GarryB wrote:You have to set targets... that is how you work your way towards goals.
It also means you can measure progress and identify problems.

The problem is that some see plans as set in stone and think a plan has failed if things need to be shifted or changed, or a deadline is not met.

Vladimir79 wrote: The draft law was reduced to 12 months because 200,000 were dodging the draft per year. Now it is down to 24,000.

ekacipta021292 wrote:

Anyway, will the VMF get the PAK-FA anytime soon?

How about the Interior troops? Are they based on conscripts?

Turning now to Russia, where its leaders are pursuing a more cooperative approach to relations with the United States and the West and are seeking access to foreign investment, technology, and markets. An example of cooperation is Moscow’s willingness to permit supplies to pass through Russia to Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Russia also voted for a fourth round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran and canceled Iran’s SA-20 contract, but it still opposes unilateral U.S. or EU sanctions and will work with Iran in areas not subject to sanctions, including support for the nuclear power plant at Bushehr.

Moscow has concerns about how long the positive trend in U.S.-Russian relations will last. Moscow sees the New START agreement as a key element of the evolving bilateral relationship. However, Moscow worries that U.S. policy will become more confrontational. Other concerns are U.S. military assistance to Georgia and plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe as part of the Phased Adaptive Approach. Moscow’s foreign policy pronouncements may increasingly reflect political posturing in advance of Russia’s December 2011 parliamentary election and March 2012 presidential election.

The Russian military’s most comprehensive reform since World War II continues. The goal is to create more agile, modern, and capable forces. General purpose forces will be smaller, more mobile, and combat ready. They will be better suited to respond to threats along Russia’s periphery, win local conflicts, and quickly end regional wars. Russia will rely on its robust nuclear arsenal to deter and, if necessary, engage in larger regional or worldwide conflicts.

Russia has moved from division- to brigade-centric ground forces, disbanded most of its Soviet-era mobilization reserve structure, and consolidated air force units. To better control general purpose forces in regional conflicts, it has formed the first peacetime joint strategic commands – West, East, South, and Center.

Moscow’s 10-year modernization plan is a top priority for the armed forces. Defense-related spending probably will increase in 2011 by 9.2 percent in real terms to $72.9 billion. The 2011-2020 State Armament Program aims to spend about $630 billion with substantial increases for new weapons. Currently, the level of modern equipment in service is 10 percent; Moscow wants to increase it to 30 percent by 2015 and 70 percent by 2020. We assess that competing demands to sell arms abroad, Russia’s aging industrial base, lack of resources plus corruption and mismanagement most likely will keep modern equipment below those levels.

New equipment for the general purpose forces will begin to increase in 2011, but deliveries will be small and Soviet-era weapons will remain the standard. Russia also will buy selected foreign systems, such as France’s Mistral amphibious assault ship, and will integrate foreign technology and sustain joint production programs.

Russia is upgrading massive underground facilities that provide command and control of its strategic nuclear forces as well as modernizing strategic nuclear forces as another top priority. Russia will field more SS-27/Topol-M road-mobile ICBMs and SS-27 Mod-X-2 (RS-24) MIRVed ICBMs. It also will continue development of the Dolgorukiy/SS-NX-32 Bulava SSBN/SLBM and next-generation Air Launched Cruise Missiles.

Russia already has formidable space and counterspace capabilities and is improving its navigation, communications, ballistic missile launch detection, and intelligence-gathering satellites. It has extensive systems for space surveillance and tracking and others with inherent counterspace applications, such as satellite-tracking laser rangefinders. Russia is researching or expanding directed-energy and signal jamming capabilities that could target satellites.

Military readiness is generally increasing in Russia’s new units, but demographic trends will complicate efforts to fill the ranks adequately. Programs to build a professional military stalled because they are expensive and Moscow’s current priority is rearmament.

We assess that competing demands to sell arms abroad, Russia’s aging
industrial base, lack of resources plus corruption and mismanagement
most likely will keep modern equipment below those levels.