.

    I'm aware that OTH radars can detect B-2 size shaping stealth, at least HF wavelength has no potential feature size effect in the same way VHF has no problems with smaller feature sizes of F-22/-35/-117.

    However the problem with OTH radars is that they are static. A massive saturation attack by Tomahawks up to nuclear ballistic missile attacks could take these vital systems off. This is the nature of any static, large system, it's survivability is limited and in a serious conflict you just try to keep it alive as long as possible. We all know how potent the Russian IADS is, but here the determination of the opponent counts, if it is ready to spend 300-600-1000 Tomahawks for a single vital object, there isn't much that can be done. Furthermore there are limitations in scan rate and 360° coverage with OTH radars.

    IR spectrum is another way but with the assumed cooling and sub-sonic speed, the ranges should be limited to 100km for cost effective TI sensors.

    Maybe I overestimate the feature-size wavelength problem of the B-2 and e.g the gaps between the control surfaced are sufficient for VHF-band scattering. But maybe it has a stealth operation regime that makes it effective against VHF-band and hence the decision for the B-21.
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    Singular_Transform

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Singular_Transform on Thu Jul 27, 2017 9:20 pm

    PeeD wrote:A possible counter-VHF effect due to size/feature size for the B-2 would also explain why the Americans went for the B-21.

    I'm aware that OTH radars can detect B-2 size shaping stealth, at least HF wavelength has no potential feature size effect in the same way VHF has no problems with smaller feature sizes of F-22/-35/-117.

    However the problem with OTH radars is that they are static. A massive saturation attack by Tomahawks up to nuclear ballistic missile attacks could take these vital systems off. This is the nature of any static, large system, it's survivability is limited and in a serious conflict you just try to keep it alive as long as possible. We all know how potent the Russian IADS is, but here the determination of the opponent counts, if it is ready to spend 300-600-1000 Tomahawks for a single vital object, there isn't much that can be done. Furthermore there are limitations in scan rate and 360° coverage with OTH radars.

    IR spectrum is another way but with the assumed cooling and sub-sonic speed, the ranges should be limited to 100km for cost effective TI sensors.

    Maybe I overestimate the feature-size wavelength problem of the B-2 and e.g the gaps between the control surfaced are sufficient for VHF-band scattering. But maybe it has a stealth operation regime that makes it effective against VHF-band and hence the decision for the B-21.

    The Nebo-m can detect the B2.

    It needs to be several times bigger to be invisible.

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    GarryB

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  GarryB on Sat Jul 29, 2017 9:01 am

    There is only one reason to try to take down Russias OTH radar network so any attempt to launch anything at them would likely result in TOPOLS and SATANs and YARs etc stretching their legs... hardly the best way to start a first strike...

    The new photonic radars they are working on could change everything...

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Erlindur on Sat Jul 29, 2017 2:28 pm

    I've been wondering about something for a while now and I think this is a nice place to ask. My last encounter with electromagnetic wave physics was back in my university days, decades back and I do not have the will to look them up again, so sorry in advance if what I ask is stupid.

    OK, I have an X-band radar with a very narrow beam. Instead of simply sending pulses with it, I preform a typical amplitude modulation on them with a frequency of UHF or even VHF wavelengths. No matter what happens to the x-band carrier (due to stealth shape), wouldn't I get back the low frequency harmonic, provided I have an appropriate receiver listening? If my beam is narrow enough, maybe it is possible to get enough data for detection or even tracking, just by using its position when I get the harmonic back.

    Do you think something like that could work?
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    Singular_Transform

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Singular_Transform on Sun Jul 30, 2017 2:32 pm

    Erlindur wrote:I've been wondering about something for a while now and I think this is a nice place to ask. My last encounter with electromagnetic wave physics was back in my university days, decades back and I do not have the will to look them up again, so sorry in advance if what I ask is stupid.

    OK, I have an X-band radar with a very narrow beam. Instead of simply sending pulses with it, I preform a typical amplitude modulation on them with a frequency of UHF or even VHF wavelengths. No matter what happens to the x-band carrier (due to stealth shape), wouldn't I get back the low frequency harmonic, provided I have an appropriate receiver listening? If my beam is narrow enough, maybe it is possible to get enough data for detection or even tracking, just by using its position when I get the harmonic back.

    Do you think something like that could work?
    Nothing prevent from you to do that ,but it won't make any benefit.


    First, the transmitter will be very expensive.
    Second, the low frequency signal won't match the resonant frequency of the phased array, means that in good case it will have no directional amplification .Bad case it will burn out the transmitter.


    And the returning signal won't have any amplification as well.


    The antennas works only with very close frequencies, say a 100 mhz antenna will works well with +/- 10 mhz
    A very high frequency antenna , like a 10000 mhz one will works well with +/-100 mhz frequency.

    It can works with wide band as well, but the amplification will be smaller at the edge.

    The data rate proportional to the frequency, say a 10 MHz means 10 megabyte .

    So, if you want to deliver a 100 mhz signal with a 10 GHz transmitter then it has to have 10 Gbyte bandwidth, and the 100 mhz will be so out from the resonant frequency it won't receive any signal at all practically.

    http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/solutions/Enterprise/Borderless_Networks/Unified_Access/CMX/CMX_RFOpFreqDataRates.pdf
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandwidth_(signal_processing)

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    Re: Is Russia safe from F-22 and Β-2?

    Post  Erlindur on Sun Jul 30, 2017 5:26 pm

    Yeah you are right but I was thinking a slightly different scenario. First not a phased array radar. I guess the math would be way too complicated. Maybe use one typical older generation conventional system.

    Second, I wouldn't dream of trying to get the reflection with the same hardware, that is why I said "provided I have an appropriate receiver listening". I was thinking about a separate receiver antenna (of the appropriate length) for the returning harmonic. One with its own circuit to amplify and analyze it and send the results back to the main radar's cpu. I only want it to work as a trigger confirming that we got a return.




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